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VAT / Sales Tax - Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 27753 Records
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2025 (2) TMI 1
Dismissal of appeal - appeal dismissed on the ground that the appellant had opted for composition under section 6 of the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act and so there was no need to examine whether the transaction of Rs. 2,59,19,818/- was in connection with inter-State sale or not - HELD THAT:- The preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the State of Delhi is that this appeal is not maintainable since an appeal shall lie only against an order passed by the highest Appellate Authority of a State under the CST Act determining issues relating to stock transfers or consignment of goods, in so far as it involves a dispute of inter-State nature.
The preliminary objection has merits. An appeal would lie to this Tribunal only against any order passed by the highest Appellate Authority of the State under the CST Act. “Authority” has been defined under section 19 of the CST Act. Prior to 31.03.2023 an appeal would lie to the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority, but after the amendment made by Finance Act No. 08 of 2023 w.e.f. 31.03.2023, appeal would lie to this Tribunal, namely, The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The assessment order was passed under the provisions of the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act, against which the appellant filed an appeal under section 43(1) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeal) as the provisions of section 16(1) of the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act make applicable the provisions of appeals under the Delhi Sales Tax Act. A further appeal was filed by the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal under section 43(2) the Delhi Sales Tax Act. The said appeal was dismissed by order dated 30.06.2014.
The order dated 30.06.2014 was certainly not passed by the Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of the CST Act - the appellant did have a remedy against the order dated 30.06.2014 of the Appellate Tribunal under section 45 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act by requiring the Appellate Tribunal to refer the matter to the High Court on any question of law arising out of such order, but that remedy was not exercised by the appellant and instead this appeal was filed under section 20 of the CST Act, which appeal is clearly not maintainable.
Conclusion - i) The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable under Section 20 of the CST Act. ii) The appellant was held liable to pay tax under the composition scheme without deductions for inter-State sales.
This appeal would, therefore, have to be dismissed as not maintainable and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1559
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by the Revenue challenging the Allahabad High Court's order dated 2-8-2024 in Sales/Trade Tax Revision No.21 of 2021. The High Court had allowed the Respondent's revision application, holding that the Notification dated 10-8-2017 granting concessional tax rates applies to all industrial units, including sugar manufacturing units, notwithstanding the separate benefits under Notification dated 7-12-2019.The High Court reasoned that: - The benefit under Notification 7-12-2019 is confined to sugar manufacturers for transportation of sugarcane, whereas Notification 10-8-2017 broadly grants concessional tax rates to all industrial units manufacturing taxable goods.- There is no exclusionary clause in Notification 10-8-2017 barring sugar units already benefiting under the 2019 Notification.- Had the government intended to restrict the 2017 Notification's benefit for sugar units, it would have explicitly stated so.- The Commissioner of Commercial Tax and the Tribunal erred by limiting the 2017 Notification's applicability to sugar manufacturing units only.The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's interpretation, finding no error of law in the impugned order, and held that the Respondent was entitled to purchase diesel at the concessional tax rate under Notification 10-8-2017. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed accordingly.
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2025 (1) TMI 1435
Levy of penalty - evasion of tax under the Punjab VAT Act by not submitting the bills at ICC despite the fact that the details of bills are duly mentioned in the Statutory Form of Rajasthan (VAT 47) and was produced at the time of generation of information for other transactions - jurisdiction to check and detain the vehicles at the ICC premises - HELD THAT:- The undisputed fact is that the goods i.e. iron goods being transported in two vehicles were detained by the Excise and Taxation Officer (MW), Bathinda for verification on the grounds that the goods in transit were in excess by weight as was detected after weighment, and requisite information in respect of excess goods was not furnished at any ICC. After issuance of show cause notice, Shri Neeraj Kumar Manager of the firm M/s Shree Shiva Steels, Mandi Gobindgarh, appeared before the Detaining Officer who claimed himself to be the owner of the excess goods loaded in both the vehicles.
