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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 49 Records
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1957 (4) TMI 86 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as been taken by virtue of the ex parte decree shall not be disturbed till a final decree is passed by the Munsif. In case the plaintiffs' suit is again decreed there would be no question of any further possession. But in case the suit is dismissed it will be only then open to the applicant to obtain possession. The ex parte decree is set aside subject to the payment of cost of a sum of Rs. 50/- by the applicant to the opposite parties within a period of three months from today. In case the deposit is not made with-in this time the application in revision shall stand dismissed. The cost shall be deposited within this time in the Court below irrespective of the fact whether the record is received by the Court below or not. The case has been pending here for the last four years and there has been considerable delay. The case shall be sent back forthwith to the trial Court and the trial Court shall also give preference to this suit and decide it as expeditiously as possible.
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1957 (4) TMI 85 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ible holder is made party defendant in the suit and he supports the claim of, the plaintiff. The decisions of this Court taking a contrary view are not, in my opinion, correct, and they are overruled. 20. It was next contended on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party that if a -decree could not be passed in favour of the plaintiff, it may be passed in favour of defendant No. 5 who is the named payee, in the promissory note in question. Since, however, defendant No. 5, did not make any such prayer, nor has he appeared before us to lay any such claim, it is not necessary to deal with this matter in this case. 21. For the reasons given above, the decree of the trial court cannot be maintained. It is accordingly set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs throughout. Hearing fee ₹ 64. Vaidynathier Ramaswami, C.J. 22. I fully agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother R. K. Chaudhary, J. Jamuar, J. 23. I agree, and have nothing to add.
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1957 (4) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l the circumstances of the case with particular reference to any extenuating circumstances. But the nature of proof, as we have indicated, has nothing to do with the question of punishment. In this case, there are no such extenuating circumstances which can be legitimately urged in support of the view that the lesser penalty under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, should meet the ends of justice. It was a cold-blooded murder. The accused came for the second time, determined to see that their victim did not possibly escape the assassins' hands. 17. As regards the second appellant, we need not say anything more than that he was lucky enough to escape conviction under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, for the reasons given by the High Court, which may not bear close scrutiny. He amply deserves the punishment of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 326 of the Indian Penal Code. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, both the appeals fail and are dismissed. 19. Appeals dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 83 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an Gopal Kabra and this contention is therefore rejected. The last of the points urged was as regards the validity of the proceedings for the transfer of the income-tax assessments of the petitioners to the first respondent. But this, however, is also concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India in which judgment was delivered by Bhagwati, J., on 31st December, 1956. In this decision their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider the effect of the amendment introduced into section 5(7A) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Their Lordships held that the amendment was constitutionally valid and justified the transfer to the Income-tax Officer. The same form has been adopted in the present case. We, therefore, reject this contention also. The result is that these writ petitions fail and the rule nisi issued will be discharged. The petitioners will pay the costs of the Department. Counsels fee ₹ 250 in each petition. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... commissioners were prepared to allow it, but even if it can be regarded I doubt if it makes any effective difference. It is not, in my view, in harmony with the tax provisions that if the transactions fell within the terms of Schedule E the income was the value of the rights acquired by the appellants when the deeds were entered into. I agree with judge when he says "If the conclusion is correct that the transfers of the shares were profits of the taxpayers offices and remuneration for the services to be performed by them, they were paid for those services when the shares were transferred to them (though the shares were not immediately realized), and assessable accordingly." As I think that conclusion is not correct, I would allow the appeals and restore the decision of the special commissioners. Appeals allowed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Solicitors Lightbounds, Jones & Crean for Owen, Dawson & Wynn-Evans, Liverpool; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1957 (4) TMI 81 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the findings of the lower Court, or in the arguments advanced by the learned- counsel for the respondents. 20. It is not the function of the Courts of law to question the wisdom or policy underlying the legislative Act. The Courts have to interpret the law as enacted, and in case of ambiguity, an interpretation should be given, which is in harmony with the purpose and intent of the legislative measure. In this case, the object and intent was to grant relief to debtors, in respect of their only place of abode or actual habitation. The meaning of the words in Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure admit of no doubt I accordingly hold that the house in question, being the only residential house belonging to the judgment-debtors and occupied by them, is not liable to attachment or sale in the execution of the decree of the respondents. 21. In the result the appeals are allowed but in the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout,
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1957 (4) TMI 80 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts on which the direction would have to be given the other way. But between those two extremes there is a very large tract of country in which the matter becomes a question of degree ; and where it becomes a question of degree it is then undoubtedly, in my opinion, a question of fact; and if the Commissioners come to a conclusion of fact without having applied any wrong principle, then their decision is final upon the matter." In the present case we are not satisfied that the finding of fact reached by the Tribunal is based upon no material or that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in law in reaching that finding of fact. It follows, therefore, that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the conclusion reached by the Appellate Tribunal, and the question referred to the High Court by the Appellate Tribunal and as recast by us must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference.
