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Showing 1 to 20 of 22 Records
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1959 (6) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... des only for an exemption from payment of tax; and if in computing the total income liable to tax and the rates at which the tax is payable set-off of losses of the previous years is to be allowed, it would be difficult to hold that the set-off will be postponed to the benefit of section 15C. The Legislature undoubtedly intended to confer certain benefits upon industrial undertakings to which section 15C applies but we will not on that account be justified in holding that, when the Legislature has not provided that the benefit of section 15C is to be allowed as a deduction from income, deduction substantially of that nature should still be made on the assumption that an absence of an express provision dealing with priority implied that intention. 8. We reframe the question by substituting the word "before" for the word "without" and answer the question in the affirmative. 9. Assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner. 10. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (6) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to lay-off compensation. 7. We are accordingly of the opinion that compensation payable for lay-off, under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, is not wages within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act. Similar view was taken in Reference under S. 81 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, In the matter of, 58 Bom LR 328. That was a case under the Employees' State Insurance Act, but the definition of "wages" given in that Act was for all practical purposes the same as the unamended definition of this word in the Payment of Wages Act. The definition of "wages" given in the Payment of Wages Act has since then been amended, But the amendment does not in any way alter the ratio or principle of the decision in the above case, 58 Bom LR 328. With respect, we agree with the view taken in this case that lay-off compensation is not wages. The rules issued in the two applications will, therefore, be discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
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1959 (6) TMI 28 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... son undoubtedly an accretion to the assets transferred, but they could not be regarded as assets transferred'' by the assessee Mr. Joshi, who appears on behalf of the Department, contends that the dividend income from the bonus shares in the hands of the minor child is income which arose indirectly from assets transferred by the assessee and is liable to be included the purpose of assessment. But, in out judgment, the source of the dividend income from the bonus shares is not the assets transferred but the accretion thereto; and that income cannot be regarded as arising even indirectly from the assets transferred by the assessee. The Legislative has not by enacting S. 16(3) (a) (vi) sought to tax in the hands of the assessee income arising from accretions to the assets transferred by him to his minor children. (3) We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. The Commissioner of Income Tax to pay the costs of the reference. (4) Answer of Assessee
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1959 (6) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ch is relevant to the question before us. There was no interlacing and no blending of the two businesses which were totally diverse and distinct commercial operations. The nature of the two businesses, I may repeat, was wholly different. On these facts, it is extremely difficult to say that the majority of the Members of the Tribunal were in error when they held against the assessee. Moreover, in this reference we are not making an enquiry as to whether the Tribunal was right or was in error in the conclusion reached by it. We have only to satisfy ourselves whether there was any evidence on which the Tribunal could have reached the conclusion drawn by it. It is not possible to say that the Tribunal has failed to draw any proper legal inference from the proved facts of the case, nor is it possible to say that it has misdirected itself in law on any point. I agree that the answers to the three questions should be as stated by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (6) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... meaning of section 2(4A) read with section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act. In the present case, in substance the transaction between the vendors, the assessee and the ultimate purchasers appears to have assumed the form under which the property was conveyed to the ultimate purchasers and the assessee made up the difference between the price stipulated to be paid by him and the price paid by the purchasers. The consideration paid by the assessee was in substance consideration paid for being permitted to avoid the obligation to purchase the property. By no stretch of imagination, in our judgment, can compensation or damages paid for failing to carry out a contract to purchase a property be regarded as a loss arising from sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of section 2(4A) of the Income-tax Act. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative. The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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1959 (6) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cle which in substance forms part thereof would also be regarded as included in the connotation of that expression. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. S. P. Mehta that, because the diesel engines are installed in the vehicles, initial depreciation is allowable to the assessee in respect of those engines. 3. We are also unable to agree with the alternatives contention of Mr. Mehta that these diesel engines constitute "machinery being new which has been installed". In our view, in order that initial depreciation should be allowable on machinery, it must be a self-contained unit capable of being put to use in the business, profession or vocation for the benefit of which it is installed. In the present case, the diesel engines installed by the assessee do not satisfy that test. 4. On the view taken by us, the answer to the question will be in the negative. 5. The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner. 6. Question answered in the negative.
