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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 235 Records
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1988 (12) TMI 344 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... olice had not bothered even to preserve the case property in a proper manner because the parcel containing the heroin, allegedly recovered from the appellant, when brought before the trial Court was found to have no seals. So, possibility of some tampering having been done in the Malkhana with regard to the case property cannot be completely overruled. After all if the case property had been kept intact under proper seals the appellant, if he wanted to challenge the report of the Cfsl with regard to the sample, could have prayed to the trial Court for taking another sample from the remaining case property for being analysed. So the prosecution case, thus. in my opinion, suffers from these vital deficiencies and it would not be safe to convict the appellant of the serious offence allegedly committed by him under Section 21 of the Ndps Act. He deserves to be given a benefit of doudt. (5) I allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences of the appellant and acquit him.
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1988 (12) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Laxmipat Choraria and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra 1968 2 SCR 626 wherein it has been observed by Hidayatullah, J as he then was that ...Under Section 132 a witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any criminal proceeding (among others) upon the ground that the answer to such question will incriminate or may tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The safeguard to this compulsion is that no such answer which the witness is compelled to give exposes him to any arrest or prosecution or can it be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer. 14. So Section 132 of the Evidence Act sufficiently protects him since his testimony does not go against him. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated April 27, 1987 passed in Revision Petition No. 221 of 1986 is hereby set aside.
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1988 (12) TMI 342 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibition of cinematograph films in a licensed premises. (3) That Rule 7A framed by the State Government carried out the purpose of the Act and is not beyond its competence and has been made in the interest of general public. (4) That a rule like Rule 7A framed by the State Government automatically becomes a condition of a licence and that it is not the exclusive power of the Licensing Authority alone to impose such terms and conditions as it may determine; and (5) That Rule 7A and Condition -12 to the extent they provide a period of 12 weeks for screening Kannada films is arbitrary and unreasonable and is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 30. Consequently, we allow these petitions to this extent that Rule 7A of the Rules and condition-12A in Form-F, to the extent they provide a period of 12 weeks for screening Kannada films, is struck down as violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 31. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1988 (12) TMI 341 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would entitle the defendants to a conditional leave. But I think, in the present case, where the debt is fully secured and more than its worth, it is not necessary that I should pass an order for deposit as such. In the absence of any other terms being suggested by the Bar, the only term I can think of, is a time bound schedule for defending the suit. I, therefore, pass the following order Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are granted conditional leave to defend the suit upon the following terms, viz., that they shall file their written statements within eight weeks from today. Upon such written statements being filed, the suit stands transferred to the list of Commercial Causes. The parties, then, shall complete discovery and inspection within four weeks thereafter. On such completion of discovery and inspection, the suit stands expedited and the plaintiffs will then have liberty to have the suit placed on board for hearing and final disposal during the first week of September 1989.
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1988 (12) TMI 340 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1989. 54. The defendants will be entitled to the costs of these proceedings according to Rules. 55. It is not disputed that the other companion Suits Nos. (7) 178 of 1984, (2) 196 of 1984, (3) 294 of 1984, (4) 295 of 1984, (5) 402 of 1984, (6) 443 of 1984, (7) 475 of 1984 and (8) 513 of 1984, give rise to identical question and similar amendments shall have to be allowed in the plaints in all the suits. Since, however, Mr. Vajifdar wants to consider whether Appeal should be filed against this order, no order as regards similar amendments in those suits is being passed at present. However, Mr. Vajifdar does make a statement before the Court that in case he does not file any Appeal to the larger Bench or, after filing the Appeal, if he does not succeed in getting this order set aside, he will immediately consent to the plaints in the said other suits being similarly amend. 56. There shall be no order as to costs so far as amendments in the plaints in those suits are concerned.
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1988 (12) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... petitioners to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and it infringed the Constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the grounds of detention are more or less similar to the grounds in Pushkar Mukherjee's case (supra). The statements of witnesses do not, in our opinion, remove the vagueness of the grounds. Some other grounds have been urged by Dr. Chitale with a view to substantiating the invalidity of the order of detention. As we have found that the order of detention cannot be sustained, as the grounds of detention suffer from vagueness and the allegations against the petitioner are not such as to raise the question of maintenance of public order, we do not think it necessary to consider the other grounds. PG NO. 1092 For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order of detention and direct that the petitioner be released forthwith. Petition allowed.
