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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 46 Records
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1957 (3) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed out, "income," which is subjected to tax by the Indian Income-tax Act, is of much larger import than "gains" and "profits." What the Fund received from its members was certainly income in the broad sense. The question is whether the surplus, after the expenditure of the Fund had been met, was assessable income. In our opinion it was assessable income from other sources within the scope of section 12. It was income, and as the Tribunal pointed out, if the assessee could not show any statutory basis for exemption from taxation, the income became assessable. As we said, it was income from other sources within the scope of section 12. It is on that basis that the question referred to us will have to be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee, though it was not quite put on that basis by the Tribunal. In our opinion this is a fit case where there should be no order as the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (3) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in a position to use the whole of the quotas allotted to it, which included what Sabapathy could claim for himself, a claim which the partners that remained in the assessee firm were prepared to support. As what the assessee undertook to pay was for the use of the full quota including what would eventually be allotted to Sabapathy, what the assessee paid Sabapathy was really an addition to the price of the goods that the assessee firm purchased for export to Ceylon on the basis of the quotas issued to the assessee firm. Such payments came within the principle laid down by this Court in Devarajulu Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1950 18 I.T.R. 357 and as we pointed out above the Assistant Commissioner was right in applying that principle. We answer the question referred to this Court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (3) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the petition that the petitioners and two other dealers in petroleum products are the only three parties singled out for the imposition of an octroi on goods imported for the purpose of sale and that this action is discriminatory and offends against Article 14 of the Constitution. In this regard, the Administrator of the Municipality, in his affidavit, has pointed out that this statement is not correct and that the Municipality has been levying octroi on imports of goods by every one for the purpose of sale. We must accept that statement as true and, therefore, no question of determining whether there has been any discrimination arises. 11. The result, therefore, is that the petition succeeds and a writ of mandamus will issue restraining the respondents, their servants and agents from levying, collecting or recovering octroi in respect of goods brought within the octroi limits for the purpose of sale only. Respondents to pay the petitioners' costs. 12. Petition allowed.
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1957 (3) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f 1942 as under the proviso to section 11(11) of the Finance Act of 1946. It is not necessary for us, as the Tribunal has attempted to do, to find out why this proviso was enacted; but if we must look for an object in a taxing statute, we are sure of one thing, that the Indian Legislature could never have had as its object in enacting the proviso to section 10(1) and the proviso to section 11(11) that an assessee who got the benefit of refund of excess profits tax without incurring the obligation of making the deposit should also have the benefit of having the refund distributed in the relevant accounting years and not to the year in which the refund was made. In our opinion, therefore, the assessee company is liable to have the sum of excess profits tax repaid to it as income for the assessment year 1953-54 and not for the respective chargeable accounting years, and we answer the question submitted to us accordingly. Assessee to pay the costs. Question answered accordingly.
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1957 (3) TMI 59 - THE COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... sponsible for the assessment to decide as to how they will deal with those matters. I do not suppose that in every case it would be worth the trouble that would be caused to the taxing authorities if they were to inquire into every deposit account and find if the interest had been increased, unless it had been increased by a large amount. Here, of course, the increase of ? 2,000,000 is very great. In my judgment there is no question but that there has been a source of income or at any rate there has been an addition to a source of income in the deposit of this money and payment of interest on it. For these reasons, which are not quite the same as those given by Vaisey J., I think that the appeal should be dismissed. JENKINS L.J. I agree, and I cannot usefully add anything. SELLERS L.J. I also agree. Appeal dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused. Solicitors Hale, Ringrose & Morrow, for Glaisfer Porter & Mason, Birmingham; solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1957 (3) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... order impugned, it could affect only the so called "lodger" who had been, on the findings, left in occupation of the premises after October 1952. He has not made any complaint about non-service. The only other person who could be affected by the order, if at all, is the petitioner herself. She has admitted that she came to know of the order in question at about the time it had been made, because she found a copy of the order affixed at the outer door of the premises. Thus admittedly, the petitioner had timely notice of the order impugned. Hence in the instant case there is no need to apply the rule of conclusive proof as laid down in sub-s. (2) of s. 13. In any event, as the concluding words of the section have provided, any irregularity or failure to comply with the-requirements of the section cannot "affect the validity of the order". As all the grounds urged in support of the petitions fail, they are dismissed with costs, one set. Petitions dismiss ed.
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1957 (3) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee firm. The acceptance of the plea that the money was brought in by Munna Lal involves in it a finding that Munna Lal was the owner of this entire money so that the firm could not be the owner of it. In that money the other two persons Debi Dayal and Dwarka Nath had no share. In the circumstances, this money which did not belong to the firm could not be held to be profits belonging to the firm and earned during the year in question. In this light of the matter, it is quite unnecessary for us to examine how far the explanation offered for the sources from which Munna Lal obtained this money is correct. In the proceedings for assessment of the firm, the amount cannot possibly be taken into account once it has been held that the money belonged not to the firm but to one of the partners, Munna Lal. Consequently, our answer to the question referred is in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Reference answered in the negative.
