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Showing 1 to 20 of 61 Records
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1966 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n and when it does not disclose any recital of such a previous permission we are justified in drawing a presumption in favour of the respondents. If so, it follows that the order, having been made in non-compliance with the necessary conditions laid down in section 34 of the Act, is void and, therefore, need not be set aside. 12. The High Court also held that the Collector in the circumstances of the case could recall his previous order. We do not see how it could be done except in exercise of power conferred under the relevant sections. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to bring to our notice any such power other than that found in section 34 of the Act. As we have held that the order made under section 34 of the Act was void, the said order cannot be sustained under any other provision. 14. In the result, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to that Court for disposal in accordance with law. Costs will abide the result.
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1966 (3) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 8 . In this view of the matter the statement made by the appellant to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and excise would not be hit by s. 25 of the Evidence Act and would be admissible in evidence unless the appellant can take advantage of s. 24 of the Evidence Act. As to that it was urged on behalf of the appellant in the High Court that the confessional statement was obtained by threats. This was not accepted by the High Court and therefore s. 24 of the Evidence Act has no application in the present case. It is not disputed that if this statement is admissible, the conviction of the appellant is correct. As we have held that a Central Excise Officer is not a police officer within the meaning of those words in s. 25 of the Evidence Act the appellant's statement is admissible. It is not ruled out by anything in s. 24 of the Evidence Act and so the appellant's conviction is correct and the appeal must be dismissed. We hereby dismiss the appeal. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titions in which Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari appears, the petitioner is an incorporated company. It is now well settled that such a company will not be a citizen and, therefore, cannot invoke Article 19 in its aid. But the argument is that though it is a company which cannot invoke that Article, if an Act at the instance of a citizen is held to contravene Article 19, then by reason. of Article 14, the Act cannot be applied to such companies alone. Here again we express no opinion on this question since we have not dealt with Article 19 in relation to the impugned Act. 29. On our view that the impugned Act contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution and is void, the petitioners must succeed. The petitions are allowed and the rules nisi in them are made absolute. The petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2191 of 1965 and 1614 of 1964 will be entitled to costs with Counsel's fees in each of the petitions fixed at ₹ 250. There will be no order as to costs in the rest of the petitions.
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1966 (3) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of delegation it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. We are therefore of the opinion that the two cases of the Bombay High Court are not correctly decided. 56. It is not in dispute that the amendments to the Act by which the power of the State Government was also conferred on the Commissioner under sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Act were made by notifications under s. 3(4) of the 1958-Act. As we have held that s. 3(4) of the 1958 Act is ultra vires the powers of the legislature and as the Commissioner had no power under the Act before such amendments to Section 4, 5-A and 6 were made under s. 3(4) the notification issued in this case under Section 4 and 6 must fall and must be quashed. 57. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to consider the other points which have been raised in these petitions. We would therefore allow the petitions and quash the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act issued by the Commissioner in the present cases. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... found to be expedient, all Rules are cancelled and one uniform set of Rules is made for the whole of this area. This would obviate having to find out through the mazes of history and the congeries of rules, notifications and regulations what law is applicable. If any difficulty is felt in making new rules recourse may easily be taken to the provisions of s. 31 of the State of Nagaland Act which enables the President, by order, to remove any difficulty to give effect to the provisions of the State of Nagaland Act. The history of this area shows that there have been difficulties in the past in ascertaining laws which were applicable at any point of time in any particular area and led to the passing of many Acts of British Parliament and of the Governor-General in Council to remove such difficulties. We do not think that such a state of affairs should continue indefinitely when the State of Nagaland Act itself gives sufficient powers to remove difficulties. 41. Appeals allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 99 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion by the petitioners does not in any way come into conflict with the object or the scheme of the Act and must, therefore, be accepted. 49. Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 396 of 1968 and 196 of 1968, are therefore, allowed and the impugned orders by which the holdings of the petitioners, who are all displaced allottees of more than 50 standard acres and whose allotments are sought to be reduced below 50 standard acres are quashed and set aside. The permissible area of these allottees is 50 standard acres irrespective of the fact that on conversion the area would exceed 100 ordinary acres. C. W. No. 1605 of 1963 fails and is dismissed. The allotment of the petitioners in that case was in ordinary acres. Their permissible area is, therefore, 100 ordinary acres, in spite of the fact that on conversion it works out to only 49.9 standard acres. In the peculiar circumstances of these cases parties are left to bear their own costs. I.D. Dua, J. 50. I agree. Shamsher Bahadur, J. I agree.
