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Showing 1 to 20 of 62 Records
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1958 (3) TMI 105 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e the Mahant to the position of a servant. No doubt the Commissioner is invested with powers to pass orders, but orders can be passed only for the purposes specified in the section and not for interference with the rights of the Mahant." Their Lordships there were dealing with the rights of a Mahant which are certainly more substantial than the rights of a member of the Committee of the Governing body of a society registered under the Act of 1860. I do not think that the appointment of a treasurer and the vesting of the properties in him for the purposes specified in the Charitable Endowments Act would offend the fundamental rights of the petitioner either under Art. 19 or under Art. 31 of the Constitution. It cannot be denied that the petitioner has no beneficial interest in the property which requires to be protected under either of those Articles. 28. For all the above reasons, this Writ Petition must fail and is dismissed with costs; Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
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1958 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ding of the High Court on the question of vagueness or uncertainty of the agreement to extend time and that must inevitably lead to the dismissal of the present appeal. 13. We are, however, free to state that we have reached this conclusion with some reluctance because we are satisfied that there are no bona fides in the attitude adopted by the respondent in the present litigation. The main pleas raised by the respondent against the binding character of the contracts themselves as well as against the authority of Laxmidas to write the letter for extension of time have been rejected by both the courts below, and the only ground on which the respondent succeeds before us was made on behalf of the respondent for the first time in appeal. Under these circumstances we think the fair order as to costs would be that parties should bear their own costs throughout. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed but there would be no order as to costs throughout. 14. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (3) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
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... ... ..... /4th share in the house in dispute, but between the parties the effect of this transaction cannot be taken into consideration. It is not possible to consider the document only for the benefit of one party and ignore it so far as it affects the other party. If the sale of 1933 is not effective between the parties to the present litigation, then it cannot be said that the mortgage had been extinguished. I have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention. 9. The result is that this appeal succeeds to the extent that it is held that the plaintiffs are entitled to get by partition half of the house in dispute but subject to payment of Amar Singh's share of the mortgage amount due under the 1925 document. The case is remanded to the trial Court for decision of the other issues and for partition of the house in accordance with this judgment. 10. Parties have been directed to appear before the trial Court on 3-4-58. 11. Parties will bear their own costs of this appeal.
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1958 (3) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mentioned in the notice did not correspond with the relief actually claimed in the plaint. We are of the opinion that the learned Judicial Commissioner was right in his view that there was no substantial difference between the two. In the notice the relief claimed was thus expressed in paragraph 18 "That my said client is entitled to be reinstated on his former post, and to be paid the amount due to him on the basis of his being treated as if he was not discharged from the date of his discharge upto the date' of reinstatement". In the plaint the main relief claimed was a declaration that the order of discharge or removal of the respondent was illegal and arbitrary. As we have already stated, in our view, there is no substantial difference between the two and the notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, cannot be held to be invalid on the ground urged on behalf of the appellant. 9. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1958 (3) TMI 101 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... ase we are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for refund of the amount of the sale proceeds, namely, ₹ 650/-which has found its way into the Government Treasury and to which extent the Government of India has been enriched. In other words, Rs, 650/- deposited on 21-6-1950, in the Government Treasury in favour of the Union Government is money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use and the plaintiff is entitled to the refund of this money on the principle of ex-acquo et bono. In other words , the plaintiff has in equitable claim for refund of the money which had been received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use. 5. For these reasons we hold that the decree passed by the lower appellate Court should be set aside and the plaintiff should be granted a decree to the extent of ₹ 650/- and proportionate costs in all She Courts, Accordingly, we modify the decree of the lower appellate court and allow the appeal to this extent.
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1958 (3) TMI 100 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... essary because the amount of ₹ 48,50,689, mentioned in question No. 1 also includes the sum of ₹ 10,15,000 which is separately dealt with the question No. 2. Therefore, the figure of ₹ 38,35,689 will be substituted for ₹ 48,50,689 in question No. 1. We will answer these questions after we receive the supplementary statement of the case. 17. When the supplementary statement of the case comes back, it would be open to Mr. Joshi to contend that the principle laid down in Lord's Dairy Farm Ltd's case does not apply to the facts of this case, because Mr. Joshi says that this is a case where Secretary had full authority to do the bank's business and this is not a case where some special powers were delegated to an office of the bank. The Tribunal will also find what the power of the secretary were and submit the finding in the supplementary statement of the case. 18. No order on the notice of motion, nor order as to costs on the notice of motion.
