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Showing 1 to 20 of 654 Records
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2003 (9) TMI 827 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is whether the question relating to penalty of tax should be reconsidered afresh. In the present case, the explanation of the petitioner that such vehicle, i.e. excavators were not being considered as motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act and no registration was necessary appears to be correct, and only after Supreme Court's decision, it has been clarified that such vehicles are required to be registered and taxes are required to be paid. In such view of the matter, it is evident that the petitioner did not have any intention to flout the provisions contained in the Act and the non-payment of tax was not intentional and therefore, it would not be proper to direct any further enquiry in the matter. It is further made clear that the petitioner is liable to pay the tax. Only the imposition of penalty is being quashed. 9. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Consequently, WPMP No. 58235 of 2002 is closed.
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2003 (9) TMI 826 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t No.3 and its selection cannot be faulted. Besides t he respondent No.3 had bid pursuant to the tender notice and participated in the proceedings before the Selection Committee. It cannot now take advantage of any alleged vagueness in the tender notice. One further aspect needs clarification, that is, the period of tender notice. It appears fro m the official records which were noted by the High Court that the event was a three year one. The mentioning of the actual years did not limit the period. That is also how the offers of the tenderers were assessed and scrutinised. In any event the respondent No.3 having effectively stopped the operation of the three years period by reason of the writ proceedings before the Division Bench of the High Court, the appellant must not be denied the benefit which it would otherwise have got had the writ petition not been filed. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. The decision of the High Court is set aside. I.A.No.2 of 2003 is dismissed.
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2003 (9) TMI 825 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ra, the Rule is not to enable the Plaintiffs after they fail to conduct the suit with proper care and diligence, hence the lower appellate Court is right in dismissing the application to withdraw the suit. The decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts and circumstance of the case on hand. Therefore, interference of this Court is unwarranted. 16. With the result, the revision fails, liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. No costs. Connected CMP is closed. What are all stated above need not be taken into account by the appellate Court at the time of deciding the appeal on merits. 17. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prays this Court to observe the right of the petitioners herein to approach the appellate Court for adducing additional evidence. Such an observation may not be required. In case such a petition is filed, it is for the appellate Court to decide the same on its own merits and in accordance with law.
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2003 (9) TMI 824 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onouncements covering the field itself, the decision reported in 1998 Cal Cri LR 287 (Supra), MANU/TN/0291/1999 (Mad) (Supra) and MANU/AP/0751/2001 (AP) (Supra) in my humble opinion, have no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the present case and as such upon overall assessment of the materials available in the Instant case, I hold with certainty that the allegations contained in the petition of complaint against petitioner No. 2 are not sufficient enough to proceed under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act. 22. Now, in view of what I have stated in the preceding paragraphs, I hold with certainty that this is a fit case where quashing of the aforesaid proceeding should be allowed. Consequently, the proceeding being case No. 1070-C/2001 under Section 138 of the N.I. Act pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Tamluk, Dist. Midnapore be quashed. 23. Xerox certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties with utmost expedition.
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2003 (9) TMI 823 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Taz Mulk Ansari and Ors. relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant has no applicability since that was a case of Clause (a) of Section 6N and, therefore, Section 2(g) had no relevance. 12. The High Court has rightly concluded that the termination of the respondents was in violation of Section 6N read with Section 2(g) of the UP Act. 13. Regarding denial of back wages to the respondents, in our view, no interference is called for having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case including the circumstance of the financial position of the appellant and the proceedings before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. 14. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. The Special Leave Petition No. 18267 of 2003 (CC-3847/2000) is also dismissed. The respondents are directed to be reinstated from November, 2003. They shall be paid wages from the month of November, 2003. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 822 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd Anr., IV (2003) SLT 335 2003 AIR SCW 3258, the Supreme Court has noted the circumstances under which the power can be invoked under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In view of the above and when kept in mind the facts of the case, at this stage, the proceedings initiated against the petitioners cannot be quashed as no such case is made out for that and, consequently, the petition deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the petition is dismissed. However, it is open to the petitioners to plead before the Trial Court by filing proper memo or application, as the case may be, that the second petitioner (Sundeep S. Rao) alone as the Managing Director was the person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm and taken the responsibility/ liability for the cheques in question and, as such, others need not be proceeded with further and, if such a memo or application is made, the Trial Court to pass an appropriate order on its merits in accordance with law.