A perusal of the record further shows that the drivers of both the trucks did not produce any document in respect of excess goods and categorically stated that they have no other document relating to the goods in question. The explanation given by owner of the goods that since the TIN of the consignor firm was blocked, therefore, the drivers could not generate the information in respect of excess goods, cannot be believed since perusal of the record shows that GR No.980 and 981 alongwith retail invoices No.39 and 40 dated 19.08.2009 were produced by Sh. Neeraj Kumar stated to be Manager of the appellant-firm, after the show cause notice was issued to the owner of the goods. Further these documents should have been with the drivers at the time of furnishing information at ICC as per the requirement of Section 51 (2) of the Act as referred to above. This proves the intention of the appellant to evade tax.
A perusal of the record shows that the Ld. AETC (MW) Bathinda after conducting proper inquiry and after giving full opportunity of being heard to the appellant, has passed the penalty order under Section 51 (7) (c) of the Act.
There are no infirmity in the order dated 30.07.2010 passed by the Ld. VAT Tribunal, Punjab, Chandigarh, the same is upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1434
Denial of input tax credit in terms of Section 19(5)(c) and 19(2)(V) of the TNVAT Act, 2006 - whether the petitioner was entitled to file a petition under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 which is pari materia to Section 55 of the TNGST Act, 1959? - HELD THAT:- The application that was filed by the petitioner under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 is in time. Even if the writ petition that were filed by the petitioner earlier challenging the Recovery Notice and the Assessment order dated 24.06.2016 were to be dismissed on account of latches, it cannot be construed that the application under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 were barred. Even if the Appellate remedy is not available under Section 51 of the TNVAT Act, 2006, the remedy under Section 84 of the Act cannot be denied particularly when the law has been settled in favour of the assessee.
The impugned order dated 11.05.2022 stands quashed and the case stands remitted back to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits - Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (1) TMI 1433
Seeking quashing of FIR - prolonged trial - right to speedy trial - Petitioner has asserted that she was never involved in any illegal activity and cooperated during the investigations and had also provided all the documents to the Investigating Officer, but the facts were not presented in a correct manner before the Court - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the FIR had been registered in the year 1999 for the offences, punishable under Sections 406/420/468/471/120B of IPC, 1860 and Section 50 (1) of the DST Act and Section 9 of the CST Act along with the allegations of Forgery, Breach of Trust and use of False Documents. From the FIR, the Chargesheet and the Charges which have been framed, it is evident that the allegations made against the Petitioner are serious in nature.
In Hussainara Khatoon (I) vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [1979 (2) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court observed that Article 21 of the Constitution of India confers constitutional right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law which should be reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not fair, reasonable or just, such deprivation would be violative of Fundamental Right. It was further observed that deprivation of liberty of a person cannot be termed as reasonable, fair or just unless such procedure ensures a speedy trial for the determination of guilt of such person. Therefore, reasonably expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the Fundamental Right and Liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was further observed that peculiar facts and circumstances of the individual cases may be considered for quashing of the proceedings.
The Apex Court in the matter of Santosh Dev [1994 (2) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT], it was observed that Article 21 of the Constitution of India recognises the constitutional right of speedy trial. It was also noted that the trial was not concluded within four years but in terms of Section 245 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which was inserted in 1998, mandated that the trial be completed in four years.
In the present case, it cannot be denied that the FIR got filed in the year 1999, in which the Chargesheet came to be filed on 10.11.2003 and the Charges were framed in 2021. However, since then, testimony of 5 witnesses, out of 17 prosecution witnesses, has been recorded. None of the grounds as stated in the aforesaid judgments has been pleaded in the present case, aside from the fact that the Petitioner has appeared umpteen times before the Court and is now 71 years old and is ailing.
There is no case made out for quashing of the Chargesheet as well as of the FIR.
