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1957 (12) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... realise rent from the tenants of this property and will submit accounts in the Court below of all realisations and also of such expenses as may be reasonably incurred by him in the management of the property. The appellant is further directed to pay all municipal taxes and rates quarter by quarter and satisfy the Court below that such rates and taxes are paid. All surplus money which may remain in the hand of the appellant after meeting the outgoings must be deposited in the Court below quarter by quarter. If these directions are not properly carried out by the appellant then it will be open to the opposite party to renew their application for appointment of an outsider as administrator pendente lite in respect of the disputed property in the Court below. The probate case will be heard by the Court below as expeditiously as possible. Let the records be sent down to that Court at an early date. 9. Parties will bear their own costs in this Court. B.N. Banerjee, J. 10. I agree.
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1957 (12) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ves could not be he regarded as tenants by sufferance, but would regarded as mere trespassers. 8. The principle underlying clause (cc) paragraph (XI) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act is to enable a landlord to get possession of his property by a cheap remedy endeavouring to obtain his rights on the basis of the contractual rights as between himself and his tenant. This paragraph does not envisage suits wherein complicated questions that may arise between other parties apart from the bare questions of tenancy. If parties other than appellants are parties to the suit, then such suits would governed by Section 7 (5) of the Court Fees Act. 9. While, therefore, with respect differing from Bell, J., in the view taken by him, we hold that suit would be governed by Section 7, Clause of the Court Fees Act. 10. The revision is allowed with costs. The petitioner is permitted to amend his written statement as prayed for. The case will go back to the lower Court for further proceedings.
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1957 (12) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... sed Moidunny was worth more than two lakhs of rupees and had about 60 acres of cocoanut gardens and 40 acres of paddy lands, that after his death about 20 acres of lands have been assigned to defendant 1's wife for clearing debts amounting to ₹ 4489--6--10 (which according to the plaintiff are only bogus debts), and that from the income of the property the debts mentioned in Ext. II could have been easily paid off. About these matters, the extent of the indebtedness of the estate, the available income, and the surplus after expenditures-plaintiff has not been able to adduce detailed evidence because of the defendant's omission to plead that the execution of Ext. II was a bonafide and reasonable act of administration; and without sufficient evidence it will not be proper to go into a question which does not arise on the pleadings and about which the parties had not joined issue at the trial. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1957 (12) TMI 40 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order contrary to the scheme which he admittedly did by giving four plots to the petitioners in violation of the terms of the scheme. The position taken up in paragraph 7 (ii) of the written statement of respondent No. 1 is not tenable inasmuch as it is stated that the scheme provisions could not stand in the way of an order under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act. The scheme had never been amended as such or modified under any separate order made under Section 42 of the Act and it seems to me very doubtful that in an individual case it is open to the Director to make an order in violation of the scheme which had been accepted by all the right-holders and on the basis of which complete re-partition had taken place. 14. For all the reasons given above, the petition will be allowed and the order of the Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, dated 15-12-1956, will be quashed and it is ordered accordingly. 15. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs in this Court.
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1957 (12) TMI 39 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ;compensation for loss... They have to be given their plain and natural meaning. The words imply that the claimant would be entitled to compensation for the loss sustained by him whether such loss is occasioned by non-delivery on account of the tortuous conduct of the Railway or its servants or by conversion of the goods or by the goods being lost in transit. The right to claim compensation from the Railway arises whether the cause of action is founded on contract or on tort. On a true construction of S. 77 loss means loss to the owner by whatever means. There is no warrant for making a distinction between a claim for compensation on account of loss of goods by a Railway Company and a claim for compensation on the ground of non-delivery or misdelivery. 15. We allow this revision and set aside the Judgment of the lower Court. The plaintiffs suit is dismissed for want of notice under S. 77 of the Railways Act. The petitioner will have his costs both here and in the lower Court.
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1957 (12) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cannot be invoked by the appellant's learned advocate to assist his client. 5. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the present appeal should have been filed before this Court at all. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the matter, and without examining the validity or otherwise of the order passed by the learned Assistant judge on merits, we order that the appeal memo be returned to the appellant's learned advocate for presenting the same before the proper Court. As to costs, we shall make no order. 6. Before parting with this judgment, we would point out that the leave that was granted by the Assistant Judge to the appellant for filing an appeal before the High Court was granted under a misapprehension. The learned Judge did not realise that an appeal from an order passed by him would not lie to this Court but to the District Court. That being so, the leave granted by the learned Assistant judge would be infructuous. 7. Order accordingly.
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1957 (12) TMI 37 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of a holiday for a Sunday in the event of the worker being made to work on a Sunday. It is inconceivable that a person should be held responsible for something which he had no control over." The position of the persons which P. W. 3 had, engaged in the present case in connection with the execution of his contract for garbling pepper, was similar to that of the workers whom the contractor in the above case had employed to attend to the work of binding of the printed volumes of the Allahabad Law Journal Company. These persons could in no sense be deemed to have been persons employed by the petitioner. His prosecution under the provisions of the Factories Act must, therefore, fail. 9. In the result, this revision petition is accepted and the conviction entered against the accused-petitioner and the sentence awarded to him by the lower court, are set aside and he is acquitted of the offences charged against him in this case. The amount of fine, if realised, will be refunded.
