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1975 (2) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... clare that levy of contribution at the rate of 2 per cent of the annual gross income of the trusts became levy of tax after 31st March, 1970 and was without the authority of law. Since there was a prayer in the writ petition to declare Rule 32 as ultra vires, we think that the respondent is entitled to this relief. 30. We allow the appeal to the extent indicated but make no order as to costs. II. Civil Appeal No. 488 of 1973 31. In this appeal, the points for consideration are practically the same. For the reasons we have given in our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 487 of 1973, we do not think that the Division Bench was justified in holding that the respondent was not liable to pay contribution in respect of the donations in question here and in quashing the order dated 30th March, 1965. We, therefore, allow the appeal subject to the declaration of the nature of the levy after 31st March, 1970, made in the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 487 of 1973. We make no order as to costs.
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1975 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nding before this Court will abate consequent on the above statutory provision. The Appellants have moved in C.M.P. No. 19 of 1975 for passing an order of abatement Under Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Counsel for the Respondent faced with the decision of this Court and the clear statutory provision agrees that the stand taken by the Appellants is correct. We therefore hold that the suit and the appeal stand abated. It is open to the parties to work out their rights before the appropriate Consolidation Authorities. With this direction, the appeal is disposed of as abated. Parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1975 (2) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1968 in clearest language it was intimated on behalf of respondent No. 1 that he was not pursuing his application under Rule 90. It was only then that the Court made a formal order recording its dismissal. In our judgment on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the order of the Court made on 9-3-1968 had the effect of merely recording the withdrawal of the application under Rule 90 which was already effectively made on 1-1-1968. Even without that order, the withdrawal was effective on that day. 13. We, therefore, hold that the application filed by respondent No. 1 under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code has rightly been allowed. The appellant pursued his remedy even to this Court on a mere technicality to grab the properties purchased by respondent No. 1 for a sum of ₹ 70,000/- which the appellant had purchased along with other portion of the property for a sum of ₹ 16,000/- only. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs in favour of respondent No. 1.
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1975 (2) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... believe that he was an ardent supporter and worker of the appellant in the election. He, too, does not give any reason as to why he has chosen to betray his erstwhile friend. In any case, his evidence is according to his own showing, of an accomplice character. 145. In his statement as R.S. 17, the appellant refuted and denied all the allegations relating to this charge also. 146. After considering very carefully the evidence of this troika Ritu Dhawai Richhpal Singh and Raje Ram one of whom was the admitted enemy of the appellant and the other two self-styled friends and self- confessed accomplices, we are left with the impression that the story propounded by them is not genuine and worthy of credence. Thus this charge also fails. Accordingly we reverse the finding of the High Court on Issue No. 4, also, in favour of the appellant. 147. For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the election petition with costs.
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1975 (2) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... st the appellant by the High Court are clearly outside the observations relied on by respondent No. 1. It was not a case where money was paid to respondent No. 3 as consideration for votes promised or as a bargain for getting votes. It was a money paid to him to retire from the contest and to do propaganda and persuade the voters to vote for the appellant. In spite of the propaganda and the appeal of respondent No. 3 the voters were left free not to respond to his persuasion. In no view of the matter, therefore, it is possible to sustain the judgment of the High Court holding the appellant guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(1)(A)(b) of the Act. That being so, it is plain that respondent No. 3 also must be exonerated of the charge leveled and found against him of bribery within the meaning of Section 123(1)(B)(b). 11. In the result the appeal is allowed with costs payable by respondent No. 1 and the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside.
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1975 (2) TMI 127 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 00 then the balance amount will be redeposited in the Court. If the expenses exceed Ra. 25.000 even then the accounts should be filed in Court as this amount has eventually to be taken, into consideration for the purpose of, passing a partition decree, if any such decree is Passed. If the suit for partition fails the Court may have to pass an order directing the refund of the money out of the security which the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 4 might have furnished to this Court Subject to this direction, I direct that the sum of ₹ 25,000 should be deposited in Court by defendant No. 1 within ten days and he, can utilize such part of the fixed deposits shares or other assets, of the alleged Hindu joint family Property as may be. Necessary for the purpose of raising this amount including the amounts deposited in furtherance of the orders passed previously by this Court. Both the applications are allowed, but the parties will bear their own costs. 14. Applications allowed.
