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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 145 Records
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1978 (11) TMI 167 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, 1978 and the chalan was filed on 16th Aug., 1978. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that if 17th June, 1978, is included, then the chalan was filed on sixty-first day of the arrest of the petitioner. 2. The question for determination is, whether in the facts of this case, 17th June, 1978, has to be included or not. Proviso (a) to sub-s. (2) of S. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this section for a total period exceeding sixty days and on the expiry of the said period of sixty days, the accused person shall be released on ball if he is prepared to furnish bail. It is no gainsaying that it was on 18th June, 1978, that the Magistrate authorised the detention of the petitioner. Accordingly, the inclusion of 17th June, 1978, does not appear to be within the purview of the proviso. This petition, therefore, fails and the same is hereby dismissed. 3. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... evidence relating to the conduct of the accused on being confronted by the Police officer with the allegation that he had received a bribe. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh's case the evidence relating to conduct on which reliance was placed was to the effect that the accused was confused and could furnish no explanation when questioned by the Police officer. In Vaidyanatha Iyer's case also evidence to the effect that the accused was seen trembling and that he silently produced the notes from the folds of his dhoti was acted upon. We, therefore, do not see any reason to rule out the evidence relating to the conduct of the accused, which lends circumstantial assurance to the testimony of P.W. 6. 11. On a consideration of the entire evidence we are satisfied that the appellant was rightly convicted. The other points mentioned by Shri Anthony are of a minor character and do not warrant any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s reasonable depends on a variety of circumstances, 'but what is important is that the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution are fundamental to the governance of the country. Therefore, what is directed as State Policy by the founding, fathers of the Constitution cannot be regarded as unreasonable or contrary to public interest even in the context of Article 19 or 302. It follows that payment of bonus, being in implementation of Articles 89 and 48 of the Constitution, is reasonable. We agree with the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs quantified at ₹ 2,000/-. The costs be paid to respondent No. 2.
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1978 (11) TMI 164 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... egislature when it had an opportunity after J. C. Chatterjee to amend the law, did not totally wipe off the effect of Anand Nivas and J. C. Chatterjee. It did not provide that the protection shall extend to all the legal heirs of the deceased in all types of tenancies. The legislature could, I think limit heritability of any right to certain specified heirs in certain specified circumstances from the inception of the legislation without being susceptible to the vice of hostile discrimination. If it involves any hardship it can be relieved only by a legislative amendment. 34. My answer to the reference, therefore, is that after the death of a tenant, the right to continued occupation is available only in respect of residential premises and that too to the limited number of heirs specified in clause (1) aforesaid, if they fulfilll the other conditions stated therein. The appeals shall again go back to the concerned Bench for further disposal. 35. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (11) TMI 163 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ently, the Court has to presume that the interest is excessive. But, it is a presumption that can be rebutted by the plaintiff bank by showing proof of special circumstances justifying the rate of interest. In these cases the plaintiff-bank did not adduce any evidence to rebut that presumption. Consequently, I hold that the compound interest charged at the rate of 11 1/2 per cent is excessive. On the facts of these cases, I hold that 11 1/2 per cent simple interest is reasonable. 16. Accordingly, I modify the decrees of the lower Court in all the three appeals. I hold that the Appellant-Bank is entitled in each of the three suits for a preliminary mortgage decree for the principal amount with simple interest thereon at 11 1/2 per cent annum from the date of the borrowing till the date of the suit, and thereafter at 6 per cent simple interest per annum till the date of realisation. The plaintiff shall have proportionate costs though out. Three month's time for redemption.
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1978 (11) TMI 162 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the order of registration passed on 1-4-1959 and that too in the proceedings under Bombay Public Trusts Act, to which tenant was not a party, cannot have an effect of extinguishing his acquired or vested right The order passed on 1-4-1959 registering the trust cannot have effect of reviving an extinguished or lost claim so far as the trust is concerned. 8. As already observed, as the trust in the present case was registered on 31st of May 1959, it cannot claim an exemption under Section 88B of the Tenancy Act in respect of the suit lands, which had already become the property of defendant No. 4 before the right of exemption was acquired by the trust. 9. In this view of the matter In our opinion, the learned Judge of the trial Court was right in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff as the suit was not maintainable. 10. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However,in the circumstances of the case therewill be no order as to costs. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 161 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... company at the relevant time misused his position as chairman of the company and the trust reposed in him at such chairman and induced the proposed fourth defendant and the first defendant to terminate the agency of the plaintiff and give it to the third defendant company which was formed by the second defendant. Further, in the case now before us there are no circumstances which would show that the plaintiff has chosen this forum mala fide, nor can it be said that the forum chosen is such that if the Court permits the suit to go on, the other party would be so handicapped in his defence that it would lead to injustice or that the balance of convenience is decidedly or overwhelmingly against a suit going on in the forum chosen by the plaintiff. 25. We therefore find that Padmanabhan, J. was right in having refused to revoke the leave which he had granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to sue the proposed fourth defendant. This appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 160 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ticle 226 would not have been there, in a case of, present type where the petitioner has filed this writ application challenging the notification of 1975/76 after a period of bout two years, it would not be expedient in the interest of justice to stay the implementation of the Housing Board Schemes for providing home to homeless during the pendency of the writ application. Violations alleged in this case are of technical nature even if any of them succeeds on technical pleas, the respondents can still take fresh proceedings to remove those lacunae, if any, and therefore, it is not also in the interest of the petitioner Society to invest any money during the pendency of the writ application by way of allotment of land to its members and to permit them to make constructions. 34. Thus, looking from any angle, I am of the opinion that the present stay application deserves to be dismissed. The petition is, therefore, dismissed and the interim stay passed by this Court is vacated.
