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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 92 Records
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1977 (2) TMI 141 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s-examination is directed to be confined only to the contents of the written statement and if the petitioner has got any objection, he can raise it at the appropriate stage if the cross-examination exceeds or is going to be directed to a matter not mentioned in the written statement. 14. When once it is held that defendants 3, 4 and 7 have no right to cross-examine the plaintiff, the plaintiff should not be permitted to be harassed by exposing himself to the cross-examination of defendants 3, 4 and 7. Under those circumstances, I am satisfied that the jurisdiction conferred upon the court below was exercised illegally in allowing the petition filed by the defendants 3, 4 and 7 and permitting them to cross-examine the plaintiff as per the directions contained in the order sought to be revised against. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, this revision petition shall have to be allowed and it is hereby accordingly allowed but, in the circumstances without costs. 16. Petition allowed.
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1977 (2) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... garding the reasons which have led to it. It is desirable also to communicate the report of the Inquiry Officer, including that part which relates to the recommendation in the matter of punishment, so that the representation of the delinquent may be pointed and meaningful. These general observations must be tested on the concrete facts of each case and every miniscule violation does ,not spell illegality. If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures. We are satisfied that the order of the Board cannot be anathematised as condemning the man without being heard. The appeal, on the point of law, must be allowed but, in the light of the concession made, as stated earlier, we leave the formal order of the High Court undisturbed. No costs. High Court orders maintained.
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1977 (2) TMI 139 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... A. V. Krishna Rao, J. has said in his judgment in C. M. A. 30/75. 15. While dismissing the appeal the learned Judge adverted to the observation of the Court of first instance as to whether or not the appointment of the Receiver was warranted in the event of default was a matter on which the plaintiff might seek clarification from the High Court. Since on the earlier occasion it was a Division Bench that gave the direction, A. V. Krishna Rao, J. felt that it is only a Division Bench that can gave a clarification on this aspect. Now that we are sitting in a Division Bench, we clarify that if the defendants-appellants do not comply with the orders of the Court in regard to deposit, the plaintiff would be at liberty to apply to the trial Court for the appointment of a Receiver and it is for that Court to make appropriate orders on that petition. 16. With this observation, the Letters Patent Appeal and the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal are dismissed with costs. 17. Appeals dismissed.
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1977 (2) TMI 138 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... f the learned Judge that there was no question of estoppel and that the company could claim no legal right at law or in equity against adjustment on basis of promise of representation. We however feel that in the view we have taken about the right of the Government to recover the cash assistance, the adjustment in the way done should be set aside. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order discharging the Rule and make the Rule absolute. The order of the Government dated Dec. 28, 1970 Annex. 'K' to the petition adjusting the cash assistance on exports prior to April 1, 1969 against subsequent cash assistance is set aside and the respondents are restrained from giving effect or further effect to the same. Let appropriate writs issue accordingly. The respondents however will be at liberty to recover from the company, the impugned cash assistance if recoverable, in accordance with law. There will be no order for Costs in the appeal. G.N. Ray, J. 18. I agree.
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1977 (2) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Umedi Lal took them back from Joginder Lal and Ram Nath, there was no reason why the latter should have insisted on taking a receipt from him. Presumably the receipt was fabricated for the purpose of supporting their case that they did not keep the iron sheets with them, because otherwise they would have no account for them. It does appear to us prima facie that Umedi Lal was a fictitious person and the iron sheets were taken delivery of by M/s. Jindal Khemka & Co. for themselves on the strength of the forged Railway Receipt PW 10/A. But some how or the other, due to police inaction, they appear to have escaped and a small man like the appellant seems to have been made a scope goat. 10. We are of the view that the prosecution has totally failed to bring home the charge against the appellant and hence our order dated 28th January, 1977 setting aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquitting him of the offences charged against him.
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1977 (2) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... remitted to the Trial Court' for hearing the case only on the question of sentence. 31. So far as the case of Devinder Singh and Maha Singh are concerned as they have already been given sentences of life imprisonment and this is the minimum sentence that could be passed under Section 302, Indian Penal Code it is not necessary to remit their cases to the Sessions Judge. The convictions and sentences of these two accused are, therefore, confirmed and their appeals are dismissed. As regards the appeals by the three other appellants, namely, Narpal Singh, Jagmohan Singh and Gurdev Singh, we confirm their convictions which would not be reopened under any circumstances, but set aside the sentences of death passed on them and remit their cases to the Trial Court for passing sentences on them afresh after hearing the accused in the light of the observations made by us and to this extent only the appeals of the three appellants are allowed so far as their sentences are concerned.
