|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 54 Records
-
1973 (1) TMI 101 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ained in the present application 'dated the 8th December, 1971 purported to be on under Section 337(1) Criminal Procedure Code, is ruled out by the Principles of Issue Estoppel. Justice demands that the applicant concerned should be stopped from raisins the issue once again as there is no scope for any further clarification. The party aggrieved had a remedy by moving the High Court and that remedy having been exhausted the present prayer is unwarranted and untenable. Having, therefore, considered the arguments advanced by Mrs. Nag. in all dimensions I ultimately hold that those are untenable and must fail. 10. In the result, I discharge the Rule; uphold the order dated the 1st July. 1972 passed by Shri D. B. Dutta, Magistrate. 1st Class Barrackpore. in case no. -794/C of 1967; and I direct that the case shall go back to the Court below for being disposed of in accordance with law and expeditiously from the stage reached. 11. The records shall go down as early as possible.
-
1973 (1) TMI 100 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cancellation of the exemption in cases where there had been a breach of the Conditions subject to which it had been granted. If it had contemplated that cancellation of the exemption amounted to a penalty within the meaning of Section 14(2-A) of the Act, it was purposeless to provide for any penalty for a similar breach Under Section 14(2-A) because it could never be imposed. 19. Moreover, an order Under Section 17(4)(a) of the Act imposes no penalty on the Directors or other Officers of the Company concerned. 20. None of the submissions made on behalf of the Respondents have any force. 21. On merits, it has not been contended that the evidence on record does not justify the conviction of the Respondents Under Section 14(2-A) of the Act. 22. We consequently allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, Kanpur and restore that of the learned trial Magistrate. The Respondents will suffer the punishment as recorded by the learned Magistrate.
-
1973 (1) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... arrived at on the basis of the instances stated in els. (a) to (d) which are precise and definite. Similarly, ground No. 3 says that the petitioner has been exciting communal feelings among the Muslims in India and contributing to communal disturbance in Aligarh city and this conclusion is based on instances stated in els. (a) to (d) which are precise and definite. The instances under both these grounds are relevant and germane to the object which is sought to be achieved by Section 3 of the Act for the purpose of detaining persons who. are likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order. The decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioner reported in Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir 1957CriLJ316 and Pushkar Mukherjee and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal 1956 2 S.C.R. 635 are, on the facts and circumstances of this case, of no assistance to him. 21 This writ petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in the written statement to cover the specific plea of infirmity of the notice because of its being conditional. The plea of the statutory defect in the notice should, in our opinion, have been reasonably specific and precise so as to enable the appellant to meet it. The general plea could not serve the object of putting the appellant on guard about the precise case to be met at the trial and tell the management the precise nature of the plea with respect to the defect in the notice, to enable them to meet it. In our view, if Clause (b) of Section 25F is excluded from consideration and the plea relating to infirmity of the notice is ruled out, as we hold on these two points in agreement with Shri Setalvad, then, the impugned order is clearly insupportable. We are, therefore, constrained to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned award and hold that the retrenchment of Shri Naidu was proper and justified. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs.
-
1973 (1) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nment authority had failed to see that a mandatory duty. embodied in a basic rule, had been carried out. the resulting decision must necessarily be held to be-void. If the decision to dismiss the respondent was void and inoperative in law, there seems no reason why a declaration to that effect be not granted. Such a case would be covered by the principles laid down by this court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjea & Ors. ( 1964 (5) SCR 52) and S. P. Tewari V. District Board Agra & Anr.( 1964 (3)SCR 55). This could not be a case in which damages for a simple breach of contract could afford adequate relief. Damages could not wipe off the stigma attached to the record of the servant. The law requires that, before the future of a servant is- allowed to be marred by a blot on the record of the servant concerned, rules of natural justice must be complied with. ;therefore, concur with the judgment and the order proposed by my learned Brother Ray.
-
1973 (1) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... h,. to the matter and even if he happens to be a servant of the government he is not 'bound in any way to carry out or endorse the policy of the Government without discharging his duties as contemplated by s. 68-D. We are unable to hold nor has anything been shown to us except the suggestion that the schemes as published under s. 68-C were approved in toto that the authority acting under s. 68-D had not discharged his duties in a proper and judicial manner. The mere fact that the schemes were approved' without any modification cannot establish that the Secretary, Home. who exercised the functions of the State Government under s. 68-D, had failed to carry out his functions as laid down in s. 68-D or that he had approved the schemes without any modification, merely because the Government orders contained language of mandatory nature. In the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed but owing to the nature of the points raised there will be no order as, to costs.
