Home Case Index All Cases VAT / Sales Tax This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

VAT / Sales Tax - Case Laws

Showing 221 to 240 of 27754 Records

• 2024 (11) TMI 342
  

  Challenge to orders - Wrongful typing of prayer - no order passed by any authority - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not deposit any tax with the authorities of Himachal Pradesh despite the fact that it had been running its buses within its territory and thus, in this manner, it deprived the State of Himachal Pradesh of its legitimate amount of tax.

  Once that be so, obviously, it would be liable to pay interest, for it is more than settled that a person or authority deprived of use of money to which one is legitimately entitled to has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, which may be called interest, compensation or damages. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SECRETARY, IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF ORISSA VERSUS GC. ROY [1991 (12) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT].

  The petitioner instead of assailing the orders passed by the authorities below, which are in consonance with the law, should have in fact moved the tax authorities in Punjab for the refund of the tax or a part thereof, that according to it had been paid by inadvertence or if the tax was wrongly paid, recovered or retained, it was there that the petitioner could have concomitantly invoked the doctrine/principles of unjust enrichment, equity, justice and good conscious - Having legally ordered to be recovered, that too, strictly in consonance with the provisions of the PGT Act, any other interpretation would lead to an incongruous conclusion, as the State cannot be deprived of its due share of tax and interest on the belated payment.

  There are no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. 50% of the amount deposited in the Registry of this Court is directed to be refunded to the State on furnishing its account number and the petitioner is directed to deposit the remaining 50% of the interest liability alongwith interest as payable under Section 12-A of the PGT Act if not already deposited in the Registry of this Court within a period of one month from today - petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 341
  

  Challenge to Assessment orders passed under Section 27 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 - allegations against the petitioner was that the petitioner had availed input tax credit under Section 19 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 on the dealers whose registrations were cancelled - HELD THAT:- Having perused the notices that preceded the impugned order and the reply of the petitioner and the impugned orders, this is a fit case for quashing the impugned order and remitting the case back to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits after furnishing copies of the orders cancelling the registration certificate of the respective dealers. This exercise may be carried out by the respondent within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is for the petitioner to thereafter file a fresh/additional reply within a period of 30 days thereafter. The impugned order which stands quashed shall be treated as addendum to the Show Cause Notice dated 05.07.2016.

  The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

  Petition allowed.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 284
  

  Maintainability of appeal under Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 - obligation to approach the Appellate Tribunal for drawing up a ‘statement of case’ for the consideration of this Court and that the appeals which have come to be directly instituted would not be maintainable - HELD THAT:- As is evident from a reading of Section 45 of the DST Act, a person desirous of challenging an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, was required to submit a request to that Tribunal to refer a question of law arising out of such order for the consideration of the High Court. In terms of Section 45 (2), if the Appellate Tribunal were to refuse to state the case on forming the opinion that no question of law arose, both the dealer as well as the Commissioner stood enabled to apply to the High Court against such refusal.

  The hierarchy of remedies as created under the DST Act, insofar as appeals are concerned, is essentially replicated and re-enacted by the DVAT Act. Under the DVAT Act, the assessee stands accorded the remedy of preferring an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal which stands constituted. The DVAT Act further enables an aggrieved person to approach the High Court by way of an appeal in respect of every order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal to the High Court, however, is subject to the appellant establishing that the case involves a ‘substantial question of law’.

  The obligation to petition the Tribunal for drawal of a statement of case cannot be construed as a liability accrued or incurred. It was merely a matter of procedure and which did not impair the right of appeal. This more so since a referral by the Tribunal to draw a statement of case was subject to review and correction.

  The appeals as instituted before this Court in accordance with Section 81 of the DVAT are, consequently, held to be maintainable - let these matters be listed on 17.12.2024.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 283
  

  Challenge to reassessment order - disallowance of ITC - bone of contention in the case at hand is non production of books of accounts for the assessment period of 2010-11 - appeal is dismissed solely on the score that the appeal is preferred beyond period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The original order is passed without hearing the petitioner, and is in violation of principles of natural justice. In that light, the petitioner preferring an appeal after six years cannot be pointed against him, for the reason that original order was an ex parte order.

