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Money Laundering - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 13 of 13 Records
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2020 (8) TMI 938
Seeking direction for quashing of summons - illegal search and seizure proceedings conducted by the Respondent ED - HELD THAT:- As sought, let the respondents no.2 and 3 file replies within two weeks from today with an advance copy thereof to the learned counsel for petitioner through email. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be also filed within two weeks thereafter.
List on 12.10.2020 and in the meanwhile, the petitioner is directed to join the investigation as and when directed to do so, however there shall be no coercive action against him by the Department till the next date of hearing.
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2020 (8) TMI 937
Seeking grant of default bail with the aid of 167(2)(a)(ii) of Cr.P.C - whether in computation of period of 90 days or 60 days as contemplated in Section 167(2)(a) of Cr.P.C, the day of remand is to be included or excluded? - HELD THAT:- The anterior period of custody with the police prior to the remand is no detention pursuant to an authorization issued from the Magistrate. The period of detention by the Magistrate runs only from the date of order of first remand. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C pertain to the power of the Magistrate to remand an accused and there is no reason why the first day has to be excluded. The sub-section finds place in a provision which prescribe the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and distinct contingencies are carved out in sub-section (2); the first being the Magistrate authorizing the detention of the accused for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole, secondly, when the Magistrate do not consider further detention necessary and thirdly, the Magistrate authorise the detention beyond period of 15 days if adequate grounds exists for doing so. However, there is no time stipulated as to extension of custody beyond period of 15 days with a maximum limit on the same. The accused can be in magisterial custody for unlimited point of time if he is not admitted to bail. In order to avoid the long incarceration of an accused for the mere reason that the investigation is being carried out in a leisurely manner, prompted the legislature to confer a right on the accused to be released on bail if he is prepared to do so and the investigation can still continue.
As regards the applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 is concerned, which prescribe limitation in filing of suits, appeals and applications is concerned, the right of release being claimed as by way of default, there is no scope of applicability of the said enactment and in particular, Section 12 (1) and (2) since there is no decision/order, against which any Appeal/ Application is being preferred.
It is pertinent to note the recent three Judge bench decision of the Apex Court in case of S. Kasi Vs. State [2020 (6) TMI 727 - SUPREME COURT] where it is reiterated that the period u/s. 167 is inviolable and cannot be extended by the Supreme Court even while exercising its power under Article 142. The power of Magistrate authorizing detention of accused in custody by prescribing the maximum period, cannot be extended directly or indirectly by any Court with an exception contained in Special Statutes, which to that extent modify the applicability of Section 167 of the Code. Undue delay is not conducive to administration of criminal justice.
The impugned order passed by the Sessions Judge, excluding the first day of remand while computing the period of 60 days cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside and the filing of the chargesheet by the Directorate of Enforcement on 13th July 2020, being after of 60 days, by excluding the day of remand i.e. 14th May 2020, make the applicants entitled for default bail. They deserve to be released on bail in light of the right conferred u/s. 167(2)(a) (ii), if they are prepared to and furnish the bail.
Bail application allowed.
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2020 (8) TMI 889
Grant of Bail - HELD THAT:- Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, it is considered appropriate in the interests of justice to direct the release of the petitioner on bail.
The petitioner is directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹ 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court and subject to the conditions imposed - application allowed.
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2020 (8) TMI 876
Scope of appeal - Case of appellant is that the point of maintainability which goes to the root of the appeal, had not been considered by the tribunal while passing orders from time to time - HELD THAT:- The interim order made on 21st February 2020 records that the appeal would be taken up on 13th July 2020 - the interest of justice would be subserved if the tribunal is directed to hear out the appeal as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months from date by video link or any other mode.
The maintainability point shall be formally raised by the appellant by filing a supplementary affidavit before the tribunal by 7th September 2020, serving copies thereof on the respondents. The tribunal shall decide the point of maintainability as a preliminary issue - There cannot be indefinite continuance of the interim order. It is extended only till 31st December 2020 by which time the appeal should be disposed of by the tribunal.
Appeal disposed off.
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2020 (8) TMI 861
Provisional order of attachment by order - right cause before the wrong forum - sufficient cause for delay or not - Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - HELD THAT:- The expression "sufficient cause" has received the attention of this Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments. The expression "sufficient cause" which also finds a place in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been examined by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it has been consistently held that sufficient cause should receive liberal interpretation rather than pedantic approach. It is no doubt true that no litigant would stand to benefit by approaching the Courts belatedly. As such, wherever issue regarding delay would arise, there may be liberal approach while examining the plea of delay, it is not the length of delay, but it is the cause for delay which would be of paramount consideration. However long the delay might be, if the cause shown is sufficient or in the proximity of truth, such delay deserves to be condoned.
