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Showing 1 to 20 of 144 Records
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1983 (6) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iction of the innocent.... In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. 29. In the result, we set aside the judgment of the High Court in so far as Pussu is concerned and restore his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. as ordered by the trial court. As regards sentence we feel that ends of justice would be met if we impose the punishment of imprisonment for life on him. We accordingly sentence Pussu to imprisonment for life. We also restore the conviction of Pussu for the offences punishable under Sections 307 I.P.C, 323 I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act and the sentences imposed on him on that account as ordered by the trial court. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 30. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Pussu is on bail. He is n directed to surrender in accordance with the terms of his bail and undergo the punishment imposed on him.
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1983 (6) TMI 209 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o. 460/83 the offence alleged against the petitioner, it is said, is one under section 376, I.P.C. The petitioner is a resident of Bangalore City. He may approach the Court of Session. The petition is, therefore, disposed of. In Cr.P. No. 461 of 1983 the apprehension is that the petitioner may be arrested for violating a rule framed under the Essential Commodities Act and for offences under sections 3 and 7 of that Act. He hails from Mysore District. No Special grounds are made out for entertaining this application by this Court. Reserving liberty to the petitioner to approach the Court of Session this petition is disposed of. In Cr.P. No. 463 of 1983 the petitioner, who is a lady, apprehends that she may be arrested in connection with various crime numbers registered at many places for an offence involving cheating - Section 420, I.P.C. This may also be conveniently dealt with by the concerned Sessions Court. Accordingly this petition is disposed of. 20. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (6) TMI 208 - ITAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... say that exemption notifications could be referred to for ascertaining the overall scheme of the Tariff. Apart from the fact that this observation appears in the minority judgment of the Supreme Court in that case, there is no need to look to the exemption notifications in the case before us where the scope of the tariff entry is not in doubt. The second Supreme Court judgment relating to Ram Lal Mansukh Rai case relied on by the Department's representative proves the appellants' point rather than that of the Department because in that case copper billets and copper circles were two distinctly named products in two sub-items of item 26A. Such is not the case under item 17 (2). 8. Since we agree with the conclusion reached by the earlier Bench in the identical case of the appellants, we find no reason to refer the matter to a larger Bench as urged by the Department's representative Accordingly, we allow both the appeals with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1983 (6) TMI 207 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... proceedings in a suit and it is obviously to obviate such situations that the Legislature amended O. 14, R. 2. While interpreting any amendment, it must be presumed that the Legislature was aware of the law prevalent before the amendment. If this is so then one must proceed on the further assumption that the Legislature would not make any unnecessary amendment and the amendment made is for preventing the mischief arising out of the law existing at the time of the amendment. 14. Mr. Tijoriwalla invited my attention to several judgments, some of this court and some of other Courts. He was fair enouth to mention that none of them was on all fours with this case. On a proper analysis of the provisions contained in O. 14, R. 2 I have come to the conclusion as stated above, which conclusion is not affected by the several decisions on which Mr. Tijoriwalla placed reliance. 15. In the result, the petition must fail. Rule is accordingly discharged with costs. 16. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (6) TMI 206 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and dispose of property, it is not necessary for me to examine the further question whether omission of Sub-clause (f) of Clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, would result in reviving any post-constitutional law which at the date of its enactment was repugnant to Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. 26. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Section 183 (3A) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 is not arbitrary or unfair and therefore does not infringe Article 14 of the Constitution. The said provision is also not repugnant to or inconsistent with other provisions for payment and recovery of consolidated rates contained in the Calcutta Municipal Act The Sub-section (3A) of Section 183 of the Calcutta Municipal Act does not make right of appeal under Section 183 (1) of the Act nugatory or illusory. 27. I accordingly discharge this Rule without any order as to costs. 28. Let the operation of this order be stayed for four weeks from date.
