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VAT and Sales Tax - Case Laws

Showing 21 to 40 of 605 Records

• 2022 (12) TMI 1044 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT
  

  Rejection of appeal on the ground of non-payment of pre-deposit amount - Violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is to be seen that aggrieved by the order of assessment passed by the 1st respondent dated 01.10.2013, the petitioner had filed appeal in time i.e., within thirty days as prescribed under the Act. Though the petitioner had filed appeal in time, it is an admitted fact that it did not make payment of pre-deposit of 12.5% of the disputed tax, except the payment of the appeal fee of Rs.1,000/-. Upon rejection of the appeal by the 2^nd respondent authority, the petitioner choose to challenge the said order by questioning the assessment order also before this Court and thus there was no situation where the petitioner could have made the payment of pre-deposit amount prescribed under the Act.

  Though the delay in the case of Innovative Systems (2 supra) [2015 (2) TMI 1314 - SUPREME COURT] was of three months from the date of rejection of appeal to the date of payment, it is the principle and ratio laid down that need to be applied and not by comparing the period of delay - In the facts of the present case, since the petitioner had approached this Court upon rejection of the appeal by the 2^nd respondent and this Court having admitted the Writ Petition, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner cannot be deprived of the benefit of the ratio decidendi of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Innovative Systems on the ground of lapse of long period.

  Since the Writ Petition is filed challenging the order of assessment which involves factual aspects as also in the alternative, the rejection of the appeal by the 2nd respondent on the ground of non-payment of the pre-deposit relying on the judgment of Ankamma Trading Co. (1 supra) [2011 (2) TMI 1254 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] which now stands impliedly overruled, we are of the considered view that instead of this Court delving into the factual aspect involved in the matter, should direct the petitioner to make the payment of the pre-deposit amount within a reasonable time.

  Petition disposed off.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 1043 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
  

  Refund claim - parallel proceedings - petitioner has already initiated a parallel proceeding by filing another case before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal which is still pending - HELD THAT:- If the prayer of the petitioner is granted in this writ petition the same will make the proceeding before the Tribunal infructuous. At the same time, it is a matter of record that the said proceeding initiated before the Tribunal has not even been withdrawn by the petitioner and it will not be proper on the part of this writ court to entertain this writ petition by giving indulgence to the petitioner to run parallel proceeding for the very same relief.

  Petition dismissed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 969 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  

  Classification - Porridge / Daliya (cracked wheat) - Entry No. 36 of the Schedule of UPVAT Act excludes instant porridge as the latter sui generis a class of instant food as opposed to natural food - Whether the Tribunal is correct in law in stating that Entry No. 100 in Part-A of Schedule-II of the UPVAT Act is specific in nature and it covers brochures which are nothing but printed material even though brochures are comprehended within the meaning of Books in Entry No. 7 of the Schedule-I of the UPVAT Act and which in law is a specific entry” is being taken up first and decided?

  HELD THAT:- The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dilip Kumar [2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT] had cleared the air in regard to concession/exemption/incentive/rebate/subsidy and have dealt the matter in extenso and held, that in the event of any ambiguity in the exemption notification the benefit of such ambiguity should be construed in favour of the revenue denying the benefit of exemption to the subject/assessee - The Apex Court found that it is a settled law that any ambiguity in taxing statute should enure benefit of subject/assessee, but any ambiguity in the exemption clause of exemption notification must be conferred in favour of the revenue.

  It is clear that the issue in regard to exemption clause is no more res-integra and the Apex Court has settled the question in favour of the revenue, that when there is an ambiguity in exemption notification or exemption clause, the benefit of such ambiguity cannot be extended to the subject/assessee by applying the principal that an obscure and/or ambiguity or doubtful fiscal statute must receive a construction favouring the assessee.

  Classification - Porridge - The Act does not make any distinction between the normal porridge and instant porridge, and the finding arrived by the Tribunal is a fallacy. The intention of legislature was clear that exemption from tax has to be given to the product Porridge whether it was instant Porridge or normal Porridge i.e. Daliya (cracked wheat).

