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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 123 Records
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1979 (4) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is widow (or widows together) and the surviving sons and daughters get equal portions; and the branch of predeceased sons gets the same portion; (ii) among the heirs in the branch of the predeceased daughter shall be so made that the surviving sons and daughters get equal portions. 25. In accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff would be entitled to get 1/3rd share in Schedule I property in which her husband had a life-interest, while the remaining 2/3rd share in the property shall be equally distributed among the two branches of the defendants, the branches of Ramaswami and Vadivelu getting 1/3rd share each. 26. For the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and pass a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession in favour of the plaintiff with respect to her 1/3rd share in the suit property. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to pay and bear their own costs.
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1979 (4) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... has merely given effect to a recent decision of this Court as to the admissibility of certain statements, the order of the High Court may be wrong or even without jurisdiction, but there can be no doubt that it has passed a correct and just order which is in consequence with the decision of this Court and is calculated to promote the ends of justice. This Court, therefore, even if the order is wrong, would in exercise of its discretionary special leave jurisdiction refrain from interfering with the order of the High Court. We are of the view that is not a fit case in which we would be justified in interfering particularly when the High Court has itself sent back the case to the Special Judge for excluding the portions of the statements recorded and signed by the maker thereof and then decide the matter afresh. In these circumstances, therefore, we uphold the judgment of the High Court and decline to set aside the order of the High Court. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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1979 (4) TMI 175 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f action but no part of the same, arose within the jurisdiction of this Court The submissions of Mrs. Banerjee that since a representation in the form of a letter demanding justice has been made to the General Manager, who has his office within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain this application, in my view are of no substance. 15. In view of the above, I hold that the application should and so also the Rule fail on the preliminary point as raised. The Rule is thus discharged There will however be no order for costs. 16. I must also have it on record that in view of the order which I have proposed, I have not gone into or considered and decided the case on merits of the respective contentions and all points as taken are kept open. This will not also prejudice the petitioner from approaching the appropriate forum for the redress of his grievances, if he is so advised. 17. The stay of operation of this order as prayed for is refused.
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1979 (4) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... finally emerged. Counsel on both sides have also, statesman-like, assisted in producing the settlement. We command this example to the judiciary and to the Bar and reinforce it with what Gandhiji has recorded in his autobiography I have learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men's hearts. I realised that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties driven asunder. The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing, thereby-not even money, certainly not my soul. 8. We allow the appeal in part but entirely in terms of the compromise which we consider clearly reasonable and just. There will be no order as to costs. V.D. Tulzapurkar, J. 9. Decree in terms of compromise without costs. Parliament should clarify its intention regarding Section 15(1)(a).
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1979 (4) TMI 173 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... equests that stay of operation of our judgment may be granted. We do not see any merit in his request to suspend the operation of the entire judgment. We, however, stay the directions contained in writ petition Nos. 1532/76 and 217 and 218 of 1978 relating to refund of certain amounts specified therein till the end of July, 1979. In other respects, in those three writ petitions and in all respects in the other writ petitions, stay is refused. 77. The learned counsel for the petitioners in all the writ petitions draws our attention to the fact that, during the pendency of the writ petitions, bank guarantees have been furnished by the petitioners and pray that the same may be returned to the petitioners. The learned counsel for the Union of India opposes this request on the ground that as leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been granted, the guarantees in each of the cases should be allowed to continue. We, however, grant the request of the learned counsel for petitioners.
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1979 (4) TMI 172 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sidered and appreciate. Similar is the position so far as the advance by Sarda Devi is concerned. 11. In our view, therefore, there is no error so far as the approach of the authorities is concerned regarding the claim of the assessee in respect of the advances made by Gajanand Agarwal, Pushker Lal Agrawal, Sita Devi, and Jammuna Devi. But the case of the assessee in relation to the advances made by Rukmani Devi and Sarda Devi requires reconsideration. 12. We would, therefore, answer the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue so far as the asst. yr. 1962-63 is concerned (Tax Case No. 100 of 1973). In Tax Case No. 101 of 1973 we would answer the reference, partly in favour of the Department and partly in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances the Tribunal must re-examine the tax liability of the assessee in respect of the year 1963-64 in the light of the opinion expressed in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs in either of the two cases.
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1979 (4) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... erious character and even in those which involve serious offences, investigations have been pending for nearly two years. There are cases where persons have been in custody for five years-a situation too ghastly for a civilised country like ours. We therefore draw the attention of the State Government to take a policy decision with a view to ensure that accused persons, too indigent to set in motion the judicial process, do not suffer incarceration silently. The Government will do well to comply with the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure especially in the matter of persons sought to be bound over for good behaviour, persons against whom summons cases are pending and persons who have been in custody for more than six months. Maybe this will involve a mass release from Jails, but Government has to pay homage in substance and reality to the provisions of the Constitution and the Code. With these observations, and directions, we dispose of this petition. Petition disposed.
