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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 265 Records
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1986 (9) TMI 429 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time." We feel that in the circumstances of this case, we should not embark upon on and enquiry into the merits of the case and that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches alone. We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed in the High Court. We also direct that all the promotions made in the Intelligent Bureau shall be reviewed in accordance with the impugned seniority list dated January 28, 1976. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 428 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the form of injunction application for the purpose but the appointment of Receiver in this case where the defendant's business is running will not be just and convenient despite the provision in the agreement for credit facilities for appointment of the Receiver. 13. In view of what has been stated above, we find that the learned Assistant District Judge has rightly rejected the prayer for ad interim appointment of the Receiver. The appellant's application for appointment of the Receiver till the disposal of the appeal is rejected and the appeal is dismissed. And interim order of this Court appointing the Receiver stands vacated. The application for appointment of the Receiver pending in the court of learned Assistant District Judge be disposed of expeditiously without being influenced in any way by our judgment. Prayer for stay of operation of this order moved but rejected considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Gobinda Ch. Chatterjee, J. 14. I agree.
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1986 (9) TMI 427 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s whether the land in question over which the plaintiff had asserted his right was a street or not and whether the defendant had blocked the said street. The High Court held in the circumstances of that suit that the jurisdiction of the civil court had not been taken away by virtue of section 13 read with sections 13A and 13B of the Act which had been inserted by the Haryana Legislature into the Act. We are of the view that the above decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case since in this case the Panchayat which had been impleaded as a defendant had raised the plea that the suit land was a part of shamlat deh and that the plaintiffs had no right or title in it. This question has to be decided by the Collector only under section 11 of the Act and not by the Civil court. We do not, therefore, find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against which this petition is filed. The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1986 (9) TMI 426 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... cording evidence since no prejudice or failure of justice was made out by the party assailing the order, as the order was discretionary. This much would be sufficient to indicate that in all cases of issue of a commission, interference by exercise of the revisional power is not called for. Where on the face of the order itself, it is found that the Court has not recorded the satisfaction supported by reasons, the Court is satisfied that parties themselves can adduce evidence and it is found that there is no immediate requirement for issue of commission, the Court can interfere with the discretionary order since the wide discretionary power under Order 26, Rule 9, C.P.C. has not been exercised keeping the norms of the language of Order 26 , Rule 9, C.P.C. 11. In the result, the civil revision is allowed. The order is set aside and the trial Court is directed to consider the application for appointment of commission and the objection afresh. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 425 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f Section 17 is a profit in lieu of salary, his income is assessed at a higher rate than that it would otherwise have been assessed, the Income-tax Officer shall on an application made to him in this behalf grant such relief as may be prescribed. The prescribed relief is set out in Rule 21-A of the Income-tax Rules. The appellant is entitled to relief under Section 89 because compensation herein awarded includes salary which has been in arrears as also the compensation in lieu of reinstatement and the relief should be given as provided by Section 89 of the Income-tax Act read with Rule 21-A of the Income-tax Rules. The appellant is indisputably entitled to the same. If any application is required to be made, the appellant may submit the same to the competent authority and the Corporation shall, through its Tax Consultant, assist the appellant for obtaining the relief. 10. The appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside. Order in the aforesaid terms is passed.
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1986 (9) TMI 424 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t of an overall settlement between the Central Government and the employees of the Posts & Telegraph Department. It would certainly not subserve the interests of Justice to direct retrial of the respondents despite the settlement arrived at, after a lapse of nearly 18 years. Such a course would give rise to unnecessary industrial unrest for no reason whatever. We need not enter into the controversy whether this Court having in M.N. Sankarayarayanan Nair v P.V. Balakrlshnan and Ors. referred to the decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Dy Accountant General (Admn.), Office of the Accountant General, Kerala, Trivandrum v State of Kerala and Ors. while laying down the requirements of s 494 of the Code, this was tacit approval of the view taken in that case. 3. The result therefore is that the appeals must succeed and are allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the orders of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrates are restored.