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1957 (4) TMI 79 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tempt is not competent. Therefore, on that ground alone, it fails. And if that is so, then the question as to whether there was any intention or not on the part of the respondent to commit any wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court becomes purely academic and in that view of the matter I think it is not necessary to give any definite finding on that point; though on principle this much will have to be conceded that if not in the case of prohibitory injunctions at least in the case of mandatory orders the question of intention may be relevant in deciding that the contempt, if any, was not wilful but only casual or accidental or what is called unintentional in which case the act may not amount to contempt at all or even if it amounts to any it may be so slight as the Court may not feel it prudent or wise to take any action in the matter, 13. Therefore, I hold that the proceeding should be dropped and the rule discharged. pjudge Chaudhuri /pjudge , J. 14.I agree.
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1957 (4) TMI 78 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Income-tax Act. It was held by the Madras High Court that when an application for registration is made, the Income-tax Officer was entitled to examine whether the partnership was genuine ; and if he found that there was no genuineness about the partnership, it was open to him to reject the application on the ground that there was no genuine partnership brought into existence by the deed. We do not consider that this case has any bearing upon the question we are examining in the present case. For the reasons we have already expressed, we hold that upon a true construction of the deed of partnership dated the 22nd May, 1949, and in the circumstances of the case, there was a valid partnership which could be registered under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act. We accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1957 (4) TMI 77 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Income-tax Officer with reference to the assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48, and further directed rectification of the assessment for 1948-49, under which the petitioner would be entitled to a considerable amount of relief. The petitioner in these proceedings attacked only the validity of the rectification ordered by the Income-tax Officer and confirmed by the Commissioner with reference to the assessment for the assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48. The learned counsel for the Department was right in his contention, that the assessee should not be permitted by any order of ours to retain a benefit that accrues to him under the order dated 30th September, 1955, while avoiding the liability imposed upon him by that order. The petition is allowed and the rule will be made absolute. The entire order of the Commissioner dated 30th September, 1955, and the orders of the Income-tax Officer in relation to the assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48 will stand set aside. No costs.
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1957 (4) TMI 76 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act themselves, but in the possibility of administrative discrimination in the application of the Act. Even so, I think the point is without substance in the facts of the present case. The appellant never tried to prefer any appeal under the Public Demands Recovery Act. Its point appears to be that if its case had been dealt with by a certificate officer or an Assistant or a Deputy Collector, he would have decided against it and then he would be able to appeal to the Collector, who, as an appellate authority, might have given it relief which he might not give as a Tribunal of first instance. The argument is almost ludicrous, but, as I have already indicated, I am altogether unable to see why we should engage in this case in a discussion of the validity of sections 51 and 53. The above are all the questions canvassed in the present appeal. On all of them the appellant firm fails. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. Das Gupta, J.-I Agree.
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1957 (4) TMI 75 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing to do with the management. Again in the claim proceedings initiated by the present plaintiffs when the properties in dispute were brought to sale in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 7 of 1944 already referred to, the subordinate judge found on the affidavits filed by the parties before him that the petitioners therein, i.e., the present plaintiffs, were residing in the same house as their father and that the judgment-debtor himself was in actual possession of the attached property. In these circumstances, we are inclined to take the view that the partition was not intended by the parties to have any effect and the family continued joint as before with the consequence that the properties in dispute had not lost their character as joint family property and could thus be proceeded against for recovery of the arrears of tax under the Revenue Recovery Act. The result is that the objections are allowed with costs and the decree of the trial court to that extent is modified.
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1957 (4) TMI 74 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ault; and under section 45 the petitioner firm could not have been in default when there was no due service of the notices of demand issued under section 29. These notices were served by affixture to the residence of the partners, when it was known or should have been known that they were still in Burma. Even the certificates under section 46(2) were issued when the partners were still in Burma, without any means of knowing that they had been assessed to tax. The issue of the certificate and the further proceedings of the Revenue authorities were without jurisdiction. Though it was a writ of prohibition that the petitioners asked for in these two writ petitions, the more appropriate relief appears to be to set aside the certificates issued under section 46(2) of the Act, in relation to the assessment, years 1940-41 and 1941-42 by the issue of a writ of certiorari. To that extent these petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs in W.P. Nos. 251 and 252 of 1955.