Conclusion - There was no basis for quashing the FIR or Chargesheet. The trial court is directed to expedite proceedings to ensure a timely conclusion.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1368
Exercise of revisional powers vested in him u/s. 9 (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 r/w Section 64 of Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - levy of penalty u/s 10A r/w Section A3 (b) of the Act, 1956 - absence of ‘mens rea’ on the part of the appellant - HELD THAT:- The relevant form, namely Form-C is prescribed pursuant to Rule 12 of the CST (Registration & Turnover) Rules 1957. Thus, a Registered dealer purchasing the goods is eligible to avail concessional levy of CST by issuing C-Forms against the purchases of goods which are included in its Certificate of Registration and are intended for resale, for use in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale. The legislative intent is very clear. Such a concession cannot be availed if the goods bought by the Assessee are not included in its Certificate of Registration and are not used in the manner prescribed in Section 8 (3) (b). In the current context, the purchased goods ought to have been used in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale and not utilized in the construction of building or for office interiors of the Assessee.
The record does not show any effort on part of the Appellant Assessee to actually demonstrate that his purchases meet the test of “integral connection” to the ultimate production of goods. It is one thing to say so repeatedly and it is another to prove the integral connection. The test of integral connection is laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in JK COTTON [1964 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] - this judgment is placed by the Appellant Assessee himself in his compilation filed across the Bar. When the Apex Court has dealt with building material specifically in JK COTTON and held it to be ineligible for the purposes of Section 8 (3) (b) of the 1956 Act, there is very little room for the Appellant to maneuver.
Conclusion - The necessity of adhering to the specific categories of goods listed in the Registration Certificate for concessional tax rates under the CST Act. The goods must be used in manufacturing or resale to qualify for concessional rates.
The impugned order is justifiably structured and rightly has set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1251
True and proper construction of Section 51 (7) of Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 - mere filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20 (1) r/w. Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002, is sufficient without filing application for refund as per law to claim refund when it is mandatory to file refund application on portal within stipulated limitation - mandate to submit E-form-501, within stipulated period of limitation to claim refund despite filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20 (1) r/w. Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002 - correctness in directing Assessing Authority to process application of refund when it was neither filed as per law nor within limitation - applicability of decision in Mahalaxmi Cotton and Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries v/s. The State of Maharashtra [2012 (5) TMI 152 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] - limitation with respect to claim of refund ought to be considered in view of the provisions of u/s. 23 of the MVAT Act or not.
HELD THAT:- The Appellant/Assessee before the Tribunal, being a dealer registered under the MVAT Act, had filed returns for the period 2010-2011 showing a refund of Rs. 4,56,216/-. However, the said refund was not granted to the Assessee. Hence, a letter was written to the Nodal Officer. The Commissioner of State Tax (D-901), Nodal Division-5, vide Order dated 19th May, 2018, rejected the Assessee’s request for refund on the ground that the Assessee had failed to apply for grant of refund within the prescribed time. It was mentioned that the application for refund in respect of Assessment Year 2010-2011 was time barred under the provisions of Section 23 of the MVAT Act.
The Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers), after relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vichare and Co. Pvt. Ltd., v/s. State of Maharashtra & Others [2015 (3) TMI 1403 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], came to the conclusion that the Department had misconstrued the legal provisions and the right to get a refund under Section 51 (1) to (7) of the Act. The Tribunal held that if the dealer has paid an excess amount than what it is liable to pay, then the excess is not the property of the Department, or of the Government, but it is the property of the dealer, who is entitled to get a refund after scrutiny of the returns. In these circumstances, the Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers) allowed the Appeal and directed the Assessing Authority to scrutinize/ assess the returns submitted by the Appellant [i.e. Om Shree Developers], in accordance with law, at the earliest.