  On the sole ground that the original order passed by Assistant Commissioner was without hearing the petitioner, as it was an ex parte order, it is deemed appropriate to set aside the order and remit the matter back to the hands of the Assistant Commissioner - writ petition is allowed by way of remand.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 282
  

  Levy of Entry tax - benefit of the exemption notification dated 31.03.2000 - applicability of notification dated 18.12.2010 - notification dated 31.03.2000 was superseded by the notification dated 18.12.2010 or not - HELD THAT:- Under Section 11A of the KTEG Act, 1979, the State Government is entitled to exempt “specified class of persons” or “Class of dealers” or “Goods” or “Class of goods” or “All or any goods or class of goods” from the tax payable under the KTEG Act, 1979. A perusal of the notification dated 31.03.2000 shows that exemption was granted to “dealers with effect from 01.04.2000 from payment of tax on all kinds of Wind Mills Parts and Accessories thereof”, brought into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein.

  A perusal of the supply contract between the petitioner and Gamesa shows that the price quoted by Gamesa included entry tax, if any, payable. There is nothing placed on record to establish that either the petitioner or Gamesa were registered as dealer under the provisions of the Act, 1979 when the supply contract was entered between the petitioner and Gamesa - the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the notification dated 31.03.2000 and claim exemption. This Court by Order dated 03-07-2024 called upon the petitioner to place on record the certificate issued by the Department of Energy, Government of Karnataka, certifying that the petitioner is a renewable energy project, its date of commencement, its date of commercial generation and its eligibility for exemption from tax. Unfortunately, the petitioner has failed to produce any of the above documents.

  A perusal of the clauses of the supply contract establish beyond doubt that the petitioner and Gamesa were consensus-ad-idem over the liability of payment of entry tax, in as much as they agreed that the cost of WTGs included the entry tax, if any. The petitioner has also claimed the benefit of the notification dated 18.12.2010, when it filed its reply to the notice issued by the authorities under the KVAT Act, 2003. Therefore, the petitioner cannot now contend that it was entitled to claim the benefit of notification dated 31.03.2000 and claim total exemption from payment of entry tax.

  Having regard to the Renewable Energy Project of State Government and the purpose of granting exemption from payment of entry tax, the petitioner is granted three months time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, to comply with the prescribed procedure to claim the exemption. If the petitioner fails to avail the opportunity, the respondents are at liberty to proceed to recover the tax and interest payable by the petitioner in accordance with law.

  This petition lacks merit and is dismissed.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 199
  

  Jurisdiction to claim outstanding dues from petitioners regarding specific land - Priority of charge under the SARFAESI Act over the State's claim - HELD THAT:- This Court in the aforesaid decision in case of PARTNERS OF SIDDHESHWAR TAX FAB & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. [2024 (7) TMI 1547 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] has held 'Thus, the charge in respect of the property in question created for sales tax dues or VAT dues is of no avail and has no efficacy in law in view of the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act. The property in question was sold by respondent no. 6-Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the petitioners were successful purchasers and the sale certificate is issued and sale deed is also executed by which the petitioners have become absolute owners of the property and therefore considering the existing position of law, the charge created by the respondent State over the property in question in the year 2018, cannot be sustained.'

  Considering the above decision and the facts of the case, it is an undisputed fact of the case that the petitioner bank had created a prior charge in the year 2011 as against the charge created by the State in the year 2018. Therefore, the petitioner-Bank will have a prior charge over the property in question which is sold in auction in favour of petitioner no. 2 and accordingly, the impugned orders dated 26.09.2018 and 07.09.2019 are hereby quashed and set aside - petition allowed.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 198
  

  Maintainability of petiiton - availability of alternative remedy - Rejection of appeal filed by the present petitioners - non-attendance of appellant before the Authority either in person or through an agent - Section 26 (5) (a) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act - HELD THAT:- The plea of availability of an alternate remedy, cannot be construed as a Bar for exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, in the instant case, when the challenge is, to the passing of the impugned order by the Appellate Authority in contradistinction to the mandate as provided in Section 26 (5) (a) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act. The plea therefore, is being turned down.