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1979 (4) TMI 170 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... orts our view. 12. It is, however, to be emphasized that the nature of the user of the property let must, with reference to the date 'of assertion of the protection or enforcement of the right under the Acts not be an unlawful or impermissible one. 13. The view taken in Rudrayya's case proceeding, as it) case on the footing that the pronouncement of Shah, J., in Vasudev's case conflicts with Subha case and ought not to be followed cannot be said to have laid down the correct law. With great respect, we are unable to bring ourselves to agree with the conclusion reached by the Division Bench. Accordingly, overruling the decision in Rudrayya's case, we express the opinion that a property which was an agricultural land at the time of letting and which ceased to be agricultural land on the date of the petition for eviction is “premises” within the meaning of Section 3 (n) of the 'Act' attracting the provisions of Section 21 of the 'Act'.
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1979 (4) TMI 169 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll entitled to procure the documents from the United States and the procurement itself was illegal. It must be remembered in this connection that the provisions of Section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code are only enabling. It is only when the prosecuting agency is unable to procure documents except with the help of the Court, that the prosecution is compelled to approach the Court for issuance of the necessary process, for collecting the same. The prosecuting agency in the present case could have secured the said documents from the United States on its own without reference to a Court of law. There is nothing in law to bar the prosecuting agency from collecting evidence in that manner. Hence, it is erroneous to argue that merely because the documents in question have come in this country pursuant to the Letter Rogatory issued by the learned Magistrate, the use of the same should be prevented. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the petition is devoid of any merit.
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1979 (4) TMI 168 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... he Second Respondent in both these appeals will bear and pay their own costs of the Appeals. o p /o p 34. The amount deposited by the Appellants in court as security for the costs in these appeals will be refunded to the Appellants. o p /o p 35. At this stage, Mr. Sakhardande, learned Counsel for the First Respondent makes an oral application for certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution. o p /o p 36. Since we have merely followed the Supreme Court decisions, including J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961)ILLJ540SC ; and The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. The State of Gujarat 1973 1SCR1 , so far as all the points arising in these appeals are concerned, it is not possible for us to give a certificate contemplated by Article 133(1) of the Constitution. Hence we reject the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. o p /o p 37. Appeals allowed. o p /o p
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1979 (4) TMI 167 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but its field of operation should be unmistakably delineated. Viewed in this light, there is no warrant for holding that the contract of tenancy is illegal as between the landlord and tenant. Vis- -vis the Controller/Authorised Officer, it undoubtedly is. 36. The above reasoning holds good even while examining whether the contract is opposed to public policy. In other words, the Court has to see the public policy sought to be served or furthered by the provisions in question and see whether by giving effect to the contract the public policy would suffer in any manner. While the public policy demands that the contract should be ignored vis- -vis the Controller/Authorised Officer, the same public policy under lying the enactments as such demands that it should not be ignored as between the landlord and tenant. 37. For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that G. Eswariah's case does not lay down the correct law and must accordingly be overruled. 38. Answered accordingly.
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1979 (4) TMI 166 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on is in possession either by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of contract for sale of land or "otherwise" that land must be included in the holding of that person. No restrictive meaning can be given to the enactments of this nature which are exproprietary in character. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the expression "holding" and the expression 'held by a person' occurring in Sec. 3 (I) must necessarily mean, to be in actual possession. To be held otherwise, would be doing violence to the language and also intendment. We have held the same view in a recent batch of civil Revn. Petns. Nos. 385 of a 978 etc. (Reported in AIR1980AP89 ). Same is the view recently expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Authorised Officer V. K. C. V. Narasayya (supra). 9. In the result, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed, setting aside the orders of the lower Tribunals. No costs. 10. Revisions allowed.
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1979 (4) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... le to reverse the order of acquittal passed by the High Court. It was submitted by Mr. Lalit that the accused may have illicit relations with a neighbour who may have impelled him to commit murder. In the first place, this seems to be a very weak motive for the respondent to kill his wife whom he married very recently. Indeed1, if this was so, there was no earthly reason for the respondent to marry at all and to make preparation to go out for a honeymoon trip. 4. After having considered all the comprehensive aspects of the matter, we are satisfied that the High Court was fully justified in holding that the prosecution case had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no doubt that the circumstances raise a serious suspicion against the respondent but suspicion however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof. For the reasons given above, this appeal is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The respondent will now be discharged of his bail bonds.
