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Showing 1 to 20 of 84 Records
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1972 (10) TMI 141 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be a starting point of limitation. In the circumstances, therefore, the delay in making the inquiry however irregular or deplorable cannot affect the question of limitation. 9. As Section 106 makes the date of knowledge of the commission of the offence the starting point of the period of limitation, we find it difficult to read the section so as to make the date on which the Inspector would or ought to have acquired knowledge of the commission of the offence had he been diligent, the starting point of limitation especially where, as here, the statute does not provide for an inquiry into the accident, much less the period within which the inquiry has to be made. It is only in the jurisprudence of Humpty Dumpty that we can equate the date on which the alleged offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector with the date on which the alleged offence ought to have come to his knowledge. We think that the High Court was right in its conclusion. 10. We. therefore, dismiss the appeal.
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1972 (10) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... encroaches on the highly cherished right of personal liberty by conferring on the executive extraordinary power to detain persons without trial by coming to subjective decisions. The detaining authority in exercising this power must act strictly within the limitations this Act places on its power so that the guarantee of personal liberty is not imperiled beyond what the Constitution and the law strictly provide. The limited right of redress conferred on the detenu under the law deserves to be construed with permissible liberality consistently with the provisions of the Act and the Constitutional guarantee. We find that the impugned order in this case has been made without paying due heed to the provisions of the Act and the order is clearly beyond the statutory scope. The impugned order must, therefore, be struck down as outside the Act. 11. The petitioner was released by us by means of a short order on October 4, 1972. We have now stated our reasons in support of that order.
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1972 (10) TMI 139 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (new). 15. One of the defenses in the written statement is that the suit is not maintainable because of the provision of Sec. 67 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, which enacts that the Deputy Commissioner may, on being satisfied that a religious institution has ceased to exist, hold an enquiry to ascertain its property and funds. An appeal may be filed against the decision to the Commissioner and then a suit. The learned District Munsif held that the provisions of the Act would not be a bar. The contention was not repeated before the learned Subordinate Judge. In my opinion, the Act does not bar a suit of the present type. The very question is whether the deity has ceased to exist at the old site so as to incapacitate the villagers from renovating it. That question itself cannot be left for the final decision of the Deputy Commissioner. 16. On the short ground mentioned already, I dismiss the appeal, but without costs. Leave granted. 17. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (10) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ate would have granted the permission to compound the offence under section 420 Indian Penal Code if he was aware that the offence under section 13 of the Maharashtra Act was not compoundable and the case in any event would have to be pro- ceeded with so far as the latter offence was concerned. All the same it appears that the said permission war, one indivisible per. mission for the offences under section 420 Indian Penal Code and section 13 of the Maharashtra Act. As no valid permission could be granted for the compounding of an offence under section 13 of the Maharashtra Act, the permission would have to be held to be invalid in its entirety. It is not permissible in, such an event to sever the permission into two parts and to uphold it so far as the offence under section 420 Indian Penal, Code is concerned and hold it to be invalid in respect of the offence under section 13 of the Maharashtra Act. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. V. P. S. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (10) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , whether aggravating or mitigating, which are connected with the particular crime under inquiry. All such facts and circumstances are capable of being proved in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act in a trial regulated by the Cr. PC The trial does not come to an end until all the relevant facts are proved and the counsel on both sides have an opportunity to address the court. The only thing that remains is for the Judge to decide on the guilt and punishment and that is what Section 306(2) and 309(2) Cr. PC purport to provide for. These provisions are part of the procedure established by law and, unless it is shown that they are invalid for any other reasons, they must be regarded as valid. No reasons are offered to show that they are Constitutionally invalid, and, hence, the death sentence imposed after trial in accordance with the procedure established by law is not unconstitutional under Article 21. 31. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1972 (10) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... facts of a particular case, the classes to be considered are really different, inequality of opportunity in. promotional chances may be justifiable. On the contrary, if the facts of a particular case disclose no such rational distinction between members of what is found to be really a single class no class distinctions can be made in selecting the best. Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution must be held to be violated when members of one class are not even considered for promotion. The case before us falls, in our opinion, in the latter type of cases where the, difference in promotional opportunities of those who were wrongly divided into two classes for this purpose only could not be justified on any rational grounds. Learned Counsel for the State was unable to indicate any such ground to us. We, therefore, think that the Mysore High Court rightly held that the impugned notifications were unconstitutional. 12. Consequently we dismiss these appeals with one set of costs.