The writ petitions had been filed on 13.12.2016 and there is not even a whisper in the writ petitions as to what prevented the petitioners from challenging the order of Adjudicating Authority dated 14.09.2016. In other words, at every step, petitioners have been exhibiting laxity, negligence, carelessness and what is applicable to a rustic villager or a person who is not conversant with the worldly affairs, i.e., to plead ignorance about nuances of filing appeals, cannot be extended to the petitioners herein because first petitioner was a Group 'A' officer in Government of Karnataka and the second appellant is none other than his wife. In other words, they are fully conversant with the nuances of filing petitions and appeals as is evident from their acts in challenging orders passed by authorities in different forums at different stages.
There is no question of law much less substantial question of law as framed in the appeal memorandum which requires to be framed in these appeals to be adjudicated and answered - Appeal dismissed.
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2020 (8) TMI 856
Jurisdiction for initiation of proceedings under the provisions of PML Act - absence of conviction of the offender for the "predicate offence" - Proceeds of crime - HELD THAT:- "Offence of money laundering" is expansively defined u/s. 3 and the Explanation inserted by amendment 2019 to this section & to section 44, being clarificatory of the legal position ab inceptio, applies to the case of the petitioner, contend Mr. Prasanna Kumar & Mr. Jayakar Shetty; they justified this submission through interpretative process - the expansive definition of the "offence of Money-Laundering" as it existed prior to insertion of aforesaid Explanation also covers the case of petitioner; now that, the challenge to the CBI investigation is held to be unsustainable, petitioner's case has been rendered worse; therefore, the submission that the impugned communication is without competence or justification, does not merit acceptance.
There are no other ground having been urged and both the writ petitions being devoid of merits, are liable to be dismissed - petition dismissed.
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2020 (8) TMI 837
Release of freezed bank accounts of petitioner - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - ‘reason to believe’ that the money lying in the credit of the said bank accounts are, in any manner, involved in ‘money laundering’ or are ‘proceeds of crime, or not - HELD THAT:- As an interim measure, on the petitioner(s) securing the amount as mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the said application, copy whereof shall be supplied by the learned counsel for the respondent to the counsels appearing in the other petitions as well, by way of a Bank Guarantee/Fixed Deposit or by maintaining a deposit of an equivalent amount in their bank accounts in question, the operation of the Impugned action of the respondent of freezing their bank accounts shall remain stayed, till the next date of hearing.
List on 12th October, 2020.
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2020 (8) TMI 573
Money Laundering - Release of petitioner from Jail - allegation of extortion - keeping in jail custody beyond the period the maximum sentence which could be awarded pertaining to alleged offence though he has been remanded in judicial custody by a judicial order passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction - judicial order of remand - valid order of remand beyond the period of maximum sentence could have been awarded to the accused (the petitioner) in view of the protection provided under Article 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India or not - period of custody in jail.
Maintainability of application - availability of alternative remedy - HELD THAT:- There is no absolute bar to entertain the writ application in the event of availability of alternative remedy subject to the condition mentioned herein above. If the issue falls under the aforesaid heading then the alternative remedy cannot be invoked as a bar for entertainment of the writ application and the court would adjudicate the dispute raised by the parties.
Issuance of writ of mandamus in the shape of habeaus corpus giving direction to the court below to release from the judicial custody - HELD THAT:- The habeas corpus is a latin word which means “to provide the body”. A writ of habeas corpus is used to bring a prisoner or other detainee (e.g. institutionalized mental patient) before the court to determine, if the person's imprisonment or detention is lawful. A habeas corpus petition proceeds as a civil action against the State agent who holds the defendant in custody. It can be exercised pertaining extradition processes used - the extension of benefit would be granted to the accused during the period of investigation, enquiry and trial with respect to other cases but, in the event, the accused has been found guilty and has been awarded sentence, till the expiry of the period of sentence, he will not be granted relief of set off with respect to other criminal cases.
Admittedly, the petitioner is not only in custody with respect to present case rather with respect to other cases also and with respect to two cases, still he has not been granted bail and, as such, he is in jail custody in respect of aforesaid two cases also.