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1979 (4) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an undertaking. In the instant case, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed by the appellant nor was any such undertaking impliedly or expressly incorporated in the order impugned. Thus, there being no undertaking at all the question of breach of such an undertaking does not arise. For these reasons, therefore, we are of the opinion that however improper or reprehensible the conduct of the appellant may be yet the act of the appellant in not complying with the terms of the consent order does not amount to an offence under section 2(b) of the Act and his conviction and order of detention in civil prison for four months is wholly unwarranted by law. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order passed by the High Court directing the appellant to be detained in civil prison for four months is hereby quashed and the appellant is acquitted of the offence under section 2(b) of the Act. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (4) TMI 163 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... s were assessable only in case there was an express agreement for their sale. This case too does not lend any strength to the argument advanced by the Standing Counsel. Considering the agreement entered into between the parties, it is not possible to hold that the contract entered into by the assessee and the Board was severable in the sense that it consisted of two parts one for the supply of paper, packing envelopes etc. and the other of labour and services viz. printing, despatching etc. The entire contract being composite in character, was a works contract and as such the authorities erred in taxing the impugned turnover. 7. The revision succeeds, and is allowed. The order of the Revising Authority to the extent indicated above is set aside and he is directed to treat the impugned turnover as works contract. The assessee is entitled to its cost which is assessed at ₹ 200/-. A copy of this order will be sent to the Revising Authority under Section 11 (8) of the Act.
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1979 (4) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... focal point of the debate is as to whether customary bonus, as claimed in this case, is impaired or eliminated by the 1976 amendment Act. Moreover, both parties have agreed that throughout they have been dealing with customary bonus only and whenever there has been a settlement or agreement it has been not the source of the right but the quantification thereof. The claim was rooted in custom but quantified by contract. It did not originate in any agreement, but was organised by it. We are, therefore, satisfied that the appeal must fail. We should have unhesitatingly directed costs to be paid by the management-appellant to the respondent-workmen; but during the course of the hearing we were far from impressed with the attitude taken up by the respondent. While the merits of the matter have to be decided indifferent to such factors, costs are discretionary and we are constrained to dismiss the appeal, directing both the parties to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (4) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... we need say is that the learned author has not referred to any decided case in support of what he has said, but the matter is now no longer res integra. In Ratnam Chettiar & Ors. v. S. M. Kuppuswami Chettiar & Ors. (supra) an identical question arose and it was held that even though there was no fraud misrepresentation or undue influence, a partition could be reopened at the instance of a minor coparcener, despite the fact that the branch was represented by his father at the partition, if the partition was unfair or prejudicial to the interest of the minor. It was also held that the entire partition need not be reopened if the partition was unfair in regard to a distinct and separable part of the scheme of partition. In such an event the reopening of the partition could be suitably circumscribed. In the light of the principles laid down in Ratnam Chettiar & Ors. v. S. M. Kuppuswami Chettiar & Ors. (supra) this appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (4) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... le to reverse the order of acquittal passed by the High Court. It was submitted by Mr. Lalit that the accused may have illicit relations with a neighbour who may have impelled him to commit murder. In the first place, this seems to be a very weak motive for the respondent to kill his wife whom he married very recently. Indeed1, if this was so, there was no earthly reason for the respondent to marry at all and to make preparation to go out for a honeymoon trip. 4. After having considered all the comprehensive aspects of the matter, we are satisfied that the High Court was fully justified in holding that the prosecution case had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no doubt that the circumstances raise a serious suspicion against the respondent but suspicion however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof. For the reasons given above, this appeal is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The respondent will now be discharged of his bail bonds.
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1979 (4) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... such long periods of time at the next hearing of the writ petition, with a view to considering what directions are necessary to be given to the State Government by way of taking positive action for the purpose of securing enforcement of the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial. We would, however, require for this purpose information from the High Court of Patna as to the norms of disposals fixed by the High Court for the different categories of Magistrates and Sessions Judges in the State of Bihar, since without this information, it would not be possible for us to decide whether the existing strength of courts and judges in the State of Bihar is adequate for the purpose of ensuring speedy trial to the accused or it is necessary to have additional courts and judges. We would request the High Court to furnish this additional information to us at the next hearing of the writ petition. We will proceed with the further hearing of the writ petition on 24th April, 1979.
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1979 (4) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and substantial improvement in the generation of energy in the State. The fact therefore remains that, as things stand at present, the proviso, which admittedly applies only to the Company, is of no practical use for the time being. So even though it is valid and has wrongly been quashed by the High Court, we do not think it necessary to restore it, so that it shall not be deemed to form part of clause 6(a) (i) of the Order. But if there is deterioration in the generation of energy again, or there are other sufficient reasons within the purview of section 22B of the Act to reinsert the proviso, in the present or modified form, it will be permissible for the State Government to do so according to the law. In the result, while C.A. No. 921 of 1978 is allowed to the extent mentioned above, C.A. No. 425 of 1979 fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their own costs in both the appeals. C.A. 921/78 allowed. C.A. 425/79 dismissed.
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