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1983 (6) TMI 205 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r the promulgation of the new bye- laws no claim was made by the Municipal Board in respect of octroi payable on rail-borne sugarcane and subsequently the State Government by the letter dated June 3, 1982 referred to above has enlarged the scope of exemption by exempting from payment of octroi on sugarcane brought into the municipal limits of all municipalities for crushing in the sugar mills irrespective of the mode of transport employed for bringing it. On a consideration of all the contentions urged by the parties before us we hold that the Municipal Board of Pilibhit was not entitled to collect octroi on sugarcane brought into its municipal limits by the appellants by rail on the relevant date. The prosecution, therefore, is not sustainable. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the proceedings in the Magistrate's court out of which this appeal has arisen are quashed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (6) TMI 204 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the assessee and the Tribunal allowed the appeal holding that the relief could be granted in respect of donation in kind also. The Revenue then moved the Tribunal for referring the abovestated question to this Court. 5. The question whether donation in kind is also entitled to the relief under s. 80G is now concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in H. H. Sri Rama Verma vs. CIT (1991) 187 ITR 308 (SC), wherein it has been held that the expression any sums paid by the assessee refers to the amount of money paid by the assessee as donation. Therefore, for the purposes of claiming deduction from income-tax under s. 80G(2)(a), the donation must be a sum of money paid by the assessee and not donation in kind. Following that judgment, we answer that question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 6. In the result, the question is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1983 (6) TMI 203 - UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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... ... ..... of Appeals, Itek Corporation v. First National Bank of Boston, 704 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). 2. In an earlier opinion in this matter, Itek Corporation v. First National Bank of Boston, Slip Opinion (D.Mass. May 25, 1982), I rendered a declaratory judgment to the effect that the demands made on the three letters of credit by Bank Melli were accompanied by fraud in the transaction; and further, that no conforming demand was made by Bank Melli prior to the expiration date of the letters, and that each of the letters had expired. At that time, the matter was before the Court for final adjudication, and so I deemed it necessary to address each of the several claims raised by Itek. Here, however, this Court has been expressly prohibited from entering a final judgment, and so I have confined my analysis of likelihood of success on the merits to that claim for which I find proof has been most clearly adduced at this preliminary stage, that is, the presence of fraud in the transaction.
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1983 (6) TMI 202 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s got no jurisdiction to entertain this application.” 5. Another decision has been cited by Mr. Bajoria reported in 1983 (1) Calcutta High Court Notes 184 Union of India and Others v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation of India and another. In paragraph 25 of page 134 of the said report it has been held as follows - “It is now well settled that cause of action means every fact which the plaintiff should prove if traversed in order to succeed in this court.” 6. I have already held that the pleadings that have been made in paragraph 32 of the writ application do not, in my opinion, form any part of the cause of action and as such this court cannot entertain this instant writ application. 7. For the reasons aforesaid this application is dismissed being held to be not maintainable in this jurisdiction. There will be no order as to costs. This order, however, will not prejudice the petitioners to seek appropriate relief in appropriate forum 9-6-1983.
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1983 (6) TMI 201 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... of India Rules and has observed that “considering his age, antecedents, the penalty he has already suffered in the departmental proceedings and confiscation of 30 gold pieces valued about ₹ 50,000/-, I feel that the accused No. 1 deserves lenient punishment.” It does not at all stand to reason how in the context of such a finding by the criminal court, it would be open to the learned Counsel for the appellant to contend that there has been an order of acquittal on merits which would nullify the entire order of confiscation and more so, a question of law would arise meriting a reference to the High Court we have no hesitation to reject this submission of the learned Counsel as utterly unsustainable and devoid of merits. 18. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the order of the Tribunal is based on consideration of facts and evidence and no question of law arises at all for reference to the High Court. Accordingly, we reject the reference application.
