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2022 (10) TMI 807 - HC - Money LaunderingAttachment of property - eviction notice provides only ten days time to the petitioner to vacate the subject property - Entitlement to take possession of the property attached under Section 5 or frozen under Sub Section 1-A of Section 17 of PMLA - requirement of serving ten days notice under Rule 5(2) of the Rules of 2013 or should wait for ten days after the expiry of 45 days period prescribed for filing appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the order of Adjudicating Authority confirming the attachment of the property made under Sub Section 1 of Section 5 or retention of property or record seized or frozen under Section 17 or 18? HELD THAT:- There are no absurdity or incongruity between Section 8 and Section 26 of the Act of 2002. Section 8(4) of the Act of 2002 clearly provides that the authorized officer can forthwith take over possession of the attached property once the order of provisional attachment is confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The expression “forthwith” used in Section 8(4) of the Act of 2002 denotes clear intention of the legislature not to wait for the period of limitation prescribed for filing of appeal under Section 26 of the Act of 2002. Rule 5(2) of the Rules of 2013, however, relaxes the mandate of word “forthwith” by providing for issuance of ten days notice to the owner/occupier of the attached property. The person aggrieved by the order of confirmation of provisional attachment made by the Adjudicating Authority is well within his/her right to file appeal under Section 26 of the Act of 2002 within this period of ten days and may persuade the Appellate Authority to intervene in the matter - One may not come across any legislation where the effect and operation of decree, judgment or order is deferred till the expiry of period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal or revision against such decree, order or judgment, as the case may be. One would rarely find a provision of automatic stay of decree, order or judgment appealable or revisable before higher forum or authority till the aggrieved person avails the remedy before such forum. It is true that in some circumstances or in a given case, ten days time available to the aggrieved person to approach the Appellate Tribunal by way of an appeal may seem to be a bit short of reasonable time, yet this Court cannot in the disguise of interpretative process substitute “ten days” time given under Rules 5(2) of the Rules of 2013 and the expression “forthwith” used in Section 8(4) of the Act of 2002 by “forty five (45) days” or (fifty five (55) days”, as is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Notwithstanding the fact that in some cases ten days time prescribed for taking possession of the attached property may result into harsh results but this Court cannot help, more particularly, when the Supreme Court has already upheld the vires of Section 8(4) of the Act of 2002 and has not found fault with any of the provisions of the Act of 2002 and the Rules framed thereunder. It is, thus, trite that principle of statutory interpretation that legislature is presumed to be careful in choice of language is well founded. First and primary Rule of construction, which is also known as literal rule of interpretation, is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used in the Statute are plain, clear, unambiguous and capable of only one construction then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction would make the Statute more consistent with its object and policy - Even if there is a defect or omission in the Statute the Court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission. It is only in certain set of circumstances when the language of the Statute is not clear, ambiguous and throws up absurd results, the resort can be had to the principles of statutory interpretation to construe such statute. The domains of “reading into” and “reading down” the Statute may come into play. It is not found that this Court is required to resort to the principles of statutory interpretation to construe and understand the otherwise plain, clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 8 of the Act of 2002 and the Rule 5(2) of the Rules of 2013 whatever be the difficulty and whatever be the consequences, the provisions of Section 8(4) of the Act of 2013 read with Rule 5(2) of the Rules of 2013 are required to be given effect to so long as these provisions exist on the Statute - petition dismissed.
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