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1988 (12) TMI 338 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... application had been rejected by the judicial court that does not mean that such an. order is of no consequence and would not have the effect of influencing the mind of the declaring authority either way while deciding whether the declaration should or should not be made. There is & catena of judgments, referred above, which lay down the proposition that the order made on the bail application is a vital document. I have no reason to take a different view. So, I hold that tbs order of declaration cannot be sustained inasmuch as the declaring authority has not taken into consideration the order of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate declining the bail to the petitioner. (8) I, hence, allow the writ petition, make the rule absolute and quash the declaration order made under Section 9(1) of the COFE.POSA Act and also hold the continuous detention of the petitioner is illegal He shall is illegal be released forthwith unless required to be detained in any other case.
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1988 (12) TMI 337 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the Supreme Court case in the instant case also the expenditure was incurred in dismantling and shifting the plant and machinery. The factory at Bhandup was on leasehold premises whereas the factory to which the plant and machinery has been shifted is a factory building constructed by the assessee itself. Evidently the assessee has shifted its plant and machinery to the premises of its own and this certainly is an advantage of enduring nature. It is an admitted position that for the purpose of deciding whether an expenditure is of capital or revenue nature, there are no hard and fast rules and the case requires to be decided on the facts of each case. Having due regard to the above stated facts in this case we hold that the expenditure is of capital nature and the Tribunal was not right in allowing the same as revenue expenditure. Accordingly, the second question is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. No order as lo costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1988 (12) TMI 336 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he orders of this Court, which finding has not been challenged before us rather the Additional Solicitor General has fairly conceded the correctness of the findings of the Tribunal relating to the bona fide of the appellants in importing the disputed goods, we are of the view that the Collector and the Tribunal both were not justified in confiscating the goods or in imposing redemption fine. 5. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Collector and the Tribunal with regard to the confiscation of goods and imposition of redemption fine. Sine, the respondent authorities have already realised the redemption fine from the appellants, we direct the respondent to refund the amount of redemption so realised within a period of one month from today. We would like to emphasise that since we have decided the matter in view of the special facts and circumstances available in these cases this order will not be treated as a precedent. There will be no order as to costs.
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1988 (12) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tituted the suit as an indigent person. There is yet another aspect. When the respondent commenced the litigation and continued up to the High Court the law on the question was nebulous. It was only thereafter an authoritative pronouncement was made by this Court with regard to the impact of Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 on the pleasure doctrine under Article 310(1). These facts and circumstances therefore call for a sympathetic consideration of the case of respondent. This Court will not deny any equitable relief in deserving cases. The case on hand cannot be an exception to that rule and indeed it is eminently a fit F case. We therefore accept the submission made for the respondent and decline to disturb the decree under appeal. In the result the appellants succeed on the question on law but the respondent retains the decree in his favour purely on compassionate grounds. The appellants also must pay the cost to the respondent as already bound. Appeal allowed.
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1988 (12) TMI 334 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xecutive, which means restriction on the carrying on of a business or to obtain a declaration that the measure is invalid, would, if other conditions are satisfied, be admissible as a deduction under section 10(2)(xv). Deductibility of such expenditure does not depend on the final outcome . of those proceedings. However wrongheaded, ill-advised, unduly optimistic or over-confident in his conviction the assessee might appear in the light of the ultimate decision, expenditure in prosecuting a civil proceeding cannot be denied as a permissible deduction if it is reasonably and honestly incurred to promote the interest of the business." (p. 170) 5. Having regard to the purpose for which the expenditure was made we are of the view that principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision will govern the instant case. 6. We, therefore, answer this question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 7. There will be no order as to costs.
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1988 (12) TMI 333 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t is not brought to our notice that there is any specific provision in the U. P. Sales Tax Act, whereunder recovery of the liability outstanding against a company can be made against the personal assets of its Director. 2. We, therefore, dispose of this writ petition finally observing that the recovery can be enforced only against the assets, belonging to the company in which the petitioner is a Director. 3. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within 48 hours.