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1983 (6) TMI 200 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... we would accept that identification of the returned goods with reference to the entries in the D. 3 as exhibited in the document, had in fact been carried out. 6. The other point taken up in the order of the Assistant Collector is that certain details of processing are not found in Form V. Form V is an account prescribed by the Department itself. If it does not contain columns relating to data which is now asked for and is not available, the appellants cannot be blamed for the non-availability. Whoever designed the form should presume to know what he was seeking to get. Thus, this objection of the Assistant Collector is not maintainable. 7. In the result, we allow the appeal, subject to the Assistant Collector satisfying himself from the Form V register, now exhibited before us as being one maintained in the normal course of business and contains information that it ought to contain under each column occurring in it and order consequential refund of duty involved.
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1983 (6) TMI 199 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rticle, under the Notification, excise duty can be charged only in respect of charges for the job-work carried out by the factory which converted the piece of cloth into a suit. These illustration have been given with a view to explain the scope and ambit of Notification No. 119 of 1975, dated April 30, 1975.” The present case before the Tribunal regarding the supply of sheets and return of made out articles was specifically dealt with in para 8 of the above judgment by way of illustration and it was held that such made out articles would be entitled to exemption under Notification No. 119/75. Even recently, the Special Bench B’ itself in the case of Indian Steel Rolling Mills - 1983 E.L.T. 2396 has followed these court judgments and has departed from its earlier decision. The view now propounded by the Special Bench B’ in Indian Steel Rolling Mills seems to be more correct, logical and in agreement with various judicial pronouncements as referred to above.
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1983 (6) TMI 198 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... material on record before the lower authority or the lower authorities have reached to a finding without sufficient material on record, the Tribunal should not fail to exercise its powers to determine the correct classification in such cases or to remand the case for proper adjudication. The proceedings before the Tribunal are not in the nature of writ proceedings or discretionary revisionary proceedings where in order to invoke the jurisdiction, the appellant is under an obligation to show that there is material on record to interfere with the order of the lower authority, but in the nature of proceedings and being regular court of appeal, the role of the Appellate Tribunal is rather to see that there was sufficient material on record to justify the decision of the lower authority, specially when the proceedings before the lower authorities were not truly adversary proceedings and the authority below while passing an order at a time has acted as a party as well as a judge.
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1983 (6) TMI 197 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... Heading 84.11(4) of the Customs Tariff, on the contrary, speaks specifically of exhaust fans and blow-airs or not less than 65 cms. sweep. 7. In term of Rule 2A of the Rules for the interpretation of the First Schedule of the Import Tariff, any reference in a Heading to an article shall be taken to include reference to that article incomplete or unfinished provided a that as imported the incomplete or unfinished article has the essential character of the complete or finished article. 8. The Impeller Rings in the instant case, it was contended, are incomplete/unfinished parts as per the drawing and since the finished or complete part is also in the form of a ring the unfinished part has the characteristics of finished part. 9. Admittedly, the Impeller Ring in question is component part of draught fans. In view thereof, we are of the opinion that the assessment should have been made under Heading 84.11(4). 10. The Appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed.
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1983 (6) TMI 196 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... gged down or taken away by imposing condition which the party can not comply with. But then the Tribunal cannot ignore their interests of the revenue altogether. Some safeguard shall have to be provided for as to the recovery of penalty in the event of the petitioners/appellants failing in their appeal. 5. Considering the undue hardship that would cause to the petitioner and taking into account the interest of revenue we feel it reasonable to call upon the appellants to furnish bank guarantee for a sum of ₹ 1 lakh and execute a bond with solvent surety for the remaining sum of ₹ 1 lakh. 6. For the reason we allow the application and direct stay of recovery of penalty of ₹ 2 lakhs on the appellants furnishing a bank guarantee for a sum of ₹ 1 lakhs and execute a bond with solvent surety for the remaining sum of ₹ 1 lakh within four weeks from the date of communication of this order to the satisfaction of the adjudicating authority.
