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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 226 Records
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1982 (4) TMI 297 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ns of the Tenancy Act are not at all attracted in the present case. The consequence which must not follow is that the reference made to the Tahsildar was wholly unnecessary and in competent and it is liable to be recalled and must be treated as recalled with the result that the Revenue Tribunal is not required now to decide on merits the Revision application pending before it, Secondly, the appellants are entitled to have their Notice of Motion for vacation of injunction heard on merits without taking into account the fact that the plaintiffs were claiming to be entitled to the benefits of the Tenancy Act. 22. In the view which we have taken, the order made by Justice Kania rejecting the Notice of Motion No. 1236 of 1981 is set aside and the Notice of Motion will not be decided on merits. The appeal is thus allowed. In the circumstances of the case, we make on order as to cost of the appeal. The Notice of Motion to be heard in the third week of June, 1982. 23. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (4) TMI 296 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... d the amount to the assessee. It was because of certain other extraneous force of SIPCOT subsidy that the board had to pay back this amount. That refund is Only the form. The substance is that the Government wanted to pay the subsidy which is to be measured in terms of difference between normal and concessional tariff rates. So it becomes clear that it is not at all a payment under Section 41(1) . If it is not such a payment then it follows that it is a capital receipt. If concessional tariff and the refund is not construed in this style as a measure and method then it will be in conflict with the object of the incentive of concessional tariff which, we repeat, following the principles in the Board Circular, is helping the growth of industries and contribution towards capital outlay. 10. Therefore, we hold that ₹ 3,00,173 received as well as ₹ 8,676 saved by concession in the aggregate ₹ 3,08,849 is capital receipt not taxable as income. 11. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (4) TMI 295 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... relation to the infringement of copyright, Court would be justified in granting injunction of both the trade mark and the copyright at this stage of the proceedings, particularly, where there is a specific averment in the plaint, whatever it may be worth, that the plaintiff has been selling the goods, inter alia, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. (7) I would, therefore, grant an injunction restraining the defendant from manufacturing, selling offering for sale, advertising or dealing in washing soap under the trade mark 501, 507 or any other deceptively similar marks and wrappers as are identical with or deceptively similar to the wrappers of the plaintiff 501 half bar washing soap and from in any manner infringing the registered trade mark and copyright of the plaintiff and from passing off its washing soap and business as the washing soap and business of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. (8) The cost in this application should abide the cause.
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1982 (4) TMI 294 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f temporary injunction was passed on 20-10-81 itself. ' It, therefore, becomes dubious as to whether there was so-much urgency or immediacy for passing the order as found by the learned Munsiff. Besides he did not record anything as to the injury that would befall the plaintiff had such an order been withheld for the time that would be required for complying with the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 C.P.C. except that the object of the suit would be frustrated by the defendants implementing the order of transfer. 6. It is, therefore, found that the impugned order was beyond jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff having regard to the non-compliance of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 80, C.P.C. and to the learned Munsiff exercising the inherent powers against the clear provisions of law. 7. The result is that the petition is allowed. The impugned order of ad interim injunction is set aside. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 293 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the defendant to make a counter-claim by amending his written statement or by way of an additional written statement. 27. The plaintiff has come to this Court seeking the equitable relief of specific performance. He must do equity himself and not alter the character of the property till he succeeds in the suit. 28. For the reasons above, the application is allowed. There will be an injunction restraining the plaintiff from making any further construction in the said plot till the disposal of the suit In the event the defendant makes a counter-claim in the suit the defendant will be at liberty to apply for further interim orders. 29. Costs costs in the cause. 30. There will be a stay of operation of the order for one week from date. The ad- interim order will continue. In the event the plaintiff makes any alteration or repairs to the existing structures, in the said plot in the meantime the same should be done on a reasonable notice to the defendant. 31. Liberty to apply.
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1982 (4) TMI 292 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (30) As observed above, the user of the mark 'OSSO' by the judgment-debtors is dishonest. However, in the interests of justice it would be proper if an opportunity was given to them to discontinue the user before passing an order of their detention in civil prison, which is a very harsh order. Accordingly, the judgment-debtors are warned and directed to stop manufacturing, selling, offering for sale or otherwise dealing in sanitation and bathroom fittings including brass cocks under the mark 'OSSO' within one month from the date of this order. They are further directed to file an affidavit within one month from the date of this order before the Registrar staling that they had complied with the directions and had stopped the disobedience of the decree, failing which they will be liable to be detained in civil prison. The decree-holders will be at liberty to move the Court for further directions in this behalf. The decree-holders will also be entitled to costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 291 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
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... ... ..... 9;s case-(6) and A. V. Nanchane's case (7), does not apply to the present case, because, as stated earlier, S. 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981 should be regarded as having re-enacted the Entry Tax Act, 1979 after the bisis for its invalidity, as held by this court in Kansa Corporation case was removed by the Supreme Court which reversed that decision of this court. By such re-enactment the writ of mandamus issued by this Court in Hansa Corporation case, became ineffectiveThe conditions on which that decision was based, were so fundamentally altered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in appeal that that decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. ( 15. ) We agree with the conclusion of the learned single Judge, though not for identical reasons. In the result, we dismiss these appeals. ( 16. ) In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Accordingly, we decline to grant the certificate prayed for and dismiss the oral application.