  It is a settled position of law, that between a Statute and a Rule, it is the Statute, which has primacy and therefore, prevails upon the Rule. In that view of the matter, while deciding the appeal, the Authority will have to be governed by the mandate of Section 26 (1) (a) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act and decide the appeal in the manner as indicated therein, the Rule being subservient to it.

  The position in this regard has been considered in BALAJI STEEL RE-ROLLING MILLS VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS [2014 (11) TMI 531 - SUPREME COURT] in which considering similar provisions as contained in the Central Excise Act and Rule 20 of the Rules framed thereunder, which provided for dismissal of an appeal on account of the absence of the petitioner, it has been held that the substantive provisions of the Act would prevail and would be the manner in which the appeal has to be decided.

  In that view of the matter, the impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted back to the respondent No. 2 for decision afresh - petition allowed by way of remand.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 118
  

  Non-refund of the excess tax amount paid by the petitioner for different assessment years - rejection of refund claim on the ground of time limitation - HELD THAT:- It is evident that the Rule 29 clearly prescribes the period before which the refund claims are required to be filed. However, proviso to Rule 29 (1) (a) empowers the prescribed authority to admit an application for refund beyond the period prescribed, namely, 180 days from the date of assessment or reassessment, if the authority is satisfied that the sufficient cause has been made out to justify the delay for not making the application within the said period.

  From a perusal of the impugned orders it is evident that the refund applications were rejected on the ground that these were time barred. Impugned orders do not reflect that the petitioner was given any notice to explain the cause of delay. The affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents also does not explain the position as to whether the petitioner was put to notice and given an opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay in filing the refund applications prior to issuance of the impugned orders.

  There is no dispute also that claims for refund sought for by the petitioner is also not disputed by the respondent Department denying the claims that the petitioner is otherwise not entitled under the law to claims the refund. The notices issued for the proceedings that the assessment by the Department which are referred to in the writ petitions are also not disputed by the Department. Under such circumstances, it is evident that the Department did initiate a proceeding for assessment which, however, was not carried out for the reasons best known to the Department.

  The impugned orders dated 16.11.2016, 15.09.2016 and 07.01.2017, therefore, are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the concerned respondent(s)/prescribed authority and this Court permits the asessee to explain the causes of delay that may have occurred in filing the refund application - Petition allowed by way of remand.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 117
  

  Challenge to order of Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal - no C-Form register - transactions in respect of which the assessee has claimed exemption under Section 6(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 challenged on the ground that the transactions were transit sales - HELD THAT:- In the absence of any records such as the C Form Register or the communication from the assessing authority of Sattur Assessment Circle, it is not inclined to disbelieve the claim of the petitioner.

  There are no reason to disallow the C Forms produced. No doubt, it is for the assessee to establish its claim of exemption. In this case, primary particulars such as the details of selling dealers and the C Forms issued by the officer have been produced.

  The presumption is, no doubt, rebuttable, and the Department is at liberty to establish that the particulars produced are false. Though the Department has alleged so, it has failed to prove the falsity of the claim, as it alleges. There is nothing to disprove the C Forms produced by the petitioner. As regards the cancellation of the registration of the selling dealers, the factum of cancellation was not available in public domain as it is today, and the petitioner cannot be made to suffer on this count. Their burden hence stands discharged.