  The finding recorded by the Tribunal does not record any substantial finding so as to exclude instant wheat porridge under Entry 36 of Schedule-I of the exempted list of goods, when no distinction has been made by legislature. The Tribunal was not correct to read in between and deny the benefit to the assessee as granted by the taxing statute. The finding recorded by the Tribunal is hereby set aside - the question of law framed thus is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 968 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  

  Rejection of the books of accounts of the revisionist - assessment of turnover on best judgment basis on the strength of invoices which were never proved by the Department as pertaining to the revisionist - HELD THAT:- It is a case where various mobile squads had sent certain material to the assessing officer who during the assessment proceedings had issued notice to the assessee to verify the said sale and purchase. There has been denial on the part of the assessee to the said transaction which has been alleged by the assessing authority. The assessing authority found that the assessee has not entered the transaction in his books of accounts and thus held that undisclosed purchase at Rs.2,30,00,000/- was made by the assessee while there was undisclosed sale to the tune of Rs.2,50,00,000/-.

  The burden to prove the material which was recovered by the various mobile squads was upon the Department and burden could not have been shifted upon the assessee to prove the same. Further, the assessee has denied the transaction having been made by him.

  Now coming to the question of Section 16 of the Act of 2008, this Court finds that the word used in Section 16 is that where a fact is in the knowledge of the assessee, then during assessment the burden of proving shall lie upon assessee. In the present case, it was the material which was recovered by the various mobile squads which was denied by the assessee and thus was not in his knowledge. Thus Section 16 of the Act of 2008 is not attracted and the argument raised from the revenue side fails - Assessee is entitled to the relief claimed and no tax liability can be fastened upon the assessee by the material which was seized by the mobile squad which remained unproved during the assessment proceedings nor at the first appellate stage.

  The question of law as framed stands answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department - the revisions stands allowed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 967 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Validity of assessment order - Short reporting resulting in purported short levy relatable to difference in sales turnover and sale of assets - reasonable opportunity to show cause provided or not - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- This Court refrains itself from expressing any opinion or view on this submission as it is statutorily imperative for the respondent to give a reasonable opportunity to the dealer before the impugned assessment order was made. Though a show cause notice was issued, there is nothing that is articulated in the impugned assessment order to show that the reply was considered. As there is no mention about the reply, this Court is of the considered view that the statutorily imperative requirement does not stand satisfied in the case on hand qua impugned assessment order and that calls for interference.

  Impugned assessment order is set aside solely on the ground that there is nothing in the impugned assessment order to show that the writ petitioner's reply dated 07.03.2018 (reply to 05.02.2018 show cause notice) has been considered whereas it is statutorily imperative to give the dealer a reasonable opportunity to show cause - respondent is directed to consider the reply dated 07.03.2018 given by the dealer and make an assessment order afresh.

  Impugned demand notice dated 04.11.2022 is set aside for the self-same reasons qua setting aside of the impugned assessment order - petition disposed off.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 966 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  

  Composition/compounding U/s 6 and 6A of VAT Act - when the matter is pending then assessment order U/s 28(2) of the VAT Act can be passed? - HELD THAT:- Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record what clearly emerges is that an S.I.B. inquiry had been carried on 11.02.2016 on the premises of the revisionist. The revisionist got itself registered as a dealer in March 2016. On the basis of the S.I.B. inquiry the tax of Rs 2.94 lakhs had been imposed which after a series of appeals etc has been reduced to Rs 1.84 lakhs. Admittedly the Government Order dated 18.02.2016 had been issued with respect to such persons like the revisionist. Admittedly the revisionist applied in pursuance to the said Government Order on 07.04.2016 but no order was passed by the competent authority on the said application and the said application remained pending and in the meanwhile the impugned orders have been passed.