This Court only places reliance on the declaration made by the petitioner as well as to the extent the Union of India has brought the fact to the notice of this Court - Though the petitioner has already suffered maximum punishment of seven years, so in the present case lodged under the PML Act, he cannot be kept in judicial custody but, because in two cases in which he is still in jail with respect to valid order of remand, in such circumstances, he cannot be released from jail custody exercising the power of habeas corpus but, this Court observes that after calculating the period of sentence in terms of Section 31 and 428 of the Cr.P.C., if the petitioner has completed seven years of jail custody, which is the maximum period he can be sentenced in this case, in such situation, he cannot be kept in jail custody with respect to the present case but, he cannot be set free from the jail on account of valid judicial order of remand with respect to two other cases.
It will not be appropriate for this Court to straightway give direction for release of the petitioner from the jail custody rather he should take proper steps in accordance with law - Application disposed off.
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2020 (8) TMI 380
Permission for withdrawal of petition - Validity of provisional attachment order - Proceeds of crime - petitioner seeks to withdraw the writ petition today on the ground that the provisional order of attachment no longer remains in force by efflux of time under Section 5 of The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- his Court is of the view that under Section 5(1)(b) of the PMLA, an order of provisional attachment remains in force only for a period of 180 days from the date of the order passed by the Director with regard to the proceeds of crime which the concerned Director has reasons to believe are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in a manner which may frustrate any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under Chapter III of the PMLA - Section 8(3) deals with a situation where the Adjudicating Authority makes an order in writing confirming the attachment of the property made under Section 5(1) or for retention of the property etc.
Admittedly, no such order has been passed by the Adjudicating Authority against the petitioner under Section 8(3). It should be mentioned that the Adjudicating Authority has been served with copies of the petition.
If the concerned Act provides certain windows to a party in relation to a provisional order of attachment expressed in the clear language of Section 5(1)(b), this Court cannot come in the way of the petitioner taking advantage of the said exit route - petition dismissed as withdrawn.
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2020 (8) TMI 344
Money Laundering - illegal collection of money - Grant of Anticipatory Bail - corruption and criminal conspiracy in which the ACB/EOW raided few offices and residences - allegation that Applicant Anil Tuteja received an amount of ₹ 2,21,94,000 and Applicant Alok Shukla received an amount of ₹ 1,51,43,000 illegally during the period from 30.5.2014 to 18.2.2015 and 1.7.2014 to 18.2.2015, respectively - HELD THAT:- There is concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and the Court of Session for entertaining an application preferred under Section 438 Cr.P.C. and an application filed by the Applicant under Section 438 Cr.P.C. directly before the High Court is maintainable.
From the speech of the then Finance Minister, it is also clear that the provisions of Section 24 of PMLA only apply after framing of a charge against the accused - In the instant matter, the predicate offence is of the year 2014–2015. In said case, charge-sheet has already been filed and no recovery was made from any of the Applicants.
No departmental proceeding has been initiated against any of the Applicants nor has any show cause notice been issued against them. No case regarding acquisition of any disproportionate property has been registered against them. Out of 212, about 153 witnesses have already been examined. Despite the fact that the 18 Applicants are officers of Indian Administrative Services, there is no allegation levelled against them that they ever influenced any of the witnesses or tampered with any evidence. ECIR case was registered against them in the year 2019. Notice was issued to them for the first time in the ECIR case in the month of March, 2020. The delay in issuance of notice has not been explained.
The benefit of anticipatory bail provided to the Applicants - both the applications for grant of anticipatory bail are allowed.
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2020 (8) TMI 256
Contempt petition - release of freezed Bank accounts of petitioner - contention of petitioner is that despite order dated 14.11.2019 quashing the freezing of the bank account, respondent Bank had not permitted the operations of the bank account - HELD THAT:- There is no wilful default on part of the respondent bank in not permitting operation of the bank account for the period that they were seeking clarification from the Enforcement Directorate as well as the Income Tax Department. The bank seems to have acted only by way of an abundant caution in seeking a clarification from the Enforcement Directorate as well as from the Income Tax Department. The cautious approach of the bank seems justified in view of the fact that the Enforcement Directorate has passed a further provisional attachment order attaching the amount of ₹ 19,22,11,271/-, which was the credit balance in the subject account.
Petition dismissed.