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1986 (9) TMI 423 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to its validity can be made on that ground. Apart from that, we are of the view that the compensation that has been awarded to the Company is neither inadequate nor illusory as contended on behalf of the petitioners. It is not in dispute that the paid-up share capital of the Company was ₹ 60 lakhs and it paid dividend up to 1965. Thereafter, the Company did not pay any dividend from 1965 to 1970. It will not be unreasonable to presume that in specifying the compensation, the Legislature has taken these facts into consideration. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the petitioners that the compensation specified in First Schedule to the Nationalisation Act in respect of the undertakings ofthe Company is illusory. The contention is rejected. No other point has been urged on behalf of the petitioners. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed and the rule nisi is discharged. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1986 (9) TMI 422 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of ₹ 1,00,000 was not liable to be included in the income of the assessee. That decision is Sukhdeo Charity Estate, Ladnu v. CIT, Rajasthan, Jaipur. There is no dispute that as a result of exclusion of this amount of ₹ 1,00,000 from the income of the assessee, the very foundation for imposition of penalty under sections 271(1)(c) has become non-existent. This is an undisputed position before us. It is therefore, clear that in this situation it is now unnecessary to answer the above question of law which has been referred for the decision of this Court. The reference is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 421 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re forthwith nonsuited. They did not choose to come up by way of revision against non-suiting or move the High Court on writ side for being made party to the acquisition proceedings. The reference was claimed only by the land-owner, Smt. Shanti Devi, who had the registered sale deed in her favour. She alone was a party in the proceeding before the Collector. The attempt now is to enlarge the scope of the enquiry under Section 18 into the inter se rights of the vendor, his coparceners and the vendee, and whether the vendor had the power to transfer and even if he had, what was the nature of his share etc. Contentious issues of Hindu Law are questions totally alien to the reference under Section 18 as made. Consequently, it must be held that the court below was wholly right in rejecting the application under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil P.C. The petition, therefore, must fail and is hereby dismissed with costs. Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. 47. I agree. M.P. Varma, J. 48. I agree.
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1986 (9) TMI 420 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... assed and having become entitled to the out flowing preferential treatment. Similar would be the outcome also in a case where a candidate's Confidential Record is bad and he earns no points in that item. Such an interpretation would thus be self-defeating and lead to absurd results, and accordingly, would be contrary to well-established canons of construction, not to speak of a common-sense-oriented approach. Since the rule does not specify a different passing standard for 'each' subject, the prescribed minimum passing standard must be the yardstick to apply to each of the subjects or items. Minimum must mean minimum in each, as much as, minimum in aggregate. The Tribunal should not have therefore upset the decision of the concerned Department and imposed on the department the mistaken interpretation propounded by it. In the result, the decision of the Tribunal must be reversed. 3. The appeal is, therefore, allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 419 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rtified copy being so delivered, the transferor company shall be dissolved without being could up and place all dominates relating to the transferor company and the files relating to the said two companies shall be consolidated accordingly; and That the above scheme of amalgamation is sectioned subject to the condition that no employee of the transferee company, that is, Alembic shall be transferred from the place where he is working to the place where the Neomer unit is situated; and It is further ordered that the transferee company shall not close down the Neomer unit which now stands transferred to It for a period of ten Years, except in accordance with law. It is further ordered that Neomer P, Ltd shall stand dissolved and amalgamated with the Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. without being wound up. 22. That any person interested shall be at liberty to apply to this court in the above matter for any direction that may be necessary. 23. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 418 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the petition). 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel, we are of the opinion that the recovery proceeding may continue against the assets of M/s Cawnpore Chemical Works Private Limited and not against the private assets of the petitioners, who are the Directors of the Company. There is, however, no justification to stay the recovery proceedings against the assets of the Company. The view that we are taking also finds support from a decision in L. Parmeshwari Das v. The Collector of Bulandshahr, (1955) 6 STC 399. It is, however, made clear that the recovery proceeding may continue against the assets of the Company wherever they may be situate against which the assessment order was passed, and in consequence thereof the recovery certificate was issued. 4. Subject to these observations the writ petition is finally disposed of. 5. A copy of the order may be given to the learned counsel within 48 hours on payment of usual charges.