Conclusion - The self-assessment returns are sufficient for refund claims and that the Department must process the Assessee's refund application. The appeal was disposed of with a directive for the Department to scrutinize the returns and process any due refund within six months.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1203
Condonation of delay of 205 days in filing a revision application under Section 28(2) of the Uttar Pradesh VAT Act - sufficient cause for delay present or not - HELD THAT:- The record shows that the limitation for filing the revision was up to 23.09.2023, but the matter was presented, for seeking permission for filing the revision, before the legal committee on 18.10.2023 to which no proper explanation has been submitted and even after the receipt of the permission for filing of the revision on 20.11.2023, , the revision has not been filed immediately without any further delay. In the application, various dates have been mentioned but the copy of the letters have been annexed surprisingly for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit trying to justify the delay. However, the emphasis has been made that the officers were busy in finalizing the proceedings of Assessment Years 2017-18, 2018-19 & 2019-20, but no proper explanation for day to day delay was submitted after getting the permission from the legal committee for filing the revision in October, 2023.
This Court in the case of STATE OF U.P. AND 3 OTHERS VERSUS ARPITA SHUKLA AND 2 OTHERS [2025 (1) TMI 1091 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT].] has not condoned the delay of 179 days. It was held in the case that 'The affidavit, which has been filed, does not give sufficient cause for the delay of 179 days in filing the appeal inasmuch as there are large gaps in affidavit wherein the period spent between 22.5.2024 till 13.9.2024 has nowhere been explained/adverted to despite, as noticed hereinbefore, the fact that the Court had granted only three months for the compliance. The manner in which the direction including time line, as indicated by the Court, has been taken and thereafter also the proceedings of the matter at snail pace cannot be countenanced in a case, wherein the direction by the Court only pertains to reconsideration of the matter by the appellants.'
Conclusion - The reasons provided by the revisionist were insufficient to justify the delay. As a result, the delay condonation application was dismissed, leading to the dismissal of the revision application itself.
The instant revision fails as no proper explanation has been submitted for condoning the delay in filing the instant revision, hence the delay condonation application is rejected.
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2025 (1) TMI 1147
Challenge to impugned assessment order as well as the rectification order - rejection of rectification application on the ground that there was no apparent mistake on the record and the grounds in the Rectification Application were actually the grounds of Appeal and not grounds for Rectification - HELD THAT:- In the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that for the assessment year 2015-16, a show cause notice was issued to the Petitioner on 12th March 2020 fixing a hearing of the case on 23rd March 2020. It is also not in dispute that by 23rd March 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the entire country was under lock-down. Once this is the case, it was impossible for the Petitioner to attend the hearing that was fixed on 23rd March 2020. Despite this, Respondent No.3 has proceeded ahead and passed the impugned assessment order. Looking at the peculiar facts of the present case we have no hesitation in holding that the assessment order has been passed in complete breach of the principles of natural justice.
There are considerable force in the arguments canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner that the impugned assessment order be set aside and the matter be remanded back to the 3rd Respondent for re-adjudicating the show cause notice dated 12th March 2020 after the Petitioner is given an opportunity to file a reply to the show cause notice as well as a personal hearing in the matter.
Conclusion - The assessment order has been passed in complete breach of the principles of natural justice. Matter remanded back to Respondent No.3 for re-adjudication.
Petition disposed off by way of remand.
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2025 (1) TMI 1091
Seeking condonation of delay of 179 days in filing the appeal - sufficient cause for delay or not - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the affidavit would indicate that the appellants, after passage of over four months, whereas in the order dated 22.5.2024 three months time was granted for complying with the direction, for the first time found it appropriate to seek opinion of the Chief Standing Counsel regarding filing of the appeal. As to what transpired after passing of the order dated 22.5.2024 till 11.9.2024, when the opinion was sought, no indication, whatsoever, has been made. The opinion was immediately tendered on 14.9.2024 by the office of the Chief Standing Counsel whereafter also the appeal has been filed on 13.12.2024, i.e., after three months from the date the opinion was tendered. The said period apparently has been consumed in seeking opinion first by the Secretary from the Special Secretary, Secondary Education and again by the Upper Secretary from the Special Secretary Secondary Education and once the permission was granted on 20.11.2024 also, about 25 days have been taken in filing the appeal.
