Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 264 Records
-
1986 (1) TMI 386
... ... ... ... ..... e judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit. If some new evidence had come into possession of the plaintiffs after the passing of the decree by the trial court, they could seek permission for leading additional evidence for which an application had already been filed but that by itself was no ground to withdraw the suit. 4. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents submitted that it may necessitate an amendment of the plaint also which so should be allowed by this court. I am afraid, no such permission can be granted at this stage. It is for the plaintiffs to move any application before the lower appellate court, which will be disposed of in accordance with law. 5. Consequently, this petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. 6. The parties, through counsel, are directed to appear before the District Judge, Gurgaon on 15th Feb. 1986. The appeal be now decided on merits, in accordance with law. 7. Petition allowed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 385
... ... ... ... ..... and, consequently, there was no merit in this contention of the department. A certificate is also filed to show that the aforesaid shares were still held by Polar Investment. There is no material to show that the shares contributed by the partners concerned had been realised by the firm in terms of money which could have come back or the benefit of which could have been enjoyed directly or indirectly by any of the partners. The departmental representative has also relied on considerable correspondence in connection with the assessment for the assessment year 1975-76 to show that the assessee, according to him, was recalcitrant, but this loses all its significance in view of the eventual orders passed in the appeals relating to registration, as well as the income determined in the assessment of the firm. In the circumstances, we set aside the charge of the capital gains in the hands of each of the partners sustained by the departmental authorities. 12. The appeals are allowed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 384
... ... ... ... ..... rt of the Advisory Board is required to be confidential. If the appropriate Government decides to take a fresh action on the basis of its own interpretation or reading of the report of the Advisory Board, how is a citizen able to challenge the action of the appropriate Government ? The contents of the report of the Advisory Board are a closed book as far as the citizen is concerned. In our opinion, therefore, considering these aspects of Art. 22(4) of the Constitution and the effect of the report made by an Advisory Board and of the opinion expressed by it as provided for, in keeping with the requirement of Art. 22(4) of the Constitution, in the different laws of preventive detention, no order of detention can be passed against a detenu who has been released under S. 8(f) of the COFEPOSA Act unless there are fresh grounds for his detention. 19. In the result, both the petitions succeed and detenus in both the petitions shall be set at liberty forthwith. 20. Petitions allowed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 383
... ... ... ... ..... ce in question. The Division Bench of the High Court, in our considered view, erred in relying upon the notification in preference to Rule 5(1)(b) and to hold that the Order of termination was wrong and in setting aside the Judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Judgment under appeal has, therefore, to be set aside and we do so. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs . We repeat what we have stated above. The respondent has been sent out for reasons which we cannot decide in the absence of necessary materials. We suggested to the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Tyagarajan, to provide the respondent with some job. The Counsel, in fairness, agreed to consult his clients. Though our Judgment was ready long ago, we gave time to the appellants' Counsel here on three occasions, to explore the possibility of providing some job to the respondent. Nothing tangible has happened. We still hope that this young man will be provided with some job in the department.
-
1986 (1) TMI 382
... ... ... ... ..... of the statutory provisions. Further, it would render the proviso to Section 2 of the Ranchi Bench . Act as also the proviso to Rule 3 wholly nugatory. 25. In the present case it is not in dispute that the case against the two petitioners has been registered in Jhinkpani police station which falls in the district of Singhbhum. The matter thus comes squarely within the jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench. The preliminary objection on behalf of the opposite party State against the very maintainability of this criminal miscellaneous petition at Patna, therefore, must be upheld. This petition is consequently dismissed and the petitioners are relegated to seek their remedy in the appropriate forum of the Ranchi Bench, if so advised. 26. Before parting with this judgment, it may be noticed that the teamed counsel for the petitioners had stated that he did not wish to press the case of petitioner No. 2 Prasant Majumdar. Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. 27. I agree. S.N. Jha, J. 28. I agree.