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1983 (6) TMI 195 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... the goods from the vessel, the Steamer Agents cannot be made liable to pay penalty for the shortages detected subsequently by its judgment in matter No. 1561/81, dated 2-2-1983. The contention raised by Shri Chatterjee that the Steamer Agents ought to have produced certificate contemplated by Article 3 of the Rules relating to Bill of Lading, does not in any way affect our above finding. The Article 3 is intended for the benefit of the Steamer Agents. They can compel the shippers to issue a certificate that the goods were in good condition. The absence of this certificate cannot clothe the Customs Authorities to impose the penalty under Section 116. 8. After careful consideration of all aspects and relying upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court referred to in this Appeal, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the Deputy Collector and confirmed by the Appellate Collector and direct the Customs authorities to refund the penalty to the appellants, if paid.
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1983 (6) TMI 194 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... s held long after the discharge of the goods, and the goods had remained in the custody of the Port Trust which were the approved (by the Collector of Customs) authorities for keeping custody of the cargo in terms of Section 45 of the Customs Act, 1962, the penalty order on the steamer agents was illegal and, therefore, it set aside the penalty order. The decision of the Hon’ble Court, referred to above, is applicable in all fours to the facts, of the present case. Shri A.K. Chatterjee was not able to place any other decision which has taken a contrary view. In the circumstances, the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, is binding on this Tribunal. Following the decision of the Calcutta High Court and for the reasons already stated, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the Asstt. Collector confirmed by the Appellate Collector and direct that the appellants shall be given the consequential relief within two months from the date of communication of this order.
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1983 (6) TMI 193 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ll reasonable doubt as in the criminal cases. 12. We have found that the appellant has satisfactorily explained his possession of the seized diamonds. The Customs authorities were satisfied that he was a bona fide purchaser. In the circumstances, the burden shifts to the Customs authorities to establish that these goods are smuggled goods and the appellant knowingly or otherwise concerned with the smuggled goods. In the instant case, the Customs department made no efforts to establish that the diamonds found in the possession of the appellant are smuggled goods. In the circumstances, the diamonds could not have been confiscated. We, therefore, set aside the orders of confiscation. 13. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders passed by the Asstt. Collector and confirmed by the Appellate Collector and direct the authorities below to return the diamonds seized from the appellant to him within two months from this date.
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1983 (6) TMI 192 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... l. So far as this scrap is concerned, it is seen that it is produced out of scrap. It is not the contention of the department that the original scrap is non-duty paid and therefore, duty should be charged on the fresh scrap which arises in the production of steel ingots and castings. Therefore, so far as the fresh melting scrap is concerned, it is seen that the classification is under 26, C.E.T. which is the same as the classification of the old scrap from which it was manufactured. Therefore, there has not been a production of our new article satisfying the definition of manufacture’ as per Section 2(f). In this view, there cannot be any levy of duty on this scrap as contended by the appellants. Since no duty is leviable, the Collectors, order for levying of duty and penalty is not correct. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to go into the other submissions of the appellants. We accordingly set aside the Collectors’ order dated 22-9-1982 and allow the appeal.
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1983 (6) TMI 191 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... o face unnecessary litigation. The respondent has filed the appeal as per Note No. 2 of the Order passed by the Additional Collector which has been reproduced and discussed above. In the result, in view of the Punjab High Court in the case of Yogeshwar Raj v. Yog Raj, 1967 A. Punj. 163 (1966) 68 Punj. L.R. 214, extract taken from Code of Civil Procedure by Mulla 14th edition, pages 592-593, I hold that though the Collector of Customs (Appeals) had no jurisdiction, the order passed by him does not in any way result in the failure of justice. Now, coming to the merits of the case, I hold that it is an admitted fact that the respondent has surrendered his Goldsmith licence a few days back and had obtained a Gold Dealer’s Licence, fully corroborates the respondent’s plea that he had ceased to be a goldsmith and had become a gold dealer. In the result, the Order passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals) is confirmed and the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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