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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 237 Records
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1986 (3) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... also fall and the appellant must be reinstated in service with back wages. But the result of our quashing the conviction of the appellants would be that the appellant would have to be tried again in accordance with law after providing free legal assistance to him at State cost and that would mean that the appellant would continue to be exposed to the risk of conviction and imprisonment and the possibility cannot be ruled out that the offence charged may ultimately be proved against him and he might land-up in jail and also lose their service. We therefore felt that it would not only meet the ends of justice but also be in the interest of the appellant that no fresh trial should be held against him and he should be reinstated in service but without back wages. We accordingly direct that the appellant shall be reinstated in service but he shall not be entitled to claim any back wages and no fresh trial shall be held against him. The appeal will stand disposed of in these terms.
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1986 (3) TMI 346 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tful that the petitioner J.R.D Tata, who was the Chairman of the Company, would have the knowledge of this episode although there is an allegation to that effect in the complaint and in the testimony of Public Witness 2 and Public Witness 3. Needless to say that the position of Managing Director of the Company is quite different from that of its Chairman because the former is directly in charge of its affairs. Reference in this context may be made with advantage to Bikram Singh v. The State, 1974 Cr.L.J. (22) To sum up, Therefore the above mentioned revision petitions with the solitary exception of Cr. R. No. 170/82, are devoid of any merit. Hence, Criminal Revision No. 170/82 is allowed and the complaint against Shri J.R.D. Tata, petitioner therein is quashed. However, Criminal Revision Petitions No. 178/82 and 179/82 are dismissed, as being without any substance. The parties (other than Shri J.R.D. Tata) are directed to appear before the concerned Court on 10th April, 1986.
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1986 (3) TMI 345 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... am unable to say that the case of the accused-petitioners is not similar to those who have been ordered to be released on bail by another Bench. Therefore, though I have my own reservations about the merits of the case and expressed them in ray earlier order but on the ground that the accused-persons similarly situated should be treated similarly as the (sic) case of the accused-petitioners is not different firm those who have been released on bail, I have no option but to allow them bail, This is only on this ground as aforesaid, I allow this bail application even though earlier it was rejected on merits and direct that all the three accused-petitioners, namely, Surja, Asha and Mangharam shall be released on bail provided each of them furnishes a personal bond in the sum of ₹ 5000/- with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge, Sikar for their appearance in his Court on each and every date and as and when they are required to do so.
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1986 (3) TMI 344 - KERALA HIGH COUR
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... ... ..... In such circumstances, I am unable to say that the fourth respondent has exercised the discretion either arbitrarily or capriciously or vindictively or has not applied its mind. The award of costs by the respondent in exhibit P-l has not been shown to be totally unauthorised or unfair or has caused any injustice. The costs have been awarded only to the legal heirs of the deceased who met with a fatal accident and, in the circumstances, it does not appear to be wholly illegal or unauthorised to merit interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. In the circumstances of the case, I do not think that the circumstances disclosed in the case warrant the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the award of costs in exhibit P-l proceedings. There is no merit in this original petition. It is dismissed in limine. 4. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to counsel for the petitioner on usual terms.
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1986 (3) TMI 343 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 77; 5000/-per annum is much below than what could be obtained from the suit property. As already pointed out. P.W. 1's evidence regarding the estimated mesne profits has not been controverted even by a suggestion in the cross-examination. Considering the entire aspects of the matter, we hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits at the rate of ₹ 5000/- per annum. 12. For the reasons stated above, the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs. Suit is decreed allowing the plaintiffs to recover the suit property (the property in between PQK and RB lines in Ext. C4) with mesne profits at ₹ 5000/- per annum. Plaintiffs are granted arrears of mesne profits at the above rate from June 1981 (date of trespass by defendants) and future mesne profits at the same rate from the date of suit till date of decree and thereafter for a period of three years or till recovery of possession whichever event happens first.
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1986 (3) TMI 342 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . But if there is omission to disclose material facts, then, subject to the other conditions, jurisdiction to reopen is attracted. It is sufficient to refer to the decision of this Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) where it had been held that if there are some primary facts from which reasonable belief could be formed that there was some non-disclosure or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the ITO has jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. This position was again reiterated by this Court in Malegaon Electricity Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1970 78 ITR 466 . 8. Furthermore, bearing these principles in mind in this particular case whether there has been such non-disclosure of primary facts which has caused escapement of income in the assessment was basically a question of fact. 9. The High Court was right in declining to call for a statement of case on a question of law. The appeals, therefore, fail. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (3) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . But if there is omission to disclose material facts, then, subject to the other conditions, jurisdiction to reopen is attracted. It is sufficient to refer to the decision of this Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) where it had been held that if there are some primary facts from which reasonable belief could be formed that there was some non-disclosure or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the ITO has jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. This position was again reiterated by this Court in Malegaon Electricity Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1970 78 ITR 466 . 8. Furthermore, bearing these principles in mind in this particular case whether there has been such non-disclosure of primary facts which has caused escapement of income in the assessment was basically a question of fact. 9. The High Court was right in declining to call for a statement of case on a question of law. The appeals, therefore, fail. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (3) TMI 340 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld get your names mutated in the revenue papers." The aforesaid terms unequivocally indicates that the title under the deed would pass on the date of execution of the deed and would not depend upon passing of consideration and, therefore, defendants 1 and 2 became the owners-in-possession of the land in question on execution of the sale deed (Ext. 2). The conclusion of the lower appellate court on this score also mast beset aside and the finding of the trial court is affirmed. 10. In view of my conclusion that the property acquired in the year 1937 is the self-acquired property of defendant No. 3 and defendants 1 and 2 acquired title over the property under Ext. 2, the plaintiffs' suit must fail and is accordingly dismissed. In the ultimate result, therefore, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court are affirmed. The second appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs of this Court.