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1959 (6) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the object of permitting income derived from property consisting of business held under trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes being excluded from the total income of the person receiving it as enacted in clause (i) of section 4(3) and not permitting such exclusion if the business is carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution and it does not satisfy the requirements which are inserted in the latter part of proviso (b) to clause (i). It does appear that income derived from business carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution can very well be income of a business which is itself the subject-matter of a religious or charitable trust; but it is not for us to enter into this enquiry or allow ourselves to speculate on the reasons. The construction of the relevant provisions must be as already mentioned by me, and on that view the answer to the question referred to us will be in the affirmative. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (6) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n on the reasons recorded by the Income-tax Officer. Even the order of the Income-tax Officer and the manner in which the reassessment proceedings were dealt with are not before the court. The reasons given by the Income-tax Tribunal for coming to the conclusion that the notices fell within the terms of section 34(1)(a) were made in a different context and we do not think that they can be regarded as conclusive or binding in considering whether the case is governed by the proviso to section 4 of Act 1 of 1959. In the circumstances, before this reference can be decided in the light of the provisions of Act 1 of 1959, we think that we must have a supplementary statement of facts as to the character of the notices issued by the Income-tax Officer in April, 1954, upon the assessees. After the supplementary statement of facts is received from the Tribunal, we will proceed to reframe the questions in the light of the provisions of Act 1 of 1959 and will proceed to answer the same.
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1959 (6) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... racts entered into in the ordinary course of business, van den Bergh's case 1935 19 Tax Cas. 390; 3 I.T.R. (Eng. Cas.) 17 will have no application. On the view taken by us. The first, question will be answered as follows "The receipt of ₹ 20,000 is a taxable receipt for the purpose of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922." As we have already held that the amount is a taxable receipt, being receipt arising from business, section 4(3)(vii) does not exempt it from liability to tax. We are in the view we have taken not called upon to consider whether even if the receipt of ₹ 20,000 is a capital receipt, by operation of section 10(5A)(d) the amount can be regarded as a revenue receipt. We answer the second question as follows It is liable to be included in the total income notwithstanding section 4 because it arose from business. The third question does not fall to be answered. The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (6) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ve any part of the gross profits; and we are unable to appreciate how the principle in Turner Morrison & Co.'s case 1953 23 I.T.R. 152 will apply to the facts of this case. When sale proceeds, gross or net, are received by the assessee, evidently section 4 is immediately attracted, and the income, profits and gains embedded therein became chargeable to tax; but in our judgment that principle will not apply to an amount left in deposit with the assessee for due performance of a contract which amount is subsequently appropriated towards the price on the execution of a sale deed. On the view taken by us, the answer to the question referred is that the amount of ₹ 96,000 odd, which is the profit made by the assessee in the transaction, is taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52 and is not liable to be apportioned as income for the assessment years 1946-47 and 1951-52. The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income-tax. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (6) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the business of the assessees. In the present case, the expenditure having been incurred by the assessee-company for acquiring a right to the manganese ore, which was not identifiable in situ, the expenditure must be regarded as capital expenditure. We accordingly answer the three questions referred for decision as under (i) The sum of ₹ 15,27,000 paid by the assessee-company for the leasehold interest in several manganese mines was capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure and as such it was not an allowable deduction. (ii) Even a proportionate amount of the total sum paid for the leasehold manganese mines, i.e., ₹ 98,280 per annum, was not deductible in determining the profits of the business. (iii) The legal and other expenses incurred for the leases of the manganese mines were not admissible deductions under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The assessee-company to pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income-tax. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (6) TMI 19 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Income-tax authorities find as a fact that certain income is from undisclosed sources, that is not a finding that, in the absence of any statement that the assessee has got other sources of income, he has no other source of income. For, if it was known that an assessee has other sources of income, there would be no finding that a certain income is from undisclosed sources which must from their very nature remain unknown to the Income-tax authorities. In this view the finding that the amount of ₹ 30,452 was an income from undisclosed sources implies that it is unconnected with the business of the assessee. Consequently, it must be held that on the facts and circumstance so the case the assessee failed to explain the excess credit in the anamat khata to the extent of ₹ 10,230. Our answer to the question, in the view that we have taken, is in the affirmative, the assessee shall bear the costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (6) TMI 18 - IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... stablishment in the United Kingdom. The true answer, to mind, is that the society does not make any "profits" from its business within the meaning of the Double Taxation Agreement. But it has a world "investment income," and it can be taxed here under rule 3 upon a proportion of that income, and when it comes to pay Australian tax in Australia (on its world investment income) it will receive credit for the amount paid here under rule 3. If I am wrong, it means that the Australian society will no longer have to pay the tax it has paid under rule 3 for 30 years or more. It will have to pay no tax at all in return for the benefit of carrying on the business of life assurance XIF in this country--but only tax on such investments as it may choose at its will to retain in this country. I do not think that this was the intention of the Double Taxation Relief Agreement between the United Kingdom and Australia. I