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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 29 Records
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1953 (2) TMI 60 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rder to protest impecunious Talukdars and their estates from being involved in debt and in order to prevent the estates from being frittered away and becoming lost to the successors. The protection was particularly necessary during the period the estate was under management so that it may remain intact till the Talukdar attained an age at which the authorities thought it safe to terminate the management. The classification made by the Government was highly reasonable and vital to the class of the persons who were grouped under it and the law rendering void the transactions entered into by them during the time their estate was under management was not discriminatory in the least, and it does not offend against Article 14 of the Constitution (vide-Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41 (H),-State of Bombay v. Balsara AIR 1951 S.C. 318 (I), and-Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 S.C. 123 (J). 10. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1953 (2) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... of an inferior Court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Before such a writ is issued, it must be shown that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice.... Once it is held that the Court has jurisdiction but while exercising it is made a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a Court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly. 32. The observation made by his Lordship regarding the powers of the Custodian General apply with greater force to the tribunals constituted by the Income Tax Act and both these cases support Mr. Sikri's submission that no writ can issue to them in respect of a matter which is within their jurisdiction to decide. 33. For all these reasons I would dismiss the petition with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 300/-. Gurnam Singh, J. 34. I entirely agree.
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1953 (2) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t is not still well settled whether the Tribunal is a necessary party to the petition challenging the order made by the Tribunal, we do not think that we should interfere with the order of costs made by the learned Judge. But we certainly do not propose to award to the Tribunal greater costs than what have been awarded by the learned Judge below. We have been told that it is very necessary that the Tribunals, which are in large numbers and which decide several cases and whose decisions are very often challenged in this Court, should know what is the correct attitude for them to take up when the rule in a petition is served upon them. We have, therefore, thought it necessary to lay down a practice which can be easily conformed to by the Tribunals. 10. Appeal dismissed, the appellants to pay the costs of respondents Nos. 2 to 26. Respondent No. 1 to bear his own costs of the appeal. Cross-objections dismissed. No order as to costs of the cross-objections. 11. Order accordingly.
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1953 (2) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... e section can be stated in three propositions; (i) Eights validly created prior to 1-7-1945 will be valid; (ii) such rights, however, may be determined under the third proviso if it is in the public interest to do so and in such cases compensation will be payable under Section 20(2) and (iii) Rights created after 1-7-1945 if they are for a period exceeding one year are liable to be avoided under the second proviso. In this view, we are of opinion that the notice dated 13-3-1951 falls under the second proviso and is valid, 22. It was stated by the petitioners that the Government have accepted rent for the current fasli ending with 30-6-1953 and that it would be inconvenient if the possession is disturbed before that date. That, however, is not a matter for decision for this Court. The Government will, we have no doubt, do what is reasonable under the circumstances. 23. in the result, the petition is dismissed, with costs of the first respondent. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1953 (2) TMI 56 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e up for decision before their Lordships of the Privy Council in -- 'AIR 1943 P. C. 153 (C)'. That was a case of a mining lease and the point for decision was whether the salami which was exigible by the lessor under the lease was income liable to be taxed. In their Lordships' opinion the salami 'had been rightly treated as a capital receipt' The reason given by the Board was that it is a single payment made for the acquisition of the right of the lessees to enjoy the benefits granted to them by the lease. That general right may properly be regarded as a capital asset and the money paid to purchase it may properly be held to be a payment on capital account There can therefore be no doubt that an insolated payment made for the acquisition of the right to use the land for agricultural purposes and enjoy the benefits accruing from the land, cannot, in any sense, constitute in- come. The petitioner's contention is, therefore, well-founded and must prevail.
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1953 (2) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... necessary or become incumbent upon the Association to achieve those objects, including the obtaining of capital funds. The contributions of 500 made by the members on the terms of the application set forth in the reasons of my brother Cartwright, both in the intention of the subscribers and of the corporation, furnished those funds. They were obviously to enable capital assets to be acquired and were limited in their application to that purpose. I am quite unable, therefore, to see how they can be held to be income. The case of Diamond Taxicab Association Limited v. M.N.R. 1952 Ex. CR. 331; 1953 C.T.C. 104., affirmed without reasons by this Court was decided on the facts there presented. It was held that the interpretation given them by the Exchequer Court, that the monies had been paid as commuted compensation for future services, had not been shown to be erroneous. I would therefore allow the appeal and set aside the assessment of the Minister with costs throughout. 1 2 3
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1953 (2) TMI 54 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ements had been lost "by an unequivocal order of forfeiture passed by the State under Section 9, Land Conservancy Act, read with the rules thereunder". It is admitted that no such order was passed in this case and so the rights of parties have to be determined without reference to the provisions of the Travancore Land Conservancy Act 4 of 1091. 7. "What is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil" is not a maxim of general jurisprudence and there is the authority of the Privy Council, - 'Vallabdas Narainji v. Development Officer, Bandra AIR 1929 P.C. 163 (B), to hold that it does not represent the law of India. Proceedings in ejectment have invariably recognised the right of a trespasser to remove the improvements he had made and this valuable right has admittedly been denied to the Respondents by the action of the Government. 8. It follows that the decree of the lower Court has to be upheld and the appeal dismissed. 9. We dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1953 (2) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , that a decision on a vital point adverse to the defendant, which goes to the very root of the suit, becomes final and decisive against him so far as the court making the order is concerned. This brings the order within the category of a 'judgment' as laid down in the Calcutta cases. We need not express any final opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of this view. It is enough for our purpose to state that there is difference between an order refusing to rescind leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and one under clause 13 directing the removal of a suit from one court to another, and there is no good reason to hold that principle applicable to one applies to the other also. 16. The result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is right and this appeal should fail, and is dismissed with costs. 17. Appeal dismissed. 18. Agent for the appellant P. K. Bose. 19. Agent for the respondent No. 1 Sukumar Ghose for P. C. Dutt.