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1986 (3) TMI 339 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rein. For this reason we respectfully agree with the view of Venkataramiah, J., as he then was in L.M. Co. vs. T.D. Board (AIR 1972 Mys. 299) and we regret our inability to agree with the decision in Laxmi Narayan vs. State AIR 1983 Ori 210). Consequently these petitions are allowed with costs and it is declared that the imposition of mineral areas development cess by Part TV of the Madhya Pradesh Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1982, as amended by M.P. Act. No. 15 of 1983 and M.P. Act No. 13 of 1985, is unconstitutional since the State Legislature was not complete to enact such a law. The respondents are, therefore, restrained from recovering any amount as mineral areas development cess under these provisions. It is also directed that the amounts which may have been recovered as mineral areas development cess by the respondents from any of these petitioners should be refunded to them. Counsel's fee ₹ 200/- if certified. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioners.
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1986 (3) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y in this Court. The question whether the import of Eau-de-cologne is presently exempt from the operation of Rule 11 and 12 of the Rules of 1966 also calls for an enquiry in the realm of fact. It is also a question of fact whether the State Government has sought the advice of the Board of Experts and determined whether the Eau-de-cologne imported by the petitioners is fit for use as intoxicating liquor. The question whether other importers have been permitted to import Eau-de-cologne into the State by the licensing authority or the evidence points to a mala fide exercise of power in favour of local manufacturers is also a question of fact. In our opinion, the petitioners can avail of their statutory remedies under the Bombay Prohibition Act. The pendency of these writ petitions in this Court may be considered as sufficient ground for condoning the delay in availing of those remedies. 9. In the circumstances, the writ petitions are dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1986 (3) TMI 337 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fastened upon the applicant and the other co-owner, particularly when they are successful in the litigation. No case, therefore, is made out by the non-applicant No.7 for claiming interest against the successful party as the co-owners did not earn any benefit of utilisation of the amount deposited by the non-applicant No.7 in the trial Court. It is unfortunate that the non-applicant No.7 would not be able to get any interest upon the substantial amount deposited by him, but then it is he who is responsible for the same. 29. In the circumstances, the instant revision is allowed. The impugned order of the learned trial Court confirming the sale of the suit house in favour of the non-applicant No.7 is set aside and he is directed to conduct the sale by public auction afresh as per him order dated 25-2-1982 by appointing a new Commissioner and by following the procedure for sale by public auction laid down in the Code. No order as to costs in this revision. 30. Petition allowed.
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1986 (3) TMI 336 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is correct in law in holding that depreciation on air-conditioner fixed in a bus was allowable at the rate applicable to the bus instead of the rate applicable to air-conditioners when separate rates of depreciation had been provided for motor vehicles and air-conditioning plants ? 3. Same questions were sought to be referred in I.T.C. Nos. 104 to 106 of 1982 against the same assessee. A Division Bench of this Court (D.K. Kapur, J. as His Lordship then was & Mahinder Narain J.) took the view that so long as the parts form a part of the motor bus, they are to be depreciated at the same rate as motor bus and they had declined the reference of the CIT holding that no question of law arises. For the reasons given by the ld., Division Bench in the order dt. 9th July, 1985, while disposing of ITC Nos. 104 to 106 of 1982, this application is also dismissed. 4. There will be no order as to costs of the present proceedings.
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1986 (3) TMI 335 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... along with the return is the particulars of actual cost of assets acquired during the previous year and nothing more. It is open to the ITO as pointed out earlier to invoke Explanation (3) as aforesaid and substitute the value which he considered as reasonable in lieu of actual cost. The exercise of this power would result in reduction of claim for depreciation and nothing more. Thus when the assessee has claimed depreciation on basis of actual cost it could not be said to have furnished inaccurate particulars of income within the meaning of s. 271(1)(C) of the Act (main part). 11. On the facts of the case therefore that neither under the Explanation nor under the main provision the assessee could be said to have furnished inaccurate particulars of income within the meaning of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. We, therefore, hold that levy of penalty in light of the above facts was not at all justified. We accordingly quash the orders of the authorities below and allowed this appeal.
