|
Advanced Search Options
Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 582 Records
-
2011 (12) TMI 786 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... duction in the Court and without any evidence to the effect that how the said alterations in the cheques were made, were absolutely void and the accused could not have been found guilty of the offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act on the basis of the said void cheques. In view of this finding, the other arguments made by the learned counsel for the appellant now remain only of academic importance, which need no further discussion in the present case. 13. In view of the aforementioned discussions, I find and hold that the respondent accused could not have been found guilty of the offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act on the basis of the said void cheques which have been produced in the Court below and marked Exhibits 2 and 2/1, there being material alteration in the dates of the cheques. 14. Accordingly, I do not find any material worth interference with the acquittal of the respondent accused. There is no merit in this appeal, which, accordingly, fails and the same is, hereby, dismissed.
-
2011 (12) TMI 778 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e debt / liability against the accused and the disputed cheque in question, was issued by the accused to the complainant towards the discharge of said legally enforceable debt / liability, partly or in whole. 22. In the circumstances, after scrutinizing and analyzing the evidence on record, the view adopted by the learned trial court, while acquitting the accused, for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is a possible view and same does not appear to be perverse. Moreover, reasoning given by the learned trial court, for acquittal of the accused, also cannot be faulted with, and hence, no interference therein is called for, and the impugned judgment and order deserves to be confirmed by dismissing the present appeal. 23. In the result, present Criminal Appeal, which is sans merits, stands dismissed, and the judgment and order of acquittal of the respondent no. 1 herein i.e. original accused, dated 16th August 2000, stands confirmed.
-
2011 (12) TMI 774 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... court which proceeded ex-parte against the defendants under Order 9 Rule 6 of the Code. This being a position, the judgment of this court in Dhanwantrai R. Josh) & ors, (1998(4) ALL MR 509 (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case. 7. Since it is proved by the applicant - defendant No. 5 that the suit summons was not served upon her, the decree is liable to be set aside under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code. Accordingly, ex-parte decree is set aside and notice of motion is allowed in terms of prayer clause (b) which reads as follows - (a) That the Ex-parte Decree dated 6.11.1998 be set aside and quashed against the Defendant No. 5 and the suit be restored on file and the same be heard on merits Taking into consideration the fact that the suit is old and filed in the year 1993, hearing of the suit shall be expedited. Defendant No. 5 through her counsel waives service of writ of summons of the suit. Defendant No. 5 is directed to file written statement within 12 weeks.
-
2011 (12) TMI 772 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... FCI Ltd. to any other institution. The 'Company' was clearly told that Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. was keeping open the option and the right to bid for the assets of the 'Company' or when the debt was assigned by IFCI Ltd. Thus, it is not a case where it can be argued that IFCI Ltd. and Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. acted in concert; clothing their acts in the secrecy of darkness and not known to the 'Company'. The 'Company' was clearly told by Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. that notwithstanding it being appointed as a consultant by it, if IFCI Ltd. assigned the debts to a third party it was keeping its option open to participate in the bidding process. 49. We affirm the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge, but not on the process of reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge but on the process of reasoning aforesaid. The appeal is dismissed. 50. Keeping in view the weak financial position of the appellant we refrain from imposing any costs.
-
2011 (12) TMI 770 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to any Court. In the event the misuse is completely stopped in all respects, the orders passed by the authorities shall stand quashed and the property would stand restored to the lessees. 9. These orders shall apply to all cases, where the order of termination of lease has been passed by the Development Authority irrespective of whether the same has been quashed and/or writs of the lessees dismissed by any Court of competent jurisdiction and even if such judgment is in appeal before this Court. 10. The orders in terms of this judgment shall be passed by an officer not below the rank of Commissioner. This order shall be passed after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard by such officer. This direction shall relate only to the determination of charges, if any, payable by the lessee or occupant for the period when the commercial activity was being carried on in the premises in question. 57. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms, with no order as to costs.