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1957 (12) TMI 36 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he assessees had made the Income-tax Officer act in full faith in their word and had thus derived a benefit thereunder, can they now turn round and dispute the competence of the Income-tax authority or be allowed to go back on their word to the detriment of the other party. No doubt, as already stated, the party has after a final assessment a vested right not to be assessed to an enhanced tax save in cases falling under sections 34 and 35. But this right is for their personal benefit. They could waive the same without any offence to the public policy. As a matter of fact, knowing full well that they had such right, they waived the same by their agreement and made the Income-tax authority act on their word. They have thus relinquished their right. At any rate, their conduct would not entitle them to the benefit of the discretionary relief under article 226 of the Constitution. These petitions, both on facts and law, do not merit any consideration. They are therefore dismissed.
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1957 (12) TMI 35 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ffect of evidence is a question of law. It follows as a consequence that if the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the business structure or an entire activity or organisation of a company has disappeared and if there is an entire failure of evidence to support the finding, the decision raises a question of law. The question whether a particular receipt is a revenue receipt or a capital receipt is also a question of law, for it is impossible to determine the nature of a receipt without construing the provision of the Income-tax Act and without ascertaining the legal meaning of certain portions of the statute. For these reasons I would accept both the petitions and require the Tribunal to state the case and to refer to this court the two questions of law which have been propounded by the Commissioner of Income-tax. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this court which I assess at ₹ 150 in each case, but payment will abide the event. Mehar Singh, J.-I agree.
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1957 (12) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f a common burden and the fee is the payment for a special benefit or privilege. Translating that expression to the context of the present facts, the fee in this case was for the specific benefit of a particular license that is obtained in this case. This fee is annexed to the license as one of its many terms & conditions. I need hardly add that by Section 89 of the Bengal Excise Act these fees and all kinds of excise revenue go to the general fund and the process prescribed for the recovery of arrears of revenue are available for this purpose. The word 'excise-revenue' under the Bengal Excise Act includes revenue derived or derivable from any fee under Section 2 (1) of the Act. 23. I, therefore, hold that the fee is authorised and permitted by Statute and is neither ultra vires nor illegal nor unconstitutional. 24. The application, therefore, must fail and is dismissed. The Rule is discharged and interim order, if any, vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1957 (12) TMI 33 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rding of which is different from that of the Travancore--Cochin Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950; decisions like Vallambrosa Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Farmer (Surveyor of Taxes) 1910 5 Tax Cas. 529, and they are not dealt with in this judgment. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the contentions of the assesses are unsustainable, that the deduction claimed is not a permissible deduction under section 5(j) of the Travancore-Cochin Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, and answer the question referred in I.T.R. No. 15 and I.T.R. No. 16 of 1955 and the first of the two questions referred in I.T.R. No. 18 and I.T.R. No. 19 of 1955 accordingly. We also answer the second of the two questions referred in I.T.R. No. 18 and I.T.R. No. 19 of 1955 in the negative. A copy of this judgment will be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal as provided by sub-section (6) of section 60 of the Act. References answered accordingly.
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1957 (12) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Order 39, Rule 1(a), Civil Procedure Code. In the present case the rights of the respondent, the decree-holder in C.S. No. 228 of 1954, will remain unaffected by the disposal of the partition suit, O.S. No. 1119 of 1955. 17. Under such circumstances where no relief could be granted to the appellant against the respondent in the main suit itself, it is not permissible to grant any interim relief, to be operative till the disposal of the suit. Even were it only a question of discretion, I should hold that in such a case the Court should exercise its discretion against the grant of interim injunction. I would go further and hold that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant by way of interim relief what could never be granted in the main suit itself. It is on this basis that I rest my decision to confirm the order of the learned Additional City Civil Judge, who refused to grant interim injunction for which the appellant-petitioner applied. 18. This appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1957 (12) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ddy he would have to go to the open market and pay the open market price. The value to him of the paddy he had in his hands was thus its value at the open market rate and it is that market value which it represented. He could not have purchased the paddy, if he had been required to purchase it, at the procurement rate. In those circumstances, there could be no question of applying the procurement rate to the determination of the market value of the paddy consumed by the members of the assessee's family and his staff. For the foregoing reasons, the answers to the questions referred should, in my opinion, be as follows Question 1. Yes, so far as the assessee's own share of the produce was concerned, unless it was found that the portion, not received, had been remitted in which case the portion remitted should be included in the computation. Question 2. No. As success is equally divided, there will be no order for costs. GUHA J.--I agree. Questions answered accordingly.