-
1986 (1) TMI 381
... ... ... ... ..... f the right to the tenancy in respect of premises referred to in section 5(11)(c)(ii) of the Act after the determination of the lease, which is protected by the Act cannot be made under a will in favour of a person not referred to in that sub-clause. We do not find any kind of justification to saddle the landlord with the liability to treat a stranger who is not referred to in sub-clause (ii) of section 5(11)(c) of the Act as a tenant on the basis of a bequest made under a will by the tenant. Since we are disposing of the case on the basis of the express provisions of the Act which are sufficiently restrictive in character, we do not propose to deal with the wider proposition that a statutory tenancy which is personal to the tenant cannot be bequeathed at all under a will in favour of any body. We leave the said question open. In the circumstances, there is no ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 380
Infringement of patents
Held that:- Herbicide CP 53619 (Butachlor) was publicly known before Patent Number 125381 was granted. Its formula and use had already been made known to the public by the report of the International Rice Research Institute for the year 1968. No one claimed any patent or any other exclusive right in Butachlor. To satisfy the requirement of being publicly known as used in clauses (e) and (f) of sec. 64(1), it is not necessary that it should be widely used to the knowledge of the consumer public. It is sufficient if it is known to the persons who are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge of the patented product or process either as men of sciene or men of commerce or consumers. The section of the public who, as men of science or men of commerce, were interested in knowing about Herbicides which would destroy weeds but not rice, must have been aware of the discovery of Butachlor. There was no secret about the active agent Butachlor as claimed by the plaintiffs since there was no patent for Butachlor, as admitted by the plaintiffs. Emulsification was the well-known and common process by which any Herbicide could be used. Neither Butachlor nor the process of Emulsification was capable of being claimed by the plaintiff as their exclusive property. The solvent and the emulsifier were not secrets and they were admittedly not secrets and they were ordinary market products. From the beginning to the end, there was no secret and there was no invention by the palintiffs. The ingredients, the active ingredient, the solvent and the emulsifier, were known; the process was known, the product was known and the use was known. The plaintiffs were merely camouflaging a substance whose discovery was known through out the world and trying to enfold it in their specification relating to Patent Number 125381. The patent is, therefore, liable to be revoked.
-
1986 (1) TMI 379
... ... ... ... ..... sales tax is assessed under the Central Act that the turnover has to be determined as contemplated by section 8A of the Central Act. Since in the instant case, the sales tax was leviable and assessed under the M.P. Act, section 8A of the Central Act obviously could not be invoked and the turnover had to be determined on the basis of the definition of the said term under the M.P. Act. As regards the determination of the quantum of valuable consideration for goods sold for purposes of finding out the sale price, within the meaning of section 2(o) of the M.P. Act, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1971 28 STC 331 1971 VKN 389 has to be followed. 5.. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the aforesaid question referred to us is in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the department. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1986 (1) TMI 378
... ... ... ... ..... f 1981 (Parthas Textiles v. State of Kerala) has held that the sale of a motor car was connected with the textile business of the assessee exigible to tax under the Act. The turnover by sale of unserviceable vehicles and scrap materials obtained by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation was held to be liable to tax in the unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in T.R.C. Nos. 49, 50 and 51 of 1981 (Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Kerala). In the light of these pronouncements we are clearly of the view that the turnover by sale of the surplus machinery in the present case is exigible to tax and the Tribunal was wrong in directing deletion of the same from the taxable turnover of the assessee. We therefore set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore that of the Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax (Appeals), Quilon. The tax revision case is allowed. There will however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 377
... ... ... ... ..... , we are of the opinion that the assessment and imposition of tax in the cases under category (1) and (2), i.e., O.J.Cs. 676, 677 and 1413 of 1978, 960 and 1771 of 1979, 1297, 1493, 1494, 1495, 1521, 1522, 1982, 1983 and 1984 of 1980, 1132 of 1982 and 188 and 189 of 1983, applying the amending provision are invalid and are hereby quashed. But the same in the cases in category (3), i.e., O.J.Cs. 411 of 1978, 1855 and 1891 of 1980, 1326, 1327 and 2429 of 1981, 363, 1131, 2360 and 1673 of 1982 and 28, 401, 402 and 1647 of 1983, is valid and cannot be set aside. 9.. In the result, therefore, O.J.Cs. 676, 677 and 1413 of 1978, 960 and 1771 of 1979, 1297, 1493, 1494, 1495, 1521, 1522, 1982, 1983 and 1984 of 1980, 1132 of 1982 and 188 and 189 of 1983 are allowed and O.J.Cs. 411 of 1978, 1855 and 1891 of 1980, 1326, 1327 and 2429 of 1981, 363, 1131, 2360 and 1673 of 1982 and 28, 401, 402 and 1647 of 1983 are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.-I agree.