The affidavit, which has been filed, does not give sufficient cause for the delay of 179 days in filing the appeal inasmuch as there are large gaps in affidavit wherein the period spent between 22.5.2024 till 13.9.2024 has nowhere been explained/adverted to despite, as noticed hereinbefore, the fact that the Court had granted only three months for the compliance. The manner in which the direction including time line, as indicated by the Court, has been taken and thereafter also the proceedings of the matter at snail pace cannot be countenanced in a case, wherein the direction by the Court only pertains to reconsideration of the matter by the appellants.
Conclusion - The appellants failed to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for the delay, noting the slow pace of proceedings and lack of adherence to the court's timeline.
Thus, no case for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is made out. The application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1030
Recovery of arrears of tax due for the Assessment Year 2014-15 to 2016-17 - petitioner submits that Form-F which has been filed along with counter statement by the respondents is based on a forged signature of both the writ petitioner and his wife - liability of petitioner and his wife for the tax arrears of the petitioner's estranged son-in-law based on documents alleged to contain forged signatures - HELD THAT:- Form – F dated 12.04.2013, has been executed in front of Advocate & Notary from Villupuram namely M/s.Lion M.Pandurangan. It bears the notarial seal and signature of the said Notary dated 22.04.2013. The variance in the date of Form-F as 12.04.2013 and the date of the notarial seal and signature as 22.04.2013 indicates that the said documents was not executed in presence of the said Advocate & Notary. The signature of the deceased petitioner and his wife are also in variance with the other documents which have been produced before this Court which are stated to be genuine documents where the deceased petitioner and his wife S.Selvi have affixed their signature. The signature in Power of Attorney dated 15.03.1996 bears the signature of the deceased petitioner as a witness. It is in variance with the signature in Form-F dated 12.04.2013 which has been duly notarized on 22.04.2013. Similarly, the signature of Mrs.S.Selvi in the Sale Deed dated 26.06.2018 different from the signature in the Form-F which have been filed along with the documents.
The signature in Form-F are clear imitation of the signatures of the deceased petitioner and his wife Mrs.S.Selvi. Therefore, neither the petitioner nor the petitioner's wife can be fastened to tax liability based on the aforesaid documents containing a forged signature of the deceased petitioner and his wife.
Conclusion - Liability cannot be imposed based on forged documents. The property cannot be encumbered without a valid legal basis - The procedural inaction in unrelated matters does not justify dismissal of a writ petition.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 985
Refund claim - mere filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20 (1) r/w Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002, is sufficient without filing application for refund as per law to claim refund when it is mandatory to file refund application on portal within stipulated limitation - true and proper construction of Section 51 (7) of Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 is it mandatory to submit E-form-501, within stipulated period of limitation to claim refund despite filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20(1) r/w. Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002 - true and proper construction of Section 51 (7) of Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 - issue of limitation with respect to claim of refund ought to be considered in view of the provisions of u/s. 23 of the MVAT Act or not.
HELD THAT:- The Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers), after relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vichare and Co. Pvt. Ltd., v/s. State of Maharashtra & Others [2015 (3) TMI 1403 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], came to the conclusion that the Department had misconstrued the legal provisions and the right to get a refund under Section 51 (1) to (7) of the Act. The Tribunal held that if the dealer has paid an excess amount than what it is liable to pay, then the excess is not the property of the Department, or of the Government, but it is the property of the dealer, who is entitled to get a refund after scrutiny of the returns. In these circumstances, the Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers) allowed the Appeal and directed the Assessing Authority to scrutinize/ assess the returns submitted by the Appellant [i.e. Om Shree Developers], in accordance with law, at the earliest.
The present Appeal does not give rise to any substantial question of law - Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 930
Time limitation for completion of assessment - assessment completed on 30.11.2018 for the assessment year 2013-2014 was barred by the limitation period prescribed under Section 17 (6) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (KGST Act) or not - notice not issued - HELD THAT:- It was imperative on the part of the revenue to issue a notice or communicate the order of the Deputy Commissioner to the assessee before the expiry of the original period of limitation contemplated under Section 17 (6) of the KGST Act, if it intended to extend the period of completion of assessment by a further period of one year as provided under Section 17 (7) of the KGST Act. This not having been done, the findings arrived at by the appellate tribunal agreed, that the assessment completed on 30.11.2018 was barred by limitation.
