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Showing 1 to 20 of 34 Records
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1959 (8) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... within any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of section 13. As I have already held the decree in question falls within exception (a) of section 13 and is a decree not of a Court of competent jurisdiction. The words as if are used in sub-section (1) to make the whole scheme of Order XXI applicable in respect of execution of decrees at foreign Courts mentioned in sub-section (1). The words as if have no wider meaning as is suggested by Mr. Parpia. Mr. Joshi relied upon, the decisions in the case of Vithalbhai Shivabhrd Patel v. Lalbhai Bhhnhliai, 44 Bom LR 380 AIR 1942 Bom 199) and Indian and General Investment Trust Ltd. v, Raja of Khalikote, AIR 1952 Cal 508 . Questions arose in those matters regarding recognition of foreign judgments and the principles as recognized by the Privy Council in the case of Raja of Faridkote were repealed in these decisions. It is unnecessary to refer to the details of facts as contained in these decisions. 2. Execution dismissed.
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1959 (8) TMI 63 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r in accordance with the provisions of this Act an application or appeal for disposal. It is, therefore, open to an aggrieved party to pursue the remedy provided by that section especially when we have no means of arriving at the cost price. For these reasons, we cannot give effect to this contention also. 68. In these circumstances, all the Writ Petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 100/- in each to be apportioned between the Municipality and the Government. These petitions have to be dismissed on another ground also, namely, that this court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not grant declaration or direct the refund of the amount collected from the petitioners, for in such an eventuality, any person seeking such relief, should have recourse to the ordinary courts of law. 69. The second appeal also is dismissed with costs as the point raised in this appeal is covered by our decision in the Writ Petitions.
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1959 (8) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e. So there was a provision in the contract for adjusting the advance. 13. We think it fit also to observe that it is somewhat curious that any question as to the application of art. 115 was allowed to be raised. The applicability of that article depends on special facts. No such facts appear in the plaint. There is no hint there that the account was mutual. We feel sure that if the attention of the learned Judges of the High Court had been drawn to this aspect of the matter, they would not have permitted any question as to art. 115 being raised, and the parties would have saved considerable costs thereby. 14. We therefore come to the conclusion that the appeal must be allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Judges of the appellate bench of the High Court are set aside and those of the learned single Judge of the High Court are restored. The appellant will be entitled to the costs in this Court and of the hearing of the appeal before the High Court. 15. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (8) TMI 61 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en up for consideration cannot possibly be regarded as the date of the hearing, (Manohar Dass v. Birandari Sheikhupurain AIR 1936.Lah. 280). On that day it is not necessary for any one to speak, for no evidence is to be recorded, no arguments are to be heard and no other question regarding the determination of the suit is to be agitated. The Court is only to direct that the commissioner's report be placed on the file. (6) I am of the opinion that the proceedings which took place on the 29th June 1950 cannot properly be called a "hearing" and it was not within the power of the Court to proceed ex parte against the defendants. Ex parte proceedings under Order 9 rule 6 can be taken if, and only if, the defendant fails to appear in Court when the suit is called on for "hearing". (7) For these reasons I would uphold the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the appeal with costs. Ordered accordingly. (8) MEHAR SINGH J. I agree. (9) Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (8) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... 57 1SCR233 and R. K. Dalmia's case. 1959 1SCR279 and other cases. Dr. Atul Gupta on the other hand relied on the cases reported in Purushottam Govindji v. B. M, Desai, (S) 1956CriLJ129 ; Collector of Malabar v. E. Ebrahim Hajee, (S) 1957CriLJ1030 ; Hindu Women's Rights and Property Act, 1937; in the matter of Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal, 1953CriLJ1621 ; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Trust Co of New York (1884) 28 Law Ed 704; Horace B. Claflin v. Julius Houseman (1878) 23 Law Ed 833; S. A. Taylor v. Henry Sternberg (19351 79 Law Ed 599); Heman Marian Sweatt v. Theophilas Shickel Painter (1950) 94 Law Ed 1114, and Brown v. Board of Education of Topega (1954) 98 Law Ed 873 and also on the cases cited on behalf of the petitioners. It is not however necessary to deal with these cases at any length in this judgment. 31. My conclusion is that Section 237 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is not void and it does not infringe Article 14 of the Constitution.