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1982 (4) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... flat under the society." It logically follows, as a necessary corollary, that if the transaction between the society and the holder of the flat were governed by Regulations in Form-A, as here, that is to say, if the society had let out the flat to her, the decision of the Court would have been otherwise. The decision in Sabharwal Brothers' case, supra, is distinguishable for two reasons. First, there was an outright sale of the flat by the society and not that it had been let out to her under Regulations in Form-A; and secondly, the society having sold the flat, the letting of the flat by the flat-owner did not in any way affect the business of the society in the matter of its letting out the flat. The observation made by this Court that the fact that such letting was forbidden by a regulation of the society was immaterial did not fall for decision in that case and was a mere obiter. In the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 289 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s would be liable to entertainment tax from the players who are playing a game of bridge and feeling entertained or thrilled by their own performance. Surely, such is not the concept of entertainment tax under the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the proprietors of the parlours who have installed Video machines are not liable to pay entertainment duty or tax on the amount inserted in the slot of those machines by the players who are operating the machines. 14. For the above reasons we hold that the order passed by the prescribed officer calling upon the petitioners to pay entertainment duty on the amount earned by them through the Video game machines installed in their parlours must be quashed and set aside and the respondents are hereby ordered to forbear and desist from recovering entertainment duly or tax from the petitioners under the impugned orders. The rule in each petition is made absolute accordingly. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioners.
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1982 (4) TMI 288 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tral Government and in any case the belong to the Central Government on account of its absolute right of user of the same, according to us the appellants are liable to be evicted from the said premises. Although therefore we are unable to agree with the learned single Judge that an oral lease is a sufficient compliance with the provisions either of S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution, we are of the view that in the circumstances there is no substance in these appeals and they will have to be dismissed. 24. In the result, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed with costs. 25. The appellants apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme court, Leave is refused for according to us there is no substantial question of law of public importance involved in the case which requires to be determined by the supreme court. 26. The appellants are given time to vacate the premises in their occupation on 31st July, 1982. 27. Appeals dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e instant case the tenant has not sub-let any portion without the written consent of the landlady after the commencement of the Act. As the tenant has not sub-let any portion after the commencement of the Act without the written consent of the landlady, the landlady does not have any proper ground for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting within the meaning of S. 13 (2) (ii)(a). Mere continuance of possession by the sub-tenants lawfully inducted by the tenant with the written consent of the landlady contained in rent note does not afford any ground to the landlady for eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting, as the tenant has not sub-let after the commencement of the Act any portion without the consent in writing of the landlady. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The Judgment of the High A Court affirming the decision of the lower courts and the order of eviction, are hereby set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (4) TMI 286 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... elevant for the purposes of the concession, we also hold that modernization and revamping do not in themselves preclude substantial expansion of an existing unit. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the conditions for registration are substantially fulfilled. The regulation do not require any reference to Section 13 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 but only the ITC licence. These licences having been endorsed as Project Import, there was no reason for the Assistant Collector to deny the registration of the contract. Further, there is no evidence that he called upon the appellants to produce their industrial licence, on which the review notice proposes to place reliance. We find force in the respondents’ contention that the licence under Section 13 had in fact been obtained for the Project as it was mandatory. For these reasons, we would uphold the impugned order and discharge this notice. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 285 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... licant Lalit Kumar but a subsequent statement was made by Chandra Prakash that the Bahikhatas did not relate to his firm and related to the business of Lalit Kumar and this was accepted by the authorities and a prosecution was launched against Lalit Kumar. The admissions made by Lalit Kumar at two different stages showing that the Bahikhatas related to his business was the only evidence used against him and even if this was accepted the entries in these Bahikhatas were not proved. No presumption could be made in this case under Section 67 of the Gold (Control) Act and it was not shown that Lalit Kumar was a dealer in gold as defined in Section 2(j) of the Act. 12. Criminal Revision No. 1756 of 1980 is, therefore, allowed. The conviction and sentence of the applicant are hereby set aside. The applicant is on bail. He need not surrender and his bail bonds are hereby discharged. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded to him. Criminal Revision No. 213 of 1981 is hereby dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 284 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... e records of the case and the submissions made by both the appellants in their written memoranda of appeals and during the course of personal hearing. 9. The Board observes that the Central Excise authorities were themselves not too sure of the application of rule 56-C in this matter. If this was not so they would have immediately taken remedial steps to bring the appellants under the ambit of this rule. 10. Moreover, from a reading of rule 56-C, it is observed that an assessee is provided the option to avail of the benefit under the rule. The application of this rule on an assessee cannot, therefore, be made compulsory, and a unilateral decision to this effect cannot be made by the Central Excise Authorities. The appellants were at liberty to pay duty at each stage of the clearances of excisable goods in accordance with the normal procedure prescribed under the Rules. 11. The Board, in the circumstances sets aside the Orders of penalty of both the Appellants.