The S.T. Revision therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 839
Imposition of condition for stay to the recovery of tax assessed by the Assessing Officer - case of petitioner is that no amount ought to have been directed to be deposited as a condition precedent for granting a stay - HELD THAT:- As far as the preliminary objection is concerned, the same need not detain us any further because the same is covered by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/S. BHAMBHANI SHIPPING LTD. VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS [2017 (12) TMI 629 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]. In this decision, a Division Bench of this Court was in fact considering the provisions of Section 27 of the MVAT Act, 2002 and came to the conclusion that an order granting or refusing to grant a stay on conditions, is not an appealable order under Section 27 of the MVAT Act, 2002. This decision is binding. Hence, as far as the objection to the maintainability of the Writ Petition is concerned, the same stands rejected.
As far as the decision relied upon the case of RAJ KUMAR SHIVHARE VERSUS ASSTT. DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [2010 (4) TMI 432 - SUPREME COURT] is concerned, the same is clearly distinguishable on facts. First of all, what the Court was considering were the provisions of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. Further, after going through this decision, the fact situation in the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was completely different from the present case.
Conclusion - The Petitioner should not be saddled with any pre-deposit as a condition for stay.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 730
Reversal of Input Tax Credit on lubricant - jurisdiction to travel beyond the specific order of remand by the appellate authority - Rule 21(11) of UP VAT Rules - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority in first round of litigation as well as the judgement of the Full Bench of this Court in M/s Ram Dayal Harbilas [1979 (2) TMI 176 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], it is clear that the remand order for passing afresh order in accordance with law is an open remand order. The case in hand shows that the matter was not remanded by the first appellate authority with a specific direction as noted above and therefore, the order passed after remand by the assessing authority as well as the Tribunal cannot be said to be unjustified.
The record further shows that once the lubricant became taxable item at the hand of the manufacturer and importer and for the trader it become non VATable goods, and once the item is declared as non VAT goods in the hand of the trader as revisionist is also a trader, the judgements cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the revisionist in M/s Mercury Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. [1999 (12) TMI 829 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT LARGER BENCH], M/s Goodage Rubber Works [2003 (4) TMI 531 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] and Indra Industries [2000 (1) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT] that the circular will influence the same, will be of no help to the revisionist.
Further, the record shows that the revisionist, in its wisdom, has not challenged the validity of the circular dated 17.01.2014 before any competent court. Under the revisional jurisdiction, the validity of the circular cannot be tested.
Conclusion - The court established that an open remand order allows for a fresh determination of issues without specific restrictions, and the classification of goods impacts their VAT status and ITC claims.
Revision dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 668
Contempt petition alleging disobedience of the judgment ALOK CHITRA MANDIR VERSUS DY. COMMISSIONER (ADMN.) & ORS [2014 (4) TMI 1329 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] - application of the petitioner under Rule 32 of the Rajasthan Entertainment & Advertisement Tax Rules, 1957 - validity of Section 9A of the Entertainment Tax Act, 1957 upheld - HELD THAT:- A bare perusal of Court vide judgment ALOK CHITRA MANDIR makes it clear that the Court, in specific terms, held that the petitioner could not have been deprived of the benefit of the amended scheme which came into effect from 23.02.1995 and further, the contention of the department that the petitioner would be governed by the old un-amended scheme could not be accepted.
Vide the judgment, the Deputy Commissioner was only directed to decide whether the petitioner assessee would be entitled to any refund of the amount of compensation of Entertainment Tax already paid by it in excess. The Deputy Commissioner was directed to examine the application of the petitioner for rectification of the mistake in terms of Rule 32 of the Rules of 1957. The same was to be done keeping into consideration the fact whether the petitioner had realized tax in terms of the old un-amended scheme or not, that is, whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment would come into play because of which the petitioner would not be entitled for refund of the compensation amount as paid in excess.
