|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 45 Records
-
1957 (1) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d summarily, as it deserved to be, there would have been admittedly an end of the matter and on the passing of the Amendment Act on 28-12-1949 the appellants would not have got a right either to have the matter reopened before us or to apply to us for review. Instead of the appeal being dismissed summarily it was admitted and remained pending for more than three years with the consequence that in the meantime the law was amended and it has got an opportunity of contending that the appeal should be decided in accordance with the provisions of the amended law. It seems somewhat illogical that if this Court had acted correctly the appellant would have been without any redress but he becomes entitled to redress because this Court admitted the appeal which did not deserve to be admitted. 26. But the authorities seem to be against the view that I have advanced and I must yield to them. I only hope that the matter will be considered by the Supreme Court in near future and set right.
-
1957 (1) TMI 60 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rance as we have here. 6. Difficult questions might have arisen if the liability under Ext. A had matured and the plaintiff, to save herself from her personal obligation thereunder, had paid off the liability. Could she not then claim subrogation as against the defendants seeing that they took the property subject to Ext. A and although as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the liability to pay the debt is still on the mortgagor, she (the mortgagor) is entitled to be subrogated if she is afterwards compelled to pay it. See Ghose page 373. Or would the absolute prohibition as to subrogation in favour of the mortgagor under Section 92 debar her claim altogether. Here, however, the liability which was a contingent one at the inception and at date of the sale in favour of the defendants, failed to fix itself either on the property or as against the plaintiff and this left the defendants altogether free. 7. This second appeal fails in the result and is dismissed, with costs.
-
1957 (1) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
... ...
... ... ..... avit was occasioned by this circumstance and not due to any wilful act of negligence", (p. 5) 10. The evidence before us is insufficient for a definite conclusion that the succession was in 1947. Even assuming that the succession was on 31-12-1947 as contended by the petitioner or on 27-9-1947 as contended by his son it is impossible to say that the omission to give relief on the basis of a succession in 1947 is a mistake apparent from the record of the assessment. There was no such case at the time the assessment was made and the record of the assessment gives no indication of a succession in 1947. As a matter of fact the only statement anterior to Ext. C is the statement in Ext. I to the effect that the succession was "as and from 1-1-1948" and we must hold that Ext. F is correct and that it should be sustained. 11. It follows that the petition has to be rejected and it is hereby dismissed though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
-
1957 (1) TMI 58 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... se circumstances, I do not consider It necessary to calculate the respective shares of Surjan Singh and Bachan Singh. 24. The claimants are, therefore, entitled to receive ₹ 76,762/8/- for the land and ₹ 4,000/- for the four wells. Thus they are entitled to get ₹ 80,762/8/- in all. The Collector had allowed them ₹ 27,254/11/- in all. while the Arbitrator had increased the amount by ₹ 15,642/8/- bringing the total of compensation payable to the claimants to ₹ 42,897/-3/-. It therefore, follows that by this judgment the claimants' appeals are accepted to the extent of ₹ 37,865/5/-. They are also entitled to get interest at 4 per cent per annum as indicated above. 25. As regards costs the claimants are entitled to proportionate costs. 26. In view of the above decision, the appeals, Regular First Appeals Nos. 49 and 50 of 1949, filed by the Government are dismissed, but there will be no orders as to costs. G.L. Chopra, J. 27. I agree.
-
1957 (1) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d substance, therefore, there is a finding that he had the money. When it is shown that a person was in possession of money on a certain date and he does not give an explanation which can be believed about the disposal of that money, the reasonable inference is that he continues to be in possession of the money. It is not the case of the insolvent that this money was stolen or lost or expended since the order was made. Mr. Devanathan stated on behalf of his client that he is not in possession of any money. Such a statement is easily made, but, I do not believe it. I certainly agree with Mr Devanathan that if a person is unable to pay his failure to pay cannot be said to be willful. In the present case I have no doubt that the insolvent did have the money and is now sitting tight on it. When a person does that, his refusal to bring in the money can only be said to be willful. 17. As the insolvent has disobeyed the order of the court he will be committed to jail for six months.
-
1957 (1) TMI 56 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the High Court to interfere in revision is a limited jurisdiction and unless it is shown that the decision is one which strictly comes within one of the three clauses of Section 115, we should not interfere with the order of the Court below. There is something to be said in support of this contention; but as, in our view, the decision of the 'Court below is right, it is not necessary to consider the precise scope of Section 413 of the Act. 10. The result is that the view taken by the Court below is right. The application, therefore, fails and the rule will be discharged with costs. 11. Revisional application No. 80 of 1956 raises a similar point, in that application the applicants are the same and the year in question is the year 1953-54. The point raised in this revisional application is precisely the same and for the reasons given in revisional application No. 825 of 1955, this application must also fail and the rule will be discharged with costs. 12. Rule, discharged.