  The Government Order dated 18.02.2016 itself provides that even if application is filed beyond a period of 45 days the competent authority namely the Commissioner could still accept the said application on payment of interest. Admittedly no order has been passed by the competent authority / Commissioner on the application of the revisionist and at the same time the authorities have proceeded to impose tax on the revisionist.

  Considering that there has been inaction on the part of the authorities concerned in not acting in pursuance to the Government order dated 18.02.2016 and there being no denial that the revisionist did not apply in pursuance to the said Government Order, consequently the revision is allowed and the order impugned dated 18.06.2022 passed by the learned Commercial Tax Tribunal Bench III, Lucknow a copy of which is annexure 1 to the petition, is set aside - the matter is remanded to the respondent no. 1 to consider the appeal afresh keeping in view the observations, the Government Order dated 18.02.2016 and the application of the revisionist submitted in pursuance thereof.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 965 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
  

  Classification of goods - SAREE, PATTA, DHOTI and GAMUCHHA - whether SAREE, PATTA, DHOTI and GAMUCHHA fall under Entry Serial No.3 of Part-II of Schedule appended to the OET Act? - HELD THAT:- When “saree, patta, dhoti, gamuchha” are considered, they are the products of “textile”. They do not lose essential characteristics of fabric. Thus, the expression “textile products including cotton fabrics and ready-made garments” is wide enough to take into its sweep the goods in question. The learned OSTT has appropriately held that the Appellate Authority has erred in giving restricted meaning to the expression contained in Entry 3 of Part-II of Schedule appended to the OET Act.

  The question whether the Division Bench of the Odisha Sales Tax Tribunal, Cuttack is right in law to hold that saree, patta, dhoti and gamuchha do fall under Entry No.3 of Part-II of Schedule appended to the OET Act, is answered in the affirmative in favour of the State of Odisha-Revenue and against the petitioner-dealer.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 964 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Refund of input tax credit (ITC) - claim of ITC had been rejected on the ground that such refund would have to be tested on the anvil of Section 19 of the Act that sets out certain conditions there for - HELD THAT:- The matter was adjourned on 29.11.2022 after directing the learned Additional Government Pleader, who appears for the State, to produce the records relating to and culminating into MoU dated 07.07.2008, entered into between the State of Tamil Nadu and the petitioner. The direction was given specifically to understand the role played by the Commercial Taxes Department in such matters.

  Today, letter bearing No.7916/C1/2021-2 dated 01.12.2022 is placed before me wherein the Secretary to Government conveys to the Principal Secretary/Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Department the position that refund is liable to be granted by the Commercial Taxes Department under MoU dated 07.07.2022, without reference to the provisions of the law relating to ITC. Mr.Prasanth Kiran, learned Government Advocate, would convey that the Commercial Taxes Department accedes to this position.

  Nothing further survives in these matter and these writ petitions are allowed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 900 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
  

  Refund claim - export of goods - excess carried forward in the annual return - period of limitation for filing appeal against the order of the Assessing Authority also stood expired - HELD THAT:- As per scheme of the provisions of the '2003 Act' as also the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 governing refund it would be open for the Assessing Authority at the stage of assessment to ascertain if a dealer has paid any amount in excess of tax, interest on penalty assessed or imposed on him, allow refund of the excess amount or allow the same to be carried forward for adjustment with future tax liability - Aforesaid is the mandate of Section 20(4) of the '2003 Act'. Under Rule 41(4) of the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 it is again at the stage of framing the assessment, if the Assessing Authority finds that the sum of tax paid and input tax exceeds the sum of output tax and purchase tax, it shall determine the excess amount and from the excess amount it shall then deduct any amount due from the dealer whether under the '2003 Act' itself or the Central Act and then allow from the balance amount refund of the amount.

