2008 (7) TMI 876 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Whether coal ash is a part of cinder and covered by the term coal in entry No. 22 in Part V of Schedule II of the Commercial Tax Act or the said commodity would be taxable under entry 39 in Part IV ? Held that - The coal ash is cinder and covered by the term coal in entry No. 22 in Part V of Schedule II of the Commercial Tax Act and therefore it is not exigible to tax under entry No. 39 in Part IV. The corresponding entry in the repealed Act shall be construed accordingly in relation to the matters pending under the said Act. We are of the considered view that the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this High Court in Hukumchand Mills 1987 (8) TMI 414 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT is de hors the earlier decisions and the finding has been arrived at without the cogent and relevant material being on record of that case. Under these circumstances we find ourselves unable to subscribe to the view expressed therein with regard to cinder (coal ash) being a different commodity from its parent coal. The said decision is accordingly overruled only insofar as it holds that cinder is not coal.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether coal ash is a part of cinder and covered by the term 'coal' in entry No. 22 in Part V of Schedule II of the Commercial Tax Act or taxable under entry 39 in Part IV.
2. Interpretation of fiscal statutes and the classification of goods under specific or residuary entries.
3. The applicability of previous judicial decisions and their relevance to the current case.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Classification of Coal Ash:
The primary issue was whether coal ash falls under the term 'coal' in entry No. 22 in Part V of Schedule II of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994, or if it should be taxed under the residuary entry 39 in Part IV. The court noted that the Division Bench had referred this question to a larger Bench due to conflicting opinions in previous decisions. The respondent, a trader in coal ash, argued that coal ash, derived from partly burnt coal, should be taxed at the same rate as coal. The Commissioner had previously ruled that coal ash did not fall under the term 'coal' and was taxable under the residuary entry. However, the court found that coal ash retains the properties of coal and should be classified under entry 22 as 'coal.'

2. Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes:
The court emphasized the importance of strict interpretation of fiscal statutes, as established by the Supreme Court in various decisions. It was noted that a taxing statute should be construed strictly, and the terms used should be interpreted in their literal sense unless there is an apparent ambiguity. The court referred to several Supreme Court cases, including Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd. and A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, which highlighted that the liability to tax must be determined by the strict letter of the law.

3. Applicability of Previous Judicial Decisions:
The court examined previous decisions, including Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax and other relevant cases. It was observed that the Full Bench decision in Hukumchand Mills did not consider earlier decisions that treated coal ash as part of coal. The court also referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, which held that the term 'coal' should be understood in its popular and commercial sense, including charcoal and cinder. The court concluded that the earlier decisions, which treated coal ash as part of coal, were correct and that the Full Bench decision in Hukumchand Mills was not applicable in this context.

Conclusion:
The court held that coal ash is indeed 'cinder' and falls under the term 'coal' in entry No. 22 in Part V of Schedule II of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act. Consequently, it is not taxable under the residuary entry 39 in Part IV. The court overruled the decision in Hukumchand Mills insofar as it held that cinder is not coal and upheld the decisions of the learned single judge in W.P. No. 262 of 1998 and W.P. No. 1169 of 2004. The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.