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FEMA - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 5 of 5 Records
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2015 (12) TMI 1695 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE, NEW DELHI
Guilty of contraventions of Section 8(3) and 8(4) of FERA, 1973 r/w Section 49(3) and 49(4) of FEMA, 1999 - Penalty imposed - whether there has been no lapse/FERA violations on the part of the company and the transactions were wrongly reported in BFE due to oversight of the bankers of the company? - Enforcement Directorate creation - Held that:- We see no reason to remand the matter back to Adjudicating Authority at this stage when parties have been litigating for a period of more than 11 years. The genuineness of the papers filed by the appellants as proof of due compliance of the requirement of filing of the exchange control copies of the bills of entry with the authorized dealer within time has not been disputed by the respondents. The appeals are continuation of the trial proceedings. We are convinced on the basis of evidence filed by the appellants in the instant appeals that they had timely submitted the exchange control copies of Bills of Entries to the respective authorized dealers (banks). We are also convinced with argument that it was negligence/mistake on the part of the authorized dealers in not reporting the due compliances to the RBI and instead furnished wrong information. The basic fault appears to us on the part of the banks but since they are neither parties in these appeals nor they have been afforded any opportunity to place their version before the Tribunal, therefore, we are not making any observations against them.
We would like to emphasize that Enforcement Directorate has not been created for the sole purpose of prosecuting the matters of alleged violations under FERA/FEMA but they are duty bound to assist the Tribunal and the Courts by placing the correct facts before them on the principle of fair play so that the parties get fair justice and the faith of the parties is not eroded from the judicial system. The Enforcement Directorate is an organ in the system of dispensation of justice and the way the matters in which no case was made out as per the communication of the RBI was persuaded, without discloser of the contents of the communication received by the Enforcement Directorate, the appellants had to suffer not only in terms of expenditure that might have been incurred in the litigation but also wastage of lot of valuable time of the appellants, Tribunal and Courts. The expenses incurred in litigation by the appellants may run perhaps in lakhs of rupees. However, we think it appropriate that for the failure to place the communication before the Tribunal and convey the contents in time the respondents be imposed a token costs in all the appeals for their conduct.
In view of the above discussions the appeals deserve to be allowed with costs.
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2015 (12) TMI 1527 - SUPREME COURT
Detention orders under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 - non opportunity to assail the order of his detention - Held that:- In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is apparent, that the order of detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act was passed on 11.6.1976. Immediately after the passing of the aforesaid order, on the same day, the Government of Gujarat issues a declaration under Section 12A, with reference to the detention of the appellant. Again, on the lifting of the emergency on 21.3.1977, the declaration under Section 12A ceased to be operative, with reference to the detention of the appellant. At the beginning of the order of detention, and at the time of revocation thereof, whilst the detention order subsisted only within the limited scope of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act read with Section 12A thereof, there was really no occasion for the appellant to assail the same thereafter, on any of the grounds as may have been available to him.
We are satisfied, that in the facts and circumstances of this case, specially the position highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant, as has been noticed hereinabove, the appellant had no occasion whatsoever to challenge to the order of his detention, on the grounds available to him, while the detention order subsisted under the limited scope of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act read with Section 12A thereof after 21.3.1977, as the order under Section 3 could not have been the subject matter of challenge as the detenu was released on the same day.
In the present controversy, the appellant had no opportunity whatsoever to assail the order of his detention, after his release. As soon as the declaration under Section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act was revoked, the appellant was ordered to be released. His release undoubtedly was a release from detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.
In the above view of the matter, we are of the view, that the determination rendered by the High Court in not allowing the appellant to raise a challenge to the order of his detention dated 11.6.1976, was wholly unjustified. The order passed by the High Court is therefore liable to be set aside. The same is accordingly hereby set aside. The appellant is relegated back to the High Court, so as to enable him to press his claim, on the grounds as may be available to him (to assail the order of his detention dated 11.6.1976). It is only after the determination of the High Court, that it will be open to the authorities to proceed with the action taken against the appellant under Section 6 of the SAFEMA Act, and that too, if the appellant fails in his attempt, to successfully assail the order of his detention.
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2015 (12) TMI 1294 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Violation of Section 23 (1) read with Section 4 (1) FCRA, 1976 - Petitioner received funds without obtaining prior permission of the Central Government - Held that:- Foreign entities through whom such funds were sent were holding the same on behalf of his father. To this effect, Mr. Vipin Khanna made a statement dated 11.07.2006, whereby stated that these funds were sent on his instructions to the petitioner. Moreover, vide statement dated 13.04.2007, New Heaven Nominees’ stated that the funds sent to the petitioner by way of gifts were from funds standing to the credit of petitioner’s father with them. Moreover, similar gifts or funds were also given to the petitioner’s siblings, namely, Mr. Aditya Khanna, Mr. Naveen Khanna and Ms. Vineeta Singh by Mr. Vipin Khanna, i.e., their father. The statement dated 10.08.2007 made by CI Law Trust, corroborated that funds sent to the petitioner were paid by way of gifts from funds standing to the credit of Mr. Vipin Khanna and further stated that similar gifts or funds were given to other siblings mentioned above by father of the petitioner.