  In the facts of the present case the positive stand taken on behalf of the department is that the dealer had claimed excess carried forward in the annual return filed in Form VAT R-2. The Assessing Authority allowed the same in terms of assessment order dated 30.03.2018 (Annexure P-1). It is not even the case projected on behalf of the petitioner that a refund had been claimed at the stage of filing of the annual return. To the contrary, the pleaded case of the petitioner itself is that after passing of the assessment order dated 30.03.2018 (Annexure P-1), the application seeking refund had been made on 14.06.2018 (Annexure P-2) i.e. subsequent in point of time.

  In this regard it is observed that under Rule 42 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 the case for refund is to be forwarded to a Committee within a stipulated time frame only in a situation when a refund has been allowed in the assessment order. In the facts of the present case no refund was allowed as the petitioner had not claimed the same in the annual return filed in Form VAT R-2. Rather the petitioner had claimed excess carried forward in his annual return and the same was allowed. There was no occasion for Rule 42 to come into operation in such facts and circumstances.

  There are no patent infirmity or illegality in the impugned order dated 27.10.2020 - Petition is dismissed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 899 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
  

  Right to use between the Appellant and the railways has been entered into in the light of the scheme of the Central Govt., as own your wagon scheme - power of the State to tax the transaction which is an interstate sales or a transaction in other state - HELD THAT:- On a query of this Court as to whether any review was sought for in respect of order dated 05.12.2017 passed in WP(T) No. 54/2016, learned counsel for the parties are unable to apprise this Court. Learned counsel for the applicants, however, submit that the same would be inconsequential as the order dated 05.12.2017 was a common order in both the writ petitions.

  These cases are disposed of.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 891 - DELHI HIGH COURT
  

  Validity of assessment order - concessional rate of tax in respect of inter-State sales on the strength of C Form - mismatch of products - Section 32 of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the impugned assessment orders indicates that the benefit of C Forms has been denied to the petitioner in respect of certain inter-State sales on the ground that the C Forms could not be verified. The concerned VATO had noted that whereas the petitioner deals with kirana items – ‘soap and detergents, cosmetics/shampoo/hair oils and tooth brush/paste/powder etc’ – the concerned authorities of Rajasthan have confirmed that the C Forms have been issued in respect of different items such as gitti, grit & cotton seed cake.

  It is material to note that the VATO did not consider the judgements relied upon by the petitioner.

  Whether the petitioner could be denied the benefit of the C Forms on the ground that the same have not been verified, or on the basis of the mismatch of the products? - HELD THAT:- In Pentex Sales Corporation v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi [2013 (5) TMI 566 - DELHI HIGH COURT], this court had referred to the decision in the case of State of Madras v. M/s Radio and Electrical Ltd & Anr. [1966 (4) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT] and held that the dealer claiming the benefit of ST-I Form was required to verify that the purchasing dealer was a registered dealer and holds a registration certificate in respect of the said goods sold to him. Once the said dealer had complied with the same, his duty did not extend any further.

  In the present case, there is no dispute that the purchasing dealers are duly registered with the concerned authority as the registered dealers. Their registration certificates also indicate that they are registered in respect of the goods sold by the petitioner. There is no dispute that the petitioner had produced invoices and other material to establish that he had sold the concerned goods to the purchasing dealers. Under the scheme of taxation, the point of further taxation shifts to the purchasing dealer and the tax on the goods in question have to be recovered from those dealers.

  Petition allowed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 890 - DELHI HIGH COURT
  

  Seeking rectification of returns for the tax periods 2nd, 3rd and 4th Quarter, 2015-2016 - section 74B of the DVAT Act - HELD THAT:- The writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents/revenue to issue the rectified C and F-Forms to the petitioner subject to the verification of entitlement on merits, without being burdened with the issue concerning limitation, in line with the direction issued in other cases, including the judgment of the coordinate bench in M/S SAMSUNG C & T PVT. LTD. VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER, TRADE & TAXES, & ANR. [2019 (2) TMI 1772 - DELHI HIGH COURT].

