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1974 (3) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt into the store room to take a little strychnine. He trembled when P.W. 3 turned to ask him a searching question. He never showed any anxiety to save the doctor out of the calamity and in the committal court took a false plea of denial modified in the Sessions Court to present a plausible defence. The following questions arise Did the accused prepare the medicine which did indubitably contain poison ? Yes. Did he do it accidently ? No. Did he have motive to harm the victim ? Yes. Did he deny falsely in the committal court ? Yes, and that is itself a guilty circumstance. Do other likelihoods neutralise the incrimination available from these circumstances ? No reasonable inferences but theoretical possibilities. 19. If crime is to be punished gossamer web niceties must yield to realistic appraisals. The compounder has dispensed a deleterious substance to his own doctor and has been rightly held guilty. The sentence does not call for interference either. We dismiss the appeal.
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1974 (3) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d no jurisdiction to try the offences attributed to the petitioner. This, if true, would have been a serious matter but the proceedings show that the orders of remand were passed all through by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jamshedpur and not by the Magistrate at Gaya. 6. Though we cannot direct the release of the petitioner by issuing a writ of habeas corpus we are of the opinion that the court before which the case may now be pending must consider whether the petitioner could not be released on bail forthwith. It appears from the copy of the proceedings supplied to us that Narain Das who was arrested along with the petitioner was released on bail in or about September, 1973. The petitioner's case stands on the same footing as that of Narain Das and in view of the fact that the investigation took more than two year to complete this may be a fit case in which the Magistrate could release the petitioner on a proper bail. 7. With these observations we dismiss the petition.
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1974 (3) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n a recent case to which one of us was party Om Parkash v. State of Delhi Criminal Appeal No. 143 of 1970, Judgment dated January 25, 1974. this Court has held that police officials cannot be discredited in a trap case merely because they are police officials, nor can other witnesses be rejected because on some other occasion they have been witnesses for the prosecution in the past Basically the court has to view the evidence in the light of the probabilities and the intrinsic credibility of those who testify. The serious hurdle in the way of the appellant here is that the court which has seen the witnesses, and the appellate court which has reviewed the matter over again, have found no good reason ID discard the prosecution version. We are, therefore satisfied that the appellant has failed in this endeavour to prove that the charge leveled against him has not been satisfactorily made out. We dismiss the appeal, and if the accused is on bail, he will surrender in consequence.
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1974 (3) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which no credible explanation is forthcoming, and he is caught red-handed with the note, is a case of res ipsa loquitur. The very thing speaks for itself in the circumstances. We need not, therefore, scrutinise the substance of the argument based on the inapplicability of Section 4. We also feel that there may be some force in the argument of counsel that the jawan, P.W. 3, might have duped the railway by using a pass for one passenger and carrying a family of wife and child together. Of course, we cannot finally pronounce on this matter for want of sufficient documents. All that we need say is that even assuming that the passenger so tried to dupe the railway, that is no alibi for the Assistant Station Master to help himself to illicit gratification. Nor is the non-examination of the Deputy Superintendent of Police of any consequence in the case. 12. In these circumstances we find no reason for interfering with the concurrent conviction and sentence. The appeal is dismissed.
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1974 (3) TMI 120 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... authorities. Of Course, the petitioners should have taken steps earlier by coming to this Court before actually suffering the two decisions, but in view of the utter lack of jurisdiction in the Revenue authorities, as already indicated above, they must be held entitled to the disposal of their title suit instituted in the Civil Court, by the Civil Court itself. 6. In the result, the application succeeds and the rule issued by this Court is made absolute. Annexures 2 and 3 are hereby held to be without jurisdiction and inoperative and are accordingly quashed. The respondents are also directed to transmit the records of the title suit back to the Court from which they were received with all possible speed for its disposal by the Civil Court in accordance with law. On the facts and circumstances of this case as also for the reasons that the defendants-respondents have not appeared to oppose this application, there will be no order for costs. Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. 7. I agree.
