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Showing 21 to 40 of 655 Records
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2005 (7) TMI 712 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ngly rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay raised by the petitioner-appellant and the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 17. In view of the above said facts, circumstances of the case, settled law and current judicial thinking of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other observations made hereinbefore, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 2.7.1999 passed by the District Judge, Bijnor in Civil Misc. Case No. 223 of 1999, dismissing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is hereby quashed. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the petitioner is allowed, in consequence of which the incidental order passed by the lower appellate Court dismissing the appeal as barred by time is also quashed. The matter is remitted back to the lower appellate court. The appeal preferred by the petitioner before the lower appellate court shall be registered and decided in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
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2005 (7) TMI 711 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the issue of promissory estoppel raised in the petition is not seriously pressed in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kasinka Trading and anr vs Union of India and The Sales Tax Officer vs Shree Durga Oil Mills (supra). We may also mention that a challenge is also raised by the petitioners to the levy of fees by the DGFT on the basis of the value of the application for duty free certificate and we find absolutely no substance in the said challenge. 35. In the result the petition is partly allowed. Public Notice dated 28th January 2004 is quashed and set aside. As far as Notifications dated 2lst and 23rd April 2004 are concerned, it is declared that the said notifications will have only prospective operation and the exports made by the petitioners prior to the said notifications in respect of the classes of goods covered by the said notifications shall be liable to be computed for the purpose of determining the entitlement of the petitioners. No order as to costs.
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2005 (7) TMI 710 - ITAT AMRITSAR
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... ... ..... ed all the facts, which were supported from the material, therefore, there is no question of treating the same income from undisclosed sources. Considering the above discussion, the orders of the authorities below are set aside and the Assessing Officer is directed to treat the income of ₹ 16,56,415 as business income. This ground of appeal of the assessee is accordingly allowed. Issue No. 4 - 29. The issue of charging of interest under sections 234B and 234C of the Income-tax Act is consequential as is admitted by the learned counsel for the assessee. It is also stated that the brought forward losses of the earlier year are also consequential which is depended upon the findings of the issue decided in this appeal. The Assessing Officer shall take the appropriate action with regard to the brought forward losses in view of our findings on the main issue. 30. No other issue is pressed or argued. 31. As a result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.Bottom of Form
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2005 (7) TMI 709 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d the High Court was right in holding accordingly. See the following observations of this Court in the case of Sulochana Amma v. Narayan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14 - "(It was) contended that the remedy of injunction is an equitable relief and in equity, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be extended to a decree of a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction. We find no force in the contention. It is settled law that in a suit for injunction when title is in issue for the purpose of granting injunction, the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties. When the same issue is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit the decree in the injunction suit equally operates as res judicata." For the reasons aforesaid, these two appeals preferred by the appellant are dismissed and the judgment of the High Court is upheld. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs in these appeals.
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2005 (7) TMI 708 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the four firms have their office at 107-108, Super Shopping Complex, Bajaj Cross Road, Kandivali West, Bombay. There is also no dispute that the raid had taken place at that office premises and in pursuance of the said search and seizure action at the said common office premises on 18th April, 95, the Petitioner thereafter had made a declaration of ₹ 1.2 crores as undeclared on money. Thereafter, Mr.Tanna made a disclosure that it would be of some other firm. The contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent is that in the application for Voluntary Disclosure Scheme made on 26th December, 1996 in which he had failed to disclose all the relevant material. Over and above, the Petitioner was called upon to furnish details as to the connection with regard to the firms. But even till date from Mr.Tanna all details and particulars of parternership firms are not forthcoming. Under these circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere and the Petition stands dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 707 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... could not have manufactured all these quantities over and above their regular clearances on payment of duty. The Ld. Commissioner did not record any findings on this aspect. 21. The very first statement of Shri Manoj Sharma, Proprietor of M/s. Engineering Industries, recorded on 23-7-1997 (Page 176) confirms that M/s. Engineering Industries were manufacturing condensers of refrigeration and air-conditioning and spares thereof. Therefore, the allegation that M/s. Engineering Industries were not manufacturing the goods in question is not correct. 22. In the light of the aforesaid observations and discussions at length and in the light of earlier judgment of this Tribunal in appellants’ own case vide Order No. A/640, 641/WZB/2005/C-III, dated 27-5-2005 2006 (201) E.L.T. 201 (Tri - Mumbai) , the impugned Order passed by the Commissioner is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed with consequential relief, if any. (Pronounced in Court on 15-7-2005)
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2005 (7) TMI 706 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n miscarriage of justice, ordinarily the criminal investigation cannot be quashed. This principle is well settled and is not necessary to burden this judgment with the precedents except making a reference to R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, ; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Cri LJ 527 (SC) (supra) and State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Permal, . 30. In the result, for the above reasons, Crime No. 20 of 2003 insofar as it is under Sections 409, 420 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 is quashed and insofar as the crimes under Section 65 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the criminal petitions are dismissed. The C.I.D. Police, which registered Crime No. 20 of 2003, is directed to complete investigation and file a final report before the Metropolitan Magistrate competent to take cognizance of the case within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. 31. The criminal petitions are accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 705 - SUPREME COURT
Payment of ad valorem court fee - Non-disclosure of any cause of action - Whether the trial court and the High Court were right in holding that the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was liable to rejection - HELD THAT:- In the present suit, the relief indirectly claimed is of declaring the sale deed of 5.5.1953 to be not really a sale deed but a loan transaction. Relief of reconveyance of property under alleged oral agreement on return of loan has been deliberately omitted from the relief clause. In our view, the present plaint is liable to rejection, if not on the ground that it does not disclose 'cause of action', on the ground that from the averments in the plaint, the suit is apparently barred by law within the meaning of Clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure.