  Application disposed off.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 823 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
  

  Rectification of Mistake - mistake apparent from the record or not - whether the Tribunal was right in exercising power under Section 62 of the Act and analyses the facts only in this context and not for adjudicating the dispute? - HELD THAT:- The language of the section would indicate that what can be rectified is ‘mistake apparent from the record’. What is the exact ambit of the phrase ‘mistake apparent from the record’ that has fallen for consideration of the Honorable Supreme Court in various cases. In the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTAL EXCISE, BELAPUR, MUMBAI VERSUS RDC CONCRETE (INDIA) P. LTD. [2011 (8) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT] after taking review of the earlier decisions on the subject, the Honorable Supreme Court observed that power to rectify a mistake should be exercised when the mistake is a patent one and should be quite obvious.

  Thus, the ‘mistake apparent from the record’ has to be obvious and patent mistake and not the one that needs to be established by long drawn process of reasoning.

  As regards a ground in the rectification application based on the decision of Pee Vee Textiles, the learned Assistant Government Pleader contended that the decision in the case of Pee Vee Textiles [2008 (10) TMI 616 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] contains an elaborate discussion of facts and various factual distinctions made between the two schemes, i.e. of 1993 and 1988 have been omitted from consideration and reading of Pee Vee Textiles would clearly show that there is no legal proposition sought to be culled out by the Tribunal in the First Order as emerges from the decision of Pee Vee Textiles in respect of the 1988 Package Scheme of Incentives.

  The learned Assistant Government Pleader states that if Respondent No. 1 intends to take steps to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal on 18 April 2009, the issue of limitation may arise. However, this aspect will have to be decided by the court where such proceedings are presented. The concerned court will no doubt consider that it was not necessary for the Respondents to file any proceedings to challenge the First Order to date because the Respondent had succeeded in the Rectification proceedings.

  Petition allowed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Slump sale agreement - dues arising out of the operations and activities of the sugar unit prior to the date of acquisition - to be borne by the seller or otherwise - subsisting dues arising out of transactions occurring on dates prior to the sale - to be characterized as contingent or conditional liability or is it an accrued liability which may be computed or discharged at a subsequent date - Whether a purchaser of a sugar mill could be treated as a dealer or service provider as an entity liable for discharging dues even if they had not been acting as a dealer or service provider or otherwise as an entity on whom, liability could be fastened? - speaking order is vitiated, due to conflict of interest or not - principles of natural justice.

  HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that the liability towards the duty in question for the Amroha unit are in respect of business transactions for the period anterior to the signing date of the Slump Sale Agreement. Moreover assessment orders and recovery citations have been issued by the taxing authorities in the name of the UPSSCL. Therefore, can such liability for transactions prior to the Slump Sale Agreement dated 17.7.2010 be fastened on to the purchaser.

  In the case in hand, the business liability for the Amroha unit had definitely arisen out of the operation of the unit during the period before the same was sold to the appellant, although the liability is to be quantified and discharged at a future date. When the liability is capable of being estimated with reasonable certainty, the liability is not to be treated as a contingent one and should be considered as a liability which may be discharged at a future date. Such being the position in law and the liability in question not being a contingent one, the same cannot in our view be fastened on the purchaser who were not operating the unit, prior to the Slump Sale Agreement dated 17.7.2010.

  The liability of the purchaser for the dues relating to activities and operations of the unit for the period anterior to 17.7.2010, could not therefore have been fastened on the appellant in view of the clear provisions made in clause 9 of the Sale Deed read with Clause 12.1 and 12.2 of the Slump Sale Agreement as both are specific in nature. In the same context, the clause 2.6 which speaks of contingent liabilities and legal cases pending in respect of the unit, to be fastened on the purchaser and the seller being absolved of such liability, are generic conditions provided under clause 2.6 of the Slump Sale Agreement and we are not impressed by those - clause 9 of the sale deed being specific, will govern the parties and will override anything contrary, contained in the Slump Sale Agreement.

