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Showing 1 to 20 of 456 Records
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2001 (5) TMI 986 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ithout prior permission of the J.M.F.C., Panaji; (e) The applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at Crime Branch, Panaji daily between 5.00 to 8.00 p.m., initially for a period of seven days from today, and if necessary, as and when called upon by the Investigating Officer in connection with the investigation of the present case and the applicant shall extend full co-operation during the course of investigation; (f) The applicant shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Investigating Officer or the Court; and (g) The applicant shall not commit an offence similar to the offence alleged to have been committed by him in the present case. 16. The applicant is therefore directed to be released on bail forthwith in connection with Crime No. 3/2001 registered with the Crime Branch, Police Station, Panaji on the aforesaid conditions.
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2001 (5) TMI 985 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decisis. Shabhu Nath Goyal represents highly technical view. Considering that we are considering the rule of convenience, expediency and procedure which promotes the cause of both employer and workman deserves to be laid down. 45. In view of above, I am of the opinion that the Shambu Nath Goyal's case (supra) does not lay down correct law. The law has been correctly laid in Shankar chkravarti's case and Rajendra Jha's case. The correct procedure is as stated in Shankar Chakravarti's case subject to further safeguards for workman as already indicated above. 46. Despite above conclusions, in so far as the present appeal is concerned, considering that the award was made by the Labour Court more than 16 years back and also that the employee has already retired as we are informed, it would not be appropriate to interfere in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. In this view, I would dismiss the appeal leaving the parties to tear their own costs.
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2001 (5) TMI 984 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... motion was sought to be regularised and the appropriate authority did approve the same as a one time measure with the caution that it should not happen in future. But that would not change the principle of inter se seniority, which is governed by the provisions, contained in paragraph 302 of the Railway Establishment Manual, which we have already considered and answered. Then again, from the aforesaid letter of approval dated 17.7.2000, it is not clearly discernible, as to whether under the order in question, it is the service of these respondents which was sought to be regularised. We need not further delve into the matter, as in our view the so-called regularisation of ad hoc officiating promotion would only confer the retiral benefit to the concerned employees and would not count for the purposes of seniority in the cadre which has to be determined in accordance with the rules, as already discussed. These appeals are accordingly allowed. There would be no order s to costs.
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2001 (5) TMI 983 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t, 1956 and held that for exercise of power under that section, there must exist circumstances referable to the relevant statutory provisions. Their Lordships also held that an order passed in the printed pro forma do not satisfy the requirement of formation of an objective opinion with reference to the relevant statutory provision. 18. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that orders, annexures P3, P3/A and P3/B, passed by respondent No. 2 are ultra vires to Section 40 of the Act and liable to be quashed as such. Order, annexure P4, passed by the Tribunal is also liable to be quashed on that ground. 19. In view of the above conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to deal with other grounds of challenge raised by the petitioner. 20. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders are declared illegal and quashed. The respondents are directed to refund the amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner in compliance of orders, annexures P3, P3/A and P3/B.
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2001 (5) TMI 982 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt for fresh disposal. Special Leave Petition/(C) No. CC 3388 of 2001. 8. Vadavucode-Puthencruz Grama Panchayat got itself impleaded as a party and made a bid to file a special leave petition in challenge of the same judgment which we set aside. In view of the judgment we now pronounce, it is unnecessary to consider the special leave petition sought to be filed by the said Panchayat. However, we permit the said Panchayat to move the High Court for getting itself impleaded in the second appeal. 9. Mr. E.M.S. Anam, learned Counsel for the Petitioner Vadavucode Puthencruz Grama Panchayat submitted that pursuant to the impugned order learned Single Judge had passed consequential order and he pleads that this Court may interfere with the said consequential orders also. We find it unnecessary because when once the main impugned order is set aside any other consequential order made pursuant to the same would automatically go. 10. With these observations this matter is disposed of.
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2001 (5) TMI 981 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ers officially detaining the appellants at a place meant for detaining the persons suspected of having committed an offence under investigation. The act constituting an offence alleged to have been committed by the accused-respondents was certainly done by them in their official capacity though at a given point of time it had ceased to be legal in spite of being legal to begin with. On the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case in our opinion the learned Magistrate and the High Court have not erred in holding the accused-respondents entitled to the benefit of protection-under Section 197(2) of the Cr.P.C. We have felt it unnecessary to deal with the allegation made in the complaint relating to beating of the appellants whilst in police custody because no cognizance has been taken for an offence in that regard and no cognizance can now be taken because of the bar of limitation enacted by Section 468 of Cr.P.C. 17. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (5) TMI 980 - CEGAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... urrency of Rs.27,500/- belonging to the appellant has been absolutely confiscated I dispense with the condition of personal penalty of Rs.1,000/- (rupees one thousand only) and fix the main appeal on 1.6.2001. Dictated in the court.