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1986 (9) TMI 417 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Register maintained under Rule 1 of Part of the Rules. She will be entitled to her due place in the Seniority List of the 1984 batch. The petitioner will be entitled to her costs which we quantify at ₹ 5000. As a result of our finding a few more candidates would also be entitled to be included in the Select List and ordinarily we would have directed their inclusion in the list. But having regard to the fact that most of the others have not chosen to question the selection and the circumstance that two years have elapsed we do not propose to make any such general order as that would completely upset the subsequent selection and create confusion and multiplicity of problems. The cases of any other candidate who may have already filed a writ petition; this Court or the High Court will be disposed of in the light of the, judgment. These who have not so far chosen to question the selection will not be allowed to do so in the future because of their laches. Petition allowed
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1986 (9) TMI 416 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to the pre sent acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the above provision in the Delhi Development Act contains a wholesome principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas. We hope and trust that the Meerut Development Authority, for whose benefit the land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicable provide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses or shop buildings in the urban area in question. Having regard to what we have stated above, we are of the view that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and it is liable to be set aside. We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents in the High Court. There is no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 415 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ecision. It is nonexistent in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. The Judgment under appeal is therefore no judgment in the eye of law. This Court in 1982(3) S.C.R. page 81 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dewadas & Ors.) has taken a view which reinforces our view. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and send the matter back to the High Court for being placed before a Division Bench of the High Court, which will afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides and dispose it of in accordance with law, expeditiously. We wish to add that the Registry of the High Court was expected to have realized the true position and ought not to have created a situation which resulted in waste of court time, once for hearing the appeal, and next time, to consider the effect of the rules. No Court can afford this luxury with the mountain of arrears which every Court is carrying these days. o p /o p M.L.A. Appeal Allowed. o p /o p
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1986 (9) TMI 414 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ademic Council to exercise its power of superintendence. If as is claimed the Vice-Chancellor does not take the initiative to call a meeting of the Academic Council, the members of the Academic Council desiring to call a meeting of the Academic Council are free to take recourse to the provisions of the Act, the ordinances and the Statutes to requisition a meeting. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the Resolution of the Admissions Committee dated May 6, 1986 is tainted by any illegality. We set aside the judgment of the High Court, dismiss the writ petition filed in the High Court, and further direct the University to forthwith announce the names of the candidates selected for admission to the various courses. We leave it upon to the Academic Council to take such action as it may think fit in regard to the future years. We do not also express any opinion regarding the soundness of the scheme of the Entrance Test. There will be no order as to costs. M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 413 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not been contravened in any manner. 7. In regard to the third question, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the order of the Commissioner was based on surmises and conjectures. No enquiry had been held and, therefore, no concluded finding could be arrived at by the Commissioner and, therefore, there was no question of surmises and conjectures. 8. In regard to the fourth question, in our view, the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Smt. Rambha Devi ( supra) was not correct. The Tribunal was not right in holding that the Commissioner could not set aside the assessment in pursuance of the scheme. 9. In respect of the last question, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not right in cancelling the consolidated order of the Commissioner passed under section 263(1). 10. For the reasons stated above, all the questions are answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. However, in the special circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 412 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on of such prosecutions by the Food Inspector, Faridkot as laid down by this Court in State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal, 1961 1 SCR 458 and The Corporation of Calcutta v. Md. Omer Ali & Anr., 1976 4 SCC 527. In the premises, the impugned notification dated September 7, 1972 issued by the Food (Health) Authority must be declared as ultra vires the Food (Health) Authority insofar as the purported to delegate his powers to institute prosecutions for an offence under the Act under s. 20(1) to the Food Inspector, Faridkot. It must accordingly follow that the Food Inspector, Faridkot was not competent to lodge the complaint against the appellants for having committed an offence punishable under s. 16(1) (a) (ii) read with s. 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court and that of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Moga are set aside. P.S.S. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 411 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ighest bid made at the subsequent sale they have sufficient interest in the matter to contest the appellant's petition made under sec. 33 of the Act. We are therefore in agreement with the High Court that respondents should have been afforded opportunity of hearing before any order on the appellant's petition was passed. Since no such opportunity was afforded, the High Court was justified in quashing the orders of Sri Rajni Kant. We accordingly uphold the High Court's order to that extent. We therefore allow the appeal partly and modify the order of the High Court to the extent indicated hereinabove. The Central Government or the authority exercising its power under sec. 33 of the Act is directed to consider the appellant's petition afresh in accordance with law after giving notice and affording opportunity of hearing to Sohan Lal and Sunder Lal, respondents. In these circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. A.P.J. Appeal allowed in part.
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1986 (9) TMI 410 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... own for which it recovers various taxes. Furthermore, maintenance of roads, bridges etc. are statutory duties of the Municipal Board under Section 7 of the Act. The levy of the toll tax by the Municipal Board must therefore be struck down as ultra vires. 2. We are informed by learned Counsel for the respondents that the State Government by notification dated April 4, 1979 has withdrawn the transit tax on vehicles and other conveyances, animals and laden coolies who are merely passing through the municipal limits. Our attention has been drawn to a letter dated April 25, 1979 which shows that the State Government has taken a decision that all passenger vehicles like buses, cars, taxis and tempos etc. shall cot be made to pay the transit tax. 3. The result therefore is that the appeals must succeed and are allowed with costs. The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the impugned notification dated May 1, 1970 levying the toll tax is struck down as ultra vires.
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