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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 84 Records
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1970 (9) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... agreed that a part of the dispute shall be referred to or decided by some person other than the arbitrator. Whether or not the arbitrators are bound by that subsequent agreement, and the arbitration qua such an arrangement could be deemed superseded, is not a matter which we are concerned to decide at this stage. Primarily the dispute between the parties is as to the truth of the agreement set up by the respondent relating to the dissolution of the partnership and the dispute with regard to that agreement raised by the appellant can, in our judgment, be referred to the arbitrators under Clause 15 of the partnership agreement. 10. No argument has been advanced before us on the last plea raised before the High Court. We are not called upon to decide the extent of the power of the arbitrators under an arbitration agreement that question does not strictly arise in a petition under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 11. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (9) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the view I have taken it was not necessary to name the persons who were guilty of such publication I have already indicated that quite a number of members of Parliament was responsible for it. The hearing of this case was protracted unreasonably by the examination of witnesses on this one question and as the respondent has not succeeded in disproving dissemination of the pamphlet in the Central hall it would not be right to make an award of costs in his favour. The litigation was not one of an ordinary type and it was conducted with great zeal on either side. It has divulged a sad lack of responsibility and uprightness in the elected representatives of the people figuring either as witnesses for the petitioners or as witnesses for the respondent In a case like this where both sides are responsible for putting into the witness box a large number of persons who deliberately gave evidence which was not true, the proper course is not to award costs even to the successful party.
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1970 (9) TMI 126 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Explanation to section 314(1), we hold that the expression 'subsequent appointment' does not include increments granted to a permanent incumbent who happens to be a director or the partner or relative of a director of the company. 29. Although, we have upheld the contention of Mr. Sen that the civil court has jurisdiction to try the instant suit and that the same was maintainable as framed, we overrule the contention of Mr. Sen that by granting increments to the defendant No. 7, the Managing Director of the company acted in violation of the provisions of section 314(1) or the Explanation to that section. In our view, the trial court was right in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restore those of the trial court. The appeal is allowed but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we direct each party to bear his own costs throughout. D. Basu, J. I agree.
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1970 (9) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hased and he escaped death very narrowly. There is nothing surprising that such a person being afraid of getting out of his sister's house for a whole day. At any rate the High ' Court thought that there is nothing improbable about it. 24. Every one of the points taken into consideration by the trial Court to arrive at the verdict of acquittal has been considered by the High Court and it has given reasons for differing from the conclusions reached by the trial Court. There is nothing basically wrong in the approach adopted by the High Court. It considered the evidence on record on the basis of human probabilities and tested the evidence given by the witnesses by various methods known to law. After doing so it came to the conclusion that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 is acceptable. As mentioned earlier they are the final judges of fact. We see no reason to interfere with their conclusions. 25. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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1970 (9) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Uttar Pradesh authorities concerned did not avail themselves of the opportunity to take him back to Lucknow for being produced before the magistrate concerned. On the other hand, they were content to have an order of remand of the prisoner in New Delhi passed by the magistrate sitting in Lucknow. Such an order, as we have held, is illegal and hence the detention of the petitioner on the authority of such an illegal order of remand is also illegal. Such a situation has been brought about by the Uttar Pradesh authorities for which they have to thank themselves. 41. In the result we hold that the orders of remand dated 28th and 29th August, 1970 passed by the City Magistrate, Lucknow, are illegal. We further hold that the detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, New Delhi, after the midnight of August 28, 1970 on the authority of the illegal orders of remand is also illegal. In consequence the petitioner should be set at liberty forthwith. The writ petition is allowed.
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1970 (9) TMI 123 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ther in the circumstances of the case the evidence produced on behalf of the plaintiff was reliable and on its basis a definite finding could be recorded that the incident as alleged in the complaint made by the defendant did not take place. In case it comes to the conclusion that the evidence is reliable and on its basis a finding should be recorded that the incident as alleged in the complaint did not take place, the plaintiff would succeed as defendant's evidence has already been held to be unreliable. If however the plaintiff's evidence is also found to be discrepant the suit will fail and will have to be dismissed. 33. I, therefore set aside the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge dated 6th of July, 1962 and remand the case to the lower appellate court with a direction to readmit the appeal to its original number and to rehear it keeping into view the observations made above and in accordance with law. Costs hitherto shall abide the ultimate result.
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1970 (9) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 's retirement under F.R. 56(j). Further, there is nothing to show that the impugned order was not in public interest. As aforesaid, Col J.N. Sinha's case (1970)IILLJ284SC . clearly lays down that the question as to the correctness of such a decision by the appropriate authority, provided it is bona fide, would not be gone into by this Court. We have already negatived the plea of mala fides raised by the appellant. Consequently, a plea of lack of bona fides car hardly be entertained. Likewise, the plea that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind must also fail in view of the clear averments made in that regard in the affidavits cited earlier, no reason having been adequately shown to discard those statements as untrue or otherwise unbelievable. That being the position, we are constrained to come to the conclusion that the appellant has failed to make out his case in any one of his three writ petitions. 29. The appeals must fail and are dismissed with costs.