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1974 (3) TMI 119 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... language of Section 31 of the Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court, already referred to, wherein it has been observed that "the language used in Section 31 was comprehensive enough so as to require an Appellate Court to give effect to the substantive provisions of the Amending Act whether the appeal before it was one against a decree granting pre-emption or one refusing that relief". The relevant time when the Court has to see whether in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 5 a decree can be passed will, therefore, be -- (a) when the trial Court is about to pass a decree (b) if an appeal is taken, the time when the Appellate Court is going to pass a decree in. appeal, 29. Thus, it cannot be said that the view adopted by this Court in the decisions already referred to. that the relevant date on which the reclamation has to be made is the date of the suit, is correct. Balraj Tuli, J. 30. I entirely agree with my learned brethren and have nothing to add.
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1974 (3) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... easonably or equally open, we should adopt the one which benefits the assessee, would enable us to do no more than to treat land which is actually being built upon on the same footing as vacant land as long as no structure capable of occupation and letting is completed on The result is that we allow this appeal, and we set aside the judgment and order of the Division Bench. We also set aside the assessment order with regard to 1060 sq. yds., which was being built upon, and the orders of the Small Cause Court and a learned Judge of the High Court dismissing appeals with regard to this area of land. We send back the case to the assessor and Collector of Bombay Municipal Corporation and direct that the whole land will be valued, for purposes of rating in the relevant year, as vacant land just as it was being done in the period immediately preceding 1962. In the circumstances of the case, which is not free from difficulties, the parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (3) TMI 117 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion. 17.We would liketo state furtherthat nothingin the foregoingdiscussion must be construed so as to affect theright of a co-operating housing society toinstitute a proceeding against a member and/oran occupant claming through amember on the footing that in permittingthe occupant to enter into and obtain possession of the flat the member had contravened some binding regulations of thesaid co-operative housing society. Thiscause of action in favour of the society is quite different from one being consideredbyus and would not appear to be coveredby the requirementspostulated in Kalavati's case C. A.No. 1699of 1969 D/- 26-4-1973 (Bom). 18.In the result the rule is madeabsolute in terms of prayer (b) and theproceedings pending before the Officer on Special Duty (orhis successor) willstand Special Duty (orhis successor) will stand quashed. Inthe circumstances of thecase,however, the parties will bear their own costs of this special civil application. 19. Rulemade absolute.
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1974 (3) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that activity is ex facie long, the detaining authority should explain the delay in the making of the detention order with a view to show that there was proximity between the prejudicial activity and the detention, order. If the detaining authority fails to do so, in spite of an opportunity having been afforded to it, a serious infirmity would creep into the detention order. 6. this Court in the case of Lakshman Khatik v. State of West Bengal (Writ Petition No. 344 of 1972, decided on February 26, 1974) held that a delay of seven months in making an order for detention after the incident which led to the making of that order was fatal. As the delay in the present case is for a longer period and no cogent explanation has been given for the delay, there is no escape from the conclusion that the detention of the petitioner is not in accordance with law. We accordingly accept the petition, quash the order for the detention of the petitioner and direct that he be set at liberty.
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1974 (3) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ho argued the appeal with thoroughness and fairness, in his opening submissions, told the court that, regardless of the outcome, he had persuaded his client to raise the price to a sum equal to the amount at which the properties, lots I and 2, were estimated by M./s Corona Electricals, namely, ₹ 17, 48,096/-. He stuck to it to the end a good gesture. Consequently, we shall accept that as the price offered by the auction purchaser-appellant and direct that the appellant do deposit the balance of this amount of ₹ 17,48,096/- over what he has already paid into court (Rs.2,75,000/-) within two months from to-day, in the District Court, Thana, in which event the appellant will be put in possession of the properties purchased by him forthwith. Liberty is given to the Corporation to withdraw to the extent of its dues with up-to-date interest. We think that the circumstances of the case warrant the direction that parties will bear their costs throughout. Appeal allowed,.