-
2011 (12) TMI 767 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... concerned departments of this Court. 37. In any case, if the plaint were filed on 15th June, 2007, the Writ of Summons is out of time, the same having been taken out beyond 14 days from the date of filing of the plaint. If Writ of Summons is not taken out within 14 days, extension of time would have to be obtained. This has admittedly not been done. 38. It is true, as argued by Mr. Chakravarti that the point of delay in taking out Writ of Summons has not been taken in the Affidavit-in-Opposition or in the written statement. However, the written statement and the Affidavit-in-Opposition had been filed on the assumption that the suit had been filed on 19th June, 2007 as indicated in the plaint as also the Writ of Summons and the question of limitation has been raised. 39. This Court is unable to hold that the defendant has no defence to the claim of the plaintiff. This application for final judgment is, therefore, rejected and the defendant is granted leave to defend the suit.
-
2011 (12) TMI 766 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . 66. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, which have already been noticed above, the Returning Officer erred in acting in hot haste in rejecting the nomination paper of the proposed candidate and not postponing the scrutiny to the next day, particularly, when a request was made by the authorised representative of the proposed candidate. The election Petitioners have been successful in proving the improper rejection of the proposed candidate's nomination paper. In other words, they have been able to prove the ground for setting aside Appellant's election to 89-Athagarh Assembly Constituency under Section 100(1)(c) of the 1951 Act. 67. The consideration of the matter by the High Court does not suffer from any factual or illegal infirmity. In this view of the matter - and the factual and legal position discussed above - we see no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. 68. The appeals, accordingly, fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
2011 (12) TMI 762 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Judge of the Calcutta High Court has observed that learned Magistrate had failed to proceed in accordance with the procedure established by law in framing the charges against the accused. No such case is made out here. It was improper for the High Court to go beyond the scope of the prayers made by respondent no.1 and quash even the charges framed against all other accused. 19. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the impugned order has resulted in miscarriage of justice. It will have to be, therefore, set aside and is, accordingly, set aside. We confirm the order framing charge dated 4.1.2005 passed by learned Special Judge, Chamba and direct him to proceed further in accordance with law. We make it clear that if any observations made by us touch the merits of the case, they should be treated as prima facie observations. Learned Special Judge shall deal with the case independently and in accordance with law. 20. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.
-
2011 (12) TMI 760 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ered view that use of the impugned mark by the defendant constitutes infringement not only of the copyright, but also of the trademark of the plaintiff and consequently, the plaintiff is entitled to injunction against use of the aforesaid mark of the defendant in any manner. Though the plaintiff has also claimed damages and delivery up of the infringing material, no arguments on these reliefs having been advanced, I do not deem it appropriate to grant these reliefs to the plaintiffs. ORDER A decree for perpetual injunction is passed, restraining the defendant from using the impugned trademark Ex.PW-1/9 or any other mark which is identical or similar to the registered trademark of the plaintiff. The defendant is also restrained from infringing the copyright of the plaintiff in the red mug device by re-producing the aforesaid device or any substantial part thereof. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.
-
2011 (12) TMI 759 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... punishable under Section 120-B is also upheld; 165. The Court is of the opinion that the conviction under Section 13(1)(d) (ii) and (iii) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 returned by the Trial Court, against Mr. Sukh Ram was justified; the same is accordingly affirmed. However, his conviction under Section 120-B IPC is not justified; the same is set aside. 166. The Appeals of Ms. Runu Ghosh and Mr. Rama Rao, accordingly fail and are dismissed; Mr. Sukh Ram's appeal against the conviction for conspiracy, under Section 120-B IPC has to succeed, and is allowed. Mr. Sukh Ram's appeal against his conviction under Sections 13(1)(d) (ii) and (iii) read with Section 13(2) fails and is dismissed. The orders on sentence impugned in all these appeals are, for the above reasons, affirmed, and left undisturbed. The Appellants shall surrender and serve their sentences; they shall appear before the Trial Court, for this purpose, on 5th January, 2012.
-
2011 (12) TMI 756 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r to see that such incidents are not repeated in future and the State may not be required to face further consequences in future, including that of liability of the State to pay compensation and the other action against the concerned erring officer. Hence, we direct the Secretary, Home Department to examine the same and to take suitable remedial measure and intimate to this Court about the appropriate steps taken by the State ensuring that such incidents are not repeated in future. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the Secretary Home Department of the State Government within a period of three months and the report shall be submitted within 15 days thereafter to this Court. 10. In the event the report is not submitted, office shall place the matter before this Court for appropriate orders. The petition is disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute. 11. Mr. Pandya, learned APP shall communicate this order to the Secretary, Home Department of the State Government.