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1959 (8) TMI 59 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rules of Hindu law. The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the subject shows that only the karta and not the entire family becomes a partner when there is association between him and strangers under section 4 of the Partnership Act. The death of a partner automatically dissolves partnership and, therefore, the death of the karta puts an end to the an end to the partnership. The surviving members of the family cannot, therefore, be held liable for any debts incurred after the death of the karta. (10) In this view of the matter I would answer the first question in the negative holding that the family cannot be deemed to have become a partner when the karta of the family enters into partnership in his representative capacity. My answer to the second question would be that on the death of the karta the partnership stands dissolved. The case will now be remitted to the Division Bench for disposal. Dulat, J. (11) I agree. Gosain, J. (12) I agree. (13) Answer accordingly.
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1959 (8) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... ken under S. 201 Cri.P.C. disregarding the very wide powers vested in the High Court under S. 526(1)(e)(i) Cri.P.C. In those decisions, the powers of the High Court under S. 526(1)(e)(i) were not invoked and the relief sought was confined to a very narrow issue. Questions such as the venue of the trial court and its competency to try offences as distinct from the power of the High Court to clothe, with territorial jurisdiction, any court, even, if it did not possess territorial or local jurisdiction, were never adverted to in those decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused. The decision in ILR 42 Mad 791 AIR 1920 Mad 824, is still good law, being in conformity with the policy underlying S. 526(1)(e)(i) Criminal Procedure Code. 36. In the result, I agree that the order that we have already passed in the matter should be confirmed. A.S. Venkatachala Moorthy, J. 37. I agree with my learned brothers, Ramaswami and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed JJ. 38. Order accordingly.
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1959 (8) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... to the High Court decree, before the Insolvency Court, on the principle of waiver. We need not, however, consider this point because of the view already expressed by us. 37. For the reasons aforesaid, we dismiss this appeal and affirm the order passed by the lower court. We, however, make no order as costs of this appeal. 38. Before we close Our judgment, we desire to observe that the Receiver appellant No. 1, may not have been well advised in not taking any step so long for the realisation of the property of the insolvent and distribution of the dividends amongst the creditors entitled thereto. It was not certainly worth the while for him to join with the insolvent appellants Nos. 2 and 3 in this appeal. 39. We hope that the learned District Judge will look into his conduct and pass appropriate orders against him. if the Receiver be found guilty of any misconduct or dereliction of duty. 40. Let the records be sent down as early as possible. Braja Kanta Guha, J. 41. I agree.
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1959 (8) TMI 56 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng envisaged by the Act itself." Therefore, in the face of these authorities the matter now at least so far as this Court is concerned seems to have been finally settled and as such binding on me that an award given on reference without the intervention of Court has no legal existence, nor is capable of upholding any right or title as comprehended thereunder unless it is made a rule of the Court within the meaning of the Arbitration Act itself. It follows, therefore, that the objection taken by the defendants in this case as to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of the existence of a previous award which is not a registered one, has to fail and to that extent the application filed by the plaintiffs has to be allowed. 9. In the result, therefore, the applications are disposed of in terms as stated above. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. 10. Now therefore, the suit has to proceed to trial on other issues raised in the case.