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1986 (3) TMI 334 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of showing cause against the proposed order, he would continue in service till the hearing is completed which would not be in public interest. To continue a civil servant who is alleged to have betrayed a tendency to demand and accept illegal gratification would be against public interest and would defeat the very object of prompt action i.e. suspension in public interest if the procedure of giving a hearing before such an order is passed is required to be undergone. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken in Lakshman's case (supra). We, therefore, do not think that Rule 5 is ultra vires the Constitution on the plea that the procedure prescribed there under is in violation of the principles of natural justice. 8. In view of the above, we do not see any merit in this petition and dismiss the same. The rule is discharged with no order as to costs. The interim relief is vacated in view of the statement made at the bar by the learned Assistant Government Pleader.
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1986 (3) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts of big towns. These are easily surmountable problems of valuation in relation to individual lands and do not reflect on the constitutionality of the impugned provisions. The concerned authorities entrusted with the function of making evaluation will doubtless resolve such problems as are likely to arise appropriately in accordance with law. Be that as it may the constitutionality of the impugned provisions remains unimpaired. In the result we hold that the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside to the extent that sub- sections (3) and (4) of Section 44 of the Act have been held unconstitutional and struck down. We wish to make it clear that the findings recorded against the writ petitioners on other points remain unaffected by this judgment. We accodingly allow this appeal, uphold the provisions contained in sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 of the Act and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondents. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1986 (3) TMI 332 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... awarded to the appellant at the rate of ₹ 105.00 per sq. yard but the compensation will be l/8th of this. In other words, the compensation to be awarded at the rate of ₹ 105.00 per square yard for 1270 sq. yards cannot be granted to the appellant who is to get one-eighth share. At the same time increase given by us cannot be given to the owners-respondents who have not chosen to file appeal or cross-objections. Thus, the appellant will get l/8th of ₹ 105.00 per square yard for the acquired land. In addition, he will be entitled to 30 solatium which will be payable on the entire amount awarded to the appellant in place of 15 . The enhanced amount will carry an interest of 9 per annum for one year from the date of taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15 per annum till the date of payment. Learned counsel wants to say something on the loss of goodwill but we do not think loss of goodwill is involved in this case. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (3) TMI 331 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ittedly under Article 227 of the Constitution and under the rules of the High Court it was heard by a Single Judge. Under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of that High Court an intra-court appeal against the decision of the learned Single Judge was expressly barred. The appeal filed by the Appellants from the decision of the Single Judge to the Division Bench was, therefore, rightly dismissed as being not maintainable. Learned Counsel for the Appellants also sought to challenge the decision of the learned Single Judge on the merits. The real object of granting Special Leave to Appeal in this case was to consider the question of law arising in the case. Apart from the question of maintainability of the appeal, there was no merit in the appeal filed by the Appellants before the Division Bench and even otherwise that appeal deserved to be dismissed. In the result, this Appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties will bear and pay their own costs of this Appeal. Appeals dismissed.
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1986 (3) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The State of U.P., 1969 1 S.C.R. 219. This construction, put by High Court, in our opinion, is logical and reasonable construction. The High Court as mentioned hereinbefore has granted a certificate under article 133 (1)(b) of the Constitution. We find that the question is a simple one and the intention and the purpose of the rule is manifest and in the language, there is no difficulty. The certificate under article 133 (1)(b) of the Constitution, in our opinion, was therefore unwarranted. We, therefore, revoke the certificate and dismiss the appeal summarily under Rule 5-A of Order XV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. We, however, make it clear that the appellant, the student in question, is a student of some credit and distinction and has obtained 74 of the marks in his examination. His case should be considered favourably and objectively in the general category for admission. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (3) TMI 329 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appointed in accordance with the Rules. We further direct that they shall be given the salary, allowances, increments and seniority to which they would have been entitled but for the judgment of the High Court. But they will not be entitled to any salary and allowances for the period during which they have not actually worked. We also make it clear that if in any other centre, selections and appointments have been made on the basis of the 1969 Amending Rules they shall remain undisturbed. The order passed by the High Court in the connected writ petition No. 10224 of 1983 on its file is also set aside. Similarly the oder passed in writ petition No.5073 of 1984 on the file of the High Court is also reversed. There shall be a common order in these connected cases as directed in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs. The High Court may take steps, if it so desires, to promulgate a fresh set of Rules of recruitment for-the staff in the subordinate courts early.
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1986 (3) TMI 328 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed in all the above matters are hereby vacated. If as a result of this Judgment and the interim orders passed by this Court, any amount becomes payable by any lessee of any mining lease of quarry lease to the State of Gujarat, the same will be paid by him to the State of Gujarat after giving such lessee credit for the amount already paid in respect of the same period as also any excess amount paid in respect of any other period. Such payment will be made by such lessee within six months from today. Correspondingly, if any amount becomes refundable by the State of Gujarat to any lessee of any mining lease or quarry lease, the State of Gujarat will refund the same to such lessee after adjusting against the amount refundable the amount actually recoverable in law and recovered by the State of Gujarat from such lessee. Such payment will be made by the State of Gujarat within six months from today. The parties will bear and pay their own costs of these Writ Petitions and Appeals.
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