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2020 (8) TMI 253
Grant of Regular bail - Money Laundering - siphoning of funds - the allegation is that the amount was given by RFL to entities which were, directly or indirectly, owned or controlled by the applicant, or in which the applicant otherwise had financial interest, including companies linked to RHC - it was held by High Court that this court is persuaded to the applicant to regular bail in the proceedings registered under sections 3/4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002.
HELD THAT:- Issue Notice - List for hearing in the next week.
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2020 (8) TMI 229
Grant of Interim Bail/Parole - categorization by way of exclusion of UTPs lodged in the jails in Delhi as under trial prisoners qua the alleged commission of offences - allegations levelled against the petitioner herein through the alleged commission of economic offences inter alia punishable under the PMLA Act, 2002 as also qua an offence punishable under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which is punishable with the imprisonment for life or that which it may extend to ten years and to a fine - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble High Powered Committee whilst considering the representation of the applicant observed also to the effect that the submissions made in the representation, related to the applicant only, but, that the Committee, was not formed to look into merits or demerits of an individual case for being released on interim bail and rather it was formed to lay down a criteria taking into consideration a particular class and not any particular prisoner or inmate and that the Committee thus, was of the opinion that the representation filed by the applicant/petitioner herein was unmerited and the same was accordingly rejected.
Significantly, however, the Hon’ble High Powered Committee made it clear that the guidelines and minutes of the Committee for release of prisoners on “interim bail” vide criterion adopted in the meetings dated 28.03.2020, 07.04.2020, 18.04.2020, 05.05.2020, 18.05.2020 and 20.06.2020, would in no way affect the rights of other UTPs, who do not stand covered under these categories, from invoking the jurisdiction of concerned courts for grant of regular/interim bail. The Hon’ble High Powered Committee further observed to the effect that the applicant was at liberty to file the bail application before the concerned Courts, and the same as and when filed, may be considered by the concerned Court on merits, in accordance with law.
The contention raised by the petitioner that the Hon’ble High Powered Committee vide its minutes dated 28.03.2020 which have been included in the present petition and the subsequent minutes till the date 31.07.2020 had in any manner supplanted the provisions of Sections 437/438/439 of the Cr.P.C., 1973,- cannot be accepted and thus, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the criterion laid down by the Hon’ble High Powered Committee observing to the effect that the category of persons alienated in its minutes dated 28.03.2020 which may not be considered for the grant of interim bail in terms of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.1/2020- IN RE : CONTAGION OF COVID 19 VIRUS IN PRISONS, stifles the right to liberty of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India or the right to life under the Constitution of India, is wholly untenable.
It is thus, essential to observe that the release of an accused on bail or on interim bail in a non-bailable offence, which he/she is alleged to have committed, is not a vested right in any accused/convict and falls within the discretionary jurisdiction of the Court concerned to grant or not to grant the prayer of an accused seeking bail or interim bail - It is essential to observe that economic offences are offences which corrode the fabric of democracy and are committed with total disregard to the rights and interest of the nation and are committed by breach of trust and faith and are against the national economy and national interest and that such nature of offences have not been considered by the Hon’ble High Powered Committee vide its minutes dated 28.03.2020 to fall within the ambit of the grant of discretionary interim bail by the factum simpliciter of the prevalence of the COVID19 corona pandemic, cannot be termed to be an arbitrary exercise of discretion for laying down the guidelines in relation to the category of alleged commission of offence in which an accused may be allowed to be released on interim bail only on the ground of prevalence of the COVID-19 corona pandemic.
The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that there has been an arbitrary and unjust classification made by the Hon’ble High Powered Committee of this Court vide minutes dated 28.03.2020 as adhered to till the minutes dated 31.07.2020, qua offences falling under cases under the PMLA Act and those investigated by the CBI/ED/NIA /Special Cell of Delhi Police and Terror related Cases, cases under Anti National Activities and Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act etc., cannot be accepted as it cannot be contended that these said offences have not been distinguished from other offences on the basis of any intelligible differentia.
The prayer made in the petition is declined, however, it is open to the petitioner to seek redressal in accordance with law in terms of Chapter XXXIII of the Cr.P.C., 1973 to seek the grant of bail, which apparently necessarily has to be considered on its own merits as already observed by the Hon’ble High Powered Committee vide its minutes dated 20.06.2020 whilst rejecting the representation of the petitioner against the classification in relation to economic offence vide its minutes dated 28.03.2020.
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