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1959 (8) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the petitioners. The reliefs asked for, which would practically tantamount to ruining this company and the interests of the majority shareholders and achieve for minority shareholders what they would not have achieved either in the civil suits or by winding up, cannot be granted. But in regard to buying up, this solution need not be imposed by me, because there is a suit already pending in the Sub Court, Tiruchirapalli, for that purpose and as a matter of fact the respondents are ready and willing to pay even more than what they have stipulated for to buy up the shares of the petitioners. But so emboldened have the applicants become by their obstructive tactics of harassing the respondents, that they are now claiming right to buy up the majority shareholders. In short it has become a case of not the dog wagging the tail but the tail wagging the dog. (16) This petition and the ancillary petitions totally devoid of merits are dismissed with costs. (17) Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (8) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ) II pp. 119, 120 where the law is summarised. There is nothing to prove that, the Dominion had expressly or even tacitly recognized the ,old rights, the burden of proving which lay upon the respondent Secretary of State for India v. Bai Rajbai (L.R. 42 I.A. 229) and Vajesingh's case (1924) L.R. 51 J.A. 357, 360) (op. cit.). In this view of the matter it is not necessary to determine whether the Nawab could or did confer title on the donee in respect of this property. Equally fruitless will be an inquiry into the powers of the Nawab - to resume or derogate from, his grants and whether similar or identical powers were inherited by the Dominion Government or its agents. The action of the Dominion Government being an act of State, the act of the Administrator, however arbitrary, was not justiciable in the municipal courts and the suit was not well founded. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The respondent's suit shall be dismissed with costs. throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (8) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of action arising under Ex. A-l. Ex. A-2 (a) as already stated is an acknowledgment of payment of ₹ 4/- under Ex. A-2. The contention is that the acknowledgment of part payment of a sum secured by Ex. A-2 must be limited to the liability arising under Ex, A-2 and not for the liability arising under Ex. A-1. No authority of rule of law has been cited before me in support of this contention. In my view, Ex. A-1 (a) and Ex. A-2 (a) can be used for purposes of limitation under Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act. 6. I, therefore, allow the revision and decree the suit for ₹ 300-2-0 with interest at ₹ 12/- per cent per annum till the date of the institution of the suit and ₹ 6/- per cent per annum till the date of realisation of the sum decreed. The petitioner will recover costs throughout from the respondents 1 to 5. The respondent No. 6 had been given up and unnecessarily made a party to this revision petition. The revision against him is dismissed.
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1959 (8) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a true interpretation of Rule 178 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the licensee is not prohibited from entering into a partnership. I distinguished the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in AIR1950Mad444 on the ground that the rules framed under the Abkari Act are differently worded. I took the view that even on the footing that the formation of a partnership amounts to a transfer within the meaning of Rule 178(2), still it is protected by the terms of Rule 178(4). I followed the principle laid down by Govinda Menon J. in AIR1952Mad293 and held that the object of Central Excise Act is nothing but a fiscal one intended for collecting taxes and that no question of public policy or illegality arises so as to attract the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act. For the reasons aforesaid, I am unable to follow with great respect the view taken by Rajagopala Iyengar J. in AIR1957Mad186 as regards the scope and effect of Rule 178 of the Central Excise Rules.
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1959 (8) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e learned Counsel for the appellants is a weak one. It is said that the official receiver does not claim under Meenakshi Achi, and, therefore, he cannot rely upon the execution petition filed by her to save the bar of limitation. There is a fallacy underlying this argument. The question for decision is not whether the official receiver claims under Meenakshi Achi, but whether the execution petitions filed by her were in accordance with law. If as I held, at the time the previous execution petitions were filed, Meenakshi Achi had a valid title to execute the decree, the execution petitions filed by her would certainly be in accordance with law within the meaning of art. 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act. I, therefore, reject this contention. 47. In view of the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by me, the last two contentions based on payments of installments do not arise for consideration. 48. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 49. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (8) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion had arisen although the legislature had prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of such a claim in any application that might be made to the law courts." 17. The English decision In re Astley and Tyldesley Coal and Salt Co. (1899) 68 L. J. Q. B. 252 on which doubt had been cast by some later cases was expressly approved by the Privy Council in course of the judgment. The Privy Council had applied by analogy the provisions of the Limitation Act including Section 14 to arbitration proceedings. The Indian Legislature accepted the law laid down by the Judicial Committee and embodied it in Section 37(1) of the Indian Arbitration Act 1940. 18. I hold that the claim of the respondent was not barred by limitation at the date of the commencement of the arbitration. 19. In view of this finding it is not necessary to go into the other question raised in this application. The application is dismissed with costs. Das Gupta, C.J. 20. I agree. Lahiri, J. 21. I agree.