  The appellate authority has rendered a categoric finding that there was no willful default on the part of the assessee in claiming the exemption and reliance is placed on the C Forms produced. Hence, the existence of the C Forms, and their genuineness has been accepted in the deletion of penalty and this order has been accepted by the Commercial Taxes Department - the impugned order is set aside and this writ petition is allowed.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 116
  

  Seeking to withdraw charges and raise attachment levied by their office over the mortgaged property exclusively charged in favour of this Petitioner - Section 48 of the SARFAESI Act - HELD THAT:- It would be germane to refer to the decision of this Court in case of PARTNERS OF SIDDHESHWAR TAX FAB & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. [2024 (7) TMI 1547 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] wherein, it is held 'the charge in respect of the property in question created for sales tax dues or VAT dues is of no availand has no efficacy in law in view of the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act. The property in question was sold by respondent no.6-Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the petitioners were successful purchasers and the sale certificate is issued and sale deed is also executed by which the petitioners have become absolute owners of the property and therefore considering the existing position of law, the charge created by the respondent State over the property in question in the year 2018, cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside and as a consequence the mutation entries in revenue records also stands deleted.'

  In view of the above settled legal position, the attachment order of the respondent-State would not survive and is accordingly ordered to be quashed and set aside and consequently, the mutation entries in the revenue record also stand cancelled.

  Petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 115
  

  Priority of charge under SARFAESI Act over VAT Act charge - seeking declaration that the Petitioner Bank has first charge over the promo mortgaged by the Respondent no. 3 u/s 26E of the SARFAESI Act, which would override the charge of the Respondent No. 2 under Section 48 of the VAT Act - HELD THAT:- In case of PARTNERS OF SIDDHESHWAR TAX FAB & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. [2024 (7) TMI 1547 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], this Court held that 'the charge in respect of the property in question created for sales tax dues or VAT dues is of no availand has no efficacy in law in view of the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act. The property in question was sold by respondent no.6-Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the petitioners were successful purchasers and the sale certificate is issued and sale deed is also executed by which the petitioners have become absolute owners of the property and therefore considering the existing position of law, the charge created by the respondent State over the property in question in the year 2018, cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside.'

  In view of the above, the respondent No. 2 is directed to remove the charge over the property (in question) as it is not in dispute that the petitioner-Bank has created the charge prior in point of time and hence, as per the settled legal position, the charge created by the respondent No. 2 in the year 2019 would not survive and accordingly, the mutation entry in Revenue Record stands deleted.

  Petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 114
  

  Seeking declaration that the action of the respondent No.2-Sales Tax Department of continuing charge over the property in question was invalid and illegal on the ground that the petitioner is a successful auction purchaser of the property in public auction held by the secured creditor - HELD THAT:- It would be germane to refer to the relevant paras of the decision of this Court in case of PARTNERS OF SIDDHESHWAR TAX FAB & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. [2024 (7) TMI 1547 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] wherein the question as to whether the auction purchaser would be liable to discharge the dues of the sales tax department is no more res integra. This Court in the aforesaid decision has held 'the charge in respect of the property in question created for sales tax dues or VAT dues is of no avail and has no efficacy in law in view of the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act. The property in question was sold by respondent no.6-Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the petitioners were successful purchasers and the sale certificate is issued and sale deed is also executed by which the petitioners have become absolute owners of the property and therefore considering the existing position of law, the charge created by the respondent State over the property in question in the year 2018, cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside and as a consequence the mutation entries in revenue records also stands deleted.'

  The respondent authorities are directed to remove the charge in respect of the property in question created for sales tax dues in view of the provisions of the RDB Act as the sale certificate and sale deed is executed and the petitioner has become the absolute owner of the property. Accordingly, the charge created by the respondent-State over the property in question in the year 2014 cannot be sustained and is quashed and set aside and as a consequence, mutation entry in revenue record being Entry No. 5303 also stands deleted.

  Petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 50
  

  Application for condonation of delay dismissed - provisions of Section 12-B of the J&K GST Act, 1962 ignored, which provide that the provisions of Sections 5 & 12 of the Limitation Act, Samvat 1995 shall apply to the appeals, revisions, filed under this Act before Appellate, Reviewing Authorities or the Tribunals - it was held by High Court that 'the order passed by the appellate authority has attained finality because in view of the provisions of Section 12(d) of the J&K GST Act, which is a special Act, has excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.'