would therefore allow the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (6) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tnership agreement was executed on August 15, 1953, where under the business conducted in the name of Hiralal Mathuradas was conducted in partnership between Jayantilal and the assessee Bai Mani. On these facts, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion, especially having regard to the quantum of interest which Hiralal had, and the extent of capital which he had brought into the partnership and the relation which subsisted between Hiralal and Jayantilal and the conduct of the two partners Jayantilal and Bai Mani that the latter had succeeded to her husband Hiralal in his capacity as a partner by inheritance. In our view, the Tribunal's conclusion is one on a question of fact and we do not think we will be justified having regard to the evidence in interfering with the conclusion of the Tribunal. On the view taken by us, the answer to the question submitted to us will be in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (6) TMI 16 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... , the average life of only 12 months possessed by upper knives seems to me be near the line, but no attempt has been made to separate these knives and the other appliances, and I do not know whether it would have been practicable to do so. In point of function there is no distinction, so far as I can see, between the upper knives and the rest. I would therefore give the upper knives the benefit of the doubt and for the present purpose treat them as possessing the requisite degree of longevity. This accords with the arrangements between the Revenue and the company referred to in paragraph 6 of the case, which allowed all the knives and lasts an average life of three years. So far as the question is one of fact and degree, I think the special Commissioners must be taken to have held by implication that the expenditure here in question was capital expenditure, and I see no sufficient reason for differing from that view. I would accordingly dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (6) TMI 15 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of preference arose. In the case of the Trustees of the Charity Fund, Esplanade Road, Fort, Bombay the settlor, after setting out the charitable purposes, had directed in the deed of trust that in applying the income of the trust properties the trustees shall give preference to the "poor and indigent relations or members of the family of Sir Season David, including therein distant and collateral relations" and their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the provision relating to the giving of preference to the poor and indigent relations or members of the family of Sir Season David could not affect the public charitable trust constituted under sub-clause (a) of clause 13 of the trust deed. In our view, this judgment is decisive of the question which is sought to be raised before us. We, therefore, answer the question referred for decision in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax to pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (6) TMI 14 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment, some of which by their very nature are incapable of being fixed in position at the time when they are worked or used. The assumption made by Mr. Joshi that the expression "installed" must necessarily mean "fixed in position" at the time when the plant is worked or used does not, in our judgment, seem to be justified. The expression "installed" is also used in the sense of "inducted or introduced", and if that be the sense in which that expression is used, there is nothing inconsistent in the context in which that word is used which will justify us in holding that the word "plant" in section 10, sub-section (2), clause (vib), of the Income-tax Act was not intended to include vehicles. We, therefore, proceed to answer the question referred to us for decision in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the assesses. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (6) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icult to rely upon the Explanation to support the view that the payment is capital payment or revenue payment. The decided cases here have taken the view ( Guff 39 s case (1) to which we have already referred and Khosal. In re (2)) that a payment made as compensation for loss of employment is to be regarded as a capital payments. If that be the correct view, in the present case notwithstanding the fact that for the payment of Rs. 1 lakh by the company to the assessee, the assessee was being compensated for loss of employment and was also giving up all his claims against the company and binding himself to a covenant not to accept employment which may be detrimental to the interest of the company out of a certain area, it would not in our judgment make any difference as to the nature of the payment made to him. On that view of the case, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. nbsp Question answered in the negative.
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1959 (6) TMI 12 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... initions shows that what is taxed is the amount of the sale price or part of sale price in respect of the sale or supply of goods and, therefore, the consideration is inseparably a part of the transaction which is sought to be taxed. This contention, in our opinion, also cannot succeed. These were all the contentions raised on behalf of the assessees. The appeal fails and is dismissed. So far as Civil Reference No. 37 of 1957 is concerned, we answer the first part of the first question referred to us in the affirmative. The second part of the question, therefore, does not call for decision. The first part of the second question referred is also answered in the affirmative. The second part does not arise in view of the answer to the first part. An order answering the reference as above shall be separately drawn up. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The reference is answered as above. So far as the reference is concerned there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (6) TMI 11 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acter were hit by Article 286(1) of the Constitution only and if the goods were delivered for consumption in the State of Assam, they could always be taxed by the State of Assam, the seller would be entitled to charge sales tax from the purchaser. And the purpose of section 15 was that if the goods were sold to the dealers who intended to resell them, the seller will not charge any sales tax from them, and therefore, he should not be made liable to pay the same. No objection, therefore, can be taken to the rule in so far as it enjoins upon the assessee before getting a deduction under section 15 to produce a declaration in writing by the purchasing dealer that the goods were mentioned in the purchasing dealer s certificate of registration and were intended for resale. In this view of the matter we answer the second question in the affirmative. In the circumstances, the parties should bear their own costs. SINHA, C.J.-I agree. DEKA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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