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Showing 1 to 20 of 242 Records
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1980 (4) TMI 325 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of them. 19. We are, therefore, of the view that a revision to the High Court would be tenable at the instance of a party who is unsuccessful before the Sessions Judge, or who is aggrieved by his order. In other words, a concurrent finding of the Sessions Judge and of the Courts below becomes final, but when the Sessions Judge reverses the order of the Court below in revision the defeated party is not precluded from moving the High Court. The consensus of judicial opinion as can be seen supports only this view. 20. We, therefore, hold that these two criminal applications filed here by the persons who were non-applicants before the Sessions Judge in the Criminal Revisions and who are aggrieved by the decisions of the Sessions Judge are tenable and competent. There is no need to convert these petitions into applications under Section 482 of the Code. These criminal revisions shall be dealt with and disposed of by the learned single Judge according to law. 21. Revisions allowed.
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1980 (4) TMI 324 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rge of a statutory obligation, No bilateral agreement or settlement of accounts by mutual agreement can be spelt out from the fact that certain amounts are mentioned in the balance sheet of a company as due to a person No promise to pay the amount is involved by the inclusion of a debt in the balance sheet. It follows that a balance sheet is not an account stated. (See John Shaw and Bans Salfara Ltd. v. Shaw - 1935 K B. 113). Inclusion of a debt in a balance sheet is only an acknowledgment of liability. To claim the benefit of S.18 of the Limitation Act the acknowledgment must be made before the original debt is time-barred. The trial court was therefore right in holding that the appellant was entitled to a decree for such amounts only as were not barred on 6-5-1967 the date of Ext. A2 balance sheet less the amounts paid by the Sabha during the said period and subsequently. The appeals and the cross-objection will stand dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1980 (4) TMI 323 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re, be accepted. 22. Mr. Cama's contention that this plea is not supported by the pleadings in the petition also cannot be accepted. It is stated that the reduction in pension is arbitrary and is without rhyme or reason and this, in my view, is enough to support the contention of Mr. Madnaney. 23. In the result, I make rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) and (b3) and set aside the orders refusing to grant to the petitioner full salary during the period of suspension and refusing to pass an order giving all allowances to the petitioner and refusing to treat the period of suspension as being a period of duty. The order of reduction of pension by 5% is also set aside. The respondents are directed to pass necessary orders in accordance with law on the principles already set-out above. 24. The respondents to pay to the petitioner the costs of the petition. The above directions should be carried out by the respondents within ten weeks from the date of singing of this judgment.
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1980 (4) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... do not think that any prior decision of an external authority can be reasonably imposed on the exercise of that power. But I do agree that there is room for imposing a supervisory regime over the exercise of that power. One sector of supervisory jurisdiction could appropriately lie with the court trying the accused, and it would be desirable for the custodial authority to inform that court of the circumstances in which, and the justification for, imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. It should be for the court concerned to work out the modalities of the procedure requisite for the purpose of enforcing such control. 47. In the present case it seems sufficient, in my judgment, that the question whether the petitioner should be handcuffed should be left to be dealt with in the light of the observations made herein by the Magistrate concerned, before whom the petitioner is brought for trial in the cases instituted against him. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
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1980 (4) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ivision Bench consisting of himself and Lakshmana Rao, J., stated This is a very indirect benefit, and Section 70 can in our opinion only have application where there is direct benefit to the person for whom the work is done. The persons who are enjoying the benefit of this work are the owners and occupiers of the buildings in the locality. It would be doing violence to the Section to say that in these circumstances the work was done for the benefit of the municipality. The judgment of the Division Bench was upheld by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Governor-General In Council, Represented by the General Manager, South Indian Railway v. Municipal Council, Madura, Through its Commissioner along with the reasons on which it was based. But then the case is of no help to the defendant who had enjoyed the full benefit of the delivery of goods to G. Brothers and not merely an indirect benefit thereof. 10. For the reasons stated the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1980 (4) TMI 320 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e question, as to whether certificate should or should not be granted in exercise of its suo motu power and to make an appropriate order either granting or not granting a certificate within the shortest possible time. If, however, the Court takes up the question of determination at a subsequent stage, it may lead to unnecessary and avoidable arguments to the effect, that the determination not having been done as soon as may be after the passing or making a judgment, decree, final order or sentence, the Court cannot exercise the suo motu power at that stage. 12. We thank the Advocate General and Sri U. L. Narayana Rao. 13. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us as follows A party, who has failed to make an oral application immediately after the passing or making of a judgment, decree final order or sentence, cannot file a written application for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court at a subsequent stage. 14. Reference answered accordingly.