However, a bare perusal of the order impugned dated 08.09.2016 makes it clear that the Deputy Commissioner, in total contravention to the finding as recorded by the Court in judgment ALOK CHITRA MANDIR, again held that the petitioner would not be entitled to the benefit of the amended scheme and therefore, affirmed the order dated 05.04.1995. In the specific opinion of this Court, the said approach of the Deputy Commissioner clearly amounts to the defiance of the judgment ALOK CHITRA MANDIR.
However, a perusal of the order dated 08.09.2016 makes it clear that no such consideration has been made by the authority. True it is that in contempt jurisdiction the Court is not required to consider as to what the judgment or order should have contained but then definitely, it has to consider the directions issued in the judgment/order. Evidently, in the judgment dated 04.04.2014, there was a specific finding recorded by the Court that the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefit of the amended scheme and once the said finding had been recorded by the Court, the Authority i.e., the respondent-contemnor could not have again adjudicated the same issue and recorded a finding totally contrary to the finding as recorded by the Court.
Conclusion - There appears to be no justifiable reason to deprive the petitioner assessee from benefit of the amended scheme which came into offing w.e.f. 23rd of February 1995. The respondent-contemnor is hereby directed to recall its contemptuous order dated 08.09.2016 and pass a fresh order strictly in compliance of the judgment ALOK CHITRA MANDIR VERSUS DY. COMMISSIONER (ADMN.) & ORS [2014 (4) TMI 1329 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT].
Let the matter be listed on 10.02.2025.
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2025 (1) TMI 667
Challenge to order of attachment passed by the respondent-authority under the provision of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1961 - priority of charges - charge created by the Sales Tax Department over the property has precedence over the charge created by the bank under SARFAESI Act - HELD THAT:- In case of Partners of Siddheshwar Tax Fab & Ors vs. State of Gujarat and ors [2024 (7) TMI 1547 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], this Court held 'the charge in respect of the property in question created for sales tax dues or VAT dues is of no avail and has no efficacy in law in view of the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act. The property in question was sold by respondent no.6-Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the petitioners were successful purchasers and the sale certificate is issued and sale deed is also executed by which the petitioners have become absolute owners of the property and therefore considering the existing position of law, the charge created by the respondent State over the property in question in the year 2018, cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside and as a consequence the mutation entries in revenue records also stands deleted.'
Conclusion - The respondent-authorities are directed to remove the charge over the property in question as it is not in dispute that the respondent-Bank has created the charge prior in point of time and hence, as per the settled legal position, the charge created by the Sale Tax Department subsequently in the Year 2017-18 would not survive and accordingly, mutation entry in the revenue record stands deleted.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 666
Rejection of petitioner's claim of ITC by invoking Section 19(5)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 - HELD THAT:- It was thus submitted that the impugned order insofar as it invokes Section 19(5)(c) of the Act, cannot be sustained. - Following the precedents, the submission of the petitioner accepted.
The learned counsel for the petitioner would request that the right of the department to reconsider subsequent to the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court may be preserved. In view thereof, the impugned order is set aside and the right of the Department to revisit/ reconsider the issue invoking Section 19(5)(c) of the Act, subsequent to the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court stands preserved.
The writ petition stands disposed of.
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2025 (1) TMI 665
Levy of penalty under Section 12(3)(a) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 - Taxability of the consideration received on sale of unredeemed articles by the auctioneers in terms of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 - assessee's contention at the stage of assessment was that it is the auctioneer that would be so liable - HELD THAT:- The levy of penalty under Section 12 (3) (a), in the case of non-filing of returns, is, in our view, automatic. Admittedly, in the present case, the petitioner has not filed the returns and hence, the basis of assessment would be irrelevant - in any event, the assessing authority has rightly proceeded to assess the actuals of the sale consideration as obtained from the auctioneers and hence there is no question of best judgment assessment. This argument of the petitioner is hence rejected and levy of penalty under Section 12 (3) (a) is confirmed.
