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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 659 Records
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2006 (11) TMI 723 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ach case, the document in question has been considered and analysed and a conclusion arrived at on the issue of registration one way or the other on the consideration of the document. In the present case ,the document has been construed as being only evidence of deposit of the title documents and, thus, would not require registration. 27. It is apparent that the petitioner having mortgaged the property to secure forbearance to sue against the borrower is trying to defeat the rights of the respondent Corporation conferred under the statute being the SFC Act and this cannot be permissible. 28. In the end, it must be observed that the observations made by the courts below and by this Court are naturally only prima facie in nature since the matter in issue relates to the decision on interlocutory applications and will not influence the decision in the main suit. 29. The petition and the application are accordingly dismissed as being without any merit. CM No. 10684/2004 Dismissed.
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2006 (11) TMI 722 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Finance proceeded on a wrong premise that the Pension Scheme was not in existence and it was a new one. Two legal fictions, as noticed hereinbefore, were created, one by reason of the memorandum, and another by reason of the acceptance of the recommendations of the Fourth Central Pay Commission with effect from 1.1.1986. In terms of such legal fictions, it will bear repetition to state, the respondent Nos. 1 to 13 would be deemed to have switched over to the pension scheme, which a fortiori would mean that they no longer remained in the CPF scheme. 7. In that view of the matter the Single Judge was correct in allowing the writ petition filed by the private respondents herein with a rider that thereby the Union of India would not be liable to financial liability but the Division Bench could not have modified the same, as was sought to be done, by its order dated 16.9.2004. Subject to the aforementioned observations, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2006 (11) TMI 721 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed by Badan Singh PW1 and two other independent witnesses Aditya Chobey PW6 and Surender Rai Sharma PW11. 17. On consideration of the totality of the circumstances of this case, the prosecution has been able to establish on the basis of evidence on record that the respondent had received bribe and, therefore, he is guilty of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The respondent was convicted by the Special Judge on the basis of overwhelming evidence on record. The High Court without appreciating the facts of this case in proper perspective set-aside the judgment of the Special Court. The reasoning given by the High Court for setting aside the judgment cannot stand the test of scrutiny for a moment and in this view of the matter. Consequently, the judgment and sentence awarded by the Special Court is restored. The appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh deserves to be allowed. It is directed accordingly.
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2006 (11) TMI 720 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t can take into consideration the defense raised by the defendants on the merits of the case. Consequently, it is apparent that the plaint discloses cause of action against the defendant No. 2 and the plaint is not liable to be rejected against defendant No. 2 on the grounds as has been raised by defendant No. 2/applicant. 41. Considering the averments made in the plaint in the facts and circumstances, it can not be inferred that the suit has been instituted against a wrong person or there is a bona fide mistake in instituting the suit against the defendant No. 2. In the entirety of facts and circumstances, it can not be inferred that the presence of defendant No. 2 is not necessary for determination of real matter in dispute. 42. Therefore, the application of the defendant No. 2 for rejection of the plaint against him under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or for his deletion under Order 1 Rule 10 is dismissed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own cost.
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2006 (11) TMI 719 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o disprove the presumptions or to hold that the amount taken was repaid. The learned Magistrate, therefore, ought to have convicted the accused under Section 138 of the Act. 15. In view of the above, the appeal deserves to succeed, The impugned Order dated 14.11.2005 is hereby set aside. Consequently, the accused is hereby convicted under Section 138 of the Act. 16. The accused is hereby sentenced under Section 138 of the Act to undergo S.I. for ten days and to pay compensation of Rs. 85.000/- to the complainant in default to undergo three months S.I. At the request of the learned Counsel for the accused, the sentence imposed herein, is suspended for a period of four weeks to enable the accused to file appeal before the Supreme Court, as desired by him. The bail bonds executed by the accused pursuant to the Order of this Court dated 18.3.2006, before the learned J.M.F.C., Canacona, shall remain in force for the said period of four weeks after which they shall stand cancelled.
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2006 (11) TMI 718 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... using to summon witness P.K. Satyanathan on the ground that he happened to be the Government Pleader in District Court, Nagpur and that he had appeared on behalf of State in the bail application filed by the accused. On the ground of his appearance as an Advocate in the case, he cannot be held to have been dis-entitled from being a competent witness if his evidence is otherwise relevant. Applicants cannot be debarred from examining him in their defence for establishing their plea of alibi by his evidence. On due consideration of all the facts and circumstances appearing in the case and the legal propositions discussed hereinabove, I am of the opinion that this revision deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, this revision is allowed. Impugned order rejecting prayer of applicants to summon Dr. Anil Agrawal, Dr. R.K. Right and P.K. Satyanathan as witness in their defence is set aside. The trial Court is directed to summon the aforesaid witnesses in defence, in accordance with law.