The High Court does not seem to be right in rejecting the plaint on the ground that it does not disclose any 'cause of action'. In our view, the trial court was right in coming to the conclusion that accepting all averments in the plaint, the suit seems to be barred by limitation. On critical examination of the plaint as discussed by us above, the suit seems to be clearly barred on the facts stated in the plaint itself. The suit as framed is prima facie barred by the law of limitation, provisions of Specific Relief Act as also under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This is a fit case not only for rejecting the plaint but imposing exemplary costs on the appellant on the observations of this Court in the case of T. Arvindam v. T.V. Satyapal [1977 (10) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT].
In the result, the appeal fails with costs incurred throughout by the respondents to be paid by the appellants. A further cost in the sum of ₹ 10,000 (Rupees ten thousand only) is imposed on the appellant to be paid to the respondents for prosecuting and prolonging litigation up to this Court in a hopelessly barred suit.
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2005 (7) TMI 704 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng to this conclusion, the Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Katta Sujatha (Smt.) vs . Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2002)7SCC655 as also the judgment of this Court in the case of Cdr. Shekhar Singh Vs. N.K. Wahi 2003 1 JCC 52. 5. In the present case, it is clear that the complainant has alleged nothing against the petitioner except saying that she is the Director of the accused company. The allegation that she is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company is merely a bald allegation without any consequence because he does not specify how the petitioner is so responsible and on what basis such allegation is made in the complaint. The Metropolitan Magistrate was, Therefore, not justified in summoning the petitioner in the five complaints mentioned above. I am, Therefore, constrained to allow the five petitions and quash the impugned orders and discharge the petitioner in all these complaints.
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2005 (7) TMI 703 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mmoning the Respondent No.2. The learned Judge by the impugned order has rejected the Application. In my view the Application could not have been rejected as the Respondent No.2 who has filed affidavit of examination-in-chief will have to step into the witness box and offer himself for cross-examination by the Petitioner-accused. There can be re-examination of the Respondent No.2, if permissible, in accordance with the law. Therefore, while rejecting the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, the impugned order will have to be modified to some extent. 16. Accordingly, the following order is passed in all the petitions (i) The impugned order dated 2nd April 2005 is modified by directing the Respondent No.2 to make himself available for cross-examination by the Petitioners or by the Advocate for the Petitioners. (ii) The Petitions are disposed of accordingly. (iii) The parties and the concerned Court to act on an authenticated copy of this order.
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2005 (7) TMI 702 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the Arbitral Tribunal is still in the process of adjudication of the claims and counter claims of the parties and has yet to make its Award. Therefore, at this stage it cannot be said if the petitioner or the respondent would succeed on their claims or counter claims and if so, to what extent. The present petition and the prayer made therein appears to be wholly pre-mature. This was precisely the main reason which has weighed with the Arbitral Tribunal in declining a similar prayer made by the petitioner by means of an application under Section 17 of the Act. 15. Thus having considered the matter in its entirety and as a result of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition has no merits and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. is No.9853/2003 is allowed and the ad-interim ex-parte injunction order dated 25.5.2003 stands vacated. The petition and is No.9853/2003 stand disposed of accordingly.
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2005 (7) TMI 701 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Ors. 1960 1SCR773 ). Contemporaneous documents clearly show that the complainant right from the beginning had accepted the position that the branch had got knocked off the tree because of storm. If he wanted to explain the admission, the onus was on him to adduce material to show the contrary. Such material has to be of clinching nature so as to outweigh the admission. The National Commission did not consider these aspects. The State Commission's approach was also not in the correct direction. In the aforesaid background it would be in the interest of justice to remit the matter to the National Commission for hearing the matter afresh. It shall permit the parties to place such evidence in support of their respective stands if they want to adduce such evidence. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on either of the respective stands. The appeal is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2005 (7) TMI 700 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... grounds, we would still issue a direction to the Respondents to comply with the directions issued by the Division Bench in its order dated 4th February, 2004 in relation to the decision of the application of the Petitioner for allotment of alternative plots in terms of the policy of the administration. Once a direction was issued by the Division Bench, it was expected of the Respondents to act in terms of the judgment expeditiously. Period of more than 5 months have passed, but the Respondents have taken no steps except writing a letter to the Petitioner. In these circumstances, we direct the concerned respondents to ensure compliance of the order of the Division Bench, failing which they would be liable to be proceeded against in accordance with law. An appropriate order should be passed by the Respondents in terms of the Division Bench judgment, expeditiously and without fail. 7. For the reasons aforestated, all the three applications filed by the Petitioner are dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 699 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... position, the case is posted for pronouncing the judgment. 18. In Kasiappa Gounder v. Karuppan , this Court has taken the view that 'after the commencement of the trial, in view of the embargo available under Order 6 Rule 17 proviso, the amendment is not permissible.' 19. Thus, the decisions available, on this question of law, are also uniform and therefore, there should be judicial consistency. I am constrained to follow the above decisions, in addition to the facts established in this case, as recorded by me supra. 20. For the foregoing reasons, the revision deserves acceptance, warranting interference of this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the revision is allowed. The order of the learned Additional District Munsif, Tiruchendur in I.A. No. 126 of 2004 in O.S. No. 110 of 2002, dated 29.3.2004, is set aside, dismissing the said I.A. Parties are directed to bear costs of their own. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 398 of 2004 is closed.