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2001 (5) TMI 979 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... authorised person 'before settlement of shop to the tenderer'. In the present case, such opportunity was clearly denied to the authorities when respondent No. 4 had not furnished the requisite particulars along with her tender. 13. We are, therefore, of the opinion that as the tender itself of respondent No. 4 was liable to be rejected because of lack of particulars as stated hereinabove, no further question arises. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that Rule 206 is not mandatory. The language of the said Rule is clear and unambiguous. It not only says that the tenders must be in their required Form but also stipulates the consequence of non-compliance thereto, the consequence being that the tenders not containing all the particulars 'shall be liable to be rejected'. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed, the decision of the Division Bench which is impugned in this appeal is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored.
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2001 (5) TMI 978 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uted. But instead of prosecuting the company if a payee opts to prosecute only the persons falling within the second or third category the payee can succeed in the case only if he succeeds in showing that the offence was actually committed by the company. The provisions do not contain a condition that prosecution of the company is a sine qua non for prosecution of other persons who fall within the second and the third categories mentioned therein. The Court held that even if the company is not prosecuted for one or the other reason, the other prosecuted persons cannot, on that score alone, escape from the penal liability created through the legal fiction envisaged in Section 141 of the Act. 4. In this view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The trial court is directed to proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
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2001 (5) TMI 977 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ra of ₹ 15 crores (rupees fifteen crores) each with a bank guarantee for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Judge; 2. On their behalf counsel will remain present on the date of posting of the matter and would not ask for adjournment on the ground that the appellants are not present in India. 3. The appellants will remain present before the Special Judge as and when their presence is needed in the case. 4. If there is any violation of the aforesaid conditions, it would be open to the Special Judge to pass appropriate orders for cancellation of bail of the appellants. 8. In any case, this order would not adversely affect further proceedings in the trial Court and the Court will deal with the matter without being influenced in any way by this order or any observations made in the order passed by the High Court. 9. This interim measure is upto 20th August, 2001 and the matter be listed before this Court on 7th August, 2001 for further hearing and directions.
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2001 (5) TMI 976 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nch decision in Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore Vs. Surya Roshini Ltd. 2001 (42) RLT 817. Since the impugned order is no longer in force, we direct the jurisdictional authority to consider the issue raised in this case also while passing fresh orders in pursuance of the decision of this Tribunal in Final Order No.131-134/2001-B. 2. The appeal is disposed of as above.
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2001 (5) TMI 975 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... temporary injunction a strong prima facie case will have to be established. It has also to be borne in mind whether the appellant had also honestly and concurrently used the trade marks or there are other special circumstances arising in the matter. The courts below have merely looked at what the prima case is and tried to decide the matter without considering the various other aspects arising in the matter. Therefore, we think, the appropriate order to be made is that injunction either in the favour of the appellant or against them or vice-versa is not appropriate and the proceedings in the suit shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible or the Registrar under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 may decide the matter which may govern the rights of the parties. The order made by the High Court shall stand set aside and it is made clear that there shall be no order of temporary injunction in favour of either party. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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2001 (5) TMI 974 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Section 51 of the Merchant Shipping Act. Therefore, in terms of the provisions of Section 3(15), this Court will be the High Court in relation to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 vessels because part of cause of action for institution of the suit has arisen at Bombay. 14. It is common ground before me that the agreement of mortgage as also the agreement of guarantee were entered into at Bombay and the amount of loan was also paid at Bombay. The amount, as per the agreements, was also to be repaid at Bombay and therefore, it can be safely said that part of the cause of action for institution of the suit has arisen at Bombay and therefore, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In the result therefore, issue Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are answered in the affirmative. It is held that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Parties to act on the copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate/Personal Secretary as true copy. Certified copy expedited.
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2001 (5) TMI 973 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w to be heard on the crucial date, if they had filed their objections within the stipulated period. If the objections or any of them are allowed, the draft scheme shall meet the fate consistently with the decision on objections and the approved scheme dated 29.5.93 shall be accordingly modified or annulled in so far as routes specified at serial nos. 2 to 39 are concerned. In the event of the objections being dismissed, the approved scheme, as notified on 29.5.93, shall continue to remain in operation. At the risk of repetition we would like to make it clear that in so far as Saharanpur-Delhi route is concerned, no objection in that regard shall be heard and the scheme as regards the said route shall be deemed to have been approved and maintained in terms of this court's direction in Ram Krishna Verma's case (supra). No order as to the costs. 12. All the appeals and the intervention applications shall be deemed to have been disposed of in terms of the above direction.
