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Showing 1 to 20 of 87 Records
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1962 (3) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nly to prevent undue grabbing of lands by persons with the necessary means to do the same. Section 184 by providing that no right of pre-emption would arise on the exchange of lands clearly indicates that the object of the Berar Code in providing for the right of pre-emption is to achieve consolidation of holding. We feel no doubt that the benefits to arise out of consolidation far outweigh the disadvantages caused by the restriction put by it on the right to property guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(f). 63. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions in Chapter 14 of the Berar Land Revenue Code creating a right of pre-emption on the sale of land are valid and fully within the Constitution. This appeal therefore must also fail and we would dismiss it with costs. 64. BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority Civil Appeal No. 270 of 1955 is allowed; no order as to costs. 65. C.A. No. 27 of 1955 allowed C.A. No. 430 of 1958 and C.A. No. 595 of 1960 dismissed.
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1962 (3) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... suggested that the assumption made by the Full Bench about the character of the bakasht lands by virtue of the provisions of section 6 is inconsistent with the decisions of this Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd. 1962 2 SCR 441. His argument is that the provisions of section 6 of the Act correspond to the provisions of section 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (I of 1951), and that what this Court has said about the effect of the provisions of section 18, has shaken the validity of the conclusion of the Full Bench in regard to the effect of section 6 of the Act. We do not think it necessary to consider this point as well in the present appeal. In any case, both the decisions on which Mr. Jha has relied afford no assistance to us in dealing with the point with which we are concerned in the present appeal. 20. The result is, the order passed by the High Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. 21. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (3) TMI 130 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y of deciding on confiscation committed an error, it could not be said to have acted without, jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of natural justice. An errors are not amenable to the writ of certiorari. The error if any far from being apparent on the face of the record, requires to be established by research into the intricacies of the schedule and the appendices. It does not satisfy the test laid down by the Supreme Court (Mohammad Nooh's case, 1958 SCA 73 (AIR 1958 SC 86) that the error to be corrected by certiorari must be one "so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on the decision an indelible stamp of infirmily or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or in revision." 47. The appeal therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs. 48. The operation of this order will be stayed for a period of ten days from date whereafter all interim orders will stand vacated. Bose, C.J. 49. I agree.
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1962 (3) TMI 129 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t from the appellant was a sufficient infringement of his fundamental right under article 19(1)(g), and the appellant was clearly entitled to relief under article 226 of the Constitution." 27. The passage above quoted is clearly obiter. That apart, we do not think that the passage properly brings out the ratio of the decision in Himmatlal's case. As noted earlier, in Himmatlal's case, the court was called upon to deal with a case where there was no tax liability. It was not a case where there was a liability but the order quantifying it or the steps taken to collect the same were invalid. 28. For the reasons mentioned above, we are satisfied that we are satisfied that would not be justified in granting any relief to the petitioner in this case. That being so, we have not thought it necessary to go into the merits of his contentions. 29. In the result, this petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs. advocate's fee ₹ 100. 30. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (3) TMI 128 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the karta, Seth Lal Chand, accepted the appointment on behalf of the family, it must be held that what he accepted was work as an independent contractor. As a manager of the business of the Hindu undivided family he had a right to enter into contracts and he could deal with all the properties of the Hindu undivided family on their behalf. This consideration of the facts found in this case can only lead to the inference that the appointment of the family as Government Treasurer was accepted as work of an independent contractor and not as an appointment in the capacity of a servant. The first part of the question which has been referred to us for opinion is, therefore, answered in the negative and the second part in the affirmative. The assessee will be entitle to the costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 300. The same amount shall be treated as fees payable to learned counsel for the Department for the purposes of calculation of costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (3) TMI 127 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has escaped assessment, but virtual rejection of a return may amount to escape of the income mentioned in it from assessment. The return of the assessee cannot be said to have been pending merely because the Income-tax Officer did not pass a specific order rejecting it. When he assessed all the incomes mentioned in it as the income of the Hindu undivided family and did not assess the assessee at all on it, it meant that he had rejected the return and not kept it pending. He must be deemed to have found, as required by section 23(3), that the assessees total income was nil. Accordingly we answer the question in the affirmative and direct that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 66(5). We further direct that the assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax the costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (3) TMI 126 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and that the tax cannot be recovered from them. If section 29 authorises the Gift-tax Officer to recover gift-tax from the donee merely on his subjective opinion that it cannot be recovered from the donor, that is an additional infirmity of that section, clothes as it does the Gift-tax Officer with arbitrary powers to recover tax, not from the person primarily liable but from the donee, who is liable only if the tax cannot be recovered from the donor. For the reasons aforesaid, I hold that sections 6 and 29 of the Act put unreasonable restrictions on the donee's right to acquire and hold property and is unconstitutional to that extent. I, therefore, quash the assessment order so far as the donee petitioner company is concerned and command the respondents not to enforce the same against the peti- tioner company. Let writs of certiorari and mandamus accordingly issue. This rule is made absolute with costs, hearing fee being assessed at five gold mohurs. Rule made absolute.