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1958 (3) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... how clumsily the forms also settled, and the present form is an illustration of what we have had occasion to say in the past." 38. The manner in which the official contract form which had been settled when the by-laws of the Association came first to be promulgated has been retained in its pristine glory in spite of the various changes made in the operation of the by-laws and the practice of the trade only enhances the difficulties of the parties and enables the parties who are so minded to raise all sorts of disputes tenable or otherwise in order to avoid their liability in respect of the transactions effected by them in the Association. It may be hoped that the Association will take effective steps to bring the official contract form in conformity with the by-laws in operation from time to time and the practice of the trade prevailing in the Association. 39. The result therefore is that this appeal fails and must stand dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (3) TMI 98 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... the question of law that arises from the order of the Tribunal. The question as framed is "If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether having regard to the observations of Their Lordships in 1955 27ITR245(Bom) , the notice served on 1st April 1954 was out of time?" We have made no observations in that case with regard to the service of the notice. But Mr. Joshi says that the observations referred to are the observations with regard to the order under Section 23 be coming intructuous. We will reframe the question deleting, reference to the observations in Navinchandra's 1955 27ITR245(Bom) and the reframed question will be "If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether the notice served on 1st April, 1954 was out of time?" and we will answer that question in the affirmative. 5. Commissioner to pay the costs. 6. No order on the notice of motion. No order as to costs on the notice of motion. 7. Answers in the affirmative.
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1958 (3) TMI 97 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her the bets which the golfer won were liable to tax. Mr. Justice Lawrence came to the conclusion that these bets did not arise from his employment as a professional golfer. Now the facts which the English court has to consider were entirely different from the facts that we have to consider. In playing a private game the golfer was not exercising his profession; in laying the bet he was not doing something which was ordinarily a part of his profession; and, as Mr. Justice Lawrence points out, in laying the bet he took the risk, although it might have been a remote risk, of losing the bet. Therefore, clearly this particular activity of the golfer could be separated from his activity as a professional. It cannot be said in this case that the activity of the assessees could be separated from their normal ordinary activity as architects. 4. We must, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the negative. 5. Assessees to pay the costs. 6. Question answered in the negative.
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1958 (3) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e fundamental rights of the petitioner is involved and his grievance against the order passed by the second respondent cannot be ventilated by a petition under Art. 32. This position is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He, however, argued that, if we construe s. 17 in his favour and hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent application, his purpose would be effectively served even though technically his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground that it is not competent under Art. 32 of the Constitution. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this contention. We would accordingly hold that the second respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent's application; but, since the petition itself is not competent under Art. 32, we would direct that the petition fails on this technical ground and must be dismissed. There could be no order as to costs. 16. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (3) TMI 95 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... company is sufficiently stamped. It is not necessary therefore to consider what a stamp would have been payable on the form which ought to have been filed but was not actually filed. As has been pointed out by my Lord the Chief Justice, in the referring order there is no suggestion that any contract other than a contract for sale was entered into between the parties. Nor is there any material before us on the basis of which it can be held that any other contract of sale was in fact entered into. The contract which was admittedly made was only an agreement to transfer in future and was chargeable with duty under Article 5(c) of Schedule I-B to the Stamp Act and must be held to have been properly stamped. I, therefore, agree that the reference should be answered as proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. By The Court 18. We hold that the particulars filed by the Company under Section 104(2) of the Indian Companies Act 1913 were duly stamped and answer the reference accordingly.
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1958 (3) TMI 94 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... raised before us cur careful considerations, we are of the opinion that the appeals filed on behalf of the State should be allowed and the appeals filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in the various suits (Krishna Group) should be dismissed. 28. The result would be that the suits of all the plaintiffs would be dismissed. As regards costs we direct that so far as those plaintiffs in the suits filed in the Sub-Court, Krishna, are concerned who agreed to pay the difference, they be made liable to pay the full advocate's fee in the lower Court and in this Court while those plaintiffs in the sub-Court Krishna who did not give their consent to paying the difference are concerned, they would be liable to pay 3/4 of the advocate's fee payable In this Court and in the Court below. The plaintiffs in the suits in the various Courts in the Districts of East and West Godavari will pay the costs of the Govern ment here and in the Court below. This judgment will govern all the appeals.
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1958 (3) TMI 93 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee and when from them the shares of the partners can be ascertained, it is idle to suggest that the instrument of partnership does not specify the shares of the partners. It is technicality with a vengeance. The fourth ground on which registration was refused was that the application as framed does not meet the requirements of the Act and the Rules. The Tribunal does not give us any reason, why it thinks that the application does not comply with the provisions of the law, and Mr. Joshi has not pointed out to us any flaw or defect in the application itself. The application is signed by the partners of the firm as it was constituted on the date of the application as required by law, and the two Schedules contain all the necessary information which has got to be supplied by a party applying for registration. In our opinion, therefore, the registration was wrongly refused and we must answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs.
