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1986 (12) TMI 389 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... there was no sufficient cause for his detention. 2. The impugned order of detention in the instant case was issued against the detenu on 23-6-1983. The list of documents does not show that the report of the Advisory Board submitted in the case of the said co-detenu Mohomed Hanif Abubakar was placed before the detaining authority for its consideration. 3. Hence, non-placement and the consequent non-consideration of the said report of the Advisory Board submitted in the case of the said co-detenu by the detaining authority, is fatal to the impugned order of detention, as held by the Supreme Court in Mohomed Shakeel's case AIR 1983 SC 541 and as held by this Court in Mehboob P. Kunju's case1 by Kurdukar and Khatri JJ on 14-12-1983. 4. Hence, the impugned order of detention dated 23rd June 1983 issued against the detenu is quashed and set aside. The rule is made absolute and the detenu is directed to be released from detention forthwith, if not required in any other case.
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1986 (12) TMI 388 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d scope of Section 321, Cr. P.C. and not the truth or otherwise of the allegations against the second respondent. Therefore, when we uphold the order of the High Court and that of the Special Judge, we have only upheld the propriety of the orders tested against the scope of Section 321, Cr. P.C. The number of true cases that get crucified at the altar of the doctrine of benefit of doubt is legion. Since the scope of this appeal does not and cannot extend to the consideration of the merits of the case in depth, I have advisedly not embarked upon such an enquiry. I firmly believe that this Court while deciding cases should consider only the legal issues involved and not the individuals involved. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold that this appeal has to fail and has to be dismissed. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal. S. Natarajan, J. 84. I agree. ORDER 85. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal shall stand dismissed.
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1986 (12) TMI 387 - JAMMU & KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Bakshi that the learned Single Judge has no power to pass such an order under section 132. Passing of any order in aid of seeking observation of the provisions of the Act would depend on the facts of each case. The learned Single Judge is seized of the matter, therefore, he has to decide the application as also the objections filed by the respondents on merits having regard to the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 8. We are sure that as and when Mr. Bakshi appears before him, the learned Single Judge would accord consideration to the objections of the appellants and thereafter pass orders as warranted under law. 9. We have not found any illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders. These do not decide any right of the appellant, much less to their disadvantage. As such no interference with the said orders is called for. We accordingly refrain to interfere with the impugned orders. 10. With these observations, these three appeals as also C. M. Ps. are disposed of.
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1986 (12) TMI 386 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sub-section (2) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report." What we intend to emphasize is that right of hearing is very important right of which no litigant should be deprived. Thus on the consideration of all the cases cited and on the two cases quoted by learned single Judge, we answer the reference as under (i) That the power of re-call is different than the power of altering or reviewing the judgment. (ii) That powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. can be and should be exercised by this Court for re-calling the judgment in case the hearing is not given to the accused and the case falls within one of the three conditions laid down under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
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1986 (12) TMI 385 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... travention under section 12(2)(b) is concerned. 12. Before parting with this case, we want to observe that the order of the adjudicating authority does not contain the list of documents relied on by the authority. Since the order is subject to appeal before the Appellate Board and a further appeal before this court, it will be necessary for a proper scrutiny of the order passed that all the documents perused and relied upon by the authority are listed with adequate description and referred to as far as possible in the order itself with indication of their serial number. We do hope that in future this requirement will be kept in mind by the concerned officers. 13. In the result, the penalty levied by the adjudicating authority as reduced by the Appellate Board, is set aside as far as the penalty for contravention under section 12(2)(b) is concerned. The penalty levied under section 10(1)(b) as modified by the Appellate Board, is confirmed, No costs. Time for payment-one month.
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1986 (12) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... te that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary to the public policy, and would be contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act. 23. In that view of the matter, the appeal must be allowed on that ground alone and it is not necessary for us to refer to the other grounds. We must necessarily overrule the decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court referred to hereinbefore. 24. Before we conclude, we must, however, note that Shri Poti appearing for the tenant has conceded that rent should be increased to ₹ 500 per month for the premises in question, as the existing rent is too low. The appeal is accordingly allowed and we direct on the concession of Shri Poti that rent would be ₹ 500 per month from this date. The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside. 25. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (12) TMI 383 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he defendant before he was recalled. We are of the view that by relying on these pieces of direct and circumstantial evidence the defendant has successfully discharged the evidential burden initially lying on him by a preponderance of probabilities. From then on, the presumption under S. 118 'disappears' and becomes 'functus officio' and the 'evidential' burden' shifts to the plaintiff who has also the legal burden arising out of the pleading to prove consideration. On a consideration of the entire evidence we are of the view that the plaintiff has not discharged the 'legal burden'. He cannot at that stage once again rely on the presumption under S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The flitting of the bat of presumption in the twilight is over and it has 'disappeared' in the 'sunshine of actual facts'. 37. We accordingly, allow the appeal and dismiss the suit but in the circumstances without costs. 38. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (12) TMI 382 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat a civil suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and, inter alia, challenging the entries in the revenue record would still be maintainable even after the insertion of Clause (ee) in Section 87(1), Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. 22. In the light of the above, it has necessarily to be held in Paritosh Maity v. Ghasiram, Second Appeal No. 36 of 1977(R) that the civil suit preferred by the plaintiff respondent was perfectly maintainable in law. The appeal is otherwise without merit and is consequently dismissed though the parties are left to bear their own costs. 23. In Second Appeal No. 149 of 1977(R), (Shri Radhagobinda Jew v. Panu Mahto) the suit preferred before the Civil Court is held to be maintainable. However, the appeal stands concluded by concurrent findings of fact which do not call for any interference by this Court and the same is consequently dismissed. There will be no order as to cost. S. Roy, J. 24. I agree. R.C.P. Sinha, J. 25. I agree.