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1970 (9) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... of the cumulative sentence for commission of those five offences. We have only pointed out that this error occurred, because the High Court adopted the extraordinary course of convicting the appellant for an offence with which he had never been charged, for which he had never been tried, and without examining whether the ingredients of that offence were established and what was the maximum punishment that could be awarded for it. In adopting this course, the High Court, as we have indicated earlier, failed to record a clear finding whether the offences, for which the appellant had been convicted by the trial Court, were proved or not. In these circumstances, the appeal is allowed, the conviction under section 419 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside. The case will now go back to the High Court for rehearing the appeal and giving a decision on the appeal in respect of the offences for which the appellant was convicted by the trial Court. Appeal allowed.
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1970 (9) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the litigation between the parties. This was reaffirmed in Jethanand and Sons v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1961 3SCR754 . approving the view of the Privy Council referred to. Indeed, we could cite on this aspect of the case quite a large number of precedents from various courts in India. In the present matter, the suit was decreed in the absence of the defendant who applied to have the decree set aside and gave reasons for it. The trial court did not accede to the prayer but the High Court held that the matter was governed by Order 9 Rule 9 of the CPC and that there were valid reasons for setting aside the ex-parte decree. As a result of the setting aside of the decree the suit is very much alive today and this cannot be treated as a final adjudication of the suit itself. The certificate granted by the High Court in such circumstances was premature and was not competent. We accordingly set aside the certificate and dismiss the appeal. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1970 (9) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eld. As per' clause (a) proviso (i) of sub-section (4) of s. 38, she would be entitled to resume for personal cultivation either one third of the family holding or half of the lands leased by her, whichever is more. It is seen that the High Court was informed that the family holding in this case consists of 32 acres and on that basis the High Court held that half of the land leased would be more and as such the appellant would be entitled to get possession of half ,If the area leased, namely, half of 27 acres and 37 gunthas. It is for the purpose of effecting a division of the leased properties into two halves and place the landlord and the tenant in possession of one portion, that the High Court after setting aside the order of the revenue tribunals remanded the matter to the Naib Tahsildar. Those directions given by the High Court, in our view, are, perfectly correct and justified. The, appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (9) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eld that the suit to enforce the first mortgage did not bar a suit to enforce the second mortgage. This was before the insertion of Section 67A but the principle embodied in that section is clearly illustrated by that case. The bar of Section 67A, therefore, could not possibly come in the way of the institution of the present suit. 5. On the question of interest we are of the view in the light of the provisions of the mortgage deed and all the circumstances that the rate of 12% is unfair and penal. We are inclined, therefore, to give this relief that the interest should be calculated at the rate of 10 1/2% (which was the original contractual rate) from the date of the mortgage to the date of the preliminary decree. Thereafter the interest shall be payable as directed by the trial court at the rate of 6% per annum till realisation. With this modification the appeal is dismissed but in view of the entire circumstances the parties are left to bear their own costs in this Court.
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1970 (9) TMI 117 - HIGH COURT ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... in Sawan Mal's case 1970 All LJ 938(supra) I should refer this case to a larger Bench. I would have done so, had the decision from which I am differing been of another learned Single Judge because, in that case, there would have been a conflict of decisions between two Single Judges of this Court and that conflict would have confused the subordinate courts. As the earlier decision with which I am differing is my own, no confusion will result. I, therefore, do not think it necessary to refer this case to a larger Bench. As I have said above if the Privy Council decision in Bhagchand Dagdusa Gujarathi's case and the Supreme Court decision in Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand's case 1966 1SCR988 had been brought to my notice, I would not have held what I did. 7. For the reasons given above, I allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned District Judge and reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1970 (9) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t is quasi-judicial, and by the use of the expression "absolute discretion" it is not intended to invest the Licensing Authority with arbitrary power so as to destroy the limitations to which it is subject by its inherent nature. The Act does not purport to confer arbitrary authority upon the Licensing Authority or the State Government, and by the use in the rules of the expression absolute discretion the legislative intent disclosed by the Act cannot be superseded. 12. It is clear on a perusal of the record that the State Government did not correctly apprise itself of the facts when it gave its directions to the Licensing Authority to dismiss the application, and the State Government also acted in violation of the rules which inhere the exercise of judicial power when it dismissed the appeal without giving reasons. The orders dated July 9, 1964 and August 21, 1964 were rightly set aside by the High Court. 13. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (9) TMI 115 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... liabilities under sub-clause (iv) of section 4(1)(a). The petitioners have not done this. Therefore, it is not possible even to attack the validity of the notification issued under section 4. In this connection, we may refer to the Supreme Court decision given in Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi v. State of Gujarat. Reference to page 875 of the reported decisions shows in the observations of the Supreme Court that in such cases in which the petitioner has failed to make out the case for non-application of mind, it would be better for the Government to leave the petitioner to their burden in view of the legal presumption and the provisions contained in article 166(2) of the Constitution. 76. In this view of the matter, we hold that both these petitions should fail. Both of them are, therefore, dismissed with costs. 77. The learned advocate for the petitioner in Spl. C.A. 638/69 applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Said leave is granted under article 133(1)(b) and (c).