  HELD THAT:- This Special Leave Petition is disposed off by reserving liberty to the petitioners herein to agitate this issue in any other appropriate case.

  The question of law, which sought to advance, is kept open - Application disposed off.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 49
  

  Taxability of panel boards purchased by a manufacturer of submersible pumps - whether panel boards purchased against Form XVII declarations should be taxed separately at a higher rate or as part of an integrated unit with submersible pumps? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, there is a finding of fact by the assessing authority that reveals that the goods supplied are integrated sets, comprising both submersible pump and panel board. In such circumstances, where the department has accepted the nature of final product supplied, it is found difficult to accept the stand that the two items must be treated as separate products liable to tax under different rates as stipulated in the schedules.

  In the case of Northwest Switchgear Ltd [2006 (2) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT], the assessee was engaged in the manufacture of switches, fan regulators and distribution boards that fell under Chapter Sub-Headings No. 8536.90, 8414.20 and 8537.00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The appellants had classified fan regulators under Sub-Heading 8414.20 of the Tariff Act which covers electric fans, on the strength that there is no other use of these items and these are used principally and solely with the electric fans - The issue framed to be determined was whether fan regulators would be classified along with electric fans at the same rate of duty or as parts and accessories attracting higher rate of duty - On facts, the position in that case was that regulators had been sold without the electric fan and as independent, stand-alone products. On that admitted factual basis, the Supreme Court accepted the contention of the Department that fan regulators manufactured by that assessee without any electric fans were only classifiable as a part or accessory of a fan and not as a fan itself.

  In the present case, undoubtedly, submersible pumps and panel boards are governed by separate entries. Under the Schedules, submersible pumps are taxable @ 10% under entry 26 of part 'C' of the First Schedule and panel boards are taxable under entry 14 (iii) of part 'D' of the First Schedule taxable @ 12%.

  The Assessing Authority appears to have invoked the proviso to Section 3(3) of the Act although there is no reference to the proviso in the order of assessment. The officer proceeds on the basis that the petitioner, after purchasing the panel boards on the strength of Form XVII declarations, has failed to make use of the panel boards for the purpose stated in the declarations, but has sold them as independent commodities - his conclusion cannot be accpeted in the light of categoric admission in the assessment order to the effect that the submersible pumps have been sold with the panel boards as integrated kits.

  Reference made to three assessment orders all dated 27.01.2005 for the periods 2002-2003, 2004-2005 & 2005-2006 where the claim of concessional rate of tax under Section 3(3) has been accepted by the Assessing Officer. Needless to say, it is necessary that the Department adopts a sustained and uniform view in assessment and cannot waver, taking conflicting stands, especially in the absence of any variation in facts or legal position - the decision that Form XVII declarations are legitimate and liable to be accepted for the earlier and later years, there are no justification in the officer having deviated from that view for the intervening year alone.

  The impugned order of the Tribunal dated 03.12.2007 is set aside and this writ petition stands allowed.

  ---

• 2024 (11) TMI 2
  

  Levy of Additional Sales Tax (AST) - turnover had not exceeded the threshold of Rs. 100 Crores during the year in question - challenge to amendment to the provisions of Section 2(1)(a) of the TNAST Act - HELD THAT:- The amendment to the TNAST is effective from 01.08.1996. As a result of this amendment, the threshold for the levy of AST stood enhanced from Rs. 10.00 lakhs to Rs. 100 Crores.

  It is true that if the turnover of the writ petitioner is taken for the year in entirety, it would be less than a sum of Rs. 100 Crores. However for the purpose of assessment, the assessing authority is bound to apply the provisions of the Act strictly from their dates of insertion into the Act. Hence for the period 01.04.1996 to 31.07.1996, as the turnover of the petitioner is in the region of Rs. 15.66 Crores, which is far in excess of Rs. 10.00 lakhs, the petitioner cannot avoid liability under the TNAST Act.