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2006 (11) TMI 717 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e issued and status quo has been directed to be maintained by a Division Bench of the said court by an order dated 03.05.2006. The High Court is required to consider the said writ petition on its own merit. 17. So far as the decision of the first respondent herein, not to register a regular case so as to take up an investigation into the allegation against the concerned officers, is concerned, Appellant may have to pursue his own remedy keeping in view the fact that the first respondent before this Court has furnished the details of its findings in the preliminary inquiry as also the result of the departmental proceedings initiated against the delinquent officers. However, that part of the order whereby Appellant had been directed to pay a cost of Rs. 5,000/- is set aside. Subject to the observations and directions mentioned hereinbefore, the appeal is dismissed. However, keeping in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2006 (11) TMI 716 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... their jurisdiction over them. 2. The Ld. Advocate clarified that the demand has not been confirmed against the service receiver. In any case, the period of demand is from 1999-2000 to 16-8-2002 when there were no provisions for recovery of Service tax even from the service receiver, as per the Tribunal’s decision in the case of Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. CCE & C, Aurangabad, 2006 (3) S.T.R. 411 (T) 2005 (179) E.L.T. 481 (Tri.-Mum.), such provisions having been introduced with effect from 16-8-2002 cannot have retrospective effect. 3. After hearing the Ld S.D.R., we find that the appellant has a good prima facie case on merits inasmuch as the demand has been confirmed against a Singapore firm not falling within the jurisdiction of Service tax authorities in India. As such, we dispense with the condition of pre-deposit of duty and penalty. 4. Inasmuch as the short point is involved, we fix the appeal itself for final disposal on 27-11-06. (Pronounced in Court.)
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2006 (11) TMI 715 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ccordingly, for non-inclusion of Ram Bachan and Subhash Chandra appellant Nos. 13 and 14 in the Writ Petition filed before the High Court, it cannot be said that the writ petition was not maintainable in law. In view of the aforesaid finding, the question of abatement on the death of Siya Ram (father of Subhash Chandra) could not arise at all. 19. Accordingly, in our view, Ram Bachan and Subhash Chandra appellant Nos. 13 and 14 were not at all necessary parties to the Writ Petition No. 2736/1976 and the question of non-maintainability of the writ petitions before the High Court in their absence could not arise. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with the decisions cited by Dr. Padia in connection with the question of abatement on the death of Siya Ram and maintainability of the writ petition for their non-inclusion. Accordingly, this question is answered in the negative. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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2006 (11) TMI 714 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e sentences consecutive. That is this proviso has provided that in no case the aggregate of consecutive sentences passed against an accused shall exceed 14 years. In the instant case the aggregate of the two sentences passed against the appellant being 28 years clearly infringes the above proviso. It is accordingly not liable to be sustained. 8. In view of the proviso appended to Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a manifest error in sentencing the appellant for 20 years' Rigorous Imprisonment. The maximum sentence imposable being 14 years and having regard to the fact that the appellant is in custody for more than 12 years. Now, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be sub- served if the appellant is directed to be sentenced to the period already undergone. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. The appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.
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2006 (11) TMI 713 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... red by limitation? (b) If the above question is answered in the affirmative, whether the learned ITAT was correct in law in holding the assessment to be invalid having been made pursuant to a notice under Section 142 (1)(i) which was allegedly bad in law? The learned counsel for the parties are agreed that in view of the subsequent amendment, which has been made retrospective, the matter should be remanded to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for a fresh decision on merits. It is so ordered. The Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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2006 (11) TMI 712 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lodged at Jabalpur. Our attention was further drawn to the fact that the investigation of the case is complete. We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. We accordingly do so. 11. Although the complainant has filed an application before us for impleading herself as a party, nobody has appeared on her behalf. We, therefore, direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to issue notice to her. Keeping in view of the fact that Respondent No. 2 is residing at Datia, we would request the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to accommodate her in the matter of fixing the date (s) of hearing as far as possible. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.
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2006 (11) TMI 711 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y disclosed comes into his possession which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts.” The matter has also been considered by this Court in CWP No.398 of 2006, The Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural development Bank Limited, Chandigarh v. CIT-I and another, decided on 18.10.2006. In view of the above, we are of the view that the Tribunal rightly held that initiation of proceedings for the re-assessment was not permissible in absence of any fresh facts having come to light which were not previously disclosed or some information with regard to facts previously disclosed exposing untruthfulness of facts disclosed by the assessee being in possession of the Assessing Officer. Mere change of opinion or drawing of a different inference from the same facts as were earlier available, could not be a ground for re-assessment. For the above reasons, the question referred is answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. Reference is disposed of accordingly.
