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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 158 Records
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1986 (5) TMI 275 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... der Art. 141 of the Constitution. A brief statement of reasons would greatly assist this Court in understanding the High Court's thought process which, in turn facilitates a quick and satisfactory disposal of Special Leave Petitions. We understand the difficulty of the High Courts in writing long orders while dismissing Writ Petitions summarily. The High Courts should understand our difficulty in unravelling the reasons for summary dismissal in the absence of a brief statement of reasons. These are hallmarks of a disciplined judicial process. Since, in the instant case, the Writ Petition did involve a question deserving of careful consideration, we grant special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution and set aside the order of the High Court of summary dismissal. We direct the High Court to admit the Writ Petition to its file and dispose it of in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs. Costs quantified at ₹ 1,000. M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (5) TMI 274 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rd. 3) Voluntary organisations and social action groups which are recognised by the State Government or the State Legal Aid and Advice Board on an application being made in that behalf. Every voluntary organisation or social action group falling within Clause (1), (2) or (3) above and to which cooperation and support are directed to be extended by the State Government shall furnish whatever factual information is required by the Central Government or the State Government or the Committee for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes or the State Legal Aid and Advice Board, but we may make it clear that such voluntary organisation or social action group shall nor be under the control or direction or supervision of the State Government or the State Legal Aid and Advice Board because we take the view that voluntary organisations and social action groups operating these programmes should be totally free from any Government control. 2. The writ petition will stand disposed of in these terms.
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1986 (5) TMI 273 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... over even of the assets and properties of the Company nor claim any compensation in that behalf and, what is more, the House of Tatas, who are secured creditors, would also give up their entire security. These assurances not only remove all possible misgivings qua the management but also reflect their sincerity to the cere. The sacrifice implicit therein is, indeed, of a high order. As said, self-sacrifice is the truest test of sincerity. Hoping then for the best, let the die be cast. Hence order. 10. The Official Liquidator attached to this Court is appointed Liquidator provisionally of the Company together with all its affairs, assets, papers, books of accounts, documents and files etc. He is directed to forthwith proceed to act on this appointment. He should also immediately get in touch with the State Government to expedite its valuable decision on take-over. The Judge's summons is made absolute in terms aforesaid but, in the circumstances, with no order as to costs.
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1986 (5) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... disclose fully and truly all basic facts. From the certificate for the year 1963-64 it appears that a very large amount of money was being diverted from the company in India to London - a very familiar pattern of colonial exploitation - but it raises only a suspicion that there might not had been full disclosure - belief, however, cannot be based on suspicion. 36. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, the learned trial judge was right and the appellate court was in error in holding that there were materials from which it could reasonably be held that the assessee was guilty in not disclosing the basic facts. 37. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the decision of the division bench of the High Court under appeal. In the premises these appeals are allowed and the order and the judgment of the division bench are set aside and the order and judgment of the learned single judge are restored. The assessee is entitled to the costs of these appeals.
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1986 (5) TMI 271 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acturing of utensils on machine. They could make a report to the executive and the executive could strictly in accordance with Article 19(6) regulate the trade by imposing restriction on it provided that would appear in the interests of public and appear reasonable. The circular which is impugned in this writ petition is neither shown to be in the public interest in the counter nor reasonable. Therefore the circular impugned in the writ petition is liable to be struck down. 28. In the view which I have taken, the other points, which Mr. Z. A. Shah has formulated during his submission need not be answered. 29. Respondent No. 1 is at liberty to impose any restriction on the trade provided it conforms to the guarantees contained in Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Since the impugned circular is violative of Article 19(1)(g) and Article 19(6) also, therefore, it cannot be sustained. 30. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (5) TMI 270 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s mentioned by us earlier, the Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) continued to be in occupation of the premises even after the Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited came in. They never effaced themselves. The firm allowed Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited Company, to function from the same premises but Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited though a separate legal entity, was in fact a creature of the partners of Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) and was the very image of the firm. The Limited company and the partnership firm were two only in name but one for practical purposes. There was substantial identity between the limited company and the partnership firm. We do not think that there was any sub-letting, assignment or parting with possession of the premises by Madras-Bangalore Transport Company (West) to Caravan Goods Carrier Private Limited so as to attract Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In the result the appeal is allowed with costs.