  Writ Petition is dismissed.

  ---

• 2024 (10) TMI 1458
  

  Maintainability of the petitions in view of availability of the alternative remedy of filing statutory appeal under Section 73 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - whether the liability of payment of Value Added Tax would include ‘service tax’ component collected by the petitioner from customers or not? - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is required to calculate the taxable turnover of its sales under the provisions of Section 14 of the Act by excluding the amount of turnover of sales not subjected to tax under the Act and turnover of goods declared exempt and in case of turnover of sales in case of the works contract, charges towards labours, service and other like charges and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. Accordingly, VAT is payable upon the taxable turnover and as per the provision of Section 3 read with Section 14 of the Act, it provides for option for payment of lump sum tax in lieu of tax on turnover of sales.

  On perusal of the interpretation made by the respondent authority, whether the ‘service tax’ component collected by the petitioner could be said to be ‘sale price’ or not is answered by this Court in the case of Ambuja Cement Ltd. [2016 (4) TMI 1399 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] while deciding the issue as to whether the total taxable turnover of purchases liable for purchase tax would include ‘Value Added Tax’ component or not. It is pertinent to note that definition of ‘taxable turnover of purchase’ is mirror image of definition of ‘taxable turnover of sales’ under Section 2(33).

  When the word “includes” is used in the definition of Section 2(24) of the Act, it is clear that legislature does not intend to restrict the definition, it makes the definition enumerative and not exhaustive as held by this Court and therefore, in ordinary meaning, it has to be extended to bring within the term certain matters which in its ordinary meaning it may or may not comprise. Inclusion of the words “duties levied or leviable under the Central Excise Tariff At, 1985 or Customs Act, 1962” and any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods before the delivery thereof would indicate that the legislator intend to include only those duties/taxes within the purview of the expression “sale price”. Therefore, the intention of the legislature to exclude the service tax component from the ambit of sale price is clear, as otherwise, the same would also have found place in the categories enumerated thereunder.

  The impugned orders passed by the respondent authority setting aside the permission granted under Section 14D of the Act for payment of composition tax only on the ground that petitioners have not paid the VAT on the ‘service tax’ component which ought to have been included in the sale price is squarely covered in favour of the petitioners and on the same analogy for excluding ‘Value Added Tax’ from purchase price in case of Ambuja Cement Ltd., the petitioners are not liable to include ‘the service tax’ component as part of the ‘sales price’ so as to pay VAT thereon.

  All these petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed.

  ---

• 2024 (10) TMI 1331
  

  Quashing of disciplinary proceedings midway, i.e., at the stage when the enquiry had been completed - jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority - HELD THAT:- There was no adversarial order, resulting in no cause of action to canvass or maintain the Writ Petition. The mere pendency of the inquiry or the Writ Petitioner’s apprehension of any adverse orders cannot be a ground to maintain the Writ Petition. It is apparent that no rights of the Writ Petitioner have been abridged, nor has the inquiry resulted in altering the service conditions. In that context, the mere issuance of the show cause notice would not confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain and appreciate the Writ Petition. In the absence of any right of the litigant being adversely affected, it is not seen how the learned Single Judge could have heard and ordered the Writ Petition.

  Appreciation of the facts is the domain of the statutory authorities, specifically the disciplinary authority in this case - the Appellant/Department is directed to produce the records relating to the refund claim, which has been the contention between the Appellant/Department and the Employee.

  The learned Single Judge has erred in taking up the role of the disciplinary authority and in attempting to substitute the opinion of the disciplinary authority with the opinion of this Court, which is impermissible. The learned Single Judge could not have usurped or pre-empted the statutorily empowered disciplinary authority from forming an opinion on imposing or not imposing any penalties. The authority to impose or not impose any penalty, as provided under the rules, is in the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority, an action that has now been pre-empted by the impugned order. The Writ Petition itself was premature in the absence of any adverse impact on the rights or service conditions of the Writ Petitioner.

