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Showing 1 to 20 of 60 Records
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1963 (11) TMI 104 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of such country". It the expression "foreign law" had been used in Section 38, the drafting would not have been so pretty. In this connection, we have also to remember the provisions of the Indian Law Reports Act. Section 4 of that Act clearly provides that that Act has no bearing on the effect of judgments. 43. The declaration of law made by the Supreme Court in 1960CriLJ1156 is binding on all Courts and High Courts- cannot take a view which is inconsistent with that declaration of law and which may lead to orders being passed which would be invalid according to the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court. It would be wrong for me to follow a High Court ruling which is inconsistent with a declaration of law made by the Supreme Court. I must hold that a single appeal by the State against the orders of acquittal of several persons is not maintainable under the Criminal Procedure Code. 44. I, therefore, hold that this appeal is not maintainable and rejected.
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1963 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gard to his poor performance Roy became eligible to be dealt with under clause 10 of the Order. It was not open to the Corporation to require Roy to accept an assignment in a lower or different category. What the regulations are authorised to do is merely to determine his salary in the category of Development Officers, and so, we do not see how the order terminating his services because he refused to take an assignment as an Assistant can be justified. It would have been open to the Corporation to fix Roy's salary at the minimum in the grade prescribed by clause 5 of the Order and if he had refused to take it, an occasion may have arisen for the operation of s. 11(2) of the Act. Therefore, we are satisfied that the case of Roy cannot be distinguished from the cases of other respondents in the present group of appeals. 26. The result is, the orders passed by the High Court are confirmed, and the appeals are dismissed with costs. One set hearing fees. 27. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (11) TMI 102 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... to achieve equality where there is none, but is only to prevent the legislature from favouring one section of the equals and singling out of the other section to be the target of attack. Discrimination can come in, only when similar subjects are not treated alike. Such discrimination can escape the inhibition of the equality clause under the umbrella of permissible classification. If different entities are not accorded the same treatment by law, the charge of discrimination fails at the outset, and there is no need to justify it, on the ground of classification. 37. In our opinion, the charging sections of the wealth-tax Act and the Expenditure-tax Act do not fall within the mischief of the quality clause of the constitution. In the result, these writ petitions fail and are dismissed. The rule nisi issued in each of the petitions fail and are discharged. The petitioner will pay the costs of the respondent in each case. Counsels fee ₹ 250. 38. Writ petitioners dismissed.
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1963 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... viding for the procedure to be followed by them in that regard. We have already expressed our agreement with these conclusions of the High Court. In this view we intimated to learned Counsel for the appellant that it would not be open to him to invite our attention to the evidence which was led before the Settlement Officer for proving that the original grant was of both the warams and that the Settlement Officer and the Subordinate Judge who tried the suit erred in recording that the shrotriem grant of the village was of the melvaram alone. 32. Learned Counsel for the State pointed out that the legislature of Andhra Pradesh has in 1956 and 1957, effected amendments to the Abolition Act which would render any arguments about the merits of the original grant being of both the warams, wholly academic but we have not thought it necessary to refer to it as this is hardly relevant for the points arising for disposal in the appeal. 33. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1963 (11) TMI 100 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cular view of the legal liability of the assessee to be assessed in respect of these amounts, and since there was no default on the part of the assessee or failure to disclose truly and fully the state of things, section 34(1)(a) cannot apply. We have, nevertheless, thought it fit to refer to this part of the original proceeding to indicate the nature of the rights and liabilities of the assessee. It should follow from what we have stated that the circumstances do not warrant the view that the assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for the assessment. On the facts also, the proper inference in law to be made would be that the entire amount did not represent the income of the assessee during the year. The reassessment made in these circumstances cannot be supported. Both the question are answered in favour of the assessee, who will get his cost from the department. Counsels fees ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1963 (11) TMI 99 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nditions imposed in Section 50 of the. Act for initiation of prosecution in. respect, of it would apply. This view of the Allahabad High Court had not however been accepted in State v. Maganlal Chunilal, , where it was held that an offence Under Section 39 of the Act would not come Under Section 50 but could be dealt with only under S. 379, I. P. C. In AIR 1962 Mad 497, Sadasivam, J. has preferred to fellow the Allahabad view, which had also been accepted by the Rajasthan High Court in Dhoolchand v. State, 1957 Cri L J 233 (Raj). In view of the construction which we have put upon Section 50 of the Act, we find ourselves with great respect to Sadasivam, J. unable to share his view. 13. We accordingly answer the question formulated above in this manner the offence of dishonest abstraction, consumption or user of electricity will not be one coming within the mischief of Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act but one Under Section 379, I. P. C. read with Section 39 of that Act.