-
2011 (12) TMI 752 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... In the meanwhile, operation of the impugned judgment shall remain stayed along with order dated 11.5.2009 passed by the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health and Family Welfare shall remain stayed. It shall be the petitioner’s duty to serve the respondents before the next date of hearing failing which the interim order passed today shall stand automatically vacated.
-
2011 (12) TMI 751 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the 'Code') grants to the accused any right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial. Satish Mehra case, MANU/SC/1580/1996 (1996) 9 SCC 766 holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. 13. In the result, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petitions are accordingly dismissed.
-
2011 (12) TMI 738 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... duty has been estimated at ₹ 2,93,78,432/- 36,72,30,391 x 8/100 ₹ 2,93,78,432/- . 41.It is quite relevant to note here that the appellant has paid already a sum of ₹ 1,40,88,000/- Rupees one crore forty lakhs and eighty eight thousand only . According to the appellant, the deficit stamp duty is ₹ 29,559/- 1,41,17,559- 1,40,88,000 . This is the exact amount, which the appellant has to pay to the Government. 42.In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the first respondent dated 15.12.2010 and made in Pa.Mu.No.38508/N4/2009, and the order of the 2nd respondent, dated 02.06.2009 and made in Pro.C.S.R.No.1047/2008/Tallakulam are set aside . The appellant is directed to pay the deficit stamp duty of ₹ 29,559/- Rupees Twenty nine thousand Five hundred and fifty nine only to the 2nd respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No costs.
-
2011 (12) TMI 735 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rits of the allegations levelled against the Petitioners in the disciplinary inquiry or criminal prosecution against the Petitioners nor with the merits of the defences urged by the Petitioners in respect of the allegations. With this clarification, we allow the petition. 29. Hence, it is declared that the Petitioners' suspension under orders dated 10th September, 2009 passed by the Commissioner of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (Respondent No. 5) shall be treated as having come to an end upon expiry of the period of six months from the date of suspension, on account of such suspension not having been confirmed by the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (Respondent No. 4) during the said period of six months as provided under Section 56 (1) (b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. We, accordingly, direct the Respondent No. 4 - Corporation to allow the Petitioners to resume the work. 30. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to cots.
-
2011 (12) TMI 729 - SUPREME COURT
Murder - Act of a person of unsound mind - Conviction for offence punishable under Sections 302, 295 and 449 of the IPC - defence of insanity - suffering from Epilepsy - HC acquitted of all the offences - ''mens rea'' - respondent abruptly hurled a stone on head of Pujari Tulsi Das (now deceased) resulting into his instantaneous death - he also damaged the idol and other properties of the temple - This all was unprovoked.
HELD THAT:- To commit a criminal offence, mens rea is generally taken to be an essential element of crime. It is said furiosus nulla voluntus est. In other words, a person who is suffering from a mental disorder cannot be said to have committed a crime as he does not know what he is doing. For committing a crime, the intention and act both are taken to be the constituents of the crime, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Every normal and sane human being is expected to possess some degree of reason to be responsible for his/her conduct and acts unless contrary is proved. But a person of unsound mind or a person suffering from mental disorder cannot be said to possess this basic norm of human behavior.
Once, a person is found to be suffering from mental disorder or mental deficiency, which takes within its ambit hallucinations, dementia, loss of memory and self-control, at all relevant times by way of appropriate documentary and oral evidence, the person concerned would be entitled to seek resort to the general exceptions from criminal liability.
Epileptic Psychosis is a progressing disease and its effects have appropriately been described in the text book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi, 24th Ed. 2011 - “Epileptic Psychosis – Epilepsy usually occurs from early infancy, though it may occur at any period of life. Individuals, who have had epileptic fits for years, do not necessarily show any mental aberration, but quite a few of them suffer from mental deterioration. Religiousity is a marked feature in the commencement, but the feeling is only superficial. Such patients are peevish, impulsive and suspicious, and are easily provoked to anger on the slightest cause.''
According to the statement of this doctor and the prescription, the respondent was suffering from Epilepsy and while describing post epileptic insanity, this witness stated that after the epileptic attack, a patient behaves like an insane person and he is unable to recognise even the known persons and relatives. During this time, there is a memory loss and the patient can commit any offence.