-
1986 (1) TMI 376
... ... ... ... ..... Limited which used the same as raw material for manufacturing camphor and the contention of the assessee is that this 85 per cent of the sale turnover made by the assessee has to be taxed as oils of all kinds . From the foregoing discussion it is clear that even if a commodity is used for two different purposes, it is the use which will determine the nature of the commodity liable to be taxed. It is not disputed that 85 per cent of the vegetable turpentine is sold to M/s. Camphor and Allied Products Limited, Bareilly, which used it as oil. Thus in my opinion the Tribunal was fully justified in holding that 85 per cent of the vegetable turpentine sold by the respondentassessee to the aforesaid firm would fall under item No. 31 of the List of Notification No. 5785 dated September 7, 1981, and the sales tax would be chargeable at the rate of 4 per cent. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly rejected. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 375
... ... ... ... ..... the return submitted by the assessee is incorrect but then it is for the sales tax authorities to look into the matter and to do the needful thereafter. It is not for this Court to express any concluded opinion on the question whether or not a case for rejecting the assessee s account books and for making the best judgment assessment had in fact been made out. In this view of the matter, it is also not necessary for me to express any opinion whether or not the quantum of turnover of the assessee has been correctly determined by the appellate authority. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, as well as the order passed by the appellate authority and the original assessment order are quashed. The assessing authority shall now proceed to make the assessment afresh keeping in view the legal position indicated in the judgment. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 374
... ... ... ... ..... Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M.K. Cheriya Mammoo and Brothers 1980 45 STC 108). 13.. On going through the entire files, we are satisfied that the assesseerespondent has effectively evaded payment of tax by accounting its local purchases as purchases effected in Mahe. In this context, it is worth recalling the finding of the Full Appellate Tribunal in T.A. No. 205 of 1970 dated 11th October, 1973, that it is a known fact, the so-called pepper dealers of Mahe are not paying any tax to the Government of Pondicherry on the alleged sales nor are they sales tax assessees . 14.. The method of accounting adopted by the assessee-respondent, is nothing but a device to evade payment of tax and, therefore, the assessing authority has rightly rejected the claim of the assessee for exemption of the turnover of Rs. 5,45,406.90. as inter-State purchases from Mahe. For the reasons stated above, the tax revision case is allowed, but in the circumstances no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 373
... ... ... ... ..... Rs. 45,000 whereas according to the books of account it was only Rs. 42,000. Counsel for the assessee contended that a slight variation in the estimate given by the assessee and the actual stock recorded in the books of account is highly technical and the disclosed turnover of the assessee should not have been rejected on the basis of the said minor variation. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the order of the Tribunal I am of the opinion that the order in so far as it relates to the year 1977-78 cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In the result the revision relating to assessment year 1976-77 is rejected and the revision relating to assessment year 1977-78 is allowed and the order of the Tribunal in respect of that year is set aside and the disclosed turnover of the assessee is accepted. A copy of the order be sent to the Tribunal concerned for passing suitable order under section 11(8) of the Act. However, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1986 (1) TMI 372
... ... ... ... ..... ecome final and cannot be upset by this Court. Even if the Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal of the department again on merit in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijai Int. Udyog 1985 59 STC 49 no useful purpose would be served inasmuch as the only question involved, in the revision of the assessee and the appeal of the department was confined to the amount of penalty. Having allowed the order of the judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, to become final by not challenging the same in a higher court, the department cannot claim any further enhancement in the amount of penalty already reduced to Rs. 30,000. In view of the facts stated above and in the interest of justice I am of the view that this is not a fit case in which the Tribunal may be directed to decide the appeal of the Revenue on merit which may lead to two conflicting decisions. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly rejected. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 371