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1977 (2) TMI 135 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... piration of the said period, adjudication proceedings are commenced Under Section 51, the Department must obey the law and return the documents unless in the meantime it has commenced adjudication proceedings Under Section 51. If it is found by the Department that the period of one year, which is specified in Section 41, is not adequate, it would be for the Legislature to amend the section in order to provide for extension of time, but so long as the section stands as it is, it must be complied with by the Department. 2. Notice be issued to the Respondent to show cause why writ petition should not be admitted. No ex parte stay for the present.
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1977 (2) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Act in regulating compensation payable by Insurance Companies to victims of motor accidents. We have not the slightest doubt that if the attention of the Government is drawn, the lacuna will be covered up in good time. 13. The result is that Civil Appeals Nos. 1826 of 1968 and 132 of 1969 are dismissed and Civil Appeal No. 2310 of 1968 is allowed to this extent that the claim preferred by Raha is enhanced from ₹ 60,000/ to Rs. l,00,000/-. As no authentic proof of any settlement between Gupta and Raha has been produced before us, the decree passed by us will be jointly and severally recover able from Gupta and Bhuta after giving credit for the amounts received by Raha. It will, however, be open to the executing court on proof of any full and final settlement of the claims of Raha with Gupta or any other judgment debtor to adjust the claims accordingly under order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
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1977 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . The University stated that it had adopted as a matter of practice the rules relating to Civil Servants of the State of Jammu & Kashmir for the purpose of payment of subsistence allowance to its employees and in fact the University Council at its meeting held on 22nd February, 1971 formally accorded approval to this practice. The respondent was, therefore, clearly not entitled to receive from the University anything more than the subsistence allowance actually paid to him, which, we are told, was paid on the same basis as that prevailing under the rules relating to Civil Servants of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. These were the reasons for which we made our order dated 17th December, 1976 upholding the validity of the order of suspension dated 21st May, 1970 and holding that the respondent was not entitled to anything more than the subsistence allowance paid to him during the period of suspension under the order of the Registrars dated 6th June, 1970. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (2) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t earlier and the notice to quit expired with the end of the month of tenancy as required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was in the circumstances a valid notice which effectively determined the tenancy of the respondents with effect from the mid- night of 31st October, 1962. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the decree for eviction passed against the respondents. Since the respondents have been in possession of the premises for a long time, it is but fair that they should have some reasonable time to vacate the premises. Hence we direct that the decree for eviction shall not be executable against the respondents up to 31st October, 1977 on condition that the respondents continue to pay to the appellant regularly from month to month an amount equivalent to the monthly rent as and by way of compensation for use and occupation of the permises. There will be no order as to costs throughout. M.R. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (2) TMI 129 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it of certiorari. It should follow a fortiorari that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. (51) The power to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that the Tribunals function within the limits of its authority (See Nagendra Nath Vohra and another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam etc., . (52) In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and others v. Malikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, , it was held that where there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure but that the decision is erroneous such an error cannot be corrected under Article 227. (53) In view of the settled law, we are of the opinion that resort to the povisions of Article 227 of the Consititution cannot be made to a person who feels aggrieved by framing of a charge or issue of process under section 204 of the Code.
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1977 (2) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e retrospective introduction of the proviso in section 3 and applying the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in cases falling m the proviso. We are therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in taking the view that by reason of the introduction of the proviso in section 3 with retrospective effect the decree for eviction was a nullity and the executing court was justified in declining to execute it against the respondent. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs throughout but order and direct the respondent to pay to the appellant all the arrears of rent in respect of the premises which remain to be paid by him to the appellant in the following installments ₹ 2,000/on or before 30th April, 1977; and out of the balance a further sum of ₹ 2,000 within three months thereafter and the balance, if any, by 31st October, 1977. The respondent through his counsel undertakes to make payment of the arrears in the manner aforesaid. Appea dismissed.
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1977 (2) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arge levelled against the appellants. We would however like to point out that the appropriate provision of the Defence of India Rules under which an incitement to strike as in the instant case may be punished is rule 36(6)(j) read with rule 43(1)(a). The former defines a "prejudicial act" to include instigation or incitement for cessation or slowing down of work by a body of persons employed in any place of employment in which 100 persons or moro are normally employed, in furtherance of any strike which is prohibited under rule 118 or is illegal under any law for the time being in force. The latter provides that no person shall without lawful authority or excuse do any prejudicial act. By rule 43 (5) a person who contravenes any of the provisions of rule 43 is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 5 years or with fine or with both. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquit the appellants. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (2) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arding the reasons which have led to it. It is desirable also to communicate the report of the Inquiry Officer, including that part which relates to the recommendation in the matter of punishment, so that the representation of the delinquent may be pointed and meaningful. These general observations must be tested on the concrete facts of each case and every miniscule violation does ,not spell illegality. If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures. We are satisfied that the order of the Board cannot be anathematised as condemning the man without being heard. The appeal, on the point of law, must be allowed but, in the light of the concession made, as stated earlier, we leave the formal order of the High Court undisturbed. No costs. High Court orders maintained.