-
1957 (1) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ge, it appears from his judgment, the finding of the magistrate was understood to be a finding that the applicants were public prostitutes and the learned counsel for the appellants did not assail that finding. We are of opinion that a prostitute would answer the description of a public prostitute unless she be kept by some person exclusively in which, case she can be said to be kept by that person and to be not available for the purposes of prostitution to others. The expression "prostitute" itself means a woman who offers her body to indiscriminate sexual intercourse, especially for hire. Such a person would answer the description of a public prostitute also. We are therefore of opinion, as already mentioned, that this contention that the applicants are not proved to be public prostitutes is not sound. 7. In view of the above, we dismiss this and the connected revisions. This order will government Criminal Revisions Numbers 1365, 1366, 1374, 1375 and 1416 of 1954.
-
1957 (1) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... or. In any event the drop not appear to be any repugnancy between the Notification and the so called principle or policy of a. 9 of the 1910 Act as regards the hearing of appeals from the decisions of the Excise Commissioner. In our opinion there is no substance in this point. No other point of law or fact has been urged- before us. In our opinion for reasons stated above the judgments of the HIgh Court appealed from should be set aside and those of the appellate authority should be restored.. All the appeals are accordingly allowed. The controversy, it seems to us, arose by reason of the inartistic drafting of the relevant enactment and in the premises, although the State of Assam,has succeeded in the appeals filed by it, we make no order as to costs in its favour in any of the appeals filed by it. The successful appellants in the other appeals will get the costs of their respective appeals from the respondents in those appeals including the State of Assam. Appeals allowed.
-
1957 (1) TMI 53 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat its transactions in other markets are carried out by means of communication by telephone or post. There is no suggestion that the firm has any agent or branch in any native State, and it therefore seems to me that, whether profits result or losses are incurred as the result of transactions of this kind even with firms in Indian States, the profits accrue or the losses are incurred at the place where the payments are received, or from which they are made, namely the firm's place of business at Delhi. It was the case of a similar firm with which my Lord the Chief Justice and I were dealing in Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. Gajja Nand Gobind Ram 1955 28 ITR 499 and we held that in such circumstances no question arose of the application of section 14(2)(c) of the Income-tax Act. The result is that I would answer the second of the questions framed in the affirmative. The Commissioner is directed to pay the costs of the assessee respondent. Bishan Narain, J.-I agree.
-
1957 (1) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... eard before an order is passed under section 28(1). That assessee had ceased to exist when the order under section 28(1) was passed in this case. That Balagurumurthi was heard before the order was passed would not, in the circumstances of the case, satisfy the requirements of section 28(2). We are referring to this aspect only to emphasise that there is no machinery provided by the Act to impose the penalty under section 28(1), after the assessee has ceased to exist. Section 28(2) on the other hand provided for the imposition of a penalty, but still the person to be penalised is not the registered firm but the individual partner." We agree with the aforesaid observations. The result is that, as the assessee, the Hindu family, became divided before the procedure under section 28 was invoked the members of the erstwhile family are not liable to be penalised under that section. We, therefore, answer the reference in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to his costs.
-
1957 (1) TMI 51 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the purview of R. 9(a) and therefore there must have been a conviction before action could be taken under that clause. That clause however provides for a case where any member is convicted of an offence and not that if any complaint discloses any offence the Board of Directors is powerless to take disciplinary action until the member is convicted of the offence charged by a criminal court i.e.. the erring member is free to persist with immunity in his undesirable course of conduct until some one thinks of prosecuting him and securing his conviction. 27. In my view, this is not a fit or proper case in which the discretionary relief of permanent injunction can be granted to the plaintiffs. 28. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree appealed against are set aside and the suit is dismissed. The appellant win recover costs of this court and of the court below from the respondent No. 1 and its partners Rangnath Rathi and D.L. Agarwal.
-
1957 (1) TMI 50 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ot very much conclusive on the point in issue. The circumstances on the record are more in favour of the probabilities that perhaps after the compromise some new incident took place in the family which worked up the old feud afresh and hence this petition for review. Anyway, in view of what I have already found above that Mr. G. P. Misra had the implied authority to conclude a valid agreement of compromise on behalf of all the respondents including the petitioners, it is not necessary to give a definite finding on this point or to hold that the petitioners were all along during this litigation joint with Subodh Narayan Jha or that Subodh Narayan Jha in executing the Vakalatnama acted in a representative capacity on behalf of all his brothers. For on the ground of implied authority alone it has to be held that this application for review is without substance. 15. The application is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
-
1957 (1) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... view of Hindu law, as contended for by learned counsel for the respondents, is accepted as correct; therefore, Kamala Devi is also not entitled to the benefit of sub-s. (1) of s. 14. 28. We do not think that it is necessary to decide this case on the rival contentions presented to us with regard to s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. We have already held that under Hindu law Mst. Sumitra Devi could make a gift in favour of her daughter as marriage dowry, two years after the marriage, in fulfillment of the ante-nuptial promise made by her and that such a gift is binding on the reversioners. That being the position, it is unnecessary to decide in this case the true scope and effect of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 29. For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below. The suit of the plaintiffs-respondents must be dismissed and the appellants will be entitled to their costs throughout. 30. Appeal allowed.
-
1957 (1) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
... ...