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2005 (7) TMI 698 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ary implication. Moreover, the very purpose of the Securitisation Act is for speedy recovery of dues against defaulting borrowers and hence we should taken an interpretation which furthers that object. 7. There is no dispute that more than three-fourth of the secured creditors resolved to take action under the Securitisation Act and gave their consent for that purpose. In our opinion, once a decision has been taken by the secured creditors representing not less than three-fourth in value of the amount outstanding and consent has been given, it will amount to a measure taken to recover the secured debt under section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act. 8. As such the petitioner has a right to file an appeal under section 17 of the Securitisation Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The petitioner can take all such legal and factual pleas, as advised, before the Tribunal. Both the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Connected WPMP Nos.39502/2003 and 4967/2005 are dismissed.
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2005 (7) TMI 697 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... viso to Section 14(2). Orders under Section 15(1) are still to be passed which are not for the benefit of the tenant but for the benefit of the landlord. Again in the case of Subhash Chander v. Arjan Kaur reported as 23(1983)DLT48 , this court held that where tenant deposited rent under Section 15(1) and took benefit under Section 14(2), in the second application for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) even if he deposited rent under Section 15(1) he was still liable for eviction. This view was reiterated by this court in the case of Smt. Kamla Devi v. Shri Sadhu Ram reported as 82(1999)DLT97 and in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Ram Gopal reported as 22(1982)DLT188 . 28. Consequently, the landlord is even otherwise entitled to the orders of eviction and I order accordingly. The possession is to be given to the landlord and the manner in which it should be given, has already been indicated above. This eviction petition is allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 29. No costs.
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2005 (7) TMI 696 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... templated by Section 141 of the Act, continuance of proceedings against petitioners 2 and 3 would be an abuse of process of law and so the proceedings against them are liable to be quashed. 5. First petitioner admittedly has drawn the dishonoured cheques. Those cheques were drawn by him as the proprietor of a proprietary concern. The fact that the concern of which first petitioner is the proprietor is not made an accused, is not much of consequence because the liability of the proprietary concern and the proprietor is joint and several. So, merely because the proprietary concern is not made an accused, the proprietor who acts on its behalf is not entitled to seek relief under Section 482, Cr. P.C. So, first petitioner has to take trial. 6. In the result, petition of the first petitioner is dismissed. Proceedings in C.C. No. 350 of 2004 on the file of XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad against petitioners 2 and 3 are quashed. 7. Accordingly, the petition is partly allowed.
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2005 (7) TMI 695 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unsel for the parties may be supplied copy of the report submitted by the Local Commissioner. At request, adjourned to 25th July, 2005.
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2005 (7) TMI 694 - KARKATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... counsel appearing for the council submits that, the writ petition has become infructuous in view of the fact that Annexure-F cannot be quashed at this length of time. It is not in dispute that, the quota which was allotted to the petitioner to ba, completed on or before 31.12.2004 and in view of the fact that said fact,Annexura-F cannot be quashed. Evan if the said Annexure is quashed, the petitioner cannot export the garment under the said entitlement. Therefore, the main prayer sought in the writ petition cannot be granted to the petitioner. 4. Then in regard to the additional prayer of the petitioner is concerned, this Court is also of the opinion that damages cannot be granted to the petitioner. since the respondents have dispute the liability to pay the damages, the petitioner has to file a separate suit before competent civil court for his redressal. In the circumstances, this writ petition is disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the civil court.
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2005 (7) TMI 693 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tition by raising any plea available to them under law); (B) Petition was also not maintainable in view of Suit No. 398/90 filed by Sh. A.P. Jain, which is pending in this court and the said suit seeks enforcement of family arrangements dated 26th September 1983, 21st September 1983 and 22nd July 1984. (C) In the family settlement dated 2nd July 1984 A.P. Jain group has transferred his entire group shareholding and management to B.R. Jain group. If the decree is passed in favour of the appellants herein in the said suit, nothing would survive in the present petition. As these issues are not decided by the CLB, it would be open for the respondents to press these issues and get the determination thereon. 17. This appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 27th July 1998 is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Company Law Board for disposal in accordance with law. No costs. 18. Parties shall appear before the Company Law Board on 8th August 2005.
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