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2006 (11) TMI 710 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Accordingly, I pass the following order The writ petition is allowed. Order dated 5.5.2003 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore Rural District in Revision 25/2002-03 confirming the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Ramanagaram sub-division, Ramanagaram dated 28.6.2002 is set aside and the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Ramanagaram sub-division dated 28.6.2002 in RA.LKP.89/01-02 is set aside and remitted to the Assistant Commissioner, Ramanagaram sub-Division, Ramanagaram to consider the application for condonation of delay after affording opportunity to the petitioner to file objections to the application for condonation of delay and thereafter if sufficient ground is made out for condoning the delay and dispose of the appeal, in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Assistant Commissioner, Ramanagaram sub-division, Ramanagaram on 18.12.2006 to seek further instructions.
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2006 (11) TMI 709 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not be calculated from 30.11.1996 when envelopes were received back by the respondent/complainant. If the limitation is to be counted from 28.11.1996/29.11.1996, the last date for filing the complaint would be 13/14.1.1997. The complaint was filed on 16.1.1997, which would be beyond the period of limitation, though by two days only. Unfortunately, at that time there was no provision for condensation of delay. The result may be harsh to the complainant but that cannot be held in view of the legal position laid down by the Supreme Court and extracted above. The Courts would generally be liberal in condoning the period of limitation, particularly in such cases. But in the absence of provision authorising the Court to condone the delay, the Court would be helpless. Upshot of the discussion would be that the complaint filed by the respondent is time-barred. This petition accordingly succeeds. The summoning orders are quashed and the complaint is dismissed as time-barred. No costs.
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2006 (11) TMI 708 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ontroversy which is not of his making and since he was relieved from the post of the Principal of the Law College subsequent to the interim order passed by this Court in these appeals. It is submitted that though he was transferred as the Principal of another Institution, he could not take charge because of some interim orders passed by the High Court in a Writ Petition filed by some interested persons. Now, that we have clarified the position, we have, no doubt, that the authorities that be and the High Court will deal with the grievances of respondent No. 5 regarding his status and posting in an expeditious manner, if moved in that behalf and take an appropriate decision consistent with what we have stated in this judgment. 17. The appeals are thus allowed, the judgments of the High Court are set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the management is allowed and the Writ Petition filed by respondent No. 5 is dismissed. The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.
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2006 (11) TMI 707 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was brought on record or jurisdictional facts were not brought on record. 20. We are not oblivious of the proposition of law as was stated by Frankfurter, J. in J.J.O' Leary, Dy. Commnr., Fourteenth Compensation Distt. v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon Inc. 95 L. Ed 483 (1950) 340 US 504 that the court will not disturb a finding of an Administrative Tribunal when two views are possible and only because the appellate court can take a contrary view. But in the instant case, the Commissioner did not go into the jurisdictional facts not arrived at any finding based on any legal evidence in regard to the causal connection between the employment and the death. 21. We, therefore, are of the opinion that ultimate conclusion of the High Court may be correct. We although would not, thus, interfere with the impugned judgment, but would direct that in event any amount has been paid to Appellant the same need not be refunded. The Appeal is dismissed subject to the observations made hereinbefore
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2006 (11) TMI 706 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tice would be subserved if Appellants are given an opportunity of hearing. Keeping in view the fact that Appellants now know the allegations made against them, no fresh notice need be served. Appellants may file their returns and also all other books of accounts before the authorities under the Act within six weeks from date. The authorities shall give an opportunity of hearing to them and determine the question as to whether a jurisdictional fact existed for application of the provisions of the Act in cases of the respective employers. In the event, it is found, upon perusal of all the documents whereupon the employers may rely upon and on the basis of such information as may be sought for or directed to be furnished by the authority to the employer and upon hearing them that the provisions of the Act apply, the authorities may proceed as against them as is permissible in law. The appeals are allowed to the aforementioned extent. The impugned judgment is set aside. No costs.
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2006 (11) TMI 705 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the one punishable under Section 420 IPC, which is a compoundable offence and the bank is ready and willing to compound the same and has compromised / settled the dispute with the petitioners. So, whether the case is looked at from the standpoint of compromise or compromise coupled with merits, the ultimate effect would be the same. In the former case, treating the offence as one under Section 406 IPC, it would amount to quashing of the criminal complaint whereas in the latter case, considering the offence to be one under Section 420 IPC, it would amount to compounding. The effect would be the same?the criminal proceedings shall end. 22. Considering the fact that Section 406 IPC has been invoked by the investigating agency in the charge-sheet, I think it would be appropriate if the former route is taken and the FIR and all the proceedings pursuant thereto are quashed. Accordingly, these petitions are allowed and the said FIR and the proceedings pursuant thereto are quashed.
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2006 (11) TMI 704 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... urt. The Special Leave Petition dismissed. However, dismissal of this special leave petition will not prevent the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum.
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