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1975 (2) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e petitioner has been receiving half of his wages throughout. He does not specifically deny the receipt of a cheque for ₹ 4000 sent by Mr Mukherjee. It cannot therefore be accepted that he was under the impression, as he now tries to make out, that what he was receiving was arrears of past wages deposited in the Court in compliance with the Court's order. The Advocate for the appellant had filed the statement of the case on November 13, 1969. The petitioner-respondent had to file it by December 17, 1969 but that was not filed and the appeal was therefore set down ex parte against the petitioner-respondent. In the circumstances and the idea of the compromise not being unacceptable to the petitioner it was the right and indeed the duty of his Advocate Mr Mukherjee to do the best for his client. We are not able to see any lack of authority in the action taken by Mr Mukherjee. We are of opinion that there are absolutely no merits in this application and it is dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 125 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t that the learned Judge of the Small Cause Court acted without jurisdiction in ordering an ad interim injunction against the petitioners from proceedings with the case before the Officer on Special Duty. 5. Kantawala, Court. J., has affirmed this view in Civil Revision Application No. 417 of 1974 on November 25, 1974 (Bom) observing as follows "In more one matter I have followed the decision of Vaidya, J., referred to above i.e., (the aforesaid Udyog Mandir's case). I set aside the injunction granted by the Small Cause Court at Bombay restraining the party from proceeding with the matter before the officer on Special duty. In view of the same position in law the interim injunction granted by the Small Cause Court at Bombay is vacated. ............." 6. In the result, following the above decisions, I set aside the impugned order of the Small Causes Court in the present case, dated February 11, 1974, and make the rule absolute with costs. 7. Application allowed.
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1975 (2) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e prima facie appreciation of the recorded evidence is opposed to even a reasonable appraisement of the same bearing in mind the relevant point or points sought to be established by the evidence, there will be no option to the High Court in the interest of justice to step in to do justice in the case. This is exactly what the High Court has done in the appeal. We have considered the case from both the stand-points- whether the High Court was right in interfering with the acquittal and also whether we would be justified to take the same view as the High Court after examination of the evidence afresh. In addition to what we have found above if the accused came in the train with his wife on the date in question, about which we have not the 'slightest doubt, his subsequent conduct is a true tell-tale of his guilty mind. We are absolutely satisfied that the accused has been rightly convicted by the High Court. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 123 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that behalf. (3) The presentation of an application by a pleader to whom the authority in the prescribed manner under R. 4 of O. 3, Civil Procedure Code, was not given is only an irregularity which could be cured at a subsequent stage. 65. The question referred for the decision of the Full Bench is therefore answered as follows -- The presentation of an application by a pleader to whom the authority in the prescribed manner under R. 4 of O. 3, Civil Procedure Code, was not given, is not a nullity but only an irregularity which could be cured at a subsequent stage. Mohammed Ahmed Ansari, J. 66. I have had the advantage of going through the judgment of my learned brother Satyanarayana Raju, J., and I agree with him. (This appeal came for final hearing alter the expression of the opinion of the Full Bench, before Subba Rao, C.J., and Bhimasankaram, J.) 67. JUDGMENT -- Following the opinion expressed by the Full Bench, the appeal is dismissed with costs. D.H.Z. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 122 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in favour of the appellant. 44. This bring us to examine whether the defective notice can be considered to have become valid by efflux of time. We are unable to agree with the respondent that as 6 months' time contemplated by Section 106 of the Act had elapsed several years ago and the defendant had sufficient opportunity to find alternative accommodation and vacate the suit premises the appellant may be ordered to vacate the premises in this appeal itself without driving the respondent to a fresh suit for that purpose. The defendant-lessee has a statutory right to have a valid and proper six months' notice. Unless and until such notice is served on it terminating the tenancy created under Section 116 of the Act, the relationship of landlord and tenant continue and thereby the tenant is entitled to remain in possession until the statutory tenancy is determined in accordance with law. 45. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout. 46. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (2) TMI 121 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e legislature and it, therefore, appears that the legislature did not accept that all oil-engines fell in a separate category or sales thereof should be subject to a higher tax. Further, the fact that oil-engines were made the subject-matter of a separate sub-entry for a particular period does not mean that oil-engines are not agricultural machinery or parts of such machinery. There is nothing to prevent the legislature from taxing certain types of agricultural machinery under one head and other types of agricultural machinery under a different head and merely because a particular type of agricultural machinery is made the subject-matter of a separate entry, it does not follow that oil-engines designed and used for agricultural purposes cease to be or are not agricultural machinery. 17. In the result, we answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. 18. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. 19. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or by administrative authority remains pure and unsullied. I am, therefore, of the opinion that"the non-disclosure of the fact of consent decree by the 3rd respondent in the application made by him vitiated the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under s. 7A I would, therefore, allow the appeal and quash and set aside the order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as delegate of the District Magistrate under S. 7A and direct the 3rd respondent to hand over possession of the shop to the appellant. It would be open to the District Magistrate to take such action under S. 7, sub-S. (2) as he thinks fit including making of an order of allotment in favour of any person he thinks proper, The District Magistrate may even, if he so thinks fit, make a fresh order of allotment in favour of the 3rd respondent. Each party will bear and pay his own costs of this litigation. ORDER In view of the majority judgment the Appeal is dismissed with no, order as to costs.