  There are no hesitation in allowing the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The impugned order is set aside, and the matter is remitted back to the disciplinary/competent authority for consideration of the reply to be submitted by the Respondent/Writ Petitioner. Thereafter, the disciplinary/competent authority shall pass necessary orders within six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of the reply to the second show cause notice - appeal allowed by way of remand.

  ---

• 2024 (10) TMI 1248
  

  Benefit of the concessional rate of tax under Section 8 (a) (ii) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act (KVAT Act), 2003 - import of any goods into the State or Country 'for incorporation in the works contract' - goods imported were not incorporated in the works contract for the year 2015-16 and the goods were returned to the supplier.

  HELD THAT:- While it may be a fact that in the absence of any material to suggest the actual return of the imported goods, the revenue may have been justified in presuming that the goods imported were in fact for incorporation in the works contract, and in such a situation would have been justified in insisting on the assessee discharging the tax liability @ of 7% on the contract value in accordance with Section 8 (a) (i) of the KVAT Act, we find that when the Appellate Tribunal was satisfied on facts regarding proof of return of the imported goods without incorporation of the same in the works contracts undertaken by the assessee for the assessment year in question, the assessee cannot be denied the benefit of the concessional rate of tax of 4% in terms of Section 8 (a) (ii) of the KVAT Act.

  The pre-condition for attracting the higher rate of tax under Section 8 (a) (i) cannot be seen as attracted on the facts of the instant case where the assessee did not hold a CST registration during the assessment year in question, and further, had returned the imported goods to the supplier without incorporating any part of it in the works contracts undertaken during the said year.

  There are no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal - OT. Revision petitions are thus dismissed by answering the questions of law raised against the revenue and in favour of the assessee.

  ---

• 2024 (10) TMI 1247
  

  Levy of Octroi by the various Municipal Councils - SIM Cards issued by the Bharti Mobile Limited and distributed in the State of Punjab, being sold in their municipal limits - whether SIM Card can be treated as “goods”? - HELD THAT:- The said question is no more res intergra, keeping in view the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BSNL Vs. Union of India [2006 (3) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] and Idea Mobile Communication Ltd. Vs. Commr. of C. Ex. & Cus., Cochin [2011 (8) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while examining the imposition of sales tax on the usage of SIM, held that sales tax can be imposed.

  The question of SIM card be “goods” was left to be further examined. However, in Idea Mobile’s case , the Hon’ble Apex Court has found that the SIM Cards to be never sold as “goods” independent from services provided. In view thereto, independently the SIM Cards cannot be termed as “goods” for the purpose of Octroi.

  There are no hesitation to hold that the SIM Cards which have been distributed in various Municipal Councils for the relevant period were not leviable to Octroi. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed and the notifications dated 26.07.2001(Annexure P-6), 08.08.2001 (Annexure P-7) and 30.10.2002 (Annexure P-8) are hereby set aside.

  Petition allowed.

  ---

• 2024 (10) TMI 1176
  

  Seeking to challenge review orders 15 of the Maharashtra Settlement of Arrears of Taxes, Interest, Penalties or Late Fees Act, 2022 (Settlement Act) - refund amount for financial year 2016-2017 is sought to be adjusted against the outstanding demand for the financial years 2013-2014, 2015-2016 and 2017-2018 - seeking to review settlement orders passed under Section 13 (1) of the Settlement Act.

  Whether the Respondents were justified in exercising the review powers under Section 15 of the Settlement Act to review the settlement orders passed under Section 13 (1) of the said Settlement Act and recalculating the amount of ‘arrears’ which were initially accepted by the Respondents while passing the settlement orders? - HELD THAT:- On an analysis of the Settlement Act, it is found to be a self-contained code in itself, inasmuch as, it defines various terms for the purpose of the said Act. It provides for the designated authority for implementation of the said Act. It provides for eligibility for the settlement of the arrears, the amount which is to be considered for the settlement of the Act, the time within which the amount determined for settlement is required to be paid, the conditions to be satisfied for availing the settlement, order to be passed accepting or rejecting the settlement, power of rectification, review and appeal. Consequences of settlement order obtained by suppression and conclusiveness of the proceedings covered by settlement.