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1957 (3) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... istence of a charge in his favour but on the existence of the decree. It is not necessary to decide the question whether the appellant has such a charge and I do not feel called 'Upon to make any observation with regard to it. I wish, however, to say that the decision of November 5, 1943, has no operation by way of resjudicata in favour of the appellant and against the Official Receiver. That decision was between Thinnappa and the appellant. Though the Official Receiver was a party to the proceeding in which the decision was given, the issue as to whether there was a charge in favour of the appellant or not was not between him and either the appellant or Thinnappa, nor was it necessary to decide an issue between the Official Receiver and the appellant as to the existence of the charge in order to give Thinnappa or the appellant the reliefs they respectively claimed. The appeals should, therefore, be allowed with costs throughout, and I order accordingly. Appeals allowed.
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1957 (3) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Sarathy (1), It may also be noted that the notification issued by the U. P. Government on January 3, 1953, already quoted proceeds on the assumption that a dispute exists between the "employer and his workmen". The points of dispute in the reference, however, comprise the wrongful termination of the service of only Tajammul Hussain, a lino operator. The words used in the first part of the notification show that the Government was labouring under the misapprehension that this dispute was between the employer on the one hand and his workmen on the other, which, in fact it was not. Tajammul Hussain could not be termed work-, men (in the plural) nor could the U. P. Working Journalists Union be called "his workmen" nor is there any indication that the individual dispute had got transformed into an industrial dispute. The very basis, therefore, of the reference was bad and must be held to be so. We would, therefore, allow this appeal with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (3) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1941 entered into a venture of purchasing shares for earning profit by selling them later and then again, in 1942, he purchased shares in Amrit Banaspati Company Ltd. for the purpose of making an investment. The purchase of shares of Shri Gopal Paper Mills Ltd. cannot, therefore, lead to any inference that the purchase of the shares in the Straw Board Mills Ltd. in 1940 was also a purchase of the same nature. The subsequent engagement of the assessee in the business of purchasing and selling shares is also not a fact which can be relevant for the purpose of judging his intention at the time of the purchase of the shares in 1940. Thus none of the facts found by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which are supported by evidence, justified the inference that the purchase of those shares was a venture in the nature of trade. Consequently, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to his costs from the Department which we fix at Rs. 300.
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1957 (3) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l date of payment. The omission in the judgment, in our view, is due to oversight. We, therefore, amend the judgment and give the appellant interest at 6 per cent per annum from date of plaint till date of payment. Another point is raised in Appeal No. 481 of 1951. It is said that, by the same parity of reasoning, we adopted in the connected appeals, we should have allowed this appeal also in full. This obviously cannot be decided at this stage. The appellant, if advised, may take out an application for review of the judgment. In A.S. No. 296 of 1952, it is contended that we should, in exercise of our discretion, give the appellant Advocate s fee not on the amount at which the plaint was valued for jurisdictional purposes but on the amount in respect of which the declaration was asked for. We do not think there are any extraordinary circumstances in this case to exercise our discretion in the manner indicated by the learned counsel. We order accordingly. Ordered accordingly.
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1957 (3) TMI 52 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not warranted by the Act and cannot be sustained. The Board of Revenue constituted by the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Act, 1950, is not a body corporate like, for example, the Travancore and Cochin Devaswom Boards constituted under the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, but only a part of the Government of the State. It may not be correct to say that the duty cast upon such a Board by the said sub-rule amounts to a delegation of the rule-making power of the Government under section 24 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125. It is, however, unnecessary to consider this question as the petitioner has been allowed a deduction not on the basis of any percentage fixed by the Board of Revenue but at the maximum percentage fixed by the State itself. 21. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed, though in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (3) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... October, 1951, to 18th October, 1952, are in order and are within jurisdiction, and regarding these two notices, the applicant is not entitled to any writ. We will, therefore, partially allow this application, and make an order in the sense in which it was made in S.C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas 1956 29 I.T.R. 857. , referred to above. There will, therefore, be a writ prohibiting opponents Nos. 2,3, and 4 from taking any action or proceeding in pursuance of the show cause notices for re-assessment dated the 18th June, 1954, in respect of the periods (1) 1st June, 1947, to 12th November, 1947 (2) 13th November, 1947, to 1st November, 1948 (3) 2nd November, 1948, to 21st October, 1949 and (4) 22nd October, 1949, to 9th November, 1950. As the applicant has partially succeeded and partially failed, there will be no order as to costs. The amount of the security deposit made by the applicant may be refunded to him after deducting the costs payable by him. Ordered accordingly.