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1966 (3) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ver, evidence in this case that Bhola Nath who was a Salesman of M/s Mannulal Sidh Gopal was arrested in August, 1951 on the report of the appellant and Sidh Gopal apprehended that he would also come under the clutches of the law and his licences may also possibly be cancelled. In any event, this is a question regarding the credibility of Sidh Gopal and it is not open to the appellant to contest the finding of the lower courts with regard to the credibility of that witness in this appeal. Lastly, Mr. Sethi submitted that the appellant was 66 years old and the offence was committed in 1951 and legal proceedings have protracted for 15 years. Mr. Sethi, therefore, prayed that the sentence imposed on the appellant may. be reduced. We are unable to accept this argument. We do not consider that the sentence is excessive in the circumstances of the case. For the reasons already expressed, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 60. 12. There is no force in the second point raised by the learned counsel of the tenant. It is true that the jurisdiction of a High Court under provisions similar to section 17 of the Act is limited, but we cannot say that the High Court was wrong in holding that the Additional District Judge acted with material irregularity in not following the decision of the Mysore High Court when that decision had been rendered in a case arising from an earlier order of the same Additional District Judge. It may be that this decision was not pointed out to the Additional District Judge but we cannot, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution, say that the High Court should not have set aside the order of the Additional District Judge on this ground. 13. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The tenant is granted two months' time from today to vacate and deliver possession of the premises in dispute to the landlord. 14. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 96 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... one place to another. In this case, the evidence discloses that from Bangalore, the husband moved to Bombay and the wife came to Trivandrum, where an establishment, so to say, had been set up, though not at the expense of the revision petitioner, but really at the expense of his parents, which the petitioner has stated is equivalent to his setting up the establishment for this purpose. If that is so, in our opinion, the finding recorded by the learned District Judge does not require any interference in revision. It therefore follows that the District Court, Trivandrum has got jurisdiction to entertain O. P. 1/1965 inasmuch as the place where the parties "last resided together" within the meaning of Section 3 (3) of the Act is Trivandrum and not Bangalore. 45. The Revision Petition therefore falls and will stand dismissed. But parties will bear their own costs. ORDER (C. M. P. 1397/66) 46. As the main C. R. P. itself has been disposed of, this petition is dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... like the Civil Procedure Code. 8. The same expression "prescribed" is used in Section 14 and we cannot conceive of any reason as to why the same principle should not apply to Section 14. If we may say so the point is simply unarguable in the face of the Full Bench decision which binding upon us. 9. No argument was advanced touching the bona fides or the good faith with which the earlier proceedings in execution were prosecuted or the inapplicability of Section 14 for any other reason. We agree with Venkatadri J. that the decree-holder is entitled to exclusion of the period spent in prosecuting the prior infructuous execution proceedings both under Section 14 and under S. 15. 10. The result is, the appeal is dismissed with costs and the matter will be further enquired into by the Master as remanded by Venkatadri J. having regard to the stakes involved and points raised and argued. I fix counsel's fee at ₹ 1000 both senior and junior. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 94 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly the same sort of work as proofreaders, but that is not a matter which will render Section 19-B unconstitutional and void. It is well known that if a statutory provision is good and valid, it does not become bad and void because in actual practice some discrimination is being exercised between one set and another set of employees doing the same kind of work. It may also seem anomalous that, as held by me, the definition of working journalist in the Act should cover the Petitioners, but by Section 19-B, they should have been deprived of the benefits of the Act. These are, however, matters which it is for the Parliament to look into and further clarify its intention by proper amending legislation, if considered necessary, but it is not possible to say that Section 19-B suffers from the vice of discrimination and is liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. In the result, this petition fails but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1966 (3) TMI 93 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we think rightly too. Now, the only other matter that remains to be considered is, whether the writ petitioner as a legal representative of the deceased, Narayana Reddi, is liable to pay all the taxes subsequent to Narayana Reddi's death. Our learned brother has held that she cannot be held liable to pay. We agree with the view of our learned brother. The taxes cannot be sought to be imposed upon the writ petitioner as a legal representative of Narayana Reddi in respect of the year following his death. This position is very clear from the two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amarchand N. Shroff 1963 48 ITR (SC) 59and Commissioner of Income-tax v. James Anderson 1964 51 ITR 345 (SC). As against these, the learned counsel Shri Kondaiah did not draw our attention to any ruling. In the result, we do not see any force in these appeals and they are dismissed with costs. There will be no advocate's fee in the rest of the appeals.
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1966 (3) TMI 92 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nna stamps were affixed and the second attesting witness also signed. The document was handed over only then. 7. I may in conclusion refer to Sections 26 and 46 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 26 speaks about the making of a promissory note; and Section 46 speaks about the delivery of the instrument. Section 46 says that the making of a negotiable instrument is completed by delivery, actual or constructive, which may mean that the making will be complete only if delivery is effected. In the light of these sections also, it is apparent that the view of the Madras High Court is the more reasonable one to take in a case like this. 8. The counsel of the appellant then urges that the appellant is entitled to benefits of Act XXXI of 1958. The question, though raised before the lower Courts, does not appear to have been decided. Therefore, I leave that question to be considered at the time of execution. 9. The second appeal is dismissed, but without costs. Leave granted.