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1974 (3) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e so- called sovereign and proprietary or commercial functions for determining the liability of the State. We are of the view that, as the law stands today, it is not possible to say that famine relief work is a sovereign function of the State as it has been traditionally understood. It is a work which can be and is being undertaken by private individuals. There is nothing peculiar about it so that it might be predicated that the State alone can legitimately undertake the work. In the view we have taken on the merits of the case, we do not think it necessary to canvass the correctness of the view expressed by the High Court that the appeal by the State before the High Court did not abate even though the legal representatives of the plaintiff respondent there were not impleaded within the period of limitation. In the result, we set aside- the decree of the High Court, restore the decree and judgment passed by the District Judge and allow the appeal with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (3) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t provide a justification for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions. The scope of the inquiry in the case of preventive detention based upon subjective satisfaction being necessarily narrow and limited, the scrutiny of the court has to be even stricter than in a normal case of punitive trial. Since we have held the order of detention as invalid for the reasons given above, it is not necessary to deal with the other grounds submitted by Mr. Anthony. The writ petition and the appeal are allowed. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court is set aside and in the view we have taken we do not feel called upon to pronounce upon the various reasons given by the High Court in rejecting the petition. The rule nisi is made absolute. The petitioner shall be released forth with from the jail unless he is required in any other case. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 318 of 1974 is allowed. The application for taking additional papers on record is rejected. V.P.S. Petition allowed.
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1974 (3) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h that the daughter succeeds to the self acquired property of the father in preference to the collaterals even though they are within the fourth degree. Rattigan's work has been accepted by the Privy Council as "a book of unquestioned authority in the Punjab". Indeed the correctness of this paragraph was not disputed before this Court in Gopal Singh v. Ujagar Singhi (1955 S.C.R. 86.). It is not now open to the respondent to show whether any of the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 23 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law is present here as the previous decision is resjudicata between the parties and in any case it has not been attempted to be shown in this case. But in the view we have taken that it is s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act that applies and not the Customary Law the appellants cannot succeed in this appeal. In the result the appeal is dismissed. The appellants will pay the respondent's costs. S. B. W. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (3) TMI 111 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... On this view the revision was allowed and the assessment under section 21 was annulled. The penalty proceedings were also quashed. It was directed that the tax paid, if any, shall be refunded. 6. The finding quoted above is on a question of fact, namely, that the survey report was not totally ignored at the time of the regular assessment. If that be so, then there can be no doubt that the Saks Tax Officer will have no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under section 21. Merely because he has got second thoughts about the applicability or effect of the survey, it cannot be said that he had "reason to believe" within the meaning of section 21 that any turn-over has escaped assessment. In our opinion the Revising Authority was justified in annulling the assessment. 7. We would answer the question referred to us in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Department. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (3) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ble to be struck down as invalid on the ground of contravention of Art. 14, and if that be so, s. 4 sub-s. (3) also does not incur the condemnation of that article. We, therefore, allow the petition and make the rule absolute to a limited extent. We declare that the text books on languages prescribed by the Board as also the text books which formed the subject matter of the notifications dated 5th April, 1972, 25th April, 1972, 26th April, 1972 and 17th May, 1972 issued by the Board-both, of which categories of text books were purported to be continued by the notification dated 28th March, 1973-are not prescribed text books within the meaning of sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of s. 4. We also issue a writ quashing and setting aside the notification dated 24th May, 1973 issued by the State Government. So far as the other reliefs claimed by the petitioner are concerned, the petition is rejected and the rule will stand discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1974 (3) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this Court has been entrusted with a duty and invested with a power to enforce that fundamental right." The seriousness of the step must be appreciated by Government and continuous check-up on the need to prolong the prison life of the citizen made. The final cure for prejudicial activities threatening the survival of the community is not executive shut-up of all suspects in prison for how long one is kept guessing. Such a strategy may alienate and embitter men who should be weaned away and won over. In the present case a septuagenarian allegedly sickly is confined in jail for an unspecified period. It may well be that his private enemy on whom he threw a bomb is not there at all. It may also be that the detenu has altogether changed his outlook as many well-known terrorists have turned marvels of saintliness. History will, we hope, serve the Administration as reminder of unwitting misuse while exercising near-absolute power. We dismiss the petition. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (3) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pp. 1136-7.). This Court has, without articulating any reason, applied the doctrine of severability by deleting the offending clause which made classification unreasonable see Jalan Trading Co. v. Mazdoor Union( 1967 1 S.C.R. 15.) and Anandji and Co. v. S.T.O.( 1968 1 S.C.R.661.) . Whether a, court can remove the unreasonableness of a classification when it is under-inclusive by extending the ambit of the legislation to cover the class omitted to be included, or, by applying the doctrine of severability delete a clause which makes a classification over-inclusive, are matters on which it is not necessary to express any final opinion as we have held that the inclusion of tramway and motor omnibus service in the definition of 'establishment' did not make the classification unreasonable having regard to the purpose of the legislation. In the result, we hold that the impugned sections are valid and allow the appeals with costs. Hearing fee one set. V.P.S. Appeals allowed.