-
1973 (1) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... observed in State of Bombay V. Kathi Kalu Oghad( 1962 3 S.C.R. 10 32.) as follows. "In order that a testimony by an accused person may be said to have been self- incriminatory the compulsion of which comes within the, prohibition of the constitutional provision, it- must be of such a character that by itself it should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. In. other words, it should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person alteast probable, considered by itself." Therefore we are unable to set aside the summons. The peti- tioner must appear before the Deputy Director and answer such questions as do not tend to incriminate him, as explained by this Court. The petition is accordingly allowed to the extent that it is declared that the petitioner is a person accused of an offence within art. 20(3). The facts in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1972 are similar and the same declaration is given. Petition allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... setting aside the assessments are set aside. As regards the order levying penalty, it is seen that the assessees stand was that the sales effected by them were not taxable and, therefore, they need not register themselves as dealers under the Act. The question whether the sales effected by the assessees were taxable or not has now been decided by this court in the affirmative and the question was being agitated bona fide by them right through. It is well-settled that in cases where the assessability of the transactions of a dealer is in doubt and he bona fide thinks that his transactions will not come under the purview of the Sales Tax Act, his non-registration as a dealer or non-submission of the return in respect of his transactions cannot attract section 12(3) of the Act. We, therefore, confirm the order of the Tribunal setting aside the orders of penalty. The tax cases are, therefore, allowed in part with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200 (one set). Petitions partly allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 93 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... g so, the notification of 1st July, 1962, did not apply to the sale of raw borax, as the circumstances under which the article could be taxed under the notification were not present in the case of the sale effected by the assessee. No other notification relevant to the assessment year in question has been brought to our notice by which chemicals were subjected to a single point tax at the rate of 7 paise per rupee instead of multiple point tax in respect of unclassified article. The result is that raw borax sold by the assessee could not be taxed at the rate of 7 per cent even on the assumption that it is a chemical. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to consider the question as to whether borax is a chemical. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us by holding that the borax sold by the assessee was taxable as an unclassified article and not as a chemical. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1973 (1) TMI 92 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the revisional jurisdiction under section 32(1) there should be an order either express or implied. In this case, the assessing authority neither in the show cause notice nor in the assessment has proposed to pass any order under section 12(3). In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any order by the assessing authority levying penalty either impliedly or expressly. Section 34 specifically refers to an order passed by any authority subordinate to the Board which could be the subject-matter of revision under that section. Therefore, there should be an order passed by a subordinate authority, either express or implied, so as to attract section 34. We have already held that there is no order by the assessing authority even by implication in the matter of levy of penalty. For the reasons set out above, the order of the Board of Revenue has to be set aside, and is accordingly set aside. The tax case is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 91 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ll be penalised for something for which he is not responsible. But it is for the Legislature or for the rule-making authority to intervene to soften the rigour of the provisions and it is not for this court to do so where the provisions are clear and unambiguous. In this view of the matter the second ground of attack to rule 25-A also fails. In my opinion, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. By the Court.-In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The last sentence of sub-rule (5) of rule 25-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules is declared to be ultra vires. The assessment order dated 31st May, 1971, is modified. The demand created in it of tax on the purchase of oil-seeds shall stand reduced by Rs. 32,848.61. The Sales Tax Officer is further directed to rectify the recognition certificate granted to the petitioner by inserting in it the date of the application in column No. 1 thereof. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 90 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... assessee to sell food to its employees for a price or for any other valuable consideration. Unless and until the department establishes the essential ingredients of a valid sale, the supply of food by the assessee to its employees cannot be held to be a sale exigible to sales tax. The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. 1972 29 S.T.C. 474 (S.C.). governs the case on hand. For all the reasons stated and on a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances, we hold that the supply of food by the assessee to its employees does not amount to sale within the meaning of section 2(n) of the Act. Our answer to the question is in the negative and against the department. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 200 payable to Sri A. Balakoteswara Rao and Sri C. Suryanarayana Murthy, Advocates, appointed as amicus curiae in equal proportion. Petition dismissed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 89 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nce , what is meant was books which one can read for education, knowledge, enlightenment or recreation. 18.. On a consideration of the entire case, we are satisfied that what the notification exempted by the expression books meant for reading or reference are books which are literary in nature. As is often said, the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it, keeps. Noscitur a sociis. The word reference juxtaposed with the word reading can only indicate that the books meant for reference are books which are meant for reference for the public for education, knowledge, enlightenment or recreation. It is true that the books in question are used as books of reference by estate owners and auctioneers and also by the shareholders of companies. But to include them in the exemption will be to read into item 7 in Schedule I something which the abovesaid notification did not intend. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed, however, without costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 88 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o be made. We may point out here that even if the contention of the Government Pleader that forest-growth, timber and firewood are three different commodities is accepted, still the assessment cannot be sustained. What the petitioner was liable to pay was tax on his sales of timber and firewood all his sales were treated as sales of timber and taxed as timber at a higher rate (in fact, part of the sales was of firewood) the sales of firewood which were treated as sales of timber and taxed once cannot be treated as sales of firewood and taxed a second time. In the view we have taken above, we need not consider the other question whether, in supplying the 780 tons of firewood to the fair price shops, there was a sale or not, because the effect of our conclusion already recorded is that no portion of the sales of firewood can be taxed. The result is we allow the revision case and set aside the assessment on the firewood. The petitioner will also get his costs. Petition allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 86 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd, therefore, the State Government had to specify the foodgrains which were intended to be subjected to tax. It is said that paddy, even though a foodgrain, has not been so specified. Now, the notification mentions only foodgrains without specifying all of them. It includes cereals and pulses and excludes certain grains. This, in our opinion, is adequate specification. Specification may be by enumerating all foodgrains separately or by process of elimination. The notification sets out the foodgrains which are excluded. It means that the Government specified the foodgrains liable to tax by excluding therefrom such foodgrains as were not intended to be included. Thus, we are of the opinion, the requirement of the law has been sufficiently complied with. In the end, we hold that the petitioners are rightly being asked to pay the purchase tax on the turnover of the purchases of paddy. The petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... have already expressed our view that the bills rendered by the assessee have to be read along with the printed price list, which gave the break-up figures of the actual price for the goods and of the sales tax payable thereon. If the sale bills are read along with the price list, it is clear that the assessee had treated the sales tax separately from the actual price of the goods and had intended to pass on the tax to the purchaser. In this view, the assessee should be taken to have substantially complied with the conditions set out in S.O. 13, which provides that if the sales tax collected is separately shown, the dealer will be entitled to the exclusion of that amount. We, therefore, hold that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of the direction given in S.O. 13. The tax case is, therefore, allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside, and the turnover in dispute will stand excluded from the taxable turnover. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 84 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Appellate Assistant Commissioner can grant relief only in so far as it relates to the rectification order. The decision of the Tribunal proceeds on the basis that the order of rectification is separate from and independent of the original order of assessment and, therefore, an appeal from an order of rectification cannot cover the subject-matter of the original assessment. In this case, the Tribunal has adopted the reasoning in the said decision, that an appeal against an order under section 16 is quite independent of an appeal against an order of original assessment and that a petition for enhancement in respect of the turnover which was the subject-matter of the original assessment cannot be maintained in an appeal filed against an order under section 16. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the view taken by the Tribunal in this regard. The tax cases are, therefore, dismissed, with costs in T. C. No. 27 of 1969 alone. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petitions dismissed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 83 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ews in the matter as to whether the goods purchased are covered by the registration certificate or not, the mere issue of a C form certificate by the assessee without any further circumstance or material will not lead to the conclusion that the assessee has made false representation. We are, therefore, of the view that in this case, the Board of Revenue is not right in interfering with the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the present case, we have also to point out that the penalty levied is 1 frac12 times the enhanced rate of tax. This court has consistently held that the penalty leviable under section 10A is 11 times the concessional rate of tax payable under section 8(1). Therefore, the penalty leviable in this case is considerably low. But, in view of our setting aside the order of penalty, we are not going into the question of the quantum of penalty leviable. The tax case is therefore allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... crete instance of excess stock of 169 tins worth about Rs. 6,000 on one particular day in the course of the assessment year. When this figure was suggested to the learned counsel for the assessee he also felt that, in the circumstances, that will be a fair estimate. We, therefore, reduce the addition made by the assessing authority in this case to Rs. 50,000, which is taxable at 2 per cent being the sale value of the oil. It is made clear that out of the three items disputed before the Tribunal, item 3 relating to exemption has not been disputed before us and the challenge was only in relation to items 1 and 2. As already stated, in the place of additions of the two items, items 1 and 2, there will be a consolidated addition of Rs. 50,000 taxable at 2 percent. Tax Case No. 55 of 1969 is allowed in full. Tax Case No. 54 of 1969 is allowed in part to the extent mentioned above. There will be no order as to costs. T.C. No. 54 of 1969 partly allowed. T.C. No. 55 of 1969 allowed.
-
1973 (1) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notification issued under section 3-A
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. If the assessee believed that contention to be true it would not have collected from its purchasers the tax at the rate of one anna per rupee. Further it is now well-settled by the decision of this court that no one can challenge the validity of a provision of an Act or rule made thereunder or even a notification issued either under the Act or under the Rules made, before the authorities constituted under the Act. It is true as contended by Mr. Gupte that these decisions were rendered long after 1962, but the fact remains that the decisions in question merely interpret what the law is.
|