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1982 (4) TMI 283 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... r, New Delhi, vide his order-in-appeal No. 1725-CE/78 in the case of M/s Willard India Pvt. Ltd., Sikandrabad had held that PVC battery separators were eligible for the exemption provided in Notification No. 68 of 1971 and that there was no reason why the petitioners who are a small scale industry, should be discriminated against in the matter and burdened with duty. 4. Government find considerable force in the petitioner’s contention that the goods in question continue to be an article of plastic whatever be their end use and since they are in the nature of profile shapes, they would not fall in the excepted category of goods which alone are to be denied the benefit of exemption Notification No. 68/71. 5. The Government accordingly hold that the PVC microporous battery separators in question are classifiable under Item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff and are entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 68/71 and, therefore, allow the revision application.
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1982 (4) TMI 282 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... d other additives for making them fit for a particular use does not cease to be a phenolic resin. Government further agree with the petitioners that the benefit of Exemption Notification No. 122/71 is available to all phenolic resins (except blends of phenolic resin with other resins) and that the use of the word ‘including’ in the aforesaid exemption notification could only have the effect of enlarging the scope of the exemption notification so as to extend the benefit even to phenolic resins which are chemically modified and therefore this provision which has the effect on enlarging the scope of the exemption notification could not be interpreted so as to restrict the benefit of exemption notification only to so called pure resins. 5. The Government accordingly set aside the order-in-appeal and hold that the product in question would be entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 122/71, as a phenolic resin. The revision application is accordingly allowed.
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1982 (4) TMI 281 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... this date Rule 11 read with Rule 173J provided for a time period of one year for filing the refund claim. They have urged that it is the period of limitation prescribed under the rules as they existed on the date when the payment occurred that should be relevant for computing the time limit for filing the refund claim. Viewed this way the refund claim which was filed within one year from the date of payment of duty was not time-barred. 4. Government accept the petitioners contention that Rule 11 as it stood on the date of the alleged payment of excess duty would be the material rule for determining the time limit for filing the refund claim. Since the petitioners filed the refund claim within the period of one year from the date of the alleged payment of excess duty, their claim is not time-barred. Government accordingly set aside the order-in-appeal and direct that the Assistant Collector should consider the petitioners refund claim on merits and pass a speaking order.
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1982 (4) TMI 280 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS
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... ... ..... her than “extrusion dies” and “dies for wire drawing” is correct and the other whether the demand raised under Rule (2) (2)/10/10A read with Rule 173J under show cause notice and confirmed under Section 11A is correct and maintainable. 8. As to the first point I am of the opinion that “forged dies” manufactured by the appellants and the impugned goods in this order fall out side the ambit of T.I. 51A(iii). For under T.I. 51A (iii) it is specified as follows - (i) dies for wire drawing and (ii) extruction dies for metal and rock drilling bits. In as much as the tariff sub-item does not specify “all dies” the inclusion of “forged dies” in question under this tariff item is not correct. 9. As to the time bar, I am not considering it in view of my findings on merit. 10. Hence on merits, the appeal is allowed. The orders of the lower authority are set aside with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1982 (4) TMI 279 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... ysed and specified in the Order. 31. In these circumstances, the Board finds that the imposition of penalties on the three appellants was not justified and sets them aside. 32. The Board has on more than one occasion observed (the Orders have been published in Journals such as E.L.T. and D and CR), about the casual manner in which penalties under Rule 173Q are imposed by Adjudicating Officers. The (ill-conceived) penalties in these three appeals is five lakhs with a multiplication factor of three. The Board (as already stated above) finds no warrant for such penal action. 33. The Board would once again like to make this observation in a different language - "Rule 173Q is not a toy-pistol. It can be lethal." 34. This Order of the Board does not preclude the Collector from taking any action deemed fit by him against “PAI” and “PFW” who are the real “manufacturers” of the goods in question in the eyes of the law.
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1982 (4) TMI 278 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e which are either in common parlance or in commercial vogue. When the legislature recast entry 4, it no doubt mentioned by name, cast iron scrap. But the only practical effect of this amendment is that cast iron scrap need no longer be in doubt as to whether it is a Second Schedule item or not it can feel quit secure about its place in the entry. That is all. It is farfetched to imagine that even way back in 1959 when the legislature drew up, for the first time, entry 4 in the Second Schedule, its idea was to severely exclude cast iron scrap from the entry, and that it kept its thought to itself to let the reader find the inner meaning as best as he may. The assessee s case in this revision is a cast iron case. We hold that cast iron scrap is, and has always been a Second Schedule item. It is now openly paraded in entry 4. But even formerly it belonged to that entry although not prominently so. The revision is accordingly allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 (one set).
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