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1963 (11) TMI 98 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Iron and Steel Controller. Thus, there being no impediment to the application of sub-section (2) to section 23A, I would in the peculiar circumstances of the case direct that the order under section 35, dated the 24th May, 1963, and the demand notice of the same date be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari and it is directed that the petitioner be given three months from today in accordance with law to make a further distribution of its profits and gains so that the total distribution made is not less than 60% of the total income of the company of the relevant previous year as reduced by the taxes payable pursuant to the assessment made under section 34(1) of the Act. If no distribution is made within the period specified the present order made by the Income-tax Officer under section 35 will again be revived subject to the rights of the petitioner under sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 23A(1) of the Act. The petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.
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1963 (11) TMI 97 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rther, the amounts claimed as deduction were actually entered in the account books as payments which had actually been made to the employees, and there was no evidence that any greater amount than that recorded had been paid. It must be remembered that the book version of the assessee regarding its profits alone was rejected. Our answer to the question is "It is open to an assessing authority acting under section 16(4) of the Act to allow a larger deduction from the gross income than what is claimed in the return that is rejected and he is not bound by the deduction claimed in the return." A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Revision Board under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 24(7) of the U.P. Agricultural Income-tax Act. The opposite party shall get his costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 100, from the State. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 100. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (11) TMI 96 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... come-tax 1956 29 I.T.R. 814. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the Patna High Court. In our opinion, the Tribunal is in error in directing a fresh computation of capital gain by valuing the closing stock as the original cost of the holding averaged for the original and bonus scrips since issued or at the market price whichever is lower. The true criterion is to take the face value of the bonus shares and to ascertain the excess, if any, realised by the assessee by the sale of these shares in the year of account. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the following manner The sum of ₹ 7,269 cannot be taxed in its entirety as capital gains under section 12B of the Act. What could be brought to tax under that provision is only the excess of ₹ 7,269, if any, over the face value of the 94 bonus shares held and disposed of by the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (11) TMI 95 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Civil Court must be overruled. I therefore hold that the suit was maintainable. 10. The only other point argued by counsel for the appellant was that as the plaintiff prayed for holding a meeting for carrying on the election and as that was rejected by both the courts below, the plaintiff was not entitled to have a declaration of the invalidity of the 3rd defendant's election as Director. It cannot be said from this circumstance that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable. The plaintiff's suit was maintainable because there was the prayer for the consequential relief to hold a meeting from the stage at which the chairman declared the plaintiff to be incompetent to stand for election. I can sec no point in the argument of counsel that since the consequential relief was not granted by the courts below the declaration of the invalidity of the election granted by them cannot stand. 11. In the circumstances, the appeal has to be dismissed, and I do so with costs.
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1963 (11) TMI 94 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ain conditions. In the result, we answer the question in the negative. We direct that a copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. We further direct that the Commissioner of Income-tax will be entitled to his costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 100 from the opposite party. Counsel's fee is also assessed at ₹ 100. ----- Income-tax Reference No. 57 of 1954. For the reasons stated in our judgment in I.T. Reference No. 402 of 1954 we answer the question referred to this court in the negative. We direct that a copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. We further direct that the Commissioner of Income-tax will be entitled to his costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 100 from the opposite party. Counsel's fee is also assessed at ₹ 100. Questions answered in the negative.
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1963 (11) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... therefore of no avail and could not save that notification. For the reasons mentioned above, we have come to the conclusion that though on June 9, 1960, when the draft standing orders were submitted to the Certifying Officer under the Central Standing Orders Act the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with them, the Officer bad acquired jurisdiction in the matter before August 6, 1962, when he passed the order certifying the standing orders. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Industrial Court, Madhya Pradesh, but as that Court has not considered the other objections raised by the Unions in their appeals against the certification of the standing orders, we direct that the appeals be heard by the Industrial Court and disposed of in accordance with law after deciding the objections raised on merits. The appeals are accordingly allowed. In the special circumstances of the case, we order that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (11) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing the total agricultural income of the assessee. The Board held that 60 of it was liable to assessment under the Agricultural Income-tax Act, the remaining 40 being liable under the Indian Income-tax Act. The question framed, however, is only in respect of the income for the period from April 15, 1948, to June 30, 1948. It has not been shown that the income for this period is not liable to be included in the total income of the assessee; it is his income and it is agricultural income and the answer to the question should be in the affirmative. Our answer to the question framed in the instant case, No. 16 of 1960, is "no". A copy of this judgment should be sent to the Revision Board under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 24(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Income-tax Act. The assessee shall get his costs of the reference, which we estimate at ₹ 50, from the State. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 50.
