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2020 (8) TMI 937 - HC - Money LaunderingSeeking grant of default bail with the aid of 167(2)(a)(ii) of Cr.P.C - whether in computation of period of 90 days or 60 days as contemplated in Section 167(2)(a) of Cr.P.C, the day of remand is to be included or excluded? - HELD THAT:- The anterior period of custody with the police prior to the remand is no detention pursuant to an authorization issued from the Magistrate. The period of detention by the Magistrate runs only from the date of order of first remand. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C pertain to the power of the Magistrate to remand an accused and there is no reason why the first day has to be excluded. The sub-section finds place in a provision which prescribe the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and distinct contingencies are carved out in sub-section (2); the first being the Magistrate authorizing the detention of the accused for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole, secondly, when the Magistrate do not consider further detention necessary and thirdly, the Magistrate authorise the detention beyond period of 15 days if adequate grounds exists for doing so. However, there is no time stipulated as to extension of custody beyond period of 15 days with a maximum limit on the same. The accused can be in magisterial custody for unlimited point of time if he is not admitted to bail. In order to avoid the long incarceration of an accused for the mere reason that the investigation is being carried out in a leisurely manner, prompted the legislature to confer a right on the accused to be released on bail if he is prepared to do so and the investigation can still continue. As regards the applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 is concerned, which prescribe limitation in filing of suits, appeals and applications is concerned, the right of release being claimed as by way of default, there is no scope of applicability of the said enactment and in particular, Section 12 (1) and (2) since there is no decision/order, against which any Appeal/ Application is being preferred. It is pertinent to note the recent three Judge bench decision of the Apex Court in case of S. Kasi Vs. State [2020 (6) TMI 727 - SUPREME COURT] where it is reiterated that the period u/s. 167 is inviolable and cannot be extended by the Supreme Court even while exercising its power under Article 142. The power of Magistrate authorizing detention of accused in custody by prescribing the maximum period, cannot be extended directly or indirectly by any Court with an exception contained in Special Statutes, which to that extent modify the applicability of Section 167 of the Code. Undue delay is not conducive to administration of criminal justice. The impugned order passed by the Sessions Judge, excluding the first day of remand while computing the period of 60 days cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside and the filing of the chargesheet by the Directorate of Enforcement on 13th July 2020, being after of 60 days, by excluding the day of remand i.e. 14th May 2020, make the applicants entitled for default bail. They deserve to be released on bail in light of the right conferred u/s. 167(2)(a) (ii), if they are prepared to and furnish the bail. Bail application allowed.
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