Another witness who was produced by the defence was DW-1, Bhanwar Lal, the brother of the respondent. According to this witness, the respondent was suffering from mental disorder since 1993. He stated that when he gets the fits of insanity, he can fight with anybody, hit anybody and even throw articles lying around him. This oral and documentary evidence clearly shows that the respondent was suffering from epileptic attacks just prior to the incident. Immediately prior to the occurrence, he had behaved violently and had caused injuries to his own family members. After committing the crime, he was arrested by the Police and even thereafter, he was treated for insanity, while in jail.
Thus, there is evidence to show continuous mental sickness of the respondent. He not only caused death of the deceased but also on the very same day injured and caused hurt to his family members including DW-1. His statement made under Section 313 Cr.PC is fully corroborated by oral and documentary evidence of DW-2 and Ext. D-3 and D-4. Though, the High Court has not discussed this evidence in great detail, but this being an admissible piece of evidence, can always be relied upon to substantiate the conclusion and findings recorded by the High Court.
Ex-facie, injuries do not appear to be so vital that they could have resulted in the death of the deceased, but this fact was required to be proved by expert evidence. There is no documentary or oral evidence to prove the fact that the injuries caused by the respondent to the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Therefore, we find no error in the judgment under appeal. Thus, we have no hesitation in dismissing the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
-
2011 (12) TMI 723 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed a suit for specific performance. The Court is to consider the balance of convenience also while passing order of reference, while doing so in this case we hold that it is not a case where domestic forum would be appropriate as one of the parties to this suit would be deprived of having access to justice, but in the Court in this suit all parties are free to approach whatever way they like the Court for justice. In view of discussion as above we are unable to sustain the judgment and order of the learned Trial Judge passed under section 8 of the Act. Accordingly we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Trial Judge. We think that this suit as well as the suit filed by Mimani for specific performance of the agreement for sale ought to be heard analogously. 32. Thus the appeal is allowed. Stay of operation of this judgment and order is prayed for. We grant stay for a period of four weeks after the Christmas Vacation. Joymalya Bagchi, J. I agree.
-
2011 (12) TMI 722 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the detenu and the date of approval by the State Government. In this case, the representation sent by the detenu was received by the detaining authority on 28.7.2011 and the approval of the detention order was made on 29.7.2011. It was rightly contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that once the approval of the detention order is made by the Government, there is no obligation on the part of the detaining authority to consider the representation and it is only for the government to consider the said representation. The representation being received on 28.7.2011 by the detaining authority and the approval of the detention order being made on 29.7.2011 and there being not even a single day gap between these two dates, we are to hold that there is no violation of the Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. For the above said reasons, the impugned order of detention clamped on the detenu is not liable to be set aside and the habeas corpus petition is dismissed accordingly.
-
2011 (12) TMI 721 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... up an effective defence. If a notice is vague or it contains unspecified or unintelligible allegations, it would imply a denial of proper opportunity of being heard. Natural justice is not only a requirement of proper legal procedure but also a vital element of good administration. 5. Coming to the impugned notice, it does not state the reason as to why the petitioner should appear before the Special Tahsildar except stating that the subject relates to change of khatha, when factually no application of the petitioner for change of any khatha is pending.- Hence, the impugned notice is vague and is accordingly violative of the principles of naturaljustice. 6. In the result, the impugned notice (Annexure-A) issued by respondent No. 2 directing the petitioner to appear before him is quashed. However, respondent No. 2- Special Tahsildar is at liberty to initiate any appropriate action against the petitioner by issuing a proper notice in accordance with law. Petition disposed off.
-
2011 (12) TMI 716 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... edule to the Limitation Act, 1963 dealing with suits for recovery of money due on running and current but non-mutual accounts, in such circumstances, the residual article viz. Article 113 applies to such suits. 24. Under Article 113, the period for limitation for filing a suit is three years and the same begins to run when the right to sue would accrue when claim was denied in response to the legal notice dated 26.6.1985 on 13.7.1985 but since ₹ 7,000/- was paid on 13.7.1985 and 24.7.1985 (Rs. 2,000/- on the former date and ₹ 5,000/- on the latter date), limitation would commence from 24.7.1985. The suit being filed on 2.9.1985, governed for purposes of limitation by Article 113 the suit would be within limitation. 25. In view of the above discussion, the above captioned appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 29.8.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge is upheld.. Appellant to pay the costs assessed by the Taxation Officer to the respondent.
........
|
