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2022 (6) TMI 164 - HC - Money LaunderingGrant of statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. - time limitation of 60 days expired - Money Laundering - diversion of large-scale clients funds through shell companies which resulted in huge losses to the investors - misuse of shell companies created by KSBL - HELD THAT:- Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. obligates the investigative agencies to complete the investigation in a time bound manner. The object behind incorporating a time limit to complete investigation was explained by a full bench of the Supreme Court in M. RAVINDRAN VERSUS THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE INTELLIGENCE [2020 (10) TMI 1105 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that Once the accused files an application for bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have ‘availed of’ or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), CrPC read with Section 36A (4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency. From the above decision, it is clear that a time limit for completing investigation was incorporated in order to ensure that the accused does not languish in jail for the investigative authority’s failure to complete investigation. It was held that the right to statutory bail accrues on a person if the charge sheet is not filed within the prescribed period of sixty days. The said right to bail is indefeasible and is interlinked with personal liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The complaint filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA is similar to a charge sheet/ final report filed under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. In other words, similar to a charge sheet under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C., a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA is filed after completion of investigation, so that the Special Court can take cognizance under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. It is relevant to note that the filing of the complaint and subsequent cognizance under PMLA is governed by the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in view of Section 65 of the Cr.P.C. - In the present case, the Respondent contended that a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA was already filed on 19.03.2022. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled for statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. This Court cannot accept the contention of the Respondent as the investigation was not completed when the complaint dated 19.03.2022 was filed. A perusal of the impugned order dated 08.04.2022 indicates that the Designated Court has returned the application dated 31.03.2022 seeking extension of remand and the bail application dated 01.04.2022. According to this Court, the Designated Court has no power to return the said applications. This Court in DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTED BY ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR HYDERABAD ZONAL UNIT VERSUS KAMMA SRINIVASA RAO, KANCHERLA SRIHARI BABU [2022 (2) TMI 1011 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT] has held that it is incumbent on the Designated Court to pass a reasoned order and not merely return the applications. Neither the Cr.P.C. nor the PMLA contemplates any provision which empowers the Designated Court to return applications seeking remand or applications seeking bail. The Petitioner herein is entitled for statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. - Petition allowed.
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