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1972 (10) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urprise and was thus rendered so helpless as to be unable to comply with the requirements of the Constitution for expeditiously considering the petitioner's representation. The State Government, in our view, failed to realize the vital importance of the Constitutional check placed on the subjective exercise of the extraordinary power of preventively detaining citizens without trial. This check, it may be pointed out, serves as a safeguard against misuse or improper exercise of this power and is inextricably linked with the legality of preventive detention. We are not unmindful of the interest of the society but those interests have been harmonized by the Constitution with the interest of the individual. 6. In the view that we have taken on this challenge it is unnecessary to consider any other point in this case. The petition is accordingly allowed and making the rule absolute we set aside the order of detention and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.
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1972 (10) TMI 134 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ther the judgment of Thiru Kothandaraman nor this judgment should be construed as in any way giving any such leave. 52. In the result, subject to the modification and conditions mentioned above, the appeal is dismissed. In particular, the additional written statement already filed in the City Civil Court in December, 1970, must be eschewed, because it does not plead an equitable set-off, but proceeds on the basis of a right to forfeit the deposit of ₹ 5,000/-. Only the draft additional written statement filed before me can be accepted. A written statement to that effect can be filed in the City Civil Court provided that, as a condition precedent, the defendant pays a sum of ₹ 300/- to the plaintiff or his counsel Sri Vedantam Srinivasan, within three weeks from now, and provided further that the defendant pays the requisite court-fee on the claim of ₹ 5,000/-. 53. The parties will bear their own costs in the appeal before me. No leave. 54. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (10) TMI 133 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... peration only on and with effect from August 10, 1963, when the notification dated August 3, 1963, was published; and (iv) a legal right accrued to the appellant as well as to respondent No. 5 to have their applications for payment of compensation processed according to R. 30 as in force on the date when they made the applications to have compensation paid to them by transfer of the acquired evacuee property. 108. Subject to the observations made above, I entirely agree with the answer proposed by my lord Gurdev Singh J. to the question referred to this Full Bench. I also agree that though the amendment to Rule 22 is also necessarily prospective and could not be given retrospective effect, the impact of the change made in that behalf on the facts of the present case has to be left to be decided by the Bench hearing the Letters Patent Appeal on merits and neither we are called upon to deal with that matter, nor were any arguments addressed to us in that behalf. H.R. Sodhi, J.
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1972 (10) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community". Section 3(1) (a) (ii) of the Act confers power on the Central Government and’ the State Government to pass orders of detention with a view to, preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. This power cannot be controlled by anything stated in the long title of the Act. Besides, the long title describes the Act as- one for providing for detention for the purpose of maintenance of’ internal security and "matters connected therewith". "Internal’ Security" is an expression of width sufficient to comprehend the concept of public order. Internal disturbances can threaten the security of the State and such disturbances may assume grave pro-portions so as to have a direct impact on public order. In the result the petition, fails and is dismissed. G.C. Petition dismissed
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1972 (10) TMI 131 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the refund of the price in a case of a breach of the contract on the part of the seller -- from the date on which payment was made." 17. Electricity is not goods covered by the Sale of Goods Act. The reason is that the Sale of Goods Act applies to goods as defined in Section 2(7) of the said Act. The principal ingredient is that it is movable property. The Supreme Court in Avtarsingh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 666 has observed that "Electricity is not movable property". The claim of interest under the Sale of Goods Act is therefore not tenable. Accordingly we are not inclined to award interest in the circumstances of the case. 18. The result is that the judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge are set aside, the appeal is accepted and a decree in the sum of ₹ 99,663/14/-, is passed in favour of the appellant and against the respondent State. The plaintiff appellant will get his costs of both the courts on the decretal amount aforesaid.