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1980 (4) TMI 319 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . 21. Shyam Ambalal Siroya's case was a decision rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges. We are bound by the ratio of the two aforesaid decisions. Respectfully following the same, we hold that since a representation made by the detenu to the Central Government has been ignored and left unattended for a period of about four months, the detention cannot be justified as being according to procedure prescribed by law. In view of the stand taken by the respondent-State in the counter-affidavit filed on its behalf, we do not feel inclined, in the circumstances of the case, to issue a direction to the Central Government to consider and dispose of the representation of the detenu, now. 22. We, therefore, allow this writ petition and set aside the detention and direct release of the detenu. 23. These, then, are the reasons which we now give in support of our order, dated March 14, 1980, by which we allowed Sabir Ahmed's writ petition and ordered the detenu's release.
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1980 (4) TMI 318 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif sitting on the small cause side and that in view of Section 96(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with the first appeals and is corresponding to the old Section 586 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in relation to the second appeals, the lower Court has no jurisdiction to go into the evidence and the question of facts as in a regular first appeal and come to the conclusion that Exhibits B-2 and B-6 are not genuine disbelieving the evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 3 and to hold that the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to recover the suit amount. 10. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed and the judgment and the decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the appeal is remanded to the lower appellate Court for the appeal memo being returned to the respondent-plaintiff for presentation as a civil revision petition before proper Court. The parties shall bear their respective costs throughout.
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1980 (4) TMI 317 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and is conducting business therein, he may be permitted sufficient time to make alternative arrangements. Mr. Mridul appearing for the appellant fairly conceded that he would have no objection if one year's time is allowed to the respondent provided he gives an undertaking for handing over peaceful and vacant possession at the expiry of the time. We therefore allow time to the respondent to vacate the premises on or before 15th April, 1981 on the condition that he files an undertaking within two weeks to the effect (1) that he shall hand-over vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord on or before 15th April, 1981; (2) that he shall not induct any per son on the premises; (3) that he shall go on paying the compensation for wrongful use of premises equivalent to the rent. The undertaking must be filed supported by an affidavit within two weeks from today failing which the order granting time shall stand revoked. There will be no order as to costs. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (4) TMI 316 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aws made there under or any orders issued for the implementation of these bye-lawsor any resolutions passed by the Corporation in that respect willaffect the persons who are registered under the Architects Act, 1972. (9) We accordingly declare that the judgments under appeal bythe learned single Judge are not to be understood to mean that theimpugned actions of the Corporation including the bye-laws and theresolutions or orders referred to in relief (a) asked for in the writpetitions are quashed for all purposes. It is sufficient for us to declare that none of these provisions will affect in any way the statusand practice of persons, including the possession of license an payment of license fee or amounts of security, etc. and the respondentsshall be free to act as architects and submit building plans to theMunicipal Corporation of Delhi without having to comply with anyof these provisions.Subject to these observations, the appeals are dismissed withoutany order as to costs.
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1980 (4) TMI 315 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 25. On the oral application made by the learned Government Pleader for the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, we are inclined to certify that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance which needs a decision from the Supreme Court. We therefore giant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. The parties may take appropriate steps for printing and for the appeals being heard, together. 26. There shall be interim suspension of our review judgment for a period of four weeks on condition that the Referring Officer -- Government deposits within four weeks from today, the entire enhanced amount of interest as per our judgment and the claimants landholders are permitted to withdraw the same, as and when 10 deposited, without furnishing any security. 27. The Government Pleader expressed his inability to state that it would be impossible or difficult to recover from the landholders in case the Referring Officer, Government finally succeed.
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1980 (4) TMI 314 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions of the Supreme Court reproduced earlier, the learned Judge confirmed the order passed by the trial Court directing consolidation of the suits instead of staying the subsequently instituted suit under Section 10 of the Code. There can be no doubt that the observations of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the Court has the power to direct two suits between the same parties where common questions are likely to arise to be tried together. That power could only be traced to Section 151 of the Code. 17. These were the only submissions which were made at the Bar. In view of the above discussion I am unable to agree, with Mr. Zaveri that the order passed by the learned trial Judge directing consolidation of the two suits and refusing to stay the subsequently instituted suit under Section 10 of the Code is manifestly erroneous, I, therefore, do not see any merit in this Revision Application and dismiss the same. The rule is discharged with costs. 18. Application dismissed.
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1980 (4) TMI 313 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ppellant-defendant has a full opportunity to meet the case presented by the amendment. Maybe, a variety of circumstances some of which were mentioned before us might, if successfully established, disprove the veracity of the plaintiff's case, They are matters bearing 00 the merits of the case, not on the tea ability of the amendment. 8. Counsel also urged that there had been gross remissness, to say the least on the part of the plaintiff respondent in seeking amendment at a late stage and with a tricky touch. In such cases we mast remember the power of the Court to resort to the universal panacea for the pathology of negligence, indifference, slipshodness and other delinquencies of litigants. The Court, while allowing amendments, will, in such cases, order heavy costs. In the present case, the amendment has been allowed, but the condition of payment of costs has been imposed. In these circumstances, we do not find our way to do anything else except to dismiss the appeal.