... ... ... ... ..... ee came to know about the dishonour of the cheque, he immediately deposited the amount and also paid the interest. Whether the assessee acted mala fide or bona fide is a question of fact. The Tribunal on the basis of the entire material on record has come to the conclusion that the assessee under a bona fide belief had issued the cheque It is also well-settled that the authorities under the fiscal statute while imposing the penalty has to exercise its discretion after considering the explanation offered by the assessee. In the present case the authorities have exercised the discretion after considering the explanation offered by the assessee and as such, the order passed by the Tribunal does not require any interference by this Court under section 11(1) of the Act. In the result, the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. The question referred above is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 370
... ... ... ... ..... is the best evidence to attract the exemption. Registration is the statutory proof of the status of the purchaser and form 25 is the surest means of establishing the seller s claim to exemption. This is what is sought to be accomplished by the mandatory provisions contained in rule 32(14). In the circumstances, the contention that sub-rule (14) has to be read as directory has no substance. In view of these pronouncements of this Court we are clearly of the view that turnover covered by the form 25 declarations issued by registered dealers cannot be included in the taxable turnover of the assessees in these cases. We dismiss T.R.C. No. 92 of 1983. The impugned orders of the Tribunal in T.R.C. Nos. 5 and 6 of 1986 are set aside and the assessing authority is directed to make fresh assessment accepting the form 25 declarations produced before him. T.R.C. Nos. 5 and 6 of 1986 are accordingly allowed. No costs. T.R.C. No. 92 of 1983 dismissed. T.R.C. Nos. 5 and 6 of 1986 allowed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 369
... ... ... ... ..... oncerned with the soundness and aptness of the decision taken by the Commissioner for withdrawing all his earlier directions and circulars issued by him. In S.N. Gondakar v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in Karnataka, Bangalore 1983 54 STC 190 a Division Bench of this Court has recognised that such withdrawal made by the Commissioner was valid. We are bound by that decision. Even otherwise, we do not see any justification to hold that the same requires reconsideration. For these reasons we see no merit in this contention of Sriyuths Srinivasan and Sarangan and we reject the same. 38.. On the findings recorded by us on points Nos. 1 and 3 the appellant is entitled to succeed in its appeal. 39.. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order No. SMR 20/ 83-84 dated 16th January, 1984, of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Karnataka, Bangalore, and restore the order of the ACCT. But, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1986 (1) TMI 368
... ... ... ... ..... tification including certain commodities under the head of oil-seeds , as defined under the Central Act, there is nothing wrong in preferring such an opinion as good evidence, while stating that such notification has no statutory force and as such is not binding on the Sales Tax Officer. Merely because there had been an attempt to enlarge the scope of the definition by such a clarification which is only advisory it cannot have the effect of including the item in the Schedule. The advice by the Directorate can at best be considered as a material for drawing a conclusion regarding the nature of the commodity. But when the legislature has understood and has provided for the same as different from the items specified in the Second Schedule the statutory provision has to prevail over the clarification for guidance. The view taken by the Appellate Tribunal and the lower authority, therefore, appears to be correct and calls for no interference. The tax revision cases are dismissed.
-
1986 (1) TMI 367
... ... ... ... ..... om him and the liability which he now owes to the Government. The petitioner thus be entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,126.56 by way of refund. We direct the State Government to effect the refund of the above amount within a period of two months from today. 21.. This judgment has not in any manner adjudicated upon the liability of the petitioner for payment of any tax or dues in his individual capacity. Nor shall the judgment preclude the taxing authority from resorting to steps open to it under law, to issue him a notice of demand, and to recover from him such amount as is permissible in the event of his having been found to be a legal representative in possession of such sufficient assets of the deceased in his hands as to make him answerable for the sum. 22.. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge. The original petition will stand disposed of in the manner indicated above. We direct the parties to suffer their respective costs.
........
|