  It is the UP State Sugar Corporation Limited which had collected all the dues from their customer on behalf of the State Government and they are under an obligation to deposit the collected sum in the government treasury. But for those transactions, for the period prior to 17.7.2010, the UPSSCL are trying to usurp the collected sum and are trying to pass on the burden to the appellant who was neither the dealer nor they had anything to do with the operation of the unit prior to 17.7.2010 - the rejection of the representation of the appellant appears to be arbitrary and the speaking order could not therefore have been sustained by the High Court in the impugned judgment.

  In view of the foregoing, the liability in question, not being a contingent liability, cannot be fastened on the shoulders of the appellant.

  The appeal is accordingly allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment leaving the parties to bear their own cost.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 717 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
  

  Levy of Entry tax - tractor trolly ‘motor vehicle’ - Section 2 (h) of the Orissa Entry tax Act, 1999 (OET Act) - HELD THAT:- It is evident from a comparison of both the definitions that while Section 2(h) of the OET Act adopts the definition of the Motor Vehicle as contained in Section 2(28) of the MV Act, it excludes from that definition ‘any tractor, earth mover, excavator, bulldozer or road-roller”. Interestingly, Section 2 (28) of the MV Act includes ‘trailer’ whereas Section 2(h) of the OET Act does not. Section 2 (28) of the MV Act envisages ‘trailer’ being attached to the vehicle. There is no exclusion of ‘tractor’ from the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ under the MV Act. However, there is such exclusion under Section 2(h) of the OET Act. A trailer attached to a tractor by itself cannot be classified as ‘motor vehicle’. It is nobody’s case that the trolly has any ‘motor’ so as to attract such a definition.

  The Court notes that the impugned order of the Tribunal while noticing Section 2(h) of the OET Act stops short of noticing what was excluded from the definition. The conclusion of the Tribunal that ‘trolly’ is comprehended in the definition completely misses the point that the trolly cannot exist as a motor vehicle independent of the ‘tractor’ to which it is supposed to be attached. In fact, the Tribunal notes that under Section 2(46) of the MV Act ‘trailer’ has been separately defined to mean any vehicle ‘drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle’ - As far as the OET Act is concerned, since the tractor itself is excluded from the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ under Section 2(h) of the OET Act, the question of bringing ‘trolly’ as a stand-alone vehicle within the purview of that definition does not arise.

  This Court answers the question framed in the negative i.e. in favour of the Petitioner Assessee and against the Department, sets aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and restores the order of the 1st Appellate Authority - the revision petition is allowed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 716 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Seeking deposit of 50% of the disputed tax by giving credit to the tax already deposited - grant of stay of collection of disputed tax pending appeal filed by petitioners before the VAT Appellate Tribunal - it is alleged that the petitioners have not produced the Foreign Buyer Purchase Agreements to claim exemption under export sales - HELD THAT:- As can be seen, under Section 33 of the AP VAT Act, 2005, a dealer aggrieved by the order passed by the revisional authority under Section 32 of the AP VAT Act, 2005 can file an appeal before the VAT Appellate Tribunal. Then the second proviso to Section 33(2) of the AP VAT Act, 2005 says that no appeal against the order passed under sub-section (2) of Section 32 shall be admitted unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax admitted by the appellant to be due and 25% of the difference of the tax. Thus, it is mandatory that while preferring appeal a dealer shall make a pre-deposit of admitted tax plus 25% of the differential tax to admit the appeal. In the instant case, the petitioners have admittedly fulfilled the said condition.

  An appeal can be filed before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 33(1)(a) or (b). In the instant case, appeal is preferred under Section 33(1)(b) as against the order of the revisional authority. Then following Section 33(6) of the AP VAT Act the petitioners prayed the 3rd respondent for stay. As per Section 33(6)(a), the said authority is vested with the discretionary power of granting stay subject to such terms and conditions as he may deem fit.