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1986 (5) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court, in our opinion, was not justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine by saying that the question relates to the contractual obligation and the policy decision cannot be termed as unfair or arbitrary. There was no question of any policy decision in the instant case. The contract of supply of milk was to be given to the lowest bidder under the terms of the tender notice and the appellant being the lowest bidder he should have been granted the contract to supply, especially, when he has been doing so for the last so many years. In the result, the appeal must succeed. It is accordingly allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court dated January 10, 1986 is set aside and the Writ Petition is allowed and the order of the authorities rejecting the tender of the appellant and accepting the tender of respondent No. 4 is quashed. The respondents authorities are directed to accept the tender of the appellant. There is, however, no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (5) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and give a chance to satisfy the Authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair play and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dated August 16, 1983 and that of the Division Bench dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant in limine by its order dated February 15, 1984 are both set aside, so also the impugned order of the Railway Board dated March 11, 1972. We direct the Railway Board to hear and dispose of the appeal after affording a personal hearing to the appellant on merits by a reasoned order in conformity with the requirements of r.22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, as expeditiously as possible, and in any event, not later than four months from today. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (5) TMI 267 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sal rendered by the disciplinary authority is violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the appellant has been denied reasonable opportunity of defending himself and is on that account null and void. We accordingly allow the appeal. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The impugned order of dismissal dated 10.11. 1967 passed against the appellant is quashed and set aside. We further declare that ihe impugned order of dismissal is a nullity and non existant in the eye of law and the appellant must be treated as having continued in service till the date of his superannuation on January 31, 1983. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of this case and the time which has elapsed we are of the opinion that the State Government should not be permitted to hold a fresh inquiry against the appellant on the charges in question. We therefore direct the State Government not to do so. 14. The appeal is allowed accordingly with costs throughout.
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1986 (5) TMI 266 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nswered is whether both Bata and BSC goods are ‘such goods’ as Bata brand goods and whether the affixing of brand name amounts to manufacture to make the goods as being of different category. In respect of both as we have held above, the answer is in the negative. In view of the above, we hold that the wholesale price, which is available for BSC brand of shoes is applicable to the Bata brand of shoes for the purposes of Section 4 of the Central Excises & Salt Act. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that neither appellants nor the respondents have done any exercise in respect of Bata shoes as held by the lower authorities under Rule 6(a) of the Valuation Rules to bring out as to how by accepting or not accepting the value as applicable to BSC shoes either of the two parties are placed at a disadvantage. It may well be if that exercise had been done, the issue may not have come up in appeal as neither party might have been at a disadvantage.
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1986 (5) TMI 265 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e learned Singh Judge, it must therefore be held, has acted correctly in allowing the petition filed by the State for cancellation of the bail granted to the appellants. As the Munsif Magistrate has granted bail to the appellants before the expiry of 90 days of remand period allowed under law, the order of the Magistrate will not tantamount to one passed under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII of the Code and hence there is no scope for contending that re-arrest of the appellants can be ordered only in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 437. We, however, make it clear that after the appellants surrender themselves to custody or are taken into custody by re-arrest, they will not stand precluded from seeking enlargement on bail by filing applications under sub-section (1) of Section 437 of the Code and satisfying the Court that they deserve to be enlarged on bail. In the result, the judgment of the High Court is upheld and the appeal is dismissed accordingly. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (5) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and the conflicting nature of evidence of Chaturbhuj and nature of evidence given by Jiwan Dass, we are OF the opinion that the report of the enquiry officer Finding the appellant guilty should not have been sustained and the government should not have acted upon it. The High Court in our opinion, with great respect, was in error in not bearing in mind these aspects which have been indicated hereinbefore. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. In the premises, the order and judgment of the High Court are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal. The appellant would also be entitled to his remuneration and salary for all this period. We do not know if during the pendency of this appeal the appellant has superannuated and retired. If that is so, he should be in service upto the date J of superannuation with the entitlement of pensionary relief. If not, he should be re-instated. Appeal allowed
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1986 (5) TMI 263 - SUPREME COURT
Grant of additional licences for the import of dry fruits - Held that:- The respondents diamond exporters are not entitled to import dry fruits under the Import Policy 1985-88 under the Additional Licences possessed by them. They are also not entitled to the benefit extended by the judgment of this Court dated March 5, 1986 to those diamond exportes who had imported items under irrevocable Letters of Credit opened and established before October 18, 1985. It appears from the record before us that the respondents diamond exporters opened and established the irrevocable Letters of Credit after that date.