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1972 (10) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... question conferred upon the first respondent the right to have his pay fixed in the manner specified in the Order and that was part of the conditions of his service. We see no reason why the Court should not enforce that right. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the Order not being retrospective in character, the respondent's pay should not have been fixed with retrospective effect from 2- 7-1953. The Order is not retrospective in character. The High Court was therefore wrong in fixing the pay with retrospective effect from 2-7-1953. The direction could only be to fix the pay with effect from the date of the Order and the first respondent did not contend otherwise in this Court. The second respondent will, therefore, fix the pay of the 1st respondent in accordance with the provisions of the Order with effect from the date of the Order. The appeal is dismissed with this modification, but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (10) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ortgaged the property but by others in whom the occupancy rights were subsequently vested would, in our opinion, make no difference and would be no bar to the maintainability of the suit. It is significant in this context to observe that plaintiffs 1 to 6 became the occupancy tenants of the same land of which Lachhman Singh's father was the occupancy tenant at the time of the mortgage. It has also been argued by Mr. Agarwal that the suit for possession brought by the plaintiff-respondents was not maintainable in a civil court and could only be tried by a revenue court. Apart from the fact that no such plea was taken in the written statement or in the trial court or the first appellate court, we find that the five-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mahabal Singh and Anr. (supra) has held that such a suit is maintainable in a civil court. We see no cogent ground to disturb that view. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (10) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ant had not even completed the minimum period of teaching experience while the other two had done so. In other word the case is that the appellant was ineligible for appointment when the decision was taken. It is true that the appointment was actually notified on 19-8-1965 when the appellant had also completed his 3 years of experience. But obviously that is irrelevant. Decisions have to be taken first before appointments are notified. The usual administrative process takes some time. The appellant sought to controvert the statement of the Govt. that the decision had been taken to make the appointment on March 31, 1965. But we do not think there is any substance in that contention. It would, thus, follow that while respondents 5 and 6 were eligible for appointment as lecturers on 31-3-1965 the appellant was not and, therefore, he cannot be regarded as aggrieved for the purpose of the relief claimed by him. The appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1972 (10) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
Import Policy for Newsprint for the year April 1972 to March 1973 challenged on ground of infringement of fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression in Article 19 (1) (a) and right to equality in Article 14 of the Constitution
Held that:- In the present case, it cannot be said that the newsprint policy is a reasonable restriction within the ambit of Article 19(2). The newsprint policy abridges the fundamental rights of the petitioners in regard to freedom of speech and expression. The newspapers are not allowed their right of circulation- The newspapers are not allowed right of page growth. The common ownership units of newspapers cannot bring out newspapers or new editions. The newspapers operating above 10 page level and newspapers Operating below 10 page level have been treated equally for assessing the needs and requirements of newspapers with newspapers which are not their equal. Once the quota is fixed and direction to use the quota in accordance with the newsprint policy is made applicable the big newspapers are prevented any increase in page number. Both page numbers and circulation are relevant for calculating the basic quota and allowance for increases. In the garb of distribution of newsprint the Government has tended to control the growth and circulation of newspapers. Freedom of the press is both qualitative and quantitative. Freedom lies both in circulation and in content. The newsprint policy which permits newspapers to increase circulation by reducing the number of pages, page area and periodicity, prohibits them to increase the number of pages, page area and periodicity by reducing circulation. These restrictions constrict the newspapers in adjusting their page number and circulation. The newsprint policy is not a measure to combat monopolies. The newsprint policy should allow the newspapers that amount of freedom of discussion and information which is needed or will appropriately enable the Members of the society to preserve their political expression of comment not only upon public affairs but also upon the vast range of views and matters needed for free society.
the newsprint policy for 1972-73 violates Articles 19 (1) (a) and 14 of the Constitution. The restrictions by fixing 10 page limit in Remarks V and VIII of the policy infringe Articles 19 (1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution and are therefore, declared unconstitutional and struck down. The policy of basic entitlement to quota in Remark V is violative of Articles 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution and is therefore struck down. The measure in Remark VII(a) is violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and is struck down.