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1986 (12) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the constitutional limitations. This is clearly contrary to the constitutional scheme and it must be held to be improper and invalid. We hope and trust that such practice shall not be continued in the future and that whenever an Ordinance is made and the Government wishes to continue the provisions of the Ordinance in force after the assembling of the Legislature, a Bill will be brought before the Legislature for enacting those provisions into an Act. There must not be Ordinance--Raj in the country. We must accordingly strike down the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Ordinance, 1983 which is still in operation as unconstitutional and void. Petitioner No. 1 has done enormous research and brought this reprehensible practice of the Government of Bihar to the notice of the Court and we would therefore direct that the State of Bihar shall pay to Petitioner No. 1 a sum of ₹ 10,000 (rupees ten thousand only,) as and by way of cost of the writ petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1986 (12) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... retation as would prevent sale or mortgage of the property by the owner and in this case he was justified in saying that the landlord respondent did not have vacant possession. As the facts of this case warrant and in fact the respondent had sold away the property 1 1/2 years before his suit for his need was instituted, it cannot be said unless there was definite evidence that it was done with the intention to defeat the appellant's claim so as to be read that the landlord occupied another residential house at the relevant time i.e. at the time of institution of the suit. The appellate authority accepted the respondent's need and found him within the purview of the Act. The High Court did not interfere in revision, nor shall we under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. Interim orders are vacated. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (12) TMI 379 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... before the High Court in larger public interest and for the purpose of securing implementation of the law. We do not think that the observation made by the High Court against her were justified. In fact, the High Court accepted most of the complaints made by her and proceeded to give relief by way of directions and recommendations. The High Court should have borne in mind that the appellant was not a lawyer and was not acquainted with the procedure followed in the Court. There was, therefore, no need to make those observations. We would, therefore, direct that the observations criticising the appellant may be deleted. PATHAK, J. On the basis of the earlier authorities of this Court by which this Bench of two Judges must be bound, it appears that we must treat the Children's Aid Society as falling within the expression "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Having said that, I agree with the order proposed by the learned Chief Justice.
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1986 (12) TMI 378 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... up a special machinery for investigation of the claims for compensation made by those who allege that they have been the victims of oleum gas escape. But we would direct that Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board to take up the cases of all those who claim to have suffered on account of oleum gas and to file actions on their behalf in the appropriate court for claiming compensation against Shriram. Such actions claiming compensation may be filed by the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board.within two months from today and the Delhi Administration is directed to provide the necessary funds to the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board for the purpose of filing and prosecuting such actions. The High Court will nominate one or more Judges as may be necessary for the purpose of trying such actions so that they may be expeditiously disposed of. So far as the issue of relocation and other issues are concerned the writ petition will come up for hearing on 3rd February, 1987. Petition disposed of.
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1986 (12) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rotection to the tenants against arbitrary increase of rent of certain premises within the limits of urban areas as well as from eviction of the tenants from the rented premises. In this context, it is imperative that the word "the first hearing of the application" have to be interpretted in a manner which promote the object of this beneficial legislation. Viewed from this aspect we cannot but hold that the words "first hearing of the application" as used in provise (i) to sub-section 2 of Section 13 of the said Act does not mean the day fixed for return of the summons or the returnable day but the day when the Court applies its mind to the case. In the premises aforesaid, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of eviction passed by the High Court and confirm the judgment and order of the lower appellate court dismissing the application for eviction. There will however be no order as to costs in the peculiar circumstances of the case. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (12) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of the State Civil Service which would obviously be detrimental to public administration. The select list of 1979 which included the names of Tejinder Singh, M.P. Mitra and Gurdev Singh continued to be effective under Regulation 7(4) till another select list for the subsequent year was finally approved. There is no dispute that the aforesaid officers were promoted and appointed to I.A.S. before the approval of the select list for the year 1980. Therefore no exception can be taken to the validity of their appointment. We are, further of the opinion that delay made by the State Government in forwarding its comments to the Union Public Service Commission with regard to the 1980 list did not cause any prejudice to Pritam Singh and other petitioners as none of them was selected for inclusion in the 1980 list. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals and the writ petitions. They are accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. Appeals and Petitions dismissed.