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1962 (3) TMI 125 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 'entertained' must be given the same meaning as the word 'filed'. We find no warrant for this argument. In fact, as we have pointed out above, the true intention of the proviso appears to us to be to allow the judgment-debtor to prosecute his application to set aside the Sale if he complies with the conditions contained in the proviso to Rule 90 before the application, is finally heard and disposed of by the court. We are respectfully of the view that the case AIR 1962 All 42 1960 All LJ 578 has not been correctly decided. 11. The learned counsel for the applicant states that the second question referred to us does not arise for decision. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the Official Receiver has conceded that the view that we have taken of the case is the correct one. 13. We, therefore, allow this revision with costs and set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge dated the 8th November, 1960 and remand the application for decision according to law.
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1962 (3) TMI 124 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n, the Income Tax authorities and the Tribunal had evidence before them on which they could reasonable reach a conclusion that these properties were the stock-in-trade of the assessee. This finding of fact, therefore, is not, in our opinion, open to challenge. 7. The circumstance on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Terdalkar, viz., that the properties were held by the assessee for a number of years, and they were sold on account of tenancy legislation, have not been left out of consideration by the Tribunal, but have been taken into account by it, and after considering these circumstances along with other evidence on record, the Tribunal has reached its conclusion. It, therefore, also cannot be said that the finding of the Tribunal that the lands were the stock-in-trade of the assessee is in any manner vitiated. 8. In the result, our answer to the question is in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. 9. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (3) TMI 123 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Land Acquisition Act was held, it is submitted erroneously, to be not taxable as income. See the comment on this case in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narayanan Chettiar 1943 11 ITR 470 ; AIR 1943 Mad. 682 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sir Kameshwar Singh 1953 23 ITR 212 ; AIR 1953 Pat. 217 ( Income-tax, fourth edition, volume I, page 124)." We have been taken through the two cases mentioned as supporting the comment; but are unable to hold on the reasoning adopted in those cases that the Allahabad decision has been erroneously decided. In the light of what is stated above the question referred has to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. We do so. The department will pay the costs of the assessee. Advocate's fee ₹ 150. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1962 (3) TMI 122 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee could be aware of what the profits made during the year were in the view of the Income-tax Officer and that, on the materials which the assessee had before him, he was justified in distributing only the sum of ₹ 45,000 as dividend. We are not impressed with this argument. What was clearly found was that the books of account were unreliable and that the actual profits made during the year must be enhanced by the amounts suppressed. It was not notional addition by any means. That being so, the assessee's claim that he was ignorant of the volume of profits available during that year was rightly rejected by the departmental office below. In the light of what we have stated, all the requirements of section 23A were satisfied and the application of that provision to the facts of the case has not been shown to be erroneous in any way. The question is accordingly answered in the affirmative and against the assessee, which shall pay the costs of the department.
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1962 (3) TMI 121 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of both Babu Ram and Gobardhandas. There is nothing to show that any agreement for the payment of this amount was arrived at on behalf of the minor sons. It also appears that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not quite satisfied that the annual payment of ₹ 12,000 was in fact made, or was made genuinely for managing the business. His view appears to be that the payment was merely in lieu of a share in the business which he give up at the subsequent partition. He accepted managership of the post-partition business on a salary of ₹ 300 per month only. The payment of ₹ 1,000 per month for managing the same business, while he had a share in it, could not have been genuine and must have been made, if made at all, for the purpose of evading income-tax. The Tribunal does not appear to have paid any attention to this aspect of the matter. For the reasons stated above, we find that the question referred to us should be answered in the negative and we do so.
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1962 (3) TMI 120 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s were used only as raw material out of which entirely different machines were fashioned. Despite the dismantling, and the reassembly after renewal of worn out parts and the incorporation of modifications, the machines retained their identity and we think it would be doing violence to the language to call them new machines. They may be as good as new. The manufacturers might have had so much confidence in their proper working as to furnish a guarantee which they normally furnish only for new machines. Yet they are not new and are at best only reconditioned machines. As we have said before the manufacturers know the ordinary meaning of the word "new" with reference to machines and nothing is clearer from the correspondence than that they refused to call these machines new machines. We also refuse to call them new machines. Our answer to the question asked is in the negative. The Registrar will take action under section 66(5) of the Act. We make no order as to costs.
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1962 (3) TMI 119 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ve, I am of the opinion that power conferred on the States under entry 49 of List II includes power to tax gifts of "lands and buildings". Consequently, there is no need to resort to entry 97 of List I. As a result of this conclusion, it follows that the "Act" in so far as it purports to impose tax on gifts of "lands and buildings" is ultra vires of the powers of the Parliament and to that extent unconstitutional. For the reasons mentioned above, the order of the Second Gift-tax Officer, Mangalore, in Proceedings No. 83-n/58-59 dated November 25, 1959, to the extent it is challenged in Writ Petition No. 1077/59 has to be quashed. It is ordered accordingly. Similarly, the order dated October 28, 1959, passed by the Gift-tax Officer, Udipi, South Kanara, in Assessment Proceedings No. G.T. 21/58-59 on his file has to be quashed. It is so ordered. The respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioners in these petitions. Mir Iqbal Husain, J.-I agree.