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1978 (11) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence 'of course it is possible but not in the least probable' the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice." In Khem Karan v. State of U. P. AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1567, this Court observed (at p. 1569). "Neither mere possibilities nor remote possibilities nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can, without danger to the administration of justice, be the foundation of the acquittal of an accused person, if there is otherwise fairly credible testimony." Where the trial Court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule. That is what the High Court has done in this case. The appeal is dismissed Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rit in this contention. The plaintiff may have valid reasons for entering into a compromise with defendants 1 and 34 who might have made good a part of the loss suffered by the plaintiff. But apart from the allegation of fraud, the suit was substantially based on the scope of authority conferred by Exts. P-l and P-2 to sell lands and the acquisition of the title. by the purchasers From the attorney defendant 34 in exercise of the authority conferred by Exts. P-l and P-2 and, therefore, a compromise with defendants 1 and 34 would not render the appeal against the rest of the defendants infructuous or untenable. The third contention was that the plaintiff left India and his evidence having remained incomplete, the same could not be read in evidence. After we explained the relevant documents, we are satisfied that there is no substance in this contention. As all the contentions raised by the appellant fail, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed .
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1978 (11) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ght in stopping there. The High Court should have further considered the question whether the order for maintenance which was deemed to be an order under Section 125 of the new Code could not be cancelled under the provisions of Section 127 of the new Code. Once the order under Section 488 is deemed to be an order under Section 125 of the new Code, it must be so deemed for all purposes including the application of Section 127 of the new Code. Section 127 provides for consequential orders upon proof of a change in the circumstance of any person receiving, under Section 125, a monthly allowance, or ordered under the same Section to pay a monthly allowance to his wife, child, father or mother, as the case may be. The admitted attainment of majority of the respondent and the change of the law were surely circumstances which entitled the appellant to have the order in favour of the respondent cancelled. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court.
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1978 (11) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... But it will be hazardous for us to base our decision on any such speculation, when the appellant, himself, instead of taking any such plea, has, with obdurate persistency stuck to the position that the respondent's service has been terminated without any reason, which comes perilously near to admitting that the power reserved to the employer under the conditions of the employment, has been exercised arbitrarily. In the absence of any information from the appellant indicating that the respondent was marked off for discharge on the basis of an intelligible differentia having a reasonable nexus with the object of maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the public service, we are constrained to hold, in agreement with the High Court, that the impugned order suffers from the vice of unfair discrimination and is violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, we uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ellant in that case was at the relevant time working as Assistant in Co-ordination III of D.G.T.D. at Udyog Bhavan, New Delhi. His contention was that sanction accorded by Shri K. Rajaram, Deputy Secretary to Government of India in the Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs (Department of Industrial Development) was not valid and that he could only have been prosecuted under a sanction that may be accorded by the Home Ministry. In respect of this contention it was conceded on behalf of the State that in the absence of such sanction the prosecution must fail. The judgment proceeds on concession and not on any analysis or examination of the relevant provisions. Therefore it in no way helps the appellant in this case. This being the only point that could be raised in this appeal by limited leave and such contention being without merit, the appeal fails. and is dismissed. As the appellant is dead there is no question of his surrendering to Bail. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gal power to punish a person or destroy her service career in a manner not warranted by law by putting a rule which makes a useful provision for the premature retirement of government servants only in the ’’public interest", to a purpose‘ wholly unwarranted by it, and to arrive at quite a contradictory result. An administrative order which is based on reasons of fact which do not exist raust therefore be held to be infected with an abuse of power. So when it has been conceded by Mr. Lekhi that there was nothing on the record which would justify the impugned order dated March 26, 1976, of the appellant’s premature retirement under clause (j) (i) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, and that the Government was not in a position to support that unfair order, that order must be set aside, for it amounts to an abuse of the power which was vested in the authority concerned. The appeal is allowed with costs and it is ordered accordingly. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
Smuggling of Cargo of contraband goods - detention orders - Held that:- It is quite clear from the facts set out in the grounds of detention, that the appellant was the person who was actually engaged in the act of smuggling of the contraband stainless steel rolls into the Indian customs waters. It is, therefore, clear that for all intents and purposes the appellant was the actual smuggler and not a mere abettor. Furthermore, the activities of the appellant were such that his case would be covered by both clauses (i) and (ii) of s. 3(1) of the Act. Thus, there was due application of mind.