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1966 (3) TMI 91 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed in Section 295 of the Indian Succession Act. The oral evidence of the witnesses must be recorded in Court and an affidavit prepared before hand not signed by a witness can hardly be a satisfactory substitute for examination-in-chief in Court where the witness has to give evidence in open Court and where no leading questions can be asked which might prompt him to give the desired answers. The practice of receiving affidavits may undoubtedly tend to shorten the work of the Court but the Judges in contentious cases should avoid the temptation of adopting this practice howsoever helpful to quick disposal it may seem to be and should record the whole of the evidence of the witnesses in open court, for that is the procedure which law prescribes and which is the surest guarantee of ascertainment of truth. (6) These were all the contentions urged before us and since in our view there is no substance in them, the appeal fails and will be dismissed with costs. (7) Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 89 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ay, is the correct view and, in agreement with that view, we hold that rule 24 is ultra vires as being in conflict with the provisions of section 33(4) of the Act. In the view we have taken, it is no longer necessary to consider whether there is any inherent power to restore an appeal dismissed for default on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the failure of the assessee to appear on the date fixed for its hearing. As we have pointed out, there is no power at all to dismiss an appeal for default. In view of the foregoing considerations, we answer the first question in the affirmative. In regard to the second question, our answer is that, although there is no power to restore an assessee's appeal which has been dismissed under rule 24 for default, the order of dismissal, which was incompetently passed, could be rectified under section 35 of the Act. In the circumstances of this case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1966 (3) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ncurred by the respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to raise three fur- ther points, namely, (i) the shipowners were not bound by the representation made by the ship's mate; (ii) the bill of lading was governed by the American law and not by common law; and (iii) the plaintiff-buyer, having obtained a decree against the seller in the American court, could not maintain the present suit for damages. The first point was not raised till now and, therefore, we can. not permit the learned counsel to raise it for the first time before us. The second point, namely, what is the American law? is a question of fact. We have not got sufficient material on the record to know what the American law on the subject is. We cannot, therefore, permit the appellant to raise this point either. The third point is also one not pressed in the courts below and, therefore, does not call for our decision. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Matsya under s. 34 of the Matsya Customs Ordinance No. 14 of 1948, and subsequently in the State of Rajasthan under s. 6 of the Rajasthan (Regulation of Customs Duties) Ordinance No. 16 of 1949. It is the admitted position that the agreement entered between the Government of India and the United State of Rajasthan on February 25, 1950 incorporated certain recommendations of the Federal Finance Enquiry Committee Report 1948-49. The agreement having been executed and the condition under Art. 306 having been satisfied in this case, the continuance of the customs duty is in conformity with the provisions of this Article. In any case, the claim of the appellant is not based on any provision of Bharatpur law but upon a contractual liability of Bharatpur State and to a case of this description the provisions of Art. 306 cannot be attracted. For the reasons expressed, we hold that the judgment of the High Court is right and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (3) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rd to the interpretation of rule 24 of the Rules. As has been stated earlier in this batch of cases, the question of confirmation of each of the probationers was considered by the Full Court within the maximum period of probation provided in sub-rule (1) of rule 24, but the Full Court found them not fit for confirmation and instead of adjudging them unsuitable and recommending for termination, the Court deferred their case for further consideration and thereby granted further opportunity for proving their worth for confirmation. Such continuance of the probationers, in our considered opinion, would not confer the status of deemed confirmation, merely because a maximum period of probation has been provided there in sub-rule (1) of rule 24. In the result, the appeals are allowed, judgment passed by Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and all the writ applications stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1966 (3) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... obation any penalty was imposed and if that be the correct view the opinion expressed by the High Court that by passing the order dated December 1, 1958 the Governor was seeking to convert the earlier order of punishment into an order under r. 14 of the Subordinate Revenue Executive Service (Tahsildars) Rules, 1944 retrospectively, cannot be accepted. The order terminating' probation was made under r. 14 and continued to retain that character. The vice in the second part of the order did not either before or after it was cancelled affect the validity of the order terminating the respondent's probation. We think that the respondent was ill-advised in prosecuting the petition even after he had been appointed an officiating Tahsildar. The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. The petition filed by the respondent must be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct that there will be no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (3) TMI 84 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion was within time, and it follows on our finding that the appeal will have to be allowed, and that the application must also stand allowed. (19) The consequence of this will be that the decree in the second suit has to be declared void within the meaning of the express language of Sec. 57(3) of the Act XXIX of 1954. Some arguments have been submitted before us on the further and inevitable consequences of such a declaration or finding. We are expressing no opinion whatever on that aspect, and it does not appear to us to be relevant to the present appeal. Whether it immediately follows that the suit itself is reopened with the consequence that there must be notice of the Court to the State Wakf Board, which must be brought on record and heard in the suit, or whether the consequences in strict law are different, will be matters for the concerned Court to decide, when it is approached in this regard. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs throughout. (20) Appeal allowed
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