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1953 (2) TMI 52 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the closing down of the business of the petitioner results in unemployment to labour but this would not by itself be a sufficient ground for forcing the petitioner to work his concern when in his opinion it cannot be so worked without losses. This matter is to be enquired into by the Industrial Tribunal and unless that Court decides against the petitioner, 'prima facie' the petitioner cannot be ordered to work the mills in spite of losses. 28. The application partially succeeds and we would declare that the order of the Government by which the petitioner has been ordered to run the mills during the pendency of the inquiry is illegal and would order issue of a direction to the Government to refrain from enforcing its order for continuing the working of the mills. The proceedings relating to the reference made by the Government shall continue and the prayer of the petitioner for declaring the reference illegal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1953 (2) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... once imposed, and if we bear in mind that we must either interpret the words "to impose" to mean impose an additional burden by way of enhancing the tax or in the alternative to interpret the word "modify" to mean rot only to alter the tax which had already been levied but not so as to increase the same but also to mean to increase the tax. We interpret the word 'modify" in this sense. In our view, therefore, a Municipality which is governed by the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act has got power to enhance a tax which it has already levied, provided only it, follows the procedure which has been laid down in Section 60. In that view of the case, the action which was taken by the Municipality to increase the tax in 1941 and again in 1948 was 'intra vires'. 28. The plaintiff's suit against the Municipality must also be dismissed with costs throughout. Crass-objections are not pressed and are also dismissed with costs. 29. Order accordingly.
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1953 (2) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... part of the Railway Administration or its servants cannot be fairly inferred from such evidence, the burden of proving such misconduct shall lie upon the consignor," And it is argued that the onus is on the railway administration, whether the consignment is under risk-note "B" or "Z", to show that there was no misconduct on the part of any employee of the railway administration. The defendant has not led any evidence before me to show how the consignment was dealt with throughout the time it was in the possession or control of the railway administration. On this part of the case it cannot be stated in the circumstances of the present case that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to establish misconduct on the part of the railway administration. In the absence of any evidence led by the defendant misconduct would have to be inferred, and this part of the case must be decided against the defendant. 17. In the result the suit will be dismissed with costs.
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1953 (2) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the same erroneous impression. In this case the arbitration clause was in these terms - o p /o p "Any dispute or difference arising out of the contract shall be referred to the arbitration of the officer sanctioning the contract whose decision shall be final and binding." o p /o p 14. It is obvious that these decisions could have no relevance to the arbitration clause as drawn up in the present case. If the nature of the claim is as we have indicated above, it seems plain that it does not come within the scope of the submission. o p /o p 15. In our judgment, therefore, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was right and the Judges of the High Court were in error in reversing it. In the result the only course open to us is to allow the appeal with costs and to say that the plaintiff's claim is not within the scope of the submission and that the petition under section 34 was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. o p /o p 16. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1953 (2) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ; 3,16478/-without specifying in the award that it is for the contract dated 2-4-1943 the Union of India may be met by a plea of res judicata when it subsequently enforces its rights in respect of other matters. The award of ₹ 1000/- for costs is clearly effected by the decision of the arbitrator with regard to the contract dated 22-9-1944. The Court is not certain in whose favour and for what sum the award for costs would have been if the arbitrator had decided in favour of the petitioner with regard to the contract dated 22-9-1944. The Court cannot re-write this award. Part of the award is void and the whole award is therefore bad. 39. I pass the following order I declare that the arbitration clause contained in the contract dated 22-9-1944, for Kettles Camp has ceased to exist since the settlement contract dated 22-2-1949. I declare and adjudge the award to be void and invalid and set it aside. The respondent must pay to the petitioner the costs of this application.