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1977 (2) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pment subsequent to the order or change of law having retrospective effect. We do not make any comments on this argument of Shri Desai and leave it at that. The trial Court's judgment has therefore to be restored. It accords with justice and with law. There will thus be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in a sum of ₹ 7,464/4/-. Even truthful case urged through unveracious forensic processes must be visited with the punitive curial displeasure of denial of costs and discretionary interest. Her" the plaintiff sued for a sum of ₹ 12,000/- and gets a decree for less than ₹ 8,000/-. We deny him costs for the amount decreed in his favour but allow costs for the defendant to the extent he has succeeded (viz., for ₹ 4,535/12/-). The equities of the situation are such, especially having regard to the long lapse of time and the dubious attitude of the plaintiff and litigative prolixity, that we do not' award interest on the amount decreed at all.
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1977 (2) TMI 124 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... son of deceased Surendra. The amount which would fall to his share would be one-half of the decretal amount of ₹ 13,803 with interest, etc. This amount will have to be deposited in a nationalized bank in fixed deposit or will have to be invested in approved securities till the minor, original plaintiff No. 2 - respondent No. 2, attains majority. Of course it may be clarified that interest on the amount so invested can be withdrawn by the guardian of respondent No. 2 (respondent No. 1, mother) for the maintenance of the minor from time to time. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant applies for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. In our opinion, this case does not involve any substantial question of public importance which needs to be decided but the Supreme court of India in view of the fact that we are taking the view which is consistent with the view taken by the three High Courts of India, namely, Calcutta, Madras and Kerala High Courts.
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1977 (2) TMI 123 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... the Gold Control (Licensing of Dealers) Rules, 1969. Further the average annual turnover per dealer in the city in terms of Rule 2 (f) ibid., is sufficient to justify the grant of another gold dealer’s licence there. 3. In the above circumstances, the Government of India allow the Revision Application and direct that the applicant be granted the gold dealer’s licence subject to his satisfying the other conditions prescribed under the Gold Control (Licensing of Dealers) Rules, 1969.
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1977 (2) TMI 122 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l Government Pleader contends that the rental value was only estimated and that, therefore, it cannot be said to be an expenditure actually incurred. As a matter of fact, since the building belonged to the assessee, the assessee allowed the canteen to be run in that building. But if a building was taken on lease for running the canteen, certainly the rent would form part of the expenses incurred in running the canteen. Under the circumstances, simply because the assessee s own building was used for the purpose of running the canteen, we are not able to accept the argument that the estimated rental value thereof should not be added to the total expenses incurred for running the canteen for the purpose of calculating 25 per cent thereof with reference to the relevant Government Order. Under these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the Tribunal committed any error of law. We accordingly dismiss the revision petition. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (2) TMI 121 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... od Mohammad v. State of U.P. and Another 1978 41 S.T.C. 324. , we have held that kala namak is not liable to tax under Notification No. ST-II-6628/X-1012-72 dated 1st December, 1973. The petitioner may appear before the Sales Tax Officer who has to decide the matter in accordance with the law declared in the abovenoted decision. With these observations, we dismiss this petition and vacate the interim order dated 28th September, 1976. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (2) TMI 120 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... edible salt. In Balwant Singh Jag Roshan Lal s case 1970 26 S.T.C. 129., this court noticed that black salt was also used for digestion nevertheless this court held that black salt comes within the ambit of salt . Thus, it is clear that kala namak, even if it is manufactured by the process alleged by the sales tax authorities, is a species of edible salt and comes within the ambit of the word salt occurring in section 4(1)(a) of the Act. It follows that the impugned notification of the Government, which seeks to exclude kala namak from the exemption granted under section 4 of the Act, is clearly ultra vires of the Act to that extent. In the result, we allow these petitions and quash the impugned orders of assessment in so far as they levy sales tax on kala namak. The respondents are restrained from recovering from the petitioners sales tax on their sales of kala namak. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in these petitions. Petitions allowed.
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