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1958 (3) TMI 92 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... I consider that this is not a correct view nor do I agree with the manner in which the learned Judge has tried to get over the effect of Section 369 of the Code which provides -- "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being In force or, in the case of a High Court established by Royal Charter, by the Letters Patent of such High Court, no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error." The learned Judge did not consider that re-hearing of the case on the ground that the appellant had not been represented and heard did not amount to reviewing the judgment. In my opinion the present application is not even remotely covered by the provisions of Section 561-A of the Code and I accordingly dismiss it. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made an oral request for the grant of certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. I reject his application.
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1958 (3) TMI 91 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n that Bombay case was that this was an isolated act done by the company in the particular circumstances, and no suggestion could therefore be made that this was a part of the company's regular business activity. The present case, in my opinion, is very different for here the company regularly engages itself in laying the service lines and, as I have already observed, the company finds it profitable to engage in this activity, and this has for all purposes become a part of the regular business of the company. I am, therefore, persuaded that the company's receipts from the consumers for laying the service lines are trading receipts and the profit element therein being the difference between the service connection receipts and the service connection costs is taxable income in the bands of the company. I would, therefore, answer the reference accordingly, but in the circumstances of the case leave the parties to bear their own costs in this court. Bhandari, CJ.-I agree.
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1958 (3) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... doubt, a deed of partnership in existence in the year of account 1954-55. But that deed itself did not specify the shares of the individual partners. The specification of shares was only on September 17, 1955, though that left intact the constitution of the partnership under the earlier deed dated March 29, 1954. The effect was that the requirements of section 26A were satisfied only on September 17, 1955, but that was beyond the year of account. That the rectification effected on September 17, 1955. governed the rights and liabilities inter se as from April 1, 1955, could in no way enlarge their statutory right under section 26A of the Act. As we have already pointed out, for the purpose of section 26A there was a specification of shares only on September 17, 1955. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in refusing registration in the year of assessment 1955-56. We answer the question in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay costs of this reference.
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1958 (3) TMI 89 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and gains of a business during the relevant period, and Mr. Palkhivala's contention is that independently of section 10 and without satisfying the technicalities of that section, if he could show that from a commercial point of view it is constituted "income, profits and gains from business" then he would be entitled to succeed. The whole of our judgment is based on the view that this income is not a business income whether within the meaning of section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act or from a broader point of view. Our view is that this is a statutory income derived by the assessee by reason of the obligation undertaken by the State to pay him a certain portion of the tax by reason of the fact that he made a certain deposit contemplated by section 10 of the Finance Act of 1942. The result is that the Commissioner must succeed and we must answer the only question submitted to us in the negative. The assessee to pay the costs. No order on the notice of motion.
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1958 (3) TMI 88 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case. Our attention was also drawn by Mr. Palkhivala to a decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy 1957 32 ITR 466 . There too, the income-tax authorities failed to adduce proper evidence to establish whether the income was agricultural or non-agricultural income and an attempt was made before the Supreme Court to send the matter back to enable the Department to conduct the proper enquiry. That application was rejected by the Supreme Court by pointing out that, in view of the long lapse of time, it did not consider it desirable to direct any such enquiry. The same consideration would also apply here because the assessment year with which we are concerned is 1948-49 and we are now in 1958. The result is, we must answer Question No. (1) In the affirmative. Question No. (2) In the affirmative. Question No. (3) Unnecessary in view of our decision on Question No. (2). Commissioner to pay three-fourth of the costs of the reference.
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1958 (3) TMI 87 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here was no investigation on those lines at all at any stage of the assessment proceedings. There was certainly no finding of the Tribunal, that there was any mutuality about the two transactions. There was no finding that the transfers together constituted but a single transaction, and there was no evidence either on which such a finding could be rested. 25. We are clearly of opinion that there was no material on record to justify the conclusion of the Tribunal, that the transfer of assets effected by G.M. Kothari in favour of his daughter-in-law was an indirect transfer by D.C. Kothari of his assets to his wife, or that the transfer of his assets effected by D.G. Kothari in favour of his mother constituted an indirect transfer by G.M. Kothari of his assets to his wife. 26. We answer the first question in the negative and in favour of the assessees. 27. Considering that neither side has wholly succeeded in this reference we direct the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1958 (3) TMI 86 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er cent per annum simple interest from the date of the Hundi up to the date of suit. I also pass a decree for the same amount against the other defendant Shukanraj who being. Jeevraj's son (and was admittedly joint with him) is under a pious obligation to pay his father's debt even during the latter's life time, but this decree shall be executable against him to the extent of his interest in the joint family property only and shall not be personal. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to receive interest at 4 per cent per annum simple from the date of this decree until realisation. As to costs, I would direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout as both parties have suppressed the true state of things. By The Court 61. In accordance with the view of the majority, we answer the three questions put to us in the manner indicated in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice. We dismiss the appeal hut order parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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