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2003 (9) TMI 821 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... se. In the present case in addition to the fact that the appellant A-2 has been acquitted of the charges relating to Section 302 IPC, there is no material to bring in application of Section 201 by attributing knowledge of the commission of the offence to her. It is rightly contended by Mr. Lalit that the charges framed were for causing disappearance of evidence. Though in a given case defective charge does not vitiate trial in terms of Section 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1908, (for short 'the Code') where the omission is vital and even the substance of accusations is totally different from what is sought to be established by the prosecution, and there is no evidence on record to attribute knowledge of commission of the offence by the other accused that can be an additional factor for acquitting the accused. Looked at from any angle conviction of the appellant-accused A-2 cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The bail bonds are cancelled.
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2003 (9) TMI 820 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ence. That per se was not a ground to find the evidence as tainted. The eye-witnesses have described the incident with graphic detail and except minor discrepancies which do not in any way corrode the prosecution version, their testimony has remained unshaken in spite of incisive cross examination. The trial Court had carefully scrutinized their evidence and acted on it. On the contrary, the High Court without even indicating any plausible reason as to why the evidence was not acceptable, has chosen to ignore it and characterize it as unreliable. By a cryptic judgment more based on surmises and conjectures than appraisal of evidence, the High Court has discarded it. That being the position, inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment is indefensible and deserves to be set aside which we direct. Judgment of the Trial Court is restored. The appeal is allowed. The respondents who are on bail are directed to surrender to custody to serve remainder of the sentence.
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2003 (9) TMI 819 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The starting point of course would be the enquiry as to the necessity for taking the deceased to the hospital on 15.10.1983 where DW-3 examined him. If on further enquiry and on the basis of materials collected it appears that the accused who is being acquitted had a role to play, it shall be open to the authorities to initiate proceedings for action and the same shall be taken notwithstanding the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and affirmed by us. This is so, because on the materials now placed on record the acquittal was justified. Action will also be taken against the officials who did not register the FIR and the authorities, who were requested to conduct the crime branch enquiry but yet do not appear to have done anything in the matter. Our awarding compensation also shall not be considered as a factor to decide either way as to whether any particular official was responsible for custodial torture. The appeal stands dismissed with the aforesaid observations.
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2003 (9) TMI 818 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... - 2000 (115) E.L.T. 163. The order of this Court affirming the view of the Tribunal is reported in 2000 (121) E.L.T. A225 (S.C.) in Commissioner of Central Excise v. Sanat Products Ltd. The appeals are accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 817 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urther, it is impossible to prove by positive evidence the basis for doubting integrity of the judicial officer. In the present day system, reliance is required to be placed on the opinion of the higher officer who had the opportunity to watch the performance of the concerned officer from close quarters and formation of his opinion with regard to overall reputation enjoyed by the concerned officer would be the basis. 26. It is to be reiterated that for keeping the stream of justice unpolluted, repeated scrutiny of service records of judicial officers after specified age/completion of specified years of service provided under the Rules is must by each and every High Court as the lower judiciary is the foundation of judicial system. We hope that the High Courts would take appropriate steps regularly for weeding out the dead-wood or the persons polluting justice delivery system. 27. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs, quantified at ₹ 5000/- in each appeal.
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2003 (9) TMI 816 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uld show only their names as plaintiffs. Can we say that the persons whose names are in the suit title are the only parties to the suit? The answer would be in the negative. The named plaintiffs being the representatives of the public at large which is interested in the trust, all such interested persons would be considered in the eyes of law to be parties to the suit. A suit under Section 92 CPC is thus a representative suit and as such binds not only the parties named in the suit-title but all those who share common interest and are interested in the trust. It is for that reason that Explanation VI to Section 11 of CPC constructively bars by res judicata the entire body of interested persons from re-agitating the matters directly and substantially in issue in an earlier suit under Section 92 CPC. 21. Judged in the background of the legal parameters and the factual matrix highlighted above, the appeals are without merit and deserve dismissal which we direct. Costs made easy.
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2003 (9) TMI 815 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is mentioned in the statement of accounts. 23. In view of respective stand of the parties and the evidence led by the plaintiffs, the entries in the statement of account Ex.PX stand proved from the statement of PW1 K.K. Parbhakar Branch Manager and PW2 S.S. Gill. The defendants have failed to dispute any such entry and are thus liable to pay the amount found due on the basis of statement Ex.PX i.e. a sum of ₹ 6240.59P. The plaintiff is also entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum as the agreement Ex.P1 contemplates interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the amount due drawn by the defendants in terms of cash credit limit. 24. In view of my above findings, the appeal is accepted. The judgment and decree passed by the courts below is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs for the recovery of ₹ 6240.59P along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. from the date of the filing of the suit till realisation.
