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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 209 Records
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1989 (5) TMI 324 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ns in Delhi, nor does it serve the object and purpose of the said Clause (h) in the context of Section 14(1) of the Act (3) that a limited company. just like any natural person(s), can enjoy possession of any premises let for use as 'a residence', it can be a 'tenant' in respect of such premises, and it can be a 'tenant' in respect of such premises, and it is entitled to protection and is also liable to eviction under Section 14 of the Act and (4) that there is nothing in the context of the said Clause (h) to justify exclusion of a company from its ambit and any such interpretation would really undermine the object of this provision and upset the scheme of the Act. Therefore, we hold that Section 14(1) proviso (h) of the Act applies to all residential premises irrespective of whether such premises are let to a company or to a natural person as a tenant. (35) Consequently, we uphold the order of the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal with costs throughout.
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1989 (5) TMI 323 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Immovable property situate in India except with the previous general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India. The said provisions do not place any restriction on entering into agreement like Ex.PW2/1. The said provisions also do not place an absolute bar to the transfer or sale of any property and as such it cannot be said that the agreement itself will become void. It is well settled that a contract for sale by itself does not create any interest in or charge on such property (See Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act). Thus it cannot be held that the agreement is void on the objection raised in preliminary objection No. 4 based on Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The said provisions do not bar grant of relief of specific performance to the plaintiff and the question of permission of the Reserve Bank of India will arise if at all, at the stage of execution of the sale deed. Consequently, issue No. 5A is also answered against the defendants.
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1989 (5) TMI 322 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... regards the continuation of the proceedings under sections 147 and 148, but in view of the subsequent events, viz., dismissal of the proceedings before the Tribunal against the Indian Steamship Co., can it now be treated to be a clandestine payment to the petitioner? 23. Law Courts are competent and as a matter of fact ought always take note of the subsequent events to do complete justice between the parties and to avoid future litigations. On the wake of the Tribunal's finding, in my view, no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings under section 147 against the petitioner and the proceedings cannot also be allowed to continue to the further harassment and detriment of the petitioner. 24. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that the continuation of the proceedings would be unfair, unjust and contrary to the known principles of law. In the premises, the rule succeeds. The rule is made absolute. Each party to pay and bear their own costs.
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1989 (5) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... agreement, it is not permissible to claim 'Novino' batteries as the product of joint venture. The argument was rightly repelled on behalf of the appellant on the ground that this aspect cannot be examined in the present case in view of the limited scope of the charges as mentioned in the show cause notice quoted above. If so advised, the Commission will have to hold a fresh inquiry after issuing another show cause notice if it desires to pursue this aspect. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant also raised several other points in support of the appeal, one of them being that from the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be held that the impugned advertisements are capable of causing any loss or injury to the consumers. In view of our decision, as mentioned earlier, it is not necessary to deal with the other arguments. 11. For the reasons mentioned above the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1989 (5) TMI 320 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es prove the receipt by Ramalakshmi Ammal of a notice from Tuticorin Municipality for the collection of house tax. o p /o p This all in the opinion of the learned Judge was a substantial question of law which called for interference and it is clear that on such questions which have no substance and which could not be said to be even question of law, the interference by the High Court in second appeal could not be justified. At best the two questions on which the High Court chose to interfere quoted above could be said to be questions of appreciation of evidence. o p /o p In our opinion therefore the High Court was not fight in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the learned lower appellate court. The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that passed by the lower appellate court is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to costs of this appeal. Costs quantified at ₹ 3,000. o p /o p N.V.K. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1989 (5) TMI 319 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to discuss the question further as we are in full agreement with the view taken in Mohinder Kumar’s case (supra). The object and purpose of the exemption as discussed earlier is to effectuate the purpose of the Act, to ensure availability of more and more accommodation to meet the need of tenants. In view of the above discussion we hold that Section 3 as well as the impugned Notification are valid and the same do not suffer from any constitutional or legal infirmity. We further hold that civil court has jurisdiction to pass decree even after the expiry of period of exemption, in suits instituted during the period of exemption, and to execute the same notwithstanding the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. In the result the civil appeals, special leave petitions, and the writ petitions fails and are accordingly dismissed with costs and all interim orders stand discharged. R.S.S. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 318 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... essed by counsel for the appellant forwarding the cheque for ₹ 6,02,000 there was a request for the return of the cheque in case it was found that the appellant was entitled to the set-off claimed by her. The application of the appellant claiming adjustment was pending in Court, and no conclusion can be drawn against her on the ground that she had requested a return of the cheque in the event of the adjustment being allowed by the Court. We are of the view that the conditions set forth in the order of this Court dated 29 November, 1979 in the facts and the circumstances of the case have been complied with by the appellant substantially and she is entitled to the benefit of that order. The appeal is allowed, the order dated 21 October, 1980 of the High Court is set aside and the application by the appellant for a direction to the respondent to execute the sale deed in her favour is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 317 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o that aspect of the matter as in our considered opinion the impugned Act suffers from the vice of taking away rights to property without providing for compensation at all and is hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Connected proceedings had been taken for interim arrangement regarding provision of raw material to the petitioners and certain other parties. We do not propose to deal with those aspects in this judgment but liberty is given to parties to apply for such directions as they consider appropriate and such applications, when filed, will be dealt with separately. In the result, each of the writ petitions succeeds. We declare the provisions of ss. 3 and 4 of the Act to be ultra vires the Constitution and since these provisions contain the soul of the Act and without them, the Act cannot operate, the entire Act has to suffer. The petitioners shall have their costs to these proceedings. Hearing fee of ₹ 3,000 is awarded in each of the petitions. Petition allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 316 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts, 7 have been given to men and 7 to women. The 15th seat has been given to a male Schedule Caste candidate as he was having better merit than Jyoti Kumari. Mr. Prithviraj con- tends that 8th seat should have been given to the female candidate. There being one seat between a male and female candidate it has been rightly given to the male candidate with better merit. In view of the above discussion Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 16112-57/88 and SLP(C) No. 92/89 filed by the State of Jammu & Kashmir and the successful candidates are allowed, the judgment of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the unsuccess- ful candidates before the Jammu & Kashmir High Court are dismissed. Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 287 of 1989, SLP(C) No. 305 of 1989 and SLP(C) No. 1299 of 1989 filed by the unsuccessful candidates are dismissed. CMP 4252A/89 is also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on the detenu the delay amounts to 32 days. The only explanation offered by the third respondent is that further information required from the State Government was received by the third respondent on 17.10.88 after a delay of nearly 14 days and then the representation of the detenu was disposed of on 27.10.88 within which period there were certain holidays. Barring that, there is no other explanation. This delay when scrutinised in the light of the proposition of law adumberated above, we are of the view, that there is an inordinate and unreasonable delay and the present explanation given by the third respondent is not satisfactory and acceptable. Hence, for the aforementioned reasons we set aside the impugned order of detention on the ground that there is a breach of constitutional obligation as enshrined under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the result the appeal as well as the Writ Petition are allowed. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1989 (5) TMI 314 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it is appropriate for this Court to take the view that any award passed under the Act, that is, the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 is liable to be remitted or set aside solely on the ground that the arbitrator has not given reasons thus virtually introducing by a judicial verdict an amendment to the Act when it has not been the law for nearly 7/8 decades?
Held that:- Having given our careful and anxious consideration to the contentions urged by the parties we feel that law should be allowed to remain as it is until the competent legisla ture amends the law. In the result we hold that an award passed under the Arbitration Act is not liable to be remitted or set aside merely on the ground that no reasons have been given in its support except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission or an order made by the Court such as the one under section 20 or section 21 or section 34 of the Act or the statute governing the arbitration requires that the arbitration or the umpire should give reasons for the award. These cases will now go back to the Division Bench for disposal in accordance with law and the view expressed by us in this decision.
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1989 (5) TMI 313 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the CCI has acted in the manner he should act in the present atmosphere of socio-economic development in view of our constitutional commitments?
Held that:- The scheme and the language used, strictly speaking, do not indicate any positive role for the CCI in discharging his functions in respect of grant of sanction. But it has to be borne in mind that he is a part of a State instrumentalities committed to the endeavours of the constitutional aspiration to secure justice, inter alia, social and economic, and also under Article 39(b) & (c) of the Constitution to ensure that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as to best subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Yet, every instrumentality and functionary of the State must fulfil its own role and should not trespass or encroach/entrench upon the field' of others. Progress is ensured and development helped if each performs his role in the common endeavour.