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1975 (2) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... wal to the lessee the said clause was operative and effective only during the period of the original lease i.e. upto 11th August, 1961. The lease renewed thereafter was a renewal of the original lease in one sense and a fresh lease in another. While granting a fresh lease the Governmental authority has no power to relax the mandatory requirement of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of the Rules. By agreement it cannot take the conditions of the lease out of the said provision. It is, therefore, clear on the facts and in the circumstances of this case that while granting the renewal of the lease, the authority was neither bound nor empowered to incorporate a condition in the lease against Clause (c) of Rule 27(1). The demand of dead rent at ₹ 20/- per hectare i.e. ₹ 8/- per acre was within the limits specified in Schedule IV of the Rules and there was no infirmity in it. 9. For the reasons stated above we find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1975 (2) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a Tools Corporation v. C. A. lmanual & Ors. 1969 3 S.C.R. 773. Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. The State of Bihar & Ors. 1969 3 S.C.R. 995 and in S. I,. Agarwal v. General Manager Hindustan Steel Ltd. 1970 3 SC.R. 363 that the Praga Tools Corporation, Heavy Engineering 70 Sup. CI/75 Mazdoor Union and Hindustan Steel Ltd. are all companies incorporated under the Companies Act and the employees of these companies do not enjoy the protection available to Government servants as contemplated in Article 311. The companies were held in these cases to have independent existence of the Government and by the law relating to corporations. These could not be held to be departments of the Government. For these reasons we are of opinion that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The writ petition is dismissed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs in this Writ Petition. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hout even asking him whether he did make them. In the result, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and we remand the case to it for disposal in accordance with law after abduction of such further evidence as may be necessary in the interests of justice. In view of our order remanding the case to the High Court it is unnecessary to consider the three Civil Miscel- laneous Petitions for urging addition grounds, for condonation of delay in filing the application for urging additional grounds, and for permission to file a certified copy of the summary register for 21-3-1972 and 22-3-1972 of the Court 'of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Sonepat. These applications are, therefore, dismissed. Partics may, however, make appropriate applications in the High Court. The costs of this litigation in the High Court as well as in this Court will abide the result. The appellant will continue to function as an elected member subject to the result of the Election Petition.
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1975 (2) TMI 116 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l Procedure Code ., as the case may be, and formed an opinion as to the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding on its basis. There is no requirement of the law for a speaking order analysing the evidence adduced by the complainant or making evident how his mind worked so as to lead him to the issue of process. If such issue of process is challenged before a higher court it can find out from the complaint, the preliminary evidence (if any) and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) without any difficulty whether or not the order directing issue of summons/warrant and specifying the offence/offences made out against the accused prima facie was passed after due deliberation and is or is not justified by a sufficient ground. The question embraced by the references is answered accordingly. The revision petitions (Nos. 158/74, 9/74, 189/74) and the Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) (No. 99 of 1974) should now be put up before the learned Single Judges for disposal.
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1975 (2) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing officer under a special statute like the NDPS Act, but, this Court has held that they cannot file chargesheet and to that extent they would not be police officers. See Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 940, Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 409 29. In this case, however, the respondent having specially been empowered both under the 1946 Act as also under the Code to carry out investigation and file a chargesheet is precluded from doing so only by reason of Section 22 of TOHO. It is doubtful as to whether in the event of authorization of an officer of the department to carry out investigation on a complaint made by a third party, he would be entitled to arrest the accused and carry on investigation as if he is police officer. We hope that the Parliament would take appropriate measures to suitably amend the law in the near future. 30. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly.
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1975 (2) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... its jurisdiction under Art. 227 in interfering with the findings of fact reached by the District Court. Even if the Special Civil Application had been under Art. 226 that would have made no difference and the High Court would still have had no jurisdiction to disturb these findings of fact. Now, if these findings of fact stand, as they must, it is obvious that the dominant or primary user of the shop by the appellant was for business and not residence and there was accordingly no change of user of the shop, and if that be so, the respondents were not entitled to recover possession of the shop from the appellant either under clause (a) or clause (k) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and reverse the decree for eviction passed against the appellant. The suit filed by the respondents against the appellant. will stand dismissed. The respondents will pay the costs of the appellant throughout.Appeal allowed.
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1975 (2) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... situation "the intention of the legislature that a petition should not fail by reason of any bargain or collusion between the election petitioner and the successful candidate would be frustrated" was repelled on the ground "There is undoubtedly a lacunas in the Act, because it makes provision when an election petitioner is allowed to withdraw, but makes no such provision if he just refuses to prosecute it. But that reason would not, as pointed out by Grover, J. in Jugal Kishore's case AIR 1956 Punj 152 (supra) be a sufficient reason to construe the provisions beyond the purview of their language." This is another type of contingency, where if thought necessary, it is for the Legislature to intervene. The Court is helpless. In our judgment, therefore, none of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant is fit to be accepted as sound. The appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances we shall make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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