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2015 (2) TMI 1374 - HC - Indian LawsCondonation of delay in filing appeal - whether by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Tribunal can condone the delay, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he was prevented by sufficient cause in not preferring the application for review within the prescribed period of limitation? - HELD THAT:- On a cursory perusal of Section 22 of the Act it is vivid and luminescent that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. For the purpose of discharging its functions under the Act, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure while trying a suit in respect of the matter enumerated in clause (f) of sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Act. The Tribunal while entertaining an application for review, is conferred with the same power as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that is to say for the purpose of entertaining an application for review, the Tribunal in our view acts as a Civil Court and is conferred to exercise all powers as are vested in a Civil Court - On a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is evident that the prescribed period of limitation can be extended if Court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the period of limitation. In INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPN. OF INDIA VERSUS GRAPCO INDUSTRIES LTD. [1999 (5) TMI 613 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court, while dealing with Section 22 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 which is pari materia with the Section 22(3) of the Act, held that Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 also confers power on the Tribunal to travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and only fetter that is put on its power is to observe the principles of natural justice. The provision regarding period of limitation provided in Rule 17 howsoever peremptory or imperative the language may be, is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the language of Rule 17 is mandatory and compulsive, in that, it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed. But the same is the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section of the Act in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. The logical sequitur on the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs is that neither Section 22 of the Act nor Rule 17 of the Rules expressly excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the event an application for review is filed beyond the period of limitation along with an application for condonation of delay and the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an application within the time, the Tribunal can condone the delay. The reference is answered accordingly. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the assigned Bench.
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