It is manifest that the appellant could in the instant case be detained under sub-s.(1) of s. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 both under clauses (i) and (ii) thereof. In any case, even assuming that the appellant was merely an abettor of the smuggling of 12 rolls of stainless steel sheets on this occasion, still his activities in this transaction afforded sufficient grounds for the prognosis that he would have himself indulged in actual smuggling of the balance lot of 8 rolls of stainless steel sheets remaining behind at Dubai, if not detained, and as such cl. (i) s. 3(1) of the Act was properly invoked. W.P.dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 152 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... uo; contention that it should be treated as rubber product under Tariff Item 16A(2) is not tenable because it is neither plates, nor sheets, nor strips to be included as rubber product under the Tariff Item 16A(2). As the product remains as rubberised fabric classifiable under Tariff Item 19I(i), the demand for processing surcharge has correctly been made. The Order in Appeal is, therefore, based on the facts of the case and is correct in law. The Revision Application is accordingly rejected.
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1978 (11) TMI 151 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not the courts below were legally justified in discharging the respondents?
Held that:- The High Court correctly pointed out that the records before the Trial Judge show that the Collector Vijayasekharan had valued the land at the rate of ₹ 1.70 lakhs per acre as far back 1: as 3-2-1970 and if two years later the valuation was raised to ₹ 2 lakhs it cannot be said that the land was in any way over-valued. Lastly, there does not appear to be any legal evidence to show any; meeting of mind between respondents No. 1 and 2 at any time. Although the Collector at the time of the acquisition was a distant relation of respondent No. 1 he had himself slashed down the rate of compensation recommended by the Revenue officer from ₹ 2,10,000 to ₹ 2,00,000 and it was never suggested by the prosecution that the Collector was in any way a party to the aforesaid conspiracy.
For these reasons, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court that there was no sufficient ground for trying the accused in the instant case. Moreover, this Court could be most reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of the two courts in the absence of any special circumstances. For the reasons given above, the judgement of the High Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
Detenu release orders - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Questions whether the confessional statements recorded on December 13 and 14, 1977 were voluntary statements or were statements which were obtained from the detenu under duress or whether the subsequent retraction of those statements by the detenu on December 22, 1977 was in the nature of an after thought, were primarily for the detaining authority to consider before deciding to issue the impugned detention order but since admittedly the aforesaid vital facts which would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other were neither placed before nor considered by the detaining authority it must be held that there was non application of mind to the most material and vital facts vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority thereby rendering the impugned detention order invalid and illegal. For these reasons we set aside the impugned detention order.
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1978 (11) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the detenu be set at liberty?
Held that:- There was no material before the 4th respondent for coming to the conclusion that the detenu "engages" in transporting smuggled goods. To this extent we have to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no material for coming to the conclusion that the detenu was "engaging" himself in the unlawful activities. The detenu has been under detention from 4th July, 1977 and the period of detention permissible under section 3 is only one year. Section 9(1) enables the authority to make a declaration which would have the effect of extending the period of detention to two years from the date of detention by virtue of amendment to section 10 by Amending Act 20 of 1976. As we have found that the order under section 9(1) has not been validly made and as the detenu has been in detention for more than one year his continuance in detention is not sustainable. In the circumstances, we allow the petition.
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1978 (11) TMI 148 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... placed the bar of estoppel in the way of the revenue and, on that basis, it could not have refused to determine, independently of the facts of this case, as to what was the true rate of tax leviable on the sales of scrap batteries effected in favour of the assessee on the basis whether those scrap batteries were covered either by entry 42B of Schedule C or entry 22 of Schedule E. The foregoing discussion would show that the Tribunal erred in law in failing to determine whether, on a true and correct interpretation, the goods in question were covered by entry 42B of Schedule C or entry 22 of Schedule E and that it also fell into an error in invoking the doctrine of estoppel on the facts and circumstances of the case. The question reframed by us will accordingly stand answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Reference answered accordingly.
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