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1980 (4) TMI 312 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... facts and circumstances mentioned in the judgment of the learned District Judge, he was fully justified in reversing the finding of the trial court. The finding of the trial court was based on a consideration of only a part of the evidence on record, ignoring substantial pieces of evidence adduced by the plaintiff. The finding of the trial court on this question was not according to law and was, therefore, rightly set aside. ( 19. ) There is no merit in either of these petitions, which are, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. ( 20. ) The petitioners are, however, granted four months' time to vacate the accommodation. The petitioners will hand over vacant possession of the accommodation in dispute within this period of four months to the plaintiffs landlords. The petitioners will pay four months' damages at the rate of the rent in advance within a period of one month from today, failing which the decree for ejectment shall be executable at once.
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1980 (4) TMI 311 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... We think that these special circumstances may well justify the appropriate authority in the University resorting to alternatives which may mitigate their misfortune. We have been informed by counsel Mr. Manoj Swarup that the University is inclined to take an accommodative attitude to mitigate the hardship that may flow from the adjudication. Of course, they are free to take such steps as they deem just and necessary. We do not think there was anything wrong in Dr. Bhattacharya having been persuaded to come to the interview, but we regard it as improper that such a facility was not extended to the 2nd petitioner. In conclusion, we allow the appeal and direct a fresh selection from among those candidates who are qualified for Readership in the light of our interpretation of Ordinance 9. We make it clear that the appointments of respondents 7 and 10 sustained by the High Court, will remain untouched. The appeal is allowed subject to the observations made above. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (4) TMI 310 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the appeal fails and it is dismissed but in the circumstances with no orders as to costs. 7. Mr. Khanduja requested the Court that the tenant is staying in the premises for a long time and that he would find it very difficult to arrange for an alternative accomodation and, therefore, he must, be given reasonable time for adjusting his affairs, After hearing both sides, we are of the opinion that the tenant should be given time upto April 30, 1981, for vacating the premises occupied by him at present. Accordingly, the decree for eviction hereby confirmed shall not be executed till April 30, 1981, on the condition that the appellant tenant would file an undertaking on affidavit to this Court within two months from today that he will handover peaceful and vacant possession by April 30,1981, and that he will not induct any one into the premises and that he will pay compensation for use and occupation equivalent to rent regularly every month within 10 days of the expiry thereof.
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1980 (4) TMI 309 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o doubt appear to have vanished into thin air but then neither A-1 nor A-2 can be held responsible therefor, in the absence of proof in that behalf-proof which would exclude all reasonable doubt. The prosecution having thus failed to prove the case against the appellants, their appeals are allowed, the convictions recorded against and the sentences imposed on the appellants are set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges framed against them. Both the appel- lants who are on bail shall now be discharged from their bail-bonds. In view of the acquittal of appellant No 1, Shukla in Criminal appeal No. 494 of 1979 and appellant No. 2, Sanjay Gandhi in Criminal appeal No. 493 of 1979, Criminal appeal No. 492 of 1979, filed by the State is dismissed. In view of the fact that we have made no comments on the conduct of the investigation or on Mr. N. K. Singh, no order need be passed on the application filed by him Cvl. App. 493 & 494/79 allowed. Cvl. App. 492/79 dismissed
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1980 (4) TMI 308 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tly. It would be virtually impossible for the Board to carry on its functions if every time every mincon under it were to be subjected to disciplinary action only by the Board which is the top body acting as a corporate entity. We do not think that the provisions of the Act can be interpreted into an impossible position for the Board. On the other hand a more viable construction is what we have indicated above. 7. In this view, we reverse the finding of the High Court in regard to the interpretation It has put on the validity of the regulation and hold that the Board was competent to make the regulation in question. Even so, having regard to the special facts of this case, the learned Attorney-General has rightly agreed that the order reinstating the employees may be allowed to stand. We, therefore, allow the appeal in part to the extent of the vires of the regulation but otherwise dismiss it insofar as the factual conclusion is concernad. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (4) TMI 307 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se notices dated 13th November, 1979" (Exhibit 'L'), 4th December, 1979 (Exhibit 'R'), 11th December, 1979 (Exhibits 'S' and Exhibit 'T') are also set aside. Consequently, the seizure order of the 36000 bags of skimmed milk powder and orders imposing duty/penalty are also set aside- I further direct the respondents to immediately release and hand over 36000 bags of skimmed milk powder seized from the petitioners. The petitioners shall distribute all the 40000 bags of skimmed milk powder among poor and needy persons under the supervision of department of social welfare, Government of Maharashtra within six months from the date of this order in accordance with the order of the Central Government dated 17-8-1979 issued under section 25(2) of the Customs Act, as modified by me, in respect of the starting point of the period of distribution. The operative part of the order was already pronounced by me on 21-3-80. Rule made absolute with costs.
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1980 (4) TMI 306 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any Government must be free to alter policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on its their daily administration they cannot be hide-bound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a Court. We see no force in this submission of the learned counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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