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1963 (11) TMI 91 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... diction was lacking to establish that the Income-tax Officer had no material at all before him for believing that there had been such non-disclosure. At present, there is no material whatsoever on record to enable us to express any opinion on the question whether the Income-tax Officer issued the notices without jurisdiction. In response to the notices issued to him the petitioner has not filed any return or any statement before the Income-tax Officer showing that, during the assessment proceedings for the years in question, he had fully and truly disclosed all material facts necessary for his assessment. For the forgoing reasons, all these six petitions are allowed and the notices issued to the petitioner in each on 23rd March, 1962, are quashed. The petitioner shall have costs of these applications. Counsel's fee for all cases is fixed at ₹ 600 (six hundred rupees). The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (11) TMI 90 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er section 66(1) could have been made before it was passed. The Tribunal was wrong in saying that the question referred to us arose out of the order dated December 15, 1955, merely because it passed the final order under section 33(4) before it passed orders on the reference application. Even though the final order was passed before it passed the order on the reference application, it was bound to consider only the order passed by it on December 15, 1955, and decide whether a question of law arose out of it or not. It had no jurisdiction to consider whether any question of law arose out of the order passed by it on January 24, 1957, when the application was not for reference of any question arising out of it. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to state the case to this court, and return the reference, unanswered. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall get his costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 100. Counsels fee is assessed at ₹ 200.
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1963 (11) TMI 89 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der to be kept in abeyance for a period of three weeks in order to enable the company to pay up the dividends to the two creditors, namely, Mr. A. C. K. Krishnaswami and Mr. Hariprasad for the year 1959. There will be no order for payment in regard to the other claims made by the creditors, as they being disputed will have to be established in a suit. The amount of dividend due to Mr. Hariprasad will be deposited in court and the same will be paid over to him only after due notice to the Collector of Bombay who had issued the prohibitory order and after hearing any representation that he may make. In case the amounts are paid or deposited in court as the case may be within three weeks the winding up petition will stand dismissed. In default, there will be a winding up of the company and further proceedings will ensue. The appellants will be entitled to their costs. We make no order as to payment to Smt. Godavari Bai as she has not made the statutory demand Order accordingly.
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1963 (11) TMI 88 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ioned above. Further, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal also found that tobacco without undergoing the process of re-drying, stripping and grading could be easily sold in market. It is pointed out by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that most of the agriculturists and even merchants buy large quantities of roughly graded tobacco. Thus, the operations mentioned above could not be regarded as process ordinarily employed by cultivators necessary to make the produce marketable. If that were so, the income attributable to these operations cannot be described as agricultural income but should be treated as business income. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that the whole of the income from the sale of tobacco could not be treated as agricultural income within the connotation of section 2(1)(b)(ii) of the Income-tax Act. We have, therefore, to answer the reference in favour of the department and against the assessee. No costs.
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1963 (11) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of a criminal charge by any authority of a lower rank. Rule 7 of the Discipline Rules does not provide for such suspension of a person who had been a member of the Secretary of State's Services by an authority lower than the Governor.. The appellant was suspended by the Governor of Punjab on July 18, 1959. He had no right of appeal against such an order of suspension. The Discipline Rules did not provide for an appeal against such an order of suspension and, in not so providing, cannot be said to violate the provisions of art. 314 of the Constitution as the appellant had no right of appeal against such an order before the commencement of the Constitution. It follows that r. 7 of the Discipline Rules does not violate the provisions of that Article and that the impugned order of suspension was therefore valid. 1 would therefore dismiss the appeal. ORDER in accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed with costs in this Court and in the' High Court.
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1963 (11) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . We may add that since then the President has made another notification under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution whereby Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Gujarat have been entrusted with functions under the Act with the consent of that State. o p /o p That notification is however of July 12, 1961, and cannot cure the present notifications under ss.4 and 6 of the Act as they are anterior date. o p /o p In view of our decision on the nature of the notification under Art. 258(1) dated July 24, 1959, it is unnecessary to consider the other points raised on behalf of the appellant. o p /o p We would therefore allow the appeal with costs, set aside the order of the High Court and allow the writ petition and strike down the notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the Act made by the Commissioner of Baroda for acquisition of the appellant’s property. o p /o p ORDER BY COURT o p /o p In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs. o p /o p
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1963 (11) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or for the purpose of preparing the necessary account for submission to the income-tax authorities for assessment. These items of expenses were not incurred by her in connection with the business from which income was derived. On the other hand, as we have pointed out, that income was ascertained on the assessment of the firm in respect of which these necessary items of expenditure would normally have been allowed. This claim appears to be more in the nature of a personal expenditure incurred by her in order to enable her to prepare and submit accounts to the Income-tax Officer. No provision of the Act has been indicated to us as permitting such allowance. These items were rightly disallowed. The question referred to us is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee in so far as the interest payment is concerned. As the assessee has succeeded to a large extent, she will be entitled to costs from the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered accordingly.
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