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1988 (12) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e is an exception (for which special reasons must be given) rather than the rule, that the statistics disclose that a mere 29 persons were hanged when 85,000 murders were committed during the period 1974 to 1978 and therefore, the learned Attorney General says, there is no case for reconsideration of the question. Besides, he points out, Articles 21 and 134 of the Constitution specifically contemplate the existence of a death penalty. In the circumstances, we think the matter may lie where it does. In the result, having regard to the view taken by us on the question concerning the area and scope of the President's power under Article 72 of the Constitution, we hold that the petition invoking that power shall be deemed to be pending before the President to be dealt with and disposed of afresh. The sentence of death imposed on Kehar Singh shall remain in abeyance meanwhile. These Writ Petitions and the Special Leave Petition are concluded accordingly. Petitions disposed of
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1988 (12) TMI 331 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ka State Road Transport Corporation to run vehicles as contract carriages. The High Court is not, therefore, right in its view that a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had not been issued when the Act came into force, would not come within the definition of 'contract carriage' in section 3(g) and the prohibition contained in section 20 of the Act against the grant of contract carriage permit cannot extend to grant of special permit under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act. But before we conclude, we may observe that but for the object of the Act as stated above, it would have been very difficult for us to interpret the provisions of the Act in view of bad drafting of the same. Be that as it may, for the reasons aforesaid, these appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 in the High Court is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1988 (12) TMI 330 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he dealers will be reimbursed the differential tax paid in respect of the assessment year 1985-86 and subsequent assessment years. So far as penalty, interest and liability of sales tax on bardana is concerned, which are also raised in this petition, we are of the view that the petitioner shall exhaust its remedies under the Act by way of appeal and revision and come to this Court on reference if it has not got any remedy, but we cannot interfere with these matters in a petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution. In fact the Sales Tax Act is a compendious code itself and the remedies provided thereunder are effective and we cannot encourage this practice of coming direct to this Court without exhausting the remedies provided under the Act. The reliefs relating to the same are, therefore, relegated to the remedies under the Act. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1988 (12) TMI 329 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s occasioned export outside India since there was neither any contract nor statutory provision binding petitioners to export cotton bales nor was there any binding agreement between local dealers and the petitioners to export cotton by the petitioners such purchases, held for purpose of export and the petitioners, not exempt from purchase tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act or Central Sales Tax Act (paras 6 to 8). In view of the categorical finding in an identical situation given by this Court it was not proper on the part of the learned Tribunal to have set aside the orders of both the courts below. Thus, the view taken by the Tribunal does not appear to be correct. In the result, I allow this revision petition set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 23rd May, 1987, and affirm the order passed by the Commercial Taxes Officer, Sriganganagar dated 15th May, 1980, and the order passed by the appellate authority dated 13th July, 1984. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1988 (12) TMI 328 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt falls according to the Tribunal and for the issue of notice for doing so the case has been remanded back. In my opinion it was clearly not open to the Tribunal to do so. The Tribunal only had the authority to decide the matter which was in issue before it and on the facts of this case it was not open to the Tribunal to have passed any further order in this case beyond saying that the penalty under section 15-A(1)(h) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was not imposable. In these circumstances, the remand order passed by the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 (rupees two hundred). The impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside with the finding that on the facts of this case it was not open to the Tribunal to have remanded the case back to the assessing authority on the premises set out therein and as has been done by Sri R.K. Saxena, the Member concerned. Petition allowed.
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1988 (12) TMI 327 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gation before making the assessment order. The provisions of clause (iii) of section 9(3)(a) of the Act which empowers the appellate authority to set aside the order and direct the assessing authority to pass a fresh order after such inquiry as may be specified, do not contemplate any direction being given by the appellate authority with regard to the extent to which an assessment is to be made on remand or to limit in such cases, the power of the assessing authority to make the assessment in accordance with law. In this case, all that which had been done by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, was to set aside the assessment for fresh investigation without any specific directions and curtailing the power of the assessing authority in any manner whatsoever. The fear expressed by the learned counsel for the assessee is wholly imaginary. The second contention is also without merit and cannot be accepted. In the result, the revision is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1988 (12) TMI 326 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... beyond 60 days without communicating the order of the next higher authorities to the petitioner, on which fact there was no dispute, rendered the retention illegal. However, there is no provision in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, requiring the authorities, retaining the documents for more than 30 days to communicate to the petitioner, the permission obtained by them from the next higher authorities to keep the records for a further period. When there is no such provision, it cannot be successfully contended that there was no communication by the authorities to the petitioners herein, intimating that they had obtained permission of the next higher authorities for retention of the documents for a further period. In the instant case, since the seized records have been directed to be returned to the petitioners herein, this Court finds that nothing survives in these writ petitions. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1988 (12) TMI 325 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -State trade or commerce or in the course of export. The contention, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 7.. In Misc. Petition No. 47 of 1982, it was urged that the petitioners assessments had already become final prior to the impugned amendments and, therefore, an attempt was made to reopen the cases under section 39(2) of the State Sales Tax Act for fresh assessments. It was contended that in the circumstances of the case, the assessments could not be revised under section 39(2) of the State Sales Tax Act. However, no reason could be given as to why the assessments could not be revised in the light of the impugned amendments in the Entry Tax Act. The contention, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 8.. In the result, all the petitions fail and they are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs of these petitions. The outstanding amounts of security shall be refunded to the petitioners in their respective petitions. Petitions dismissed.
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