  As has been observed by the Division Bench in ACT Digital Home [2021 (9) TMI 1149 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT], if the mandatory deposit of 25% of the disputed tax as prescribed under the second proviso of Section 33(2) of the AP VAT Act, 2005 is sufficient to obtain stay of payment of the differential tax pending appeal, certainly the provision under Section 33(6) will become nugatory and otiose. Therefore, following the ratio in the ACT Digital Home, it can be said that the initial pre-deposit of 25% made under Section 33(2) of the AP VAT Act, 2005 will not automatically entitle any dealer to claim stay of collection of the differential tax pending his appeal as a matter of right.

  Petition dismissed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 715 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Validity of assessment order - reversal of Input Tax Credit (ITC) - mismatch of particulars set out in the annexures accompanying the petitioner's returns and the other dealers' returns of turnover - it is alleged that the procedure dealing with mismatch as set out by the Principal Secretary/Commissioner, Commercial Taxes in Circular No.5 of 2020-2021 dated 24.02.2021, not followed - HELD THAT:- There is merit in the challenge to the impugned orders of assessment and hence the same are set aside.

  Yet another issue that arises relates to non-maintenance of books of accounts. According to the petitioner, this issue has been explained before the Assessing Authority who was not taken proper note of the same. Insofar as the larger issue is set aside, this issue is also set aside.

  Matter to be adjudicated do-novo.

  Petition closed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 714 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Benefit of concessional rate of tax - Form 'C' filed - original order of assessment had come to be revised under impugned notice dated 04.12.2020 without notice or a pre-assessment proposal having been issued to the petitioner - recomputation of turnover - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Mr.Kumaran, (respondent-Revenue) would also confirm that there is no challenge to order dated 12.09.2022 as on date. This is recorded.

  In light of the admitted position, the observations and conclusions in order dated 12.09.2022 would apply on all force to the present case as well. Hence, the impugned orders are quashed.

  Petition allowed.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 713 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Rectification of mistake - error apparent on the face of record or not - petitioner sought rectification of the assessment by way of an application under Section 84 of TNVAT Act - reversal of input tax credit (ITC), on interstate sales against C declaration Forms - HELD THAT:- The contents of para 8 run counter to the records and, in fact, only tantamount to the position that the impugned order has been passed based on the petitioner's written request for rectification - Despite repeated opportunities granted to the learned counsel for the respondent to produce a copy of the personal hearing notice or at least the date on which personal hearing was conducted, there is no response forthcoming leading to the unambiguous view that there was no personal hearing that has been granted to the petitioner prior to passing of the impugned order.

  The impugned order is set aside. The petitioner will appear before the respondent on Monday, the 5th of December, 2022 at 10.30 a.m. without expecting any further notice in this regard along with complete particulars in respect of the request for rectification.

  Petition disposed off.

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• 2022 (12) TMI 597 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
  

  Purchase of gold for manufacturing of jewellery and ornaments - Claim of exemption from tax under Rule 33A of the West Bengal Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (the Rules) - The assessing authority of the said bank disallowed the claim for exemption on the sole ground that the purchasing dealer namely the writ petitioner did not manufacture the jewellery in the State of West Bengal but had manufactured the same at Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu state.

  HELD THAT:- As mentioned above, if we read the scheme of the WBVAT and the rules, it is clear that the Rule 33A was intended to give a special benefit to dealers registered in the State of West Bengal that is both the selling and purchasing dealer who deal with gold and who sells gold purchased by another registered dealer in the state who manufactures jewellery for export. Therefore, the arguments that by preventing the petitioner from carrying out job work outside the State of West Bengal would violate Article 301 and 304 of the Constitution is an argument which is stated to be outrightly rejected.

  The intention, the object and the purpose of such exemption cannot be interpreted by referring to Rule 26A which operates in entirely different field.

  There is absolutely no inconsistency nor the form is contrary to the Rule 33A rather the form is part of the rule itself.

  The order passed by the learned tribunal rejecting the revision petition filed by the fourth respondent to be just and proper and does not call for any interference.

  Writ petition dismissed.

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