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1962 (3) TMI 118 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it was a payment not only as compensation for resigning the managing agency but also for the obligation undertaken by the assessee to procure for Chidambaram Chettiar 2,500 shares of Kamala Mills. We are not prepared to accept this argument. We have already set out clause 4 of the agreement between the assessee and Chidambaram Chettiar where it is clearly stated that this sum was in respect of the resignation by the assessee of their managing agency. No remuneration for the other obligation of procuring 2,500 shares for Chidambaram Chettiar was contemplated or specified in the agreement. There is no material, therefore, in support of the claim that this sum was not wholly in respect of the termination of the managing agency. In the result, we answer the question in this manner. The sum of ₹ 2,24,000 is rightly includible in the taxable income of the assessee, but that it cannot be brought to assessment in the assessment year 1955-56. There will be no order as to costs.
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1962 (3) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n account of the employee. The intention of the Legislature as expressed in s. 6(1) of the Act is to make the employer liable only for a moiety of the provident fund and while the Scheme of 1952 is well designed to carry out this intention, in its application to workmen directly employed, by reason of the combined operation of Paras 30 and 32, it breaks down, in its extension to contract labour by reason of the inapplicability of Para 32. It operates unfairly and harshly on persons who employ contract labour and it further results in discrimination between those who employ contract labour and those who employ direct labour. The Scheme therefore cannot be said to be reasonable and must be struck down as not falling within the protection afforded by Art. 19(6). o p /o p 15. In the result we hold that the notifications dated January 15, 1958, and December 2, 1960, are unconstitutional and void. The petitioners are entitled to their costs. o p /o p 16. Petition allowed. o p /o p
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1962 (3) TMI 116 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reservation contained in the order of assessment dated February 6, 1949, that the fixation of ₹ 50,000 was provisional and subject to revision later, would not entitle the department to reopen that assessment. There can be no piece-meal assessment. In the light of the above conclusions, we answer the first question in the affirmative and against the assessee so far as the addition of ₹ 25,000 is concerned. But we answer the same question in the negative and in favour for the assessee and hold that the enhancement of the income for the Cochin business from ₹ 50,000 to ₹ 1,02,511 is unwarranted. It is stated before us by the counsel for the assessee and the department that question No. 2 need not be answered. We, therefore, decline to answer question No. 2. There will be no order as to costs. Forward a copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Question answered accordingly.
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1962 (3) TMI 115 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... estigation of the validity of an order under section 27 at the instance of an assessee seeking to rely upon a bar of limitation under section 34(3). 16. We may also point out that the assessees problem in this case is not so simple as he would like to have it. Even if the order dated August 24, 1956, can be destroyed by using a dialectical skill, that would only result in reviving the previous order of assessment dated March 29, 1956. 17. There are absolutely no grounds vitiating the impugned order of the Income Tax Officer, which is perfectly in conformity with law. Learned counsel for the assessee did not advance any argument on the question whether the addition of income made by the assessing authorities and confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal is, in any way, not supported by the materials on record. The question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee who will pay the costs to the department. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (3) TMI 114 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpossible for the assessee to contend at this stage that in respect of the accounting years, calendar years 1947 and 1948, they must be deemed to be non-resident. We are of opinion that the concession on behalf of the assessee was rightly and properly made on the materials on record and that it is too late in the day for them to contend that they are non-residents. It follows that for the years 1947 and 1948 (assessment years 1948-49 and 1949-50) the association of persons cannot be treated as a non-resident but must be deemed to be a resident and an ordinarily resident as defined under the Act. 19. The question referred to us for decision in T. C. No. 6 of 1061 is therefore answered in favour of the assessee in respect of the calendar years 1945 and 1946 (assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48) and against the assessee in respect of the calendar years 1947 and 1948 (assessment years 1948-49 and 1949-50). There will be no order as to costs in this reference. Order accordingly.
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1962 (3) TMI 113 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... tial borrowing must itself be from a Bank mentioned in that sub clause. ( 3. ) The court below held that sub clause (xi) of clause (c) of S.2 would apply and refused the application of the appellant to pay the debt in accordance with the provisions of S.4 (2) of the Act. ( 4. ) We think, that sub clause has no application. It has been held by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in XVI TLJ 143 that there is no element of borrowing in the case of a prized subscriber receiving the prize money and in executing a hypothecation bond as security for payment of the future instalments. This decision has been followed in another case of the same High Court - XVII TLJ 7. We respectfully follow the above decisions and hold that sub clause (xi) of clause (o) of S.2 has no application. ( 5. ) In the view we have taken on the above point, it is unnecessary to decide the second contention raised by the appellant in this case. ( 6. ) We allow this appeal, but make no order as to costs.
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