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1986 (12) TMI 375 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Instalment Supply (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (1984) 41 CTR (Del) 334 (1984) 149 ITR 457(Del). We answer the question accordingly for that assessment year. So far as the asst. yr. 1972-73 is concerned, however, counsel for the CIT points out that the applicable provision was really s. 40A(v) introduced w.e.f. 1st April, 1972 by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971. It appears that this amendment has not been noticed by the Tribunal. We, therefore, feel that the Tribunal was not justified in directing the ITO to work out the disallowable expenditure under s. 40(a)(v). We leave it open to the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal in relative to this assessment year afresh on this point in the light of the above answer. We are, however, expressing no opinion on the scope and interpretation of s. 40A(v) vis-&-vis the disallowance in question 6. References are disposed of as above. No costs.
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1986 (12) TMI 374 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... istrative Tribunal and be considered similarly. In all those cases where Writ Petitions were filed against the Orders of the State Government modifying or superseding the Orders of the Administrative Tribunal, we direct that those cases shall be treated as concluded by the relative orders of the Administrative Tribunal as they stood before the said orders were interfered with by the State Government. We may add that Mr. L.N. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India in all these cases, sought the permission of the Court to urge a ground in respect of the interpretation of Article 371-D of the Constitution. He contended that the power of Judicial review, even construed as a basic feature of the Constitution, was not precluded by the provisions of Article 371-D of the Constitution and therefore the Judgment of this Court called for review. We are not satisfied, however, that we should interfere. The Review Petitions are disposed of accordingly. Petitions allowed.
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1986 (12) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or the recovery on the basis of years of purchase justifies the adoption of the 15 years rule. That is more or less the basis which appears to be equitable. It may be that this would give rise to an additional burden on the exchequer but it would not be heavy and after all it would bring some relief to those who have served the cause of the Nation at great sacrifice. We are, therefore, of the view that no separate period need be fixed for the Armed Forces personnel and they should also be entitled to restoration of the commuted portion of the pension on the expiry of 15 years as is conceded in the case of civil pensioners. And for them too the effective date should be from 1.4.1985. We direct the respondent--Government to give effect to this order within a period of three months from now. We place on record our appreciation of the consideration shown by the Union of India to ameliorate the hardship of the pensioners. There will be no order as to the costs. Petitions allowed.
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1986 (12) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mmed up the legal position as follows "Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rule either expressly or by necessary implication, there is no legal obligation that the statutory tribunal should give reasons for its decision. There is also no general principle or any rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision." To the same effect is the decision in Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. Accordingly, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Director-General, Border Roads Organization is set aside and he is directed to dispose of the appeal afresh after applying his mind to the requirements of r. 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, with advertence to the points raised by the appellant in his petition of leave. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (12) TMI 371 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... received by the appellant on behalf of his brother. Though there are many details relating to other amounts of money received at different points of time from his brother Manickam he was not able to show anything in the statement disclosing the receipt of two installments of ₹ 10,000 each just prior to 3-8-1973. Therefore it is clear that the penalty has been levied in this case under section 5(1)(aa) of the Act without any finding based on adequate materials available on record to support the finding. This point of the appellant is therefore accepted. In the result, the penalty of ₹ 5,000 levied under section 5(1)(aa) of the Act is set aside and the penalty of ₹ 5,000 levied under section 5(1)(c) of the Act is confirmed and the appeal is allowed in part accordingly. The period of 15 days specified in the order of the Assistant Director. Enforcement Directorate dated 30th June 1978 shall run from today. There will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.
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1986 (12) TMI 370 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... agree with them that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice in as much as the adjudicating Collector used the evidence of other importations against them without putting such evidence to them and hearing them thereon. We are conscious that this is an 11 years old matter and remand would further delay its disposal. But we feel that we would not be justified in over-looking a violation of principles of natural justice for that reason. We wish the appellants had taken this objection before the first appellate forum itself. That would have saved many years' delay. Nevertheless, the objection having been taken before us and the appellants themselves having expressed a desire for remand, we consider it our duty to set aside the impugned orders and direct the Collector to adjudicate upon the matter afresh. We so order. The Collector should finalise the re-adjudication proceedings as expeditiously as possible. 9. The appeal is thus allowed by way of remand.
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