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1957 (3) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o information, even otherwise received by him is the last and the sixth sentence and, therefore, the affirmation is that the statement contained in that sentence is true to the knowledge of Liversedge. How it could possibly be true to his knowledge that the Commercial Tax Officer had had no information otherwise is again impossible to see. In view of the fact that there is nothing to show that the Commercial Tax Officer had not had other information before him, it is not necessary to pursue this point further. Indeed, since the appeal fails on the preliminary grounds, it is not necessary to do so in any event. I might only add that it is by no means clear to me that the information, otherwise received, must necessarily be information of the kind indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 16, but whether or not it is so, I do not decide. For the reasons I have given, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. DAS GUPTA, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (3) TMI 49 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dity of this provision was the subject-matter of consideration in a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Messrs. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited v. State of Bihar 1956 7 S.T.C. 158 A.I.R. 1956 Patna 92. and it was held in that case that the provisions of section 2(g) as amended by Bihar Act VI of 1949 are constitutionally valid. It was further held in that case that the circumstance that the goods were manufactured in Bihar constituted a sufficient territorial nexus or connection which conferred jurisdiction upon the Provincial Legislature to impose the tax, and the situs of the goods attracted the constitutional authority of the Provincial Legislature to tax the sale transaction. For these reasons we hold that all the questions referred by the Board of Revenue to the High Court should be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference, hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (3) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... resentation made by the assessees has not been carried out, by reason of the use of the expression a person , the assessees are entitled to escape the purchase tax levied under section 10(b). We must, therefore, agree with the learned Judge so far as the appellants contention under this head is concerned. The result will be that the Sales Tax Officer will be directed not to enforce the demand notice for payment of general sales tax with regard to the sale aggregating to Rs. 2,68,553-3-0, which is of cotton and aggregating to Rs. 6,47,509-1-6 of castor oil, both these sales being covered by the F.O.B. contracts which we have considered in this appeal. As the appellants have substantially succeeded, we direct that the respondent must pay to the appellants, half the costs of the appeal and with regard to the costs below, the order of costs made by the learned Judge will be set aside and we direct that the respondent should pay Rs. 250 to the appellants as costs. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (3) TMI 47 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learned counsel. It is neither section 28 nor rule 83 nor the Notification which creates an offence and provides a penalty. The case really comes under section 14, clause (e), of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, which is to the effect that any person who wilfully acts in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the rules, framed under this Act, shall on conviction by a Magistrate of the first class, be liable to a fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. The above clause has made punishable every contravention of the provisions of the Act and the rules, and the Notification of the 4th of October, 1956, merely points out that if there is a contravention of the above provisions, the person contravening would be liable to a sentence of fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. This is exactly what section 14 of the Act provides and no new offence or punishment has been created by the Notification. I do not see any force in this petition. It is accordingly rejected. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (3) TMI 46 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... b-section (3) only gives power to the officer in charge of the check post, in order to satisfy him- self that the provisions are not being contravened, to intercept and search any vehicle but to our minds it does not give him any power to make an endorsement to the effect that the delivery itself will not be made except in the presence of the Sales Tax Officer, which means in many cases inordinate delay. The delay would affect the business of the petitioners. In our opinion, therefore, section 28(3) does not give any such power to the officer in charge of the check post to make the endorsement, and the petitioners are entitled to the mandamus prayed for. We, therefore, allow these petitions with costs. A direction shall issue to the opposite party No. 1, the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, In charge, Check Post Hindon Bridge, Ghaziabad, not to make an endorsement to the effect that the delivery will not be made except in the presence of the Sales Tax Officer. Petitions allowed.
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1957 (3) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
A displaced person, was found Prima facie entitled to allotment of a house and the Accommodation Officer moved his family into the house on May 10, 1952, but no letter of allotment was issued to him. Later, when certain facts became known which in the opinion of the Union of India disentitled j to the allotment, he was informed that the house could not be allotted to him. j was evicted from the house on September 27, 1952, without being given 15 days notice as required by S. 3 of the Public Premises Eviction Act (XXVII of 1950). The house was then allotted to S and he was given possession on October 3, 1952. J filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court. The High Court ordered the Union of India and also S to restore possession of the house to J. S appealed. - Held, that the High Court erred in issuing the writ of mandamus. There was a serious dispute on questions of fact between the parties and also whether j had acquired any title to the property in dispute. Proceedings by way of a Writ were not appropriate in a case where the decision of the Court would amount to a decree declaring a party's title and ordering restoration of possession.
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1957 (3) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... stantial justice to the parties to a proceeding or to prevent the ends of justice being defeated. Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code recognises the inherent powers which the judicial courts always have to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It is next submitted that the company had entered into agreements with the Punjab Government and the Railway Administration for the supply of a large number of electric meters within a specified time and that the meters had already been imported and they were to be paid for. The company stands to suffer a great loss if the agreements are not carried out and the meters supplied within the specified period. In view of the facts stated in the application, I think the interim order deserves to be modified to the extent that the company be allowed to complete the agreements that have already been entered into and make payments in respect thereof. I order accordingly.
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