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1959 (8) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ispatched for more than two months on account of no arrangement for transport facilities having been made by the first defendant, the Madras Government. The bill mentioned in paragraph 5 would show the rate at which the godown rent was calculated and the period for which it was claimed. Therefore, on a fair reading of the notice it may be said that the fact of the contract for the payment of the godown rent, the quantity of goods stored, the rate at which and the period for which the claim was made and the failure of the first defendant to pay the same are sufficiently stated so as to enable the first defendant, which is the appellant before us, to know what the plaintiffs claim was about and whether the claim should be conceded or resisted. On a careful consideration of the terms of the notice we are not of opinion that the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is well founded. This is sufficient to dispose of this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1959 (8) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The correctness of the account was relevant if at all only at that stage. It is unnecessary, however, to rest one's conclusion in this case on the mere admission of the defendant's advocate. From the fact that the propriety of the debit in regard to the sum of ₹ 2,000 was admitted by the respondent as early as 1947, the claim under the head should be held to be proved. 20. The question then is in regard to interest. The appellant claimed interest from 21st February, 1953 to 22nd November, 1953 at 12 per cent per annum relinquishing the interest thereafter. The agreement does not provide for the payment of any interest. Under the circumstances the appellant would be entitled to get only interest at 6 per cent, from the date of demand. His claim under this head will be reduced by half and he will be awarded only a sum of ₹ 374-0-10 towards the interest. 21. In the result there will be a decree for ₹ 7855-1-6 with interest and costs in both the Courts.
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1959 (8) TMI 47 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Bombay High Court in the aforementioned case, which held that it was a revenue gain and was assessable to tax as part of the total income of the assessee in the said case, we hold that the receipt in question is only of a revenue nature. We, therefore, hold against the assessee on this point." The Income-tax authorities had sufficient material before them on which they could reach their findings, and further it appears that they had made no error in law. This is purely a question of fact. When on the facts found by the Tribunal allowance was given for the licence fee paid in computing the taxable income, the sum refunded by the Government should be included in the calculation of the taxable profits for the year in which it was received. Accordingly I would answer the question of law against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. RAMASWAMI, C.J. -I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (8) TMI 46 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be able to give information to the officer concerned in regard to the assessment. It is now firmly established that the materials on which the assessment is based may be such materials as may not be admissible under the rules of the Evidence Act. The Income-tax Officer must base his decision upon materials and those materials should be made available to the assessee, so that he may have a chance of satisfying the officer by giving any rebutting evidence to those materials. See Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1954 26 I.T.R. 775. In that view of the matter, the material furnished by the statement of a person whose attendance is enforced by the Income-tax Officer or any other officer of the Department, is good material, although that statement is not made by the person on any oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section do not compel the authorities mentioned therein to take statements of persons only upon oath. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (8) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as necessary. It is advisable, perhaps, to add a few more words about Art. 122(1) of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellant has posed before us the question as to what would be the effect of that Article if in any Bill completely unrelated to any of the matters referred to in Cls. (a) to (e) of Art. 3 an amendment was to be proposed and accepted changing (for example) the name of a State. We do not think that we need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative of Art. the question then will be not the validity of proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a constitutional provision. That, however, is not the position in the present case. For these reasons, we hold that there was no violation of Art. 3 and the Act or any of its provisions are not invalid on that ground. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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