Since the petitioner has raised a dispute in respect of the period for which the amounts have remained unpaid (relating to the levy of penal interest alone), let objections be submitted in writing before the assessing authority within a period of two (2) weeks from date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Upon receipt of the objections, if any, petitioner will be heard and orders will be passed in respect of the quantification of the penal interest to be demanded, if any. It is made clear that there is no flaw in the demand of penal interest per se and it is only in respect of the period to which the interest relates, that the assessee is extended an opportunity. The reduction in rate of tax dealt with under paragraph 3 will be taken note of at this juncture and a revised demand prepared.
Conclusion - i) The petitioner is liable for sales tax on auction turnover. ii) The penalty under Section 12(3)(a) is confirmed due to non-filing of returns.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 625
Constitutional validity of sub-clause (B) of Clause 14 “Excise Duty-Civil” of Excise Policy 2019-20 (Excise Policy 2019-20) to the extent it provides for the levy of excise duty at the rate of Rs. 10 per litre in respect of rectified spirit/alcohol and denatured spirit used in medicinal and toiletry preparations, other than in manufacture of liquor - legislative competence of Jammu and Kashmir to impose a levy of excise duty on the rectified spirit etc. for use in medicinal and toiletry preparations and also that the raw material procured by the petitioners i.e rectified spirit etc. - imposition of excise duty on these substances amounts to double taxation or not.
Legislative competence of Jammu and Kashmir to impose a levy of excise duty on the rectified spirit etc. for use in medicinal and toiletry preparations and also that the raw material procured by the petitioners i.e rectified spirit etc. - HELD THAT:- The State Excise Act was indisputably within the legislative competence of the State when it was enacted and continues to remain so even as on date. Otherwise also, there is no challenge to the vires of the State Excise Act. The impugned clause in the policy has been framed by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir in the exercise of powers vested in it under Section 16, read with Section 5, of the State Excise Act. So long as we do not find any fault with the State Excise Act, and in particular, with Sections 5 and 16 thereof, the impugned clause in the Excise Policy cannot be declared bad and unconstitutional for being beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature.
There are substance in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners who are not using in their units rectified spirit/alcohol and denatured spirit etc. for medicinal and toiletry preparations. This so because the impugned clause itself makes it clear beyond any doubt that what is sought to be levied as the duty of excise at the rate of 10 per litre is only on the rectified spirit/alcohol/denatured spirit imported in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for its use in medicinal and toiletry preparations. The expression “other than in manufacture of liquor” is redundant appendix and needs to be ignored. As a matter of fact, the import of rectified spirit/alcohol/denatured spirit in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for its use in the manufacture of liquor or any other preparations, excluding the medicinal and toiletry preparations, is not leviable under the impugned clause with the duty of excise at the rate of 10 per litre.
Whether the imposition of excise duty on these substances amounts to double taxation, given the applicability of the Goods and Services Tax (GST)? - HELD THAT:- May be it is true that rectified spirit, alcohol, or denatured spirit supplied in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (now UT of J&K) from other State/States is exigible to tax under Section 7 of IGST Act, 2017, except when used for the manufacture of liquor fit for human consumption. However, that does not take away the power of the State to levy a duty of excise under Section 16 of the State Excise Act when such goods are imported by a unit for use in medicinal and toilet preparations. The IGST is charged by the Center on inter-State supply of goods and services, as per nature of such goods or services, as the case may be. The duty of excise impugned is on the quantity of goods imported for a particular use. The two levies, being legally distinct, can be levied simultaneously, and such a levy is not hit by the double taxation, as urged by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.
Conclusion - i) The legislative competence of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to impose excise duty on rectified spirit/alcohol/denatured spirit used in medicinal and toiletry preparations was upheld. ii) The excise duty and GST are distinct levies and can coexist without constituting double taxation.
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