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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 51 of 51 Records
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1963 (7) TMI 57 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Meetings and proceedings - Proxies ... ... ... ... ..... ved from office as directors. In those circumstances, I can see no reason why the court should not declare that that was the result. It is quite true that the company can convene another meeting, and it may be that at some other meeting and at some other time the majority may take a different view from the view which the majority took at the meeting in October, 1962. But that does not alter the fact that the majority at the meeting in October, 1962, were clearly in favour of the removal of the defendants from the board, and it could only be possible for anybody to have arrived at any other conclusion on grounds which have not commended themselves to me. I propose, therefore, to declare that the two personal defendants were removed at the meeting of October 16, 1962. I shall not grant an injunction to restrain them from acting as directors as I should imagine, that, the court having declared that they were not directors, they will not desire to exercise any power as directors.
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1963 (7) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Power of court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... , 1961, and he was entitled to take those facts into consideration. We find that the board of directors of the appellant company had ample opportunity to consider the application of Nazmunnessa and yet they did not take any action except adjourning its consideration. On the 28th September, 1961, when S. P. Mitra J. passed the order appealed from, there was no justification for not entering the name of Nazmunnessa on the register of members in place of Mohammad Bashir. There was thus both a default and an unnecessary delay in entering on the register the fact of her becoming a member and the fact of Mohammad Bashir having ceased to be a member. Nazmunnessa had made out a clear title entitling her to have her name entered on the register and it was the duty of the board of directors to make the entry asked for. The board has arbitrarily and capriciously omitted to make the entry. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. Arun K. Mukherjee, J. mdash I agree.
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1963 (7) TMI 55 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up – Power to summon persons suspected of having property of company, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... and the person concerned is normally entitled to correct those errors and is not bound to sign a transcript which contains what appear to be errors. I am informed by the registrar that the ordinary procedure in such circumstances is for the person concerned to make pencil corrections in the margin of the transcript and to sign subject to those pencil corrections. That obviates that difficulty. I propose in the present case to make the order as asked in the summons, that is to say, that the respondent is required to sign the depositions taken at his examination under the provisions of section 268 of the Companies Act, 1948. I should like to make it clear that before he does sign the deposition he has now had the opportunity or has another opportunity, as the case may be, of reading through and studying the transcript before he signs it. He is also entitled to make pencil corrections in the margin and to sign subject to any corrections so made. That is as far as I can go today.
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1963 (7) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... te workers on receipts, and whenever a worker authorises another person in Form No. 139, the signature or thumb impressions of such worker on both the receipt and the authorisation in Form No. 139 should be attested by a Magistrate or a Tahsildar or a Gazetted Officer of the State Government who should, after satisfying himself about the identity of the worker, attest the same and affix under his attestation the seal of his court or office. I also direct that when a worker or a person authorised by him to receive the payment on his behalf presents himself before the liquidator for receiving payment, the liquidator should, before making the payment, satisfy himself about the identity of the worker or such person and enter a certificate in writing on the relevant paper to the effect either that he knows the worker or such person has been duly identified before him by a person known to him. As no further directions are required in this matter, this application will stand closed.
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1963 (7) TMI 53 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Payments of certain debts out of assets subject to floating charge in priority to claims under the charge, Winding up - Preferential payments
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1963 (7) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the State Trading Corporation, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, is a citizen within the meaning of article 19 of the Constitution and can ask for the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens under the said article?
Whether the State Trading Corporation is, notwithstanding the formality of incorporation under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, in substance a department and organ of the Government of India with the entirety of its capital contributed by Government and can it claim to enforce fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution against the State as denned in article 12 thereof ?
Held that:- We cannot accept the argument that there can be citizens of this country who are neither to be found within the four corners of Part II of the Constitution or within the four corners of the Citizenship Act. We are of opinion that these two provisions must be exhaustive of the citizens of this country, Part II dealing with citizens on the date the Constitution came into force and the Citizenship Act dealing with citizens thereafter. We must, therefore, hold that these two provisions are completely exhaustive of the citizens of this country and these citizens can only be natural persons. The fact that corporations may be nationals of the country for purposes international law will not make them citizens of this country for purposes of municipal law or the Constitution. Nor do we think that the word " citizen " used in article 19 of the Constitution was used in a different sense from that in which it was used in Part II of the Constitution. The first question, therefore, must be answered in the negative.
In view of this answer, we do not consider it necessary to answer the second question as that would have arisen only if the first question had been answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (7) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1963 (7) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... n this case. And on the basis of the Lahore decision the set-off claimed by the appellant is certainly justified and should be entertained. Our conclusions can be summed up as follows (1)That a question of set-off under section 47 of Act II of 1956 should normally be considered without reference to the existence of any security (2)that the arrangement between the appellant and the bank was itself to effect a set-off on the maturity of the fixed deposit (3)that the fact that the deposit had not matured when the winding up commenced is not of material consequence (4)that the effect of the bank s insolvency was to accelerate the date on which the set-off should be effected and to make the commencement of the winding up the time for that purpose and (5)that in the light of what has been stated the appellant s claim to a set-off is valid and should be admitted. The appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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1963 (7) TMI 3 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Adjudication - Evidence - Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... judicial Tribunal armed with such large powers as the Customs Department has, it is imperative that the inference drawn by the Department should be supported by material and that the person proceeded against is given a reasonable opportunity of meeting that evidence. For the Collector to say that having regard to the background of the case, these pieces of evidence were sufficient in his opinion to reach the conclusion that Ponnalagu was involved is not in conformity with what the law requires. The inference that he reaches must be based upon evidences and that evidence must be permitted to be tested by the person proceeded against. In the present case, I must observe with regret that the Customs Collector in his understandable anxiety to discover the persons responsible for the illicit import has ignored the fundamental requirements and permitted his suspicions to take the place of proof. 10.In the light of these vitiating features the orders has to be and is hereby quashed.
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1963 (7) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Demand - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... tter dated July, 28, 1962, whereby in connection with these refund applications, the petitioners were informed as follows It is now ascertained that refund claims to the tune of Rs. 28,388.21 nP. (as per enclosed statement) have been passed in your favour. In the result, the Customs authorities have ascertained and found that the above amount is due and payable to the petitioners for the first time by the decision dated July 28, 1962. As the Customs authorities attempted to adjust that liability wrongfully, the Petitioners filed this petition for redress of that wrong on Oct., 9, 1962. The contention of the Respondents that the claim was barred by the Law of limitation must be negatived. 14.In the result, there will be an order in favour of the Petitioners against Respondents 1 and 2 in terms of prayer (b) of the Petition. There will be no order as against Respondent No.3. Respondents 1 and 2 will pay the costs of the Petitioners. Respondent 3 will bear and pay its own costs.
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1963 (7) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Appellate order ... ... ... ... ..... uthority had not gone into the merits of the case, but has disposed of the matter on a preliminary ground. The preliminary ground may embrace a diversity of reasons. It may be one of lack of jurisdiction in the original Tribunal it may be one of limitation, or it may be one of a defect of procedure, going to the very root of the decision. On one or more of these preliminary grounds, a decision allowing an appeal, without going into the merits, can be given by an appellate quasi-judicial Tribunal. Therefore by reason of the disposal in this case, without going into the merits, it will not be proper to spell out an order of remand. We cannot also go into any collateral circumstances, to interpret the terms of the appellate order. The terms of the appellate order are, in our opinion, not sufficient for being construed as amounting to an order of remand. We, therefore, confirm the decision of the learned Judge, and dismiss the appeal. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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