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1957 (4) TMI 73 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tly close connection between that claim and that transaction to bring the claim within the arbitration clause even though framed technically in tort." Similarly, every extra work done in performing the contract of construction must be held to be a claim relating to the contract and therefore covered by the arbitration agreement. 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff did not urge any other circumstance for rejecting the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Ordinarily when a dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement then the suit should be stayed and it is for the plaintiff to show why it should not be stayed. In the present case the nature of the dispute is such that the Superintending Engineer is in a better position "to settle it than a Court of law which will ultimately have to reply on the evidence of rival's experts. 10. For all these reasons I accept this appeal and stay the suit of the plaintiff. There will be no order as to costs.
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1957 (4) TMI 72 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... realisation of the said sum was a clerical mistake which can be rectified and should be rectified under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. We, therefore, make an order in this appeal correcting the said mistake and we order that the decree be amended by making provision for interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit to the date of the realisation of the said sum. In other words we order that the decree be amended in the same manner as it was done by the order of the lower court dated 10-7-1954. 12. Let the amendment be incorporated in the certified copy of the decree which is already on the record and after amendment is effected the decree-holder will be entitled to apply to the court below for an order for amendment of the original application for execution. 13. Having regard to the special circumstances of this case we direct that each party will pay and bear its own costs in this appeal. N.K. Sen, J. 14. I agree.
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1957 (4) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or the consignor cannot sue the railway administration for loss of the goods; 20. It is well-settled that normally a person who 1s not a party to a contract is not entitled to maintain an action for breach of that contract. That rule, it is true, is subject to certain well-recognised exceptions, e.g., a person who is not a party to a contract can sue on it if he is claiming through a party to the contract or if he is in the position of a cestui que trust or a trust or of a principal suing through an agent or if he claims under a family settlement See National Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Popat-lal Mulji. 38 Bom LR 610 AIR. 1936 Bom 344. In this case, the plaintiffs do not fall within any of the excepted classes. Not being parties to the contract and not taking owners of the goods covered by the railway receipt, in our judgment, the plaintiffs had no right to maintain an action for compensation for loss of the goods. 21. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with 22. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y. Section 26 runs as follows "Provisions as to offences punishable under two or more enactments Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same." We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Judge's view on this aspect of the case is also unsound. In view of what has been stated above, it is unnecessary to deal with the last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant except merely to state that the Special Judge had jurisdiction to try the accused person under s. 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The result is that the appeals succeed, the order of the High Court acquitting the respondent of an offence under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside and the appeals are remanded to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for re- hearing on the merits.
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1957 (4) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... tement, if becomes admissible in evidence under 8, 32, Evidence Act, 1372 by reason of the accused surviving the wounds, cannot be admitted in evidence as a confession if it is found that the Magistrate failed to comply with the provisions of Section 164, Criminal P. C. , and that he was available for being examined as a witness under the provisions of Section 533. To such a statement the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor (B) applies. In the view I have taken there can be no question of the statement Ex. P. 2 being admissible in evidence as a, confession against the accused. If this is rejected, the evidence in this case is such as would without doubt point to the direction that none of the prosecution witnesses had witnessed the actual incident, In any view of the matter the conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside. ( 9. ) I allow the appeal end set aside the conviction and sentence and direct the accused to be released cancelling the bail bonds if any.
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1957 (4) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ties, is well within the protection of cl. (2) of Art. 19 as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a). Having regard to the ingredients of the offence created by the impugned section, there cannot, in our opinion, be any possibility of this law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution. In other words, the language employed in the section is not wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(s) and consequently, the question of severability does not arise and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner have no application to this case. For the reasons stated above, the impugned section falls well within the protection of el. (2) of Art. 19 and this application must, therefore, be dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1957 (4) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Firstly, the petitioners in their personal capacity are not entitled to claim deductions of intangible additions made in the assessment of the firm Sri Krishna Das Tika Ram in the year 1951-52 and secondly, the press notifications merely gave the right to claim deductions in respect of intangible additions made in the three years preceding the years in which the voluntary disclosures were made and this benefit had already been granted to the petitioners in their assessments for the years 1947-48, 1948-49, 1949-50 and 1950-51. It cannot, therefore, be said that any intangible additions made in the accounts of the firm for the year 1951-52 could be claimed as deductions by the petitioners in accordance with the terms of the press notifications. There is, therefore, no force, in this petition either. In the result the special appeal and the writ petitions are rejected with costs. We fix the amount of costs in the special appeal to be ₹ 200. Appeal and petitions dismissed.
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