Writ petition allowed and the respondents Nos. 10 and 11, M/s Rajni Kant Brothers and M/s Everest Gems are restrained from importing dry fruits during the period 1985- 88 under the Additional Licences granted to them under the Import Policy 1978-79
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1986 (5) TMI 262 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ally come to grips on the question. 9.. An examination of the order made by the Commissioner discloses that he has totally misunderstood the scope and ambit of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. H.M. Esufali H.M. Abdulali 1973 32 STC 77 and has understood the same as justifying an absolute interference in cases of best judgment assessments. We are of the view that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Esufali s case 1973 32 STC 77 does not lend itself to the conclusion reached by the Commissioner. 10.. When one examines the orders of the Commissioner and the DC, it is clear that the order made by the DC which was a well-reasoned order did not justify the interference of the Commissioner under section 22A of the Act. 11.. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Commissioner and restore the order of the DC. But, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed. nbsp
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1986 (5) TMI 261 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpany it keeps. The principle of ejusdem generis should be borne in mind (noscitur a sociis) (see Rein v. Lane 36 LJQB 81, quoted in Varkey v. Agricultural Income-tax and Rural Sales Tax Officer 1954 5 STC 348 (T-C), Ranganathan v. Government of Madras AIR 1955 SC 604, etc.). It is by bearing in mind the above principles of law, the crucial words, other perfumeries and cosmetics occurring in entry 80 of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, should be understood. The preceding words talcum powder are significant. So viewed, we have no doubt in our mind that agarbathi cannot be considered to be a perfumery , akin to talcum powder , (the preceding words) occurring in entry 80 of the First Schedule. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the turnover of agarbathis can be assessed only at the general rate and not at 10 per cent under entry 80 of the First Schedule. 3.. There is no merit in the tax revision case. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1986 (5) TMI 260 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the first defendant qua the goods by this order. In any event, whatever the situation might have been the necessary forms had to be delivered to the plaintiff. It is also urged by the counsel for the appellant that the forms are not to be delivered to the plaintiff because the wrong act is being sought to be applied. The argument qua this point is that the sale is actually one made from Karnataka and not from Delhi. So, the Central Sales Tax Act is to apply and not the Delhi Sales Tax Act. We are not called upon to decide the question. This is a matter for the taxing authority. As the sales tax authority has levied the sales tax treating it to be local sales we need not say anything about which Act and which tax should apply to the same. It is enough to note that in this case delivery of the forms will be of service to both the parties. The appeal is uncalled for. We dismiss it with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000. S.T. forms may be delivered within two weeks. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (5) TMI 259 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the time of renewal of the certificate. In the instant case, the petitioner was refused a certificate in the first year on the ground that he had realised sales tax in respect of sales of the newly set up industrial unit. That cannot make the dealer ineligible for a certificate for all time to come. The petitioner claimed that in the second year he has rectified this mistake and he has fulfilled all the conditions. The order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, on 28th February, 1986, is quashed. The Assistant Commissioner is directed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. If the petitioner fulfils all the conditions contained in rule 3(66a), then the petitioner will be entitled to get an eligibility certificate. Respondent No. 1 is directed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of this order. There will be no order as to costs. Writ Petition allowed.
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1986 (5) TMI 258 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the appellate order, there is also provision for filing revision under the Act. In the present case we have already held above that the impugned sub-sections (2a) and (3) of section 31 of the Act and the notification (annexure 6) embrace only such provisions which prevent the evasion of sales tax and it only ensures bona fide transaction and stops clandestine trade they are powers only incidental or ancillary to the levy of sales tax and squarely falls within entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India and hence cannot be held to be without constitutional sanction. In that view of the matter, the petitioners should avail the internal remedies available to them under the Act. For the reasons (as above) mentioned in this order, we hold that there is no merit in this application and the same is dismissed (at the stage of admission hearing itself). (Lines have been underlined for emphasis.) S.S. SANDHAWALIA, C.J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1986 (5) TMI 257 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ge 959) describes it as a mollusk (soft boneless animal) in the same class as the squid . In Encyclopaedia Britannica (Vol. 6-page 928) cuttlefish is described as a name given to a large group of marine cephalopod mollusks related to the octopuses and squids . (Mollusk is a soft bodied animal, without bones. Oysters, slugs and snails are some of the varieties of mollusks.) 10.. Thus the poignant feature of cuttlefish is that it is a non-vertebrate. Prawns and lobsters are also non-vertebrates. Even the Act does not include prawns and lobsters in the category of fish, as they have been made taxable items. There is no dispute about it. Here italicised. 11.. The conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that cuttlefish cannot be treated as a fish variety. It is hence not an exempted item. The order assessing the turnover of the sale of cuttlefish to sales tax, therefore, does not warrant interference. We, therefore, dismiss this revision. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1986 (5) TMI 256 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The argument being that as the procedure to be adopted by the revenue courts was to be that as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioners could indeed avail of the benefit of the provisions of section 60 of the Code. No credence can be given to this contention either as this provision merely provides for the procedure to be adopted by the revenue courts, but it cannot be read to incorporate the provisions of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure in all Acts under which recoveries can be effected as an arrear of land revenue. There can thus be no escape from the conclusion that no immunity from attachment or sale is available in respect of a residential house for recovery of amounts due under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. The impugned order of the lower appellate court is accordingly hereby upheld and affirmed and this revision is consequently dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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