Investigating and prosecuting the petitioner for an offence for lack of prior permission from the Central Government as per Section 8 (e) FCRA, 1976, has now a complete exemption under Section 4 (e) FCRA, 2010 Act and continuation of the same would amount to an action taken under the FCRA, 1976 which is now rendered “inconsistent with the provisions of this Act” contained in Section 54 FCRA, 2010. Thus, it amount to removing such action from the ambit of protective saving provided by Section 54 FCRA, 2010. The prosecution has relied upon Section 6 (d) and (e) of General Clauses Act, 1897 and contended that the repeal shall not affect offences, investigations, legal proceedings which were commenced under the FCRA, 1976.
prosecution had no right of revision against order dated 05.07.2011 passed by learned Trial Court being an interlocutory order and hence order dated 20.08.2011 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge which is impugned in Criminal M.C. No.3342/2011 is without jurisdiction and a nullity. Moreover, in terms of Sections 397, 399 and 401(2) Cr. P.C., no order can be passed in exercise of revisionary jurisdiction without notice to the accused person, as was done by the learned Sessions Court in this case, thus, on this ground also the order is bad in law. - In view of the material placed on record by the prosecution, ingredients of offence under Section 4 FCRA, 1976, are not made out as ‘foreign source’, as defined under Section 2 (1) (e) FCRA, 1976, or the offence under Section 4 of the 1976 Act has attended by the prosecution. The prosecution has alleged violation of Section 4 read with Section 23 FCRA, 1976, by the petitioner. In order to do so, the prosecution has failed to contend that the petitioner has received all foreign contribution within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (c) FCRA, 1976, from a foreign source. However, such ‘foreign source’ has been defined separately and categorically under Section 2 (1) (e) FCRA, 1976.
As far as companies are concerned, only those which are the companies within the meaning of Section 591 of the Companies Act, 1956 where more than 50% of nominal value is held by the government or citizen of a foreign country or a corporation or trust, the society registered in a foreign country would come under Section 2 (1) (e) FCRA, 1976. As far as trusts are concerned, it is those foreign trusts and funds which are financed by a foreign country. The prosecution has not even adverted to foreign entities from whom the petitioner received the funds are companies or trusts/firms. The charge sheet has simply lumped on these entities by labelling them as overseas firms/companies/trusts whether these are collectively treated under Section 2 (1) (e) FCRA, 1976. The only barebones reference made in para 16.14 of the charge sheet is that bank account of such entities are in United Kingdom and hence, they are foreign sources. However, in my considered opinion, this is not the definition of a foreign source under the Act.
Contribution made by a citizen of India living in another country (Non-Resident Indian), from his personal savings, through the normal banking channels, is not treated as foreign contribution. However, while accepting any donation from such NRI, it is advisable to obtain his passport details to ascertain that he/she is an Indian Passport holder. Admittedly, father of the petitioner is an Indian Passport holder and transaction is through banking channel. - material placed on record with chargesheet by prosecution is not sufficient even to frame charge against the petitioner. Therefore, I hereby quash the FIR mentioned above with all proceedings emanating thereto with liberty to the Central Government to compound the case of the petitioner under Section 41(1) FCRA, 2010. - Decided in favour of appellant.
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2015 (12) TMI 1245 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Power of court to review and supervise the investigations against the political party - investigations under Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (FCRA) - Held that:- Undoubtedly the Courts, in exercise of their power of judicial review, are entitled to direct investigation into an offence alleged to have taken place, as reiterated by the Constitution Bench in State of West Bengal Vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights West Bengal (2010) 3 SCC 571 and such direction would not amount to infringement of the doctrine of separation of powers but such power should not be exercised just for asking or to satisfy the ego or vindicate the prestige of a party interested in such investigation and only if find such a direction necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case/situation. - Courts would be justified in issuing such a direction only if were to find prima facie an offence to have been committed and the Investigating Agency, for whatsoever reason, unwilling to act lest investigate or if find the investigation though undertaken, to be not a fair one or when find the gravity of the offence prima facie found by the Court to be such which requires investigation by a specialized agency, to restore public faith in the process of law.
Either of the said requirements to have been met. Not only has the State/State Agency not refused investigation or a willingness to look into the allegations made in the petition against the respondents but from a perusal of the records produced before us we find the State to have, in the context of each and every averment made in the present case, launched an inquiry/investigation in accordance with law. The petitioner has also not been able to make out a case of the likelihood of the investigation against the respondents being not fair and proper, owing to political factors or owing to the investigative agencies being under the administrative control of the respondents. In fact, this Court had closed the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner finding no prima facie merit in the allegations of the petitioner to call for an order by the Court in exercise of its power of judicial review, to the investigative agencies to investigate. - No reason as to why the investigative agencies to whom the petitioner has already complained would not look into or are not looking into the allegations or would not discover the truth. - Appeal disposed of.
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2015 (12) TMI 1192 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of detention order - Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) - Held that:- Since the Detaining Authority was represented by the officers at the time of hearing of the petitioner's case before the Advisory Board, the petitioner too was entitled to be represented through legal practitioner. Since no such opportunity was afforded to the petitioner though claimed by him, he was denied an opportunity of a fair hearing before the Advisory Board, which eventually resulted in passing an adverse order. - as would be clear from Para 3 of the counter affidavit, that the officers had appeared in the case before the Advisory Board and participated in the proceedings against the petitioner whereas the petitioner was denied such facility. This infirmity, being fatal, renders the impugned order legally unsustainable.
If the petitioner is a habitual offender and has past criminal record, as alleged by the respondents, it was all the more necessary for the respondents to have followed in letter and spirit the procedure laid down in A.K. Roy’s case before passing the impugned order of detention. It was, however, not done. - impugned order of detention is quashed - Decided in favour of appellant.
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