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2003 (9) TMI 814 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n Ganaori Sao. Because of an Intervening situation, the disappearance of the cash due to theft by somebody else the bank drafts could not have been prepared and handed over to the appellant. Even if there is loss of money, the ingredients necessary to constitute criminal breach of trust are absent. If due to a fortuitous or intervening situation, a person to whom money is entrusted is incapacitated from carrying out the job, that will not bring in application of Section 405 IPC or Section 409 IPC, unless misappropriation, or conversion to personal use or disposal, of property is established. Unfortunately, the courts below have not looked at the issues from these vitally relevant angles. The inevitable conclusion is that accused persons cannot be convicted under Section 409 IPC. This, however, will not stand in the way of the appellant getting such relief as available, in law otherwise by pursuing a suitable remedy. 11. The appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.
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2003 (9) TMI 813 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from plying of truck. It is not a pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and fact. As per the case of CIT v. Manjeet Stone Co. (supra) also it is not necessary that unless the assessee undertakes the transportation business 40 per cent depreciation cannot be allowed. The insistence and thrust was upon the fact that whether there is any income from hiring of the truck, with the exception that a nominal income may not be taken as income from hiring of the truck. In this case, on the material produced on the record, the finding of fact has been recorded by the learned Tribunal that the assessee has receipts from hiring of the truck and that, as said earlier, is also substantial, which is not a perverse finding. 9. Taking into consideration the matter from any angle we are satisfied that no question of law does arise in the matter for our consideration. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, this application fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 812 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the promise." 11. Undoubtedly, if the promisor abstains from doing something that could be consideration for the contract. However, in the supplemental agreement there is no mention that the consideration is non-enforcement of bank guarantees. Further the Respondents had delivered the dal. The Appellants has accepted the dal. Thus the Respondents could not be said to be in breach of the original agreement. If the Respondents were not in breach of the original agreement, then the bank guarantees could not have been enforced by the Appellant. Lastly and most importantly in the suit it is not claimed that the consideration for the supplemental agreement was not the enforcement of the bank guarantees. 12. For all these reasons, we are in agreement with the reasoning given in the impugned judgment that the supplemental agreement was without consideration. 13. We therefore see no reason to interfere. Accordingly the Appeal stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 811 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... s connected documents. We find no ground to entertain the review petition which is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2003 (9) TMI 810 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he High Court should have considered this aspect. It was pointed out that the question whether Section 195 applies to documents forged prior to the proceedings in which they are tendered has, due to conflict of decisions, been referred to a 5 Judge bench. We see no substance in this submission. The law on the point is clear. At the stage of investigation Section 195 has no application. We are therefore not concerned with the question whether Section 195 applies to documents forged/fabricated prior to their being produced in Court. That question only arises after the Court takes cognizance. At this stage the only question is whether the investigation should be permitted to proceed or not. As stated above there is no ground or reason on which the complaint/FIR can be quashed. 11. For the above reasons the impugned order needs to be and is accordingly set-aside. The petition for quashing will stand dismissed. The Appeal is allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to cost.
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2003 (9) TMI 809 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Kapur, are already on regular bail. The material collected by CBI during investigation would constitute what offence can be considered only after investigation is complete and challan filed. Needless to say that conduct involving moral violations by itself cannot constitute a proof for an offence. For any moral deviation, a person may suffer social condemnation. Even a grossly vicious conduct, when alleged to be an offence, has to be established in accordance with the procedure established by law. 6. For the foregoing reasons, order dated 4.6.2003, granting, interim bail to the petitioner, is confirmed. Petitioner shall remain on bail pending final disposal of the case, on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of ₹ 50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. Bail bond be executed within two weeks. 7. Any observation made in this order would not affect the merits of the case during trial. Petition stands disposed of. Order dusty.
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2003 (9) TMI 808 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e State were not covered by the Act. As already noticed above, this plea was rejected by the High Court with which we are in agreement. Neither there was a plea nor material placed before El Court or High Court as to how many employees were working in the toddy shops in question from the beginning or whether the same employees continued/required to work in those shops even though the licensees changed or whether the new licensees could change or reduce the number of employees in existing toddy shops. In the absence of necessary pleas the High Court was right in rejecting the contention urged on behalf of the appellants based on Section 1(6) of the Act. The question of law based on Section 1(6) of the Act is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. Thus, we do not find any merit in any one of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants. In our view, the impugned judgment does not call for any interference. Hence the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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