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1957 (12) TMI 30 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the eleven annas share in the partnership of Jaipuria firm were never blended with the income of the family. The last consideration does not rally arise in this case. The other considerations referred to have been considered by the Income-tax authorities at one stage or the other. It is not true that those matters have not been considered by the Income-tax authorities. There was martial before the Income-tax authorities upon which they could reach the conclusion of fact that the eleven annas share partner of the Jaipuria firm was not Chuni Lal personally but the family firm and that being a finding of fact based on evidence this court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such a finding and direct a reference to be made to it with regard to the same. The result is that these applications are entirely misconceived and are dismissed with costs. In each application the counsel for the respondent is allowed a fee of ₹ 150. BHANDARI, C. J.--I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (12) TMI 29 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... what he has done is to conceal the particulars of his income or to deliberately furnish inaccurate particulars of such income within the meaning of clause (c) of section 38(1) of the Act. We entertain no doubt that the offence in such a case should be considered as one coming under clause (a) and not under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 38. 5. It follows that a period of eight years is not available to the Department in this case and we answer the first question accordingly. 6. In the light of our conclusion on the first of the two questions referred to us, it is agreed that the second does not arise for consideration and we are not as a result called upon to answer the same. 7. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Commissioner of Income- tax as directed by sub-section (6) of section 109 of the Cochin Income- tax Act (VI of 1117). 8. We make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (12) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntile system. This sum, therefore, even under the alternative definition of the word "paid" which we have been considering, can be held to have been incurred only on the date of the determination under section 7A of the Ordinance, which date also fell in the account year in question. Consequently, whichever alternative definition of the word "paid" be applicable to the case of the assessee, it has to be held that this amount was "paid" by the assessee in the year of account in question on a correct interpretation of the word "paid" as used in section 10(2)(iv) of the Income-tax Act. The assessee was entitled to claim this amount as a legitimate deduction in the year of account in question and consequently in the assessment for the relevant assessment year. Our answer to second question is thus in the affirmative. The assessee will be entitled to its costs from the Department, which we fix at ₹ 400. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (12) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , by reason of S. 69, in any way vary R. 7 which fixes the fee on licenses in Form F. L. 1 at ₹ 2, 000 per annum. The fact of the matter is that the impost was nothing but an executive order, if an order it was, which had no. authority of law to support it and was, therefore, an illegal imposition. As explained by this Court in Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area committee Jalalabad 1952 SCR 572 1952 AIR(SC) 115) (A), & again in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar1955- 2 SCR 603 at p. 681 )S) 1955 AIR(SC) 661 at p. 693) (B), an impost not authorised by law cannot possibly be regarded as a reasonable restriction and must, therefore, always infringe the right of the respondent to carry on his business which is guaranteed to him by Art. 19 (1) (g)of the Constitution. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to express any opinion on the other points dealt with in the judgment of the High Court. 8. For reasons stated above this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
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1957 (12) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stion, it is not at all necessary to answer that question, though we may incidentally say that we are unable to see how this payment of ₹ 89,791/- to the assessee company could be held to be a refund of additional excise duty levied on and paid by the assessee, when there is no finding of fact that this amount or an amount greater than this amount was actually realised as excise duty from the assessee and when the circumstances, under which the payment was made, clearly show that this amount was paid as compensation in respect of additional wages paid by the assessee company and no questions at any stage had arisen of refunding the excise duty already realised. The mere fact that the compensation was paid out of the proceeds of the additional excise duty cannot convert it into refund of excise duty. 11. Let the record be returned with our opinion as above. Learned Counsel for the department will be entitled to the cost for this reference, which we fix at ₹ 250/-.
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1957 (12) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r-affidavit of the Department that the revision has resulted in favour of the assessee. When this was pointed out, learned counsel urged that he was only disputing the correctness of the method of computing the amortisation. (3) In regard to the years later than that to which R.C. 27 of 1955 relates, Revenue is adopting the time basis for computing depreciation and was rejecting the method adopted by the assessee which we have already discussed. The petitioner prays that the authorities might be prohibited from doing this. It would thus be seen that the questions raised by the writ petition are all directed to obtain answers to the questions referred to us in R.C. 27 of 1955. In view of our answer to the question referred in Referred Case No.. 27 of 1955, no orders are necessary in this writ. petition which has really become unnecessary except to say that the rule is discharged and the petition dismissed. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly. Rule discharged.
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1957 (12) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w cause why that particular punishment should not be inflicted on him. There is, therefore, no getting away from the fact that Art. 311(2) has not been fully complied with and the appellant has not had the benefit of all the constitutional protection and accordingly his dismissal cannot be supported. We, therefore, accept this appeal and set’ aside the order of the Single Judge and decree the appellant’s suit by making a declaration that the order of dismissal passed by the Deputy Commissioner on December 17,1951, purporting to dismiss the appellant from service was inoperative and that the appellant was a member of the service at the date of the institution of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. The appellant will get costs throughout in all courts. He must pay all court fees that may be due from him. Under order XIV, Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules were direct that the appellants could be paid his fees which we assess at ₹ 250. Appeal allowed.
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