Having regard to the facts and the circumstances of the case in view of the various facts mentioned hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that there was no undue haste. There was proper application of mind that the sanction was for a new project. Sufficient security for the debentures as was enjoined to be ensured before sanction has been ensured in the facts and the circumstances of this case and guidance provided by means of guidelines has been substantially complied with. There has been no infraction as such of the norms required to be followed in granting the sanction. The challenge to the sanction, therefore, must fail. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 312 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... notice of the fact that pantile is sometimes used by fashionable architects and designers for building houses in respectable areas of urban housing complexes. So, while it may be generally true that they are used by the economically handicapped section, it cannot be said that it is invariably so. Such considerations cannot, however, alter the nature of the commodity itself. It is a tile not meant for use except on the roof and it cannot cease to be a roofing tile merely upon a reference to who the ultimate consumer of the goods may be. We are firmly of the view that the pantile is also a roofing tile, and is thus exigible under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954, in view of the notification issued under section 25 of the said Act. In that view of the matter, we find no substance or merit in the application. The application is thus dismissed on contest but without any costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 311 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sequent to 4th November, 1978, as it had not collected any sales tax on sales after that date. But the Tribunal had also found that the assessee had not made out a case that it was covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. 1978 42 STC 386. It opined that the sales effected by the assessee were subject to sales tax in the absence of any evidence with regard to services being rendered to the customers. Despite this, the Tribunal held that in view of section 6(2)(a) of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, the assessee was not liable to pay tax if it had not collected sales tax as it was running a restaurant. It appears to us, that in the facts and circumstances of the case as above indicated, questions of law do arise and consequently, we direct the Tribunal to draw up a statement of case and refer the above mentioned two questions for the opinion of this Court. However, we make no order as to costs. Application allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 310 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y on taxation. Tobacco is, however, meant for the poor and lower middle class citizens. Added to this, the manufacturing process of zarda is quite different and also complicated. Although tobacco is a constituent of zarda, still after manufacture the zarda is quite distinguishable and it has an identity of its own. In the above circumstances, there is no difficulty in treating zarda as being of a different class of goods from tobacco. It has also been stated earlier that any customer either literate or illiterate knows the difference between tobacco and zarda. Hence, this is also a circumstance which makes zarda a distinct goods from tobacco. In these circumstances, the classification is quite reasonable. Hence, there is no reasonable ground to strike off zarda from the relevant entry and treat the same as tobacco so as to make it tax-free. 18.. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order for costs. G.B. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Writ petition dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 309 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pears to be nominal and of few days except in the case for the month of July, 1976, where it is about 45 days. Even for that month the due date of filing the return was 31st August, 1976, whereas the bank draft was prepared on 20th September, 1976, which fact is fortified by the narration of the fact in the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). After hearing counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the various submissions made on either side and also on the basis of the decisions mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. In the result the revisions succeed and are allowed. The orders passed by the Tribunal are set aside and the penalty imposed on the assessee is knocked off. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under section 11(8) of the Act for passing necessary orders. Petitions allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 308 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he respondents has submitted that the writ petitioners in C.W.P. Nos. 836, 1148, 2132, 1920, 1877, 3170, 4732, 6508, 6307, 8511, 8405, 8406, 10497 of 1988, 3572 of 1987 and 2996 of 1989 had filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court and those writ petitions had been Taken up along with Writ Petition No. 1744 of 1982 Delite Carriers (Regd.) v. State of Haryana 1990 77 STC 170 and disposed of by the same judgment. Mr. Ratta, learned counsel for the petitioners, is not in a position to deny this assertion. If these writ petitioners had raised the question of non-applicability of the various sub-sections of section 37 except the first proviso to subsection (4), those pleas have to be taken to have been rejected. However, if these contentions had not been raised, then these petitioners are, because of the principle of constructive res judicata, debarred from raising these pleas. In the result, we find no merit in these writ petitions and dismiss the same. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1989 (5) TMI 307 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the declaration form was refused to the petitioner-company for the purpose of purchasing raw materials for Khela on the ground that the same was not newspaper within the meaning of the Act. I hold that Khela should be treated as newspaper and the petitionercompany should be entitled to purchase the raw materials at a concessional rate which concession is available in the case of newspaper. For the reasons aforesaid, I set aside the said order dated 22nd July, 1988, whereby the said magazine Khela is not treated as newspaper, as also the order dated 4th November, 1988, to the extent of restrain order that the petitioner must not use the forms under XXIVA delivered to it to cover purchase of raw materials required for publication of Khela . This writ application, therefore, succeeds. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Learned counsel for the respondent prays for a stay of this order. This prayer is refused. Writ application allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 306 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ales and exigible to sales tax. The learned counsel appearing for the Revenue has vehemently conceded that when the Tribunal decided the case the decision in Hindustan Housing Factory 1989 75 STC 233 (All.) 1989 UPTC 468, was not available before the Tribunal and it is expedient that the Tribunal should be directed to decide the case afresh, in view of the law laid down by this Court in case of Hindustan Housing Factory v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1989 75 STC 233 1989 UPTC 468. In the result both the revisions succeed and are allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal is set aside. The Tribunal is directed to decide the case afresh in the light of the observations made above and also in view of the law laid down by this Court in Hindustan Housing Factory v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1989 75 STC 233 1989 UPTC 468. Parties shall bear their own costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under section 11(8) of the Act. Petitions allowed.
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1989 (5) TMI 305 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... hall produce before respondent No. 3 a permit in respect of the disputed quantity of 235 cft of timber mentioning the same as said to be defective, within 2 (two) weeks from now, failing which the appropriate authorities shall be at liberty to take steps, if any, against the applicant, in accordance with law, treating the said 235 cft of timber as in excess of the two permits already produced before respondent No. 3. The question of charging tax, if any, will arise only to the extent of the price of the disputed quantity of 235 cft in case of sale thereof. If, however, the applicant produces such a permit within two weeks from now, as directed above, the Commercial Tax authorities shall refund the sum of Rs. 10,000 which was deposited by the applicant in compliance of our order of March 14, 1989. The application is thus disposed of. We make no order for costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application disposed of accordingly.
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