The measures in Remark VII(C) read with Remark VIII are violative of Articles 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution and are struck down. The prohibition in Remark X against common ownership unit from starting a new newspaper/periodical or a new edition is declared unconstitutional and struck down as violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. For these reasons the petitioners succeed. The import policy for newsprint for the year 1972-73 in regard to Remarks V, VII(a), VII(c), VIII and X as indicated above is struck down.
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1972 (10) TMI 126 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l authority for satisfying itself of the legality or propriety of the order of the inferior tribunal and while purporting to satisfy itself about the legality or propriety of the order, the revising authority cannot pass an order which the appellate authority could not have legally passed. Later, the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Madura Mills Co. Ltd. 1967 19 S.T.C. 144 (S.C.). has confirmed the view taken by this court in the decision in Madura Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras 1962 13 S.T.C. 124. In view of the above decisions, it is not possible for us to uphold the order of the Board of Revenue, in so far as it seeks to interfere with the order of the assessing authority, beyond the period referred to in section 34(2)(c) of the Act. The order of the Board of Revenue in so far as it cancelled the exemption given by the assessing authority on a turnover of Rs. 5,58,479 is set aside. The rest of the order will stand. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (10) TMI 125 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dicate how non-production of accounts or sale of goods to a dealer whose registration certificate has been cancelled, can fall in the category of misuse of the registration certificate . The assessee may be liable to other penalties or he may not be able to seek deductions for such sales, and for non-production of accounts he may be assessed on the basis of the best judgment according to the information available with the department under section 10 of the Act, but the department has certainly no jurisdiction whatever to cancel his registration certificate on the alleged ground of misuse of the registration certificate on the above-mentioned facts. For the reasons given above, therefore, we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and quash the impugned order of the Assessing Authority, cancelling the registration certificate of the appellant. The costs of this appeal as well as of the writ petition will be borne by the respondents. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (10) TMI 124 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lowed to say that a judgment delivered by the High Court is incorrect. Let the Assessing Authority know that such an act if committed in future will be severely dealt with. I think these observations are enough to instill respect for binding precedents in the minds of the subordinate Tribunals and courts. After observing this, I feel no necessity of issuing notice for contempt of court against the Assessing Authority. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Patiala, for circulation amongst the Assessing Authorities so that they may be more careful in future. The petition is allowed with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (10) TMI 123 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... do not fall in the category of electrical goods and in the case of State of Madras v. Indian Oxygen Limited 1968 22 S.T.C. 476., it has held that arc welding rods (which are of the same nature as electrodes) are not electrical goods. In the case of J.B. Advani-Oerlikon, Electrodes, Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. 1972 30 S.T.C. 337., the Madhya Pradesh High Court after a thorough examination of the matter, has likewise held that electrodes used for melting purposes cannot be treated as electrical goods. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madras and the Madhya Pradesh High Courts and need not add anything further. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the negative and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. This order shall govern S.T.R. No. 347 of 1970 and S.T.R. No. 348 of 1970 in which an identical question between the same parties arises. Reference answered in the negative.
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1972 (10) TMI 122 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 8 S.T.C. 285., where a contrary view has been taken. In these two cases the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act were not taken into consideration and for that reason, we are, with respect, unable to agree with the view expressed in those cases. We accordingly hold that coconuts are oil-seeds. The question referred to us is not happily worded. The words oil-seed and dry fruit are not mutually exclusive. Something which is an oil-seed may as well be a dry fruit. Indeed that is the position with regard to coconuts. The real question that arises is as to whether tax is leviable on the turnover of coconut in accordance with section 3-AA or under the general charging section 3. We accordingly reframe the question as follows Whether coconuts are oil-seeds as defined in section 3-AA(1)(vi) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act? We answer the question as reframed by us in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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