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2001 (5) TMI 972 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... Stamp Act cannot force upon the party to compulsorily pay the stamp duty. Such compulsion is imposed only upon the party's insistence for registration of the document and not otherwise. In such circumstances, the imposition of deposit of 50% of the amount towards the differential stamp duty as a condition for referring the matter to the Collector runs beyond the scope, intendment and object of the Act and, thus, offends equal protection of laws guaranteed under Article 14 of Indian Constitution and thus, is arbitrary and the said proviso to Section 47-A of Indian Stamp Act which reads “Provided that no reference shall be made by the registering officer unless an amount equal to fifty per cent of the deficit duty arrived at by him is deposited by the party concerned”. is unconstitutional and is accordingly struck-down. Now, the Registering Officer shall refer the document to the Collector without any conditions attached. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.
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2001 (5) TMI 971 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... of Orders passed by the Court of Sessions. Of course cancellation of bail has to be on principles set out hereinabove and only in appropriate cases. 18. Further, even if it is an interlocutory order, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not affected by the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 on the basis of self-imposed restriction is a different aspect. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends of justice, the High Court can interfere with the order which causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified. Re. Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra 1978CriLJ165 and Krishnan and Another v. Krishnaveni and Another 19. In this case, as indicated above, bail has been cancelled for very valid and cogent reasons. 20. Accordingly we see no substance in these Appeals. The same stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2001 (5) TMI 970 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ears or more and would cover only those offences for which punishment could be imprisonment for a clear period of 10 years or more. Under Section 386 punishment provided is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and also fine. That means, imprisonment can be for a clear period of 10 years or less. Hence, it could not be said that minimum sentence would be 10 years or more. Further, in context also if we consider clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2), it would be applicable in case where investigation relates to an offence punishable (1) with death; (2) imprisonment for life; and (3) imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. It would not cover the offence for which punishment could be imprisonment for less than 10 years. Under Section 386 of the IPC, imprisonment can very from minimum to maximum of 10 years and it cannot be aid that imprisonment prescribed is not less than 10 years. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (5) TMI 969 - ITAT JODHPUR
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... ... ..... f evident, may be rectified under section 254(2) in order to properly give necessary consequential effects to the aforesaid order of the Tribunal. In the case of ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi 1969 71 ITR 815 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. 5.We, therefore, modify our aforesaid order to the effect that the following part be inserted as para No. 8A after para No. 8 and before para No. 9 of the said order. "8A. "Before we part with this order, we may specify, for the sake of clarity, that if the assesed income falls below the returned income after giving effects to this order, the Assessing Officer is directed to restrict the same to the income returned by the assessee." 6. In the result, this miscellaneous application of the Revenue is allowed as indicated above.
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2001 (5) TMI 968 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gh as per the written statement as many as 16 or 17 Assistant Excise Officers are said to have been promoted to the post of Senior post i.e. District Excise Officer but the duty is cast by the rules on the Government to determine the strength from time to time. It cannot be said to have been accomplished only by making promotions without determining the strength. It is upto the State Government to determine the strength as per requirement; it can be 4 or more but to remove the ambiguity, it shall be appropriate that the State Government determines the strength now within six months of the cadre of the District Excise Officer so that mandate of Rule 4(2) is complied with. 10. For the reason that the writ petition is being dismissed and, therefore, there is hardly any necessity to go into the preliminary objection raised by the respondent about the locus standi of the petitioners who filed the writ petition. 11. With the above-said observations, the writ petition is dismissed.
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2001 (5) TMI 967 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... its interests. Leading out of major portion of the land for other purposes may not be in the best interests of the Trust. The Charity Commissioner while granting permission under Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act could have explored these possibilities. Therefore, we are constrained to remit the matter to the Charity Commissioner to take a fresh decision in the matter. There could be fresh advertisements inviting fresh proposals and the proposal of the 5th respondent could also be considered. The Charity Commissioner may himself formulate and impose just and proper conditions so that it may serve the best interests of the Trust. We direct that the Charity Commissioner shall take a decision at the earliest. We allow the appeal as indicated above and remit the matter to the Charity Commissioner in modification of the orders of the High Court in Writ Petition and that of Charity Commissioner. 10. The appeals is thus disposed of without, however, any order as to costs.
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