... ... ..... e present case. No refund of any duty paid and appropriated is sought for on the ground of an erroneous payment or of payment due to misconstruction or inadvertence. The limit of time prescribed in Section 40 of the Sea Customs Act did not, therefore, apply to this case, as the plaintiff does not seek refund on any of these grounds mentioned in Section 40 but claims the repayment of money held in deposit but not appropriated. 8. The last and the only remaining submission was that the duty was not refundable. We have already dealt with this point while deciding the issue of jurisdiction and we are of opinion that there was no bar to the plaintiff claiming back the money which was held in deposit and which had not been appropriated towards payment of export duty. 9. The view taken by the Court below on all these three points appears to us to be correct and the learned Civil Judge has dealt with the points exhaustively. AS a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1957 (1) TMI 47 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Custodian in spite of the plaintiff's objection which he said he had preferred before the Custodian. (4) There was no fraud committed by the vendees, as they were-under no obligation to inform the Court even if the proceedings by the Custodian had started before the institution of the suit or while the suit was pending. (5) The invalidity of the right could not be urged by the pre-emptor who was out to enforce such right, and did obtain a decree as also transfer of the title to the property from the vendee by deposit of the pre-emption money. It may however, be stated that the right was claimed in the plaint on more than one ground, and the decree had become final. (6) The plea as to the jurisdiction of the Munsif to pass the decree remains unsubstantiated. (7) There is no force in this revision, and it is accordingly dismissed. I will not allow costs to the respondents, as counsel for the respondents was unable to give any assistance in disposing o£ this revision.
-
1957 (1) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lved in the appeal filed by the respondent against that finding. If no question of law-- much less a substantial question of law--was involved in the appeal thus filed by the respondent the Labour Appellate Tribunal had certainly no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and reverse the finding recorded by the Industrial Tribunal against Nanilal Mukherjee. 8. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the award of the Industrial Tribunal in regard to Nanilal Mukherjee. The appeal will therefore be allowed, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in regard to Nanilal Mukherjee will be set aside and the award of the First Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, on issue No. 2 will be restored. 9. The respondent had filed the statement of case but did not appear at the hearing. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we order that each party will bear and pay its own costs of this appeal.
-
1957 (1) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... acquired by the Central Government and on acquisition the property shall vest absolutely in that Government free from all encumbrances. The Legislation deals with evacuee property and the acquisition thereof and the consequent destination of that property. The evacuee property notified under Section 12(1) vests in the Central Government free from all encumbrances, and it is difficult to appreciate how the State has by issuing the notification deprived the plaintiffs of equality of law or equal protection of the laws. In our view, there is no substance in the contention that the equal Protection clause of the Constitution lifts' 'been violated. 26. We have carefully considered, all the arguments which have been advanced by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs in support of the appeal, and we are of the view that the decree passed by the trial Court must, for reasons set out by us, be sustained. 27. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 28. Appeal dismissed.
-
1957 (1) TMI 44 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e the decision of Mr. Justice Misra, and also of the learned Subordinate Judge and, set aside the judgment and decrees of both, and, restore those, of the learned Additional Munsif dated the 18th March, 1949, and decree the plaintiff's suit for possession on the same terms and conditions as stated in the Judgment of the first court but only with this modification that the defendants will be entitled to remove the structure standing on the encroached land and, they will be required to restore it to its original condition, within six months from today failing which the plaintiff will be entitled to get possession by removal of the encroachment upon the portion of his plot No. 80 through court at the cost of the defendants. 17. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed but in view of the peculiar circumstances of the present case, the plaintiff will not be entitled to any cost either of this Court, or of any of the three Courts below. V. Ramaswami, C.J. 18. I agree.
-
1957 (1) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he one under s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, there can be no question of s. 5(1)(c) repealing s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code. If that is so, then, article 14 of the Constitution can be no bar. The last argument of Mr. Isaacs is that despite the fact that the prosecution is under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code, still sanction to prosecute is necessary. Quite a large body of case law in all the High Courts has held- that a public servant committing criminal breach of trust does not normally act in his capacity as a public servant, see (a) The State v. Pandurang Baburao (supra), (b) Bhup Narain Saxena v. State (supra), and (c) State v. Gulab Singh(1). We are in agreement with the view expressed by Hari ) Shankar and Randhir Singh JJ. that no sanction is necessary and the view expressed by Mulla J. to the contrary is not correct. Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1955 will accordingly be dismissed. Criminal Appeals Nos. 42 of 1954 and 97 of 1955 will be heard on merits.
-
1957 (1) TMI 42 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion "profits and gains of business, profession or vocation". In view of this finding it is scarcely necessary to consider the argument which was put forward by Mr. Kirpal in the alternative that even if for any reason the entrance fees cannot be assessed to income- tax under the provisions of section 10(1) they are liable to assessment under section 10(6). No specific services are being rendered by the company and there is no remuneration charged for any specific services. As pointed out in Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal 1956 29 I.T.R. 687, entrance fees and subscriptions are arbitrary sums charged as the price of the privilege of membership or quasi membership and not as remuneration definitely related to any specific services performed. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the question which has been referred to us by the Tribunal must be answered in the affirmative. Question answered in the affirmative.
|