  Whether authorities under the Settlement Act can abdicate and exercise powers granted to authorities under the MVAT Act? - HELD THAT:- It is important to note that the Settlement Act nowhere provides or empowers the authorities under the said Act to import the provisions of the MVAT Act and more particularly provisions of Section 50 of the MVAT Act for determination of the requisite amount to be paid under the Settlement Act. Therefore, the action of the Respondents in passing the review order by importing the provisions of Section 50 of the MVAT Act is wholly without the authority of law and without jurisdiction. If the legislature wanted to empower the authorities under the Settlement Act with the powers conferred under the MVAT Act then nothing prevented them from providing the same under the Settlement Act. The legislature while enacting the Settlement Act in Section 2 (2) provided that the “words and expressions” used in the Settlement Act, but not defined in the said Act shall have the same meanings assigned to them under the Relevant Act. However, the legislature consciously and rightly so did not empower the authorities under the Settlement Act with the powers conferred under the MVAT Act and, therefore, any action of the authorities under the Settlement Act by encroaching upon the powers conferred under the MVAT Act would be without jurisdiction.

  Whether, on a reading of the Settlement Act, amount for considering for settlement is to be arrived at after adjusting refund of other years against the dues of the years for which application is made under the Settlement Act? - HELD THAT:- There is no provision under Settlement Act which provides for calculation of outstanding arrears of a particular year to be arrived at after adjustment of refund for another year moreso in a case where there is no such adjustment of the refund order on the date of application or on the date of settlement order under Section 13 of the Settlement Act. Therefore the impugned action of the Respondents to recalculate the outstanding arrears for the financial years 2013-2014, 2015-2016 and 2017-2018 after passing the settlement order by invoking provisions of Section 15 of the Settlement Act admittedly without there being an order Section 50 of the MVAT Act is certainly without jurisdiction.

  Whether in the absence of any order under Section 50 of the MVAT Act for adjustment of refund order, are the authorities under the Settlement Act justified in invoking review powers under Section 15 of the Settlement Act? - HELD THAT:- On conjoint reading of Section 50 and Rule 60, unless an assessee desires for adjustment of refund of one year against demand of another year, the Commissioner cannot, under Section 50 adjust the same on its own volition and even if he proposes to do so he has to do so by giving an opportunity of hearing - In the instant case, admittedly there is neither such desire expressed by the Petitioner nor we have been shown any order under Section 50 which is passed for adjusting the refund of Financial Year 2016-2017 against demand for the years 2013-2014, 2015-2016 and 2017-2018. Therefore, in absence of any order under Section 50 read with Rule 60 of the MVAT Rules, the impugned action of the Respondents to adjust refund by resorting to the provisions of the Settlement Act is wholly without jurisdiction.

  In the absence of any order under Section 50 of the MVAT Act by the authorities under the said Act, review orders passed by authorities under the Settlement Act conferring power upon itself powers under Section 50 of the MVAT Act is without jurisdiction and also there is no provision under the Settlement Act to adjust such refund for arriving at the amount to be considered for the settlement and, therefore, there cannot be any error in the settlement orders for the authorities to exercise review powers under Section 15 of the Settlement Act.

  The impugned review orders dated 17th July 2023 passed under Section 15 of the Settlement Act for the years 2013-2014, 2015-2016 and 2017-2018 are hereby quashed and set aside and consequently impugned communication dated 13th October 2023 is also quashed and set aside - Respondents are directed to refund sum of Rs. 2,72,08,381/- being refund for the financial year 2016-2017 alongwith interest as per the Act and the said refund should be credited to the Petitioner’s account within four weeks from the date of uploading the present order.

  Petition disposed off.

  ---

1 ....8910111213141516........ 1388