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1974 (3) TMI 107 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... due to short levy is mentioned in Ext. P 3 series notices. It is not as if R. 173-I(i) would be an answer as attempted here. That rule enables the proper officer to assess on the basis of the return. It is subsequently that these proceedings are taken and the notices indicate that duty has been short levied. Hence without a prior notice the levy ought not have been imposed on the petitioner. Whether on the merits the goods are such as would attract a levy is a matter on which it is not necessary, in the circumstances, to express any opinion. That is a matter which can be agitated before the appropriate forum. Suffice to say that the levy would be bad since that has been made in contravention of R. 10 of the Central Excise Rules. Accordingly Ext. P7 order and Exts. P3 series notices are quashed. It is open to the Excise authorities to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. 2. The original petition is allowed as above. Parties are directed to suffer costs.
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1974 (3) TMI 106 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is not applicable at all. This Rule obviously applies if there is no provision elsewhere in the Rules. We have already shown that rule 10 squarely applies to the facts of the case. This view finds full support from the decision of the Supreme Court in N.B. Sanjhana v. E.S. and W. Mills - A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2059. 9. For the reasons states above, we allow this petition. The two orders of the Superintendent, Central Excise, Kanpur, dated 18th June, 1970, copies whereof are Annexures A2 and A3 to the writ Petition are quashed. For the same reasons the orders passed by the Appellate Authority dated 30th August, 1971, and the Central Government dated 9th February, 1973, on appeal and rivision, copies whereof are Annexures A5 and A8 respectively, are also quashed. The respondents, are further directed not to recover from the petitioner any amount in pursuance of the impugned notices of demand dated 1-12-1969 and 31st March, 1970. 10. The petitioner is entitled to its costs.
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1974 (3) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of. interim injunction was made by the learned Judge under s. 41 (b) read with the Second Schedule to the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940?
What is required for attracting the applicability of cl. 18 is a mere claim for payment of a sum of money arising out of or under the contract against the contractor and it is not necessary that a sum of money must be actually due and payable from the contractor to the purchaser?
Held that:- The only thing which the appellant,is interdicted from doing is to make recovery of its claim for damages by appropriating such amounts in satisfaction of the claim. 'That is clearly Within the power of the Court under s. 41 (b) because the claim for damages forms the subject matter of the arbitration proceedings and the Court can always say that until such claim, is adjudicated upon, the appellant shall be restrained from recovering it by appropriating other amounts due to the respondent. The order of interim injunction made by the learned Judge cannot, therefore, be said to be outside the scope of his power under s. 41 (b) read with the Second Schedule.
A claim for damages for breach of contract is, therefore, not a claim for a sum presently due and payable and the purchaser is not entitled, in exercise of the right conferred upon it under cl. 18, to recover the amount of such claim by appropriating other sums due to the contractor. Thus the appellant had no right or authority under cl. 18 to appropriate the amounts of other pending bills of the respondent in or towards satisfaction of its claim for damages against the respondent and the learned Judge was justified in issuing an interim Injunction restraining the appellant from doing so. Appeal dismissed.
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