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1970 (9) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... piece came off which he threw down without noticing it or the paper gave way and a piece fell (as it did when we handled it) it is not possible to say with definiteness. We find it difficult to believe that this mutilation, without any rhyme or reason, was done with a sinister motive. This is the unanimous view of the entire Bar of India speaking through Counsel. 38. Our duty is clear. We would have paused to consider the law applicable to reviews in such matters but we do not think we should ascertain it in this case. This matter is one of the ethics of the profession which the law has entrusted to the Bar Council of India. It is their opinion of a case which must receive due weight. The Bar Council thinks that the decision against the appellant is unsustainable. We see no reason to differ from them. We accordingly grant review in this case and set aside the order disbarring the appellant from practice which had been passed against him. There shall be no order about costs.
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1970 (9) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ut in the requisite qualifying service. Besides, his service could not have been regarded as meritorious as the record of his service produced by Subedar Mohan Singh revealed that he had been given punishments on as many as seven occasions, some of which were on charges such as theft, insubordination, absentism, etc. 13. On this evidence, as also on the evidence that was before the Commissioner, it is clear that the appellant was not and could not have been a recipient either of a gallantry award or an award for meritorious service. Nor could he have been granted any land at Samundri in respect of which he had claimed land here after partition. The Commissioner, therefore, was right in cancelling the allotment made in his favour as also the permanent rights acquired by him in consequence of that allotment. The High Court consequently was right in refusing to quash the Commissioner's order and dismissing the writ petition. 14. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (9) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ome to the conclusion that these petitions should be allowed subject to the following conditions 33. The State of Tamil Nadu shall immediately constitute a separate expert committee consisting of eminent medical practitioners (excluding all those who were members of the previous committees) for selection to the 24 unfilled seats. The selection shall be made on State wise basis. The committee shall interview only the candidates who are shown in the waiting list, the persons who unsuccessfully moved the High Court of Madras and the two petitioners before this Court. They shall allot separate marks under the five heads mentioned in the rule. The committee shall take into consideration only matters laid down in the rule, exclude from consideration all irrelevant matters and thereafter prepare a gradation list to fill up the 24 seats mentioned earlier. It is ordered accordingly. We think this is a fit case where the petitioners should get their costs from the State of Tamil Nadu.
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1970 (9) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nses. There are ways to bypass that provision. From what we have seen in the various election cases that came be-fore us we are of the opinion that law controlling election expenses has been reduced to a mockery. , We can only repeat the observations of this Court in Rananjaya Singh's case( 1955 1 S.C.R 671.) that "the appeal in this connection must be to the parliament." Now coming to the question of costs, the trial court felt extremely unhappy in having had to award costs to respondent No. 1. But it had to because of the compulsion of the lawsee s. 119 of the Act. We are not faced with any such compulsion. There is no provision in the Act which compels the appellate court to award costs to the successful party in an election appeal. This is eminently a fit case where we should not award costs to the returned candidate. The resulting position is that the appeal is dismissed but the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (9) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nly puts an end to the aforesaid relationship when the eviction decree is passed. The eviction decree was passed long after the section 18application. Therefore, the present petition is liable to, succeed only to have extent of section 18 application, that is, the tenants would be entitled to purchase the land. " But a slight modification needs to be made in the order. A proceeding for recovery of rent was commenced against Shadi. It is not clear whether the amount of compensation determined by the Assistant Collector as payable by Shadi for purchasing the land includes the rent in arrears. We declare that Shadi will be entitled to purchase the land on payment of the amount of compensation together with the amount of rent due by him. The Assistant Collector will pass appropriate order in that behalf and direct that payment be made in appropriate instalments under s. 18 (4) (a). Subject to that modification, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (9) TMI 109 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... be chargeable under article 47 (b). But then which is the proper article under which the instrument could be charged to stamp duty? The only article to which our attention was drawn and which appears to be applicable in the present case is article 5 which provides for the rate of stamp duty on agreement or memorandum of agreement. The instrument before us is clearly an agreement or, at any rate, a memorandum of agreement relating to retirement and it must, therefore, be held to be chargeable to stamp duty under article 5. ( 8. ) We , therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the following manner Question No. 1 - In the negative; Question No. 2 - Also in the negative. The instrument being an agreement or, at any rate, a memorandum of agreement relating to retirement of three partners from the firm was chargeable to stamp duty under article 5 of the First Schedule to the Act. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority will pay the costs of the reference to the applicant.
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