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1953 (2) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rope of sand". In our opinion, the present case comes directly within the principle enunciated by this court in Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum 1953 S.C.R. 404 . 22. The result is that we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. A writ in the nature of mandamus shall issue directing the respondents not to take any steps in pursuance of The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act of 1950 or to interfere with the possession of the appellants in respect to the lands comprised in the lease referred to in that Act. The appellants will have their costs in both courts. Vivian Bose, J. 23. I am in entire agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my learned brother Mukherjea. Ghulam Hasan, J. 24. I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my brother Mukherjea. N.H. Bhagwati, J. 25. I entirely agree with the judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Mukherjea and there is nothing which I can usefully add. 26. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (2) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fore the Huzur Adalat. It was open to the Central Government to provide that any person A, B, C, by name should be designated for the purpose of hearing those appeals ; and it was also open to the Central Government to constitute any other officer appointed under the Indian Income-tax Act or any other Act a tribunal for hearing appeals pending before the Huzur Adalat, and obviously no application for reference could lie against the decision of that person or officer to this Court. The mere fact that the Appellate Tribunal is constituted under the Indian Income-tax Act a tribunal for hearing appeals pending before the Huzur Adalat cannot therefore avail the petitioners in obtaining a right of obtaining reference which is expressly provided for by the Indian Income-tax Act, but which was not provided for by the Baroda Act. In my view, therefore, the petitioners were not entitled to obtain a reference claimed by them. I agree, therefore, that the appeal fails. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (2) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t pending as an appeal against a decision of this Court in a similar matter was pending decision before the Supreme Court. It has been now finally settled by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar 1953 23 I.T.R. 180 (S.C.) that if the order of the Appellate Tribunal was not one within Section 33(4) of the Act a reference under Section 66(1) was incompetent. From a perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court it is clear that no appeal lies against an order made under Section 35 of the Act to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as it would not fall within the purview of Section 30 of the Act, and further there will be no appeal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the Tribunal. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court we think that the reference under Section 66(1) of the Act was incompetent and therefore we must refuse to answer the reference. The application is dismissed. No costs. Reference not answered.
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1953 (2) TMI 44 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave had no hesitation in answering the question in the affirmative. Shri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the Department, at one time processed that we should ask for a fresh statement of the case u/s 66 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act so that we may have before us facts or circumstances which the Income-tax Officer and the AAC had acted but, in that case, we would have to ask for a reference on a question not raised by the assessee before the Appellate Tribunal Having read the order of the Income-tax Officer and the AAC, we do not feel disposed to ask for an further reference Question No (3) as framed to our minds does not arise out of the appellate order and we need not therefore give any answer to it. Our answers to the first two questions are therefore, in the negative and, as we have already said, the third question does not arise out of the appellate order. The assessee must pay costs to the Department which we assess at ₹ 400. Reference answered accordingly,
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1953 (2) TMI 43 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of ₹ 15,644 which was the estimate made by the Income-tax Officer on examination of the books of account produced by the assessee. It follows that in the facts and circumstances of this case the amount of ₹ 15,644 ought not to have been added to the amount of ₹ 85,000 as income of the assessee for the year of account and that the amount of ₹ 15,644 was not taxable in the hands of the assessee. For the reasons expressed I think that the question of law raised in this case should be answered against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to costs of the reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. RAI, J.―I agree that the answer should be against the Income-tax Department but I would reserve my judgment on the point whether the question on which statement of the case has been called for from the Tribunal under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act can be changed by us at the time of the final hearing of the case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (2) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nsel to produce fresh evidence before us, but from the circumstances that appear from the statement of the case and the assessment order we do not think we can say that there was any material from which a conclusion could be arrived at that ₹ 65,000 was the profit made in the account year from 17th October, 1944, to 4th November, 1945. We may mention that we are not called upon to decide, nor is it the case of the Department, that these profits were made in the previous account year 1943-44. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred to us is that the Tribunal could reasonably hold that the cash deposit of ₹ 5,000 in the assessment year 1943-44 represented the assessee's assessable income from some undisclosed source but it was not a reasonable inference that the sum of ₹ 65,000 was income taxable in the assessment year 1946-47. As the assessee has substantially won we allow them costs which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (2) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by his father acting as the general agent of his father. It is also in evidence that although the testator had separated, he and his father and stepbrothers used to pay land revenue jointly. There is nothing improbable in the family disputes being settled. In these circumstances there is nothing improbable in the testator appointing one of his stepbrothers as the executor of his will. It is in evidence that these stepbrothers have married the minor daughter of the testator in quite a well to do family. Taking all the circumstances into consideration we are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in taking a different view as to the credibility of the witness Sahdeo Singh who was entirely believed by the District Judge who had seen him in the witness-box before him. 8. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed and we direct probate to issue to the petitioner. The petitioner will get costs throughout in all Courts and costs of this appeal.
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