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The core legal questions considered in this judgment revolve around the limitation period applicable to prosecuting retired government servants for offences allegedly committed during their service or re-employment. Specifically, the Court examined whether criminal proceedings can be instituted against a pensioner beyond a four-year period from the date of the alleged offence, as prescribed under Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules (CSR), Volume-II, and whether such limitation bars prosecution entirely or only affects pensionary benefits. Additionally, the Court addressed the interplay between the CSR limitation rule and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the constitutional and legislative validity of the CSR rule imposing limitation on prosecution.
One principal issue considered was the interpretation and scope of Rule 2.2(b) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, which states that no judicial proceedings shall be instituted against a pensioner for misconduct or negligence more than four years after the event giving rise to the cause of action. The Court analyzed whether this limitation applies solely to pensionary consequences or also bars criminal prosecution itself. Another issue was whether the Prevention of Corruption Act, which does not prescribe any limitation period for prosecution, overrides the limitation prescribed by the CSR, or whether the limitation under CSR is a valid legislative restriction on prosecution. The Court also considered the implications of constitutional provisions regarding the legislative power of the Governor under Article 309 and the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254. Lastly, the Court examined relevant precedents on the quashing of stale prosecutions and the principles underlying limitation in criminal proceedings, particularly in cases involving public servants and corruption. Regarding the interpretation of Rule 2.2(b) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, the Court noted that the rule is located in the chapter concerning pensions and provides that the Government reserves the right to withhold or withdraw pension if a pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during service or re-employment. Crucially, the rule stipulates that no judicial proceedings shall be instituted if more than four years have elapsed since the event giving rise to the cause of action. The Court emphasized that the rule defines "judicial proceeding" to include the date on which a complaint or police report is made, marking the institution of criminal proceedings. The Court reasoned that the plain language of the rule imposes a bar on the institution of criminal proceedings beyond the four-year period, regardless of whether the officer is in service, retired, or re-employed. The rule thus operates as a limitation on prosecution itself, not merely on pensionary consequences. The Court rejected the special Judge's narrow interpretation that the limitation was only meant to regulate pension withholding and did not affect the power of the Court to try offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In assessing the legislative character of the CSR rule, the Court referred to authoritative Supreme Court pronouncements affirming that rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution possess legislative force. The Governor's power to make such rules is a legislative power akin to that exercised under Article 213 to promulgate ordinances. Therefore, Rule 2.2 is a valid legislative enactment with the force of law. The Court observed that the rule serves a dual purpose: it protects the pensioner from indefinite threat of prosecution for past misconduct and simultaneously preserves the Government's right to withhold pension if timely proceedings establish guilt. The limitation period ensures finality and repose for pensioners, balancing the public interest in prosecuting corruption with fairness to the accused. Addressing the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Court noted that while the Act does not prescribe any limitation period, criminal trials under it are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and any applicable special laws. The Code itself recognizes the applicability of special laws, including limitation provisions. The Court held that the limitation under the CSR rule does not conflict with the Prevention of Corruption Act, as limitation bars the remedy (prosecution) but does not extinguish the right or the offence itself. Thus, there is no repugnancy or constitutional infirmity in applying the CSR limitation to bar prosecution after four years. The Court distinguished the cited precedents on repugnancy under Article 254, finding them inapplicable because the CSR rule is a valid legislative rule under Article 309 and does not contradict any central law but rather complements procedural aspects of prosecution. On the question of delay and prejudice, the Court referred to established case law where superior courts have quashed prosecutions launched after undue delay, emphasizing the importance of timely prosecution for fair trial and justice. The Court noted that the petitioner was found in possession of disproportionate assets in 1975, but prosecution was initiated only in 1984, more than eight years later and four years after retirement. The Court highlighted the practical difficulties in defending a case after such delay, including the fading memory of witnesses and the accused, especially in offences under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, where the accused must satisfactorily explain sources of assets. The Court noted that the petitioner, then aged 64, would be seriously prejudiced by a protracted trial at such an advanced age. The Court thus found the delayed prosecution to be an abuse of process and prejudicial to the accused's right to a fair trial. Weighing all these factors, the Court concluded that the limitation prescribed under Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules bars the institution of criminal proceedings after four years from the date of the offence and that the delayed prosecution against the petitioner was liable to be quashed. The Court held that the rule's limitation applies equally to prosecution and pensionary consequences, and that the prosecution initiated more than four years after the offence and after retirement was barred. Significant holdings include the Court's clear statement that Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules is a legislative enactment with the force of law, imposing a four-year limitation period on instituting judicial proceedings against pensioners for grave misconduct or negligence during service or re-employment. The Court held that this limitation bars criminal prosecution if instituted after the prescribed period, not merely pensionary consequences. The Court emphasized the dual purpose of the rule: "the rule being a law with all the strength and efficacy of the law of a legislature... wisdom to the legislature need be attributed that it thought that so far as a pensioner is concerned, he should not be kept in a state of lurking fear about an event, for which he is answerable, for more than four years from the date when it took place and that the pensioner should quietly and safely keep his earned rest and peace well preserved." On the relationship between limitation and criminal law, the Court stated: "The bar of limitation merely bars the remedy and does not destroy the right... the law creating limitation bars the remedy of having the offender punished and thereby does not suffer from the vice of repugnancy." Finally, the Court concluded that the prosecution launched more than four years after the alleged offence and after retirement was an abuse of process causing serious prejudice to the accused, and therefore quashed the proceedings.
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