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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 77 Records
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2013 (7) TMI 1228 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... kers of the Forest and Environment Department working for more than five years, providing them the benefits as per our finding at Paragraph 25 above. The Appellants are directed accordingly. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 29th October, 2010 as affirmed by the Division Bench by its order dated 28th February, 2012 stands modified to the extent above. The benefit should be granted to the eligible daily wage workers of the Forest and Environment Department working for more than five years including those who are performing work other than building maintenance and repairing but they will be entitled for the consequential benefit w.e.f. 29th October, 2010 or subsequent date from which they are so eligible within four months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this order. The appeals stand disposed of with the aforesaid observation and directions to the Appellant-State and its authorities. There shall be no separate orders as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1227 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... layed by the petitioner director in the matter of issuance of cheque in question. It is true that the case was pending for long for absconsion of other accused persons but for that the petitioner accused should not be blamed. 9. In view of the discussions as made above I am of the opinion that further continuation of the criminal proceeding against the present petitioner accused will be an abuse of the process of the Court. 10. Accordingly, this application is hereby allowed on contest. The criminal proceeding being C/2012 of 1997 under Section 138/141, N.I. Act pending in the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court at Calcutta is hereby quashed so far as the present petitioner D.M. Kulkarni alias Dilip M. Kulkarni is concerned. The petitioner is released from his bail bond, if any. However, the pending case may proceed against other accused persons as per law. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order be supplied to the learned Counsels of the parties, if applied for.
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2013 (7) TMI 1224 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable. 63. Applying the above ratio in Pala Singh to the case on hand, while pointing out the delay in the forwarding of the FIR to the Magistrate, no prejudice was said to have been caused to the Appellants by virtue of the said delay. As far as the commencement of the investigation is concerned, our earlier detailed discussion discloses that there was no dearth in that aspect. In such circumstances we do not find any infirmity in the case of the prosecution on that score. In fact the above decision was subsequently followed in Sarwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, Anil Rai v. State of Bihar and Aqeel Ahmad v. State of U.P. 31. Having regard to our above conclusions, we do not find any merit in these appeals. The appeals fail and the same are dismissed. 32. The Appellants are on bail. The bail bonds stand cancelled and they shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of sentence, if any.
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2013 (7) TMI 1222 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , who never moved before any court of law and had to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, they shall not be entitled for arrears of salary. However, in view of Regulation 31 they will deem to have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. In their case, the Appellants shall treat the age of superannuation at 60 years, fix the pay accordingly and re-fix the retirement benefits like pension, gratuity etc. On such calculation, they shall be entitled for arrears of retirement benefits after adjusting the amount already paid. (c) The arrears of salary and arrears of retirement benefits should be paid to such employees within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. 39. The judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench dated 29th July, 2010 and other impugned judgments stand modified to the extent above. The appeals are disposed of with aforesaid observation and directions. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1218 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... id not look into all these aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass orders imposing a specific penalty only. This direction of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to take a decision imposing appropriate penalty on the Respondents herein. We are confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the Respondents herein would be given due consideration by the appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav's case as well. It would be open to the Respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on the basis of which the Respondents want to contend that they should be given same treatment as meted out to other three employees. Such a representation will be given 15 days from today. Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the appeals afresh within 2 months from today. 19. Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1217 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the Division Bench in relying upon Balbir Singh s case for enhancing the value, we only modify the rate fixed by the Division Bench to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha instead of Rs.42,000/- per bigha. With the modification only in respect to the rate per bigha, in all other respects the Division Bench decision deserves to be confirmed. We however, do not find any merit in the claim of the appellants for claiming any further enhancement beyond the sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in as much as there was absolutely no legally acceptable material in support of any such claim. 16. The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for consequential benefits as per the law, if any.
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2013 (7) TMI 1215 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax returns. It is further held that By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that liability to repay unaccounted cash amount is legally enforceable liability within meaning of explanation to section 138 of the said Act. Alleged debt cannot be said to be legally recoverable debt. If such liability is held to be legally recoverable debt, it will render the extension to section 138 of the said act nugatory. It will defeat very object of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act of ensuring that the commercial and mercantile activities are conducted in a healthy manner. The provision of section 138 cannot be resorted to for recovery of any unaccounted amount. Reasons assigned by learned Magistrate are justifiable reasons. It is rightly held that the complainant has failed to prove that disputed cheques were issued towards legally enforceable debt. Hence Findings recorded by Magistrate do not call for interference. ORDER i) Application seeking leave to appeal is rejected.
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2013 (7) TMI 1214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t, where a sum of Rs. 9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of Rs. 20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first Respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid to the first Respondent by way of gift at the time of marriage of the first Respondent with his daughter, there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while decreeing the suit. 41. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored.
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2013 (7) TMI 1213 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ution failed to explain the grievous injuries found on the person of Gobardhan and Munshi - Accused herein. 10. This Court has laid down sufficient guidelines for interference by the superior court against the order of acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances to interfere and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the Accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. 11. We have considered and examined the matter most minutely. Applying the parameters of interference against the order of acquittal, we are of the considered opinion that no interference is called for. This appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1212 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lable warrants having been withdrawn, the Petitioner shall personally escort Respondent No. 7 and Anand from India to the USA. 32. With these observations, the judgment of the High Court is upheld and the Criminal Appeals No. 934-936 of 2013 @ SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10606-10608 of 2010 are hereby dismissed. 33. Before parting with this order, we may also notice here that the Respondent (husband) filed a Criminal Appeal No. 937 of 2013 @ SLP (Crl.) No. 3335 of 2012, challenging the order dated 23rd December, 2011 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. As noticed earlier, the aforesaid order was passed in the criminal petition filed by the Respondent husband, seeking quashing of the criminal complaint filed by the Appellant/wife against the Respondent himself and his parents under Sections 498-A, 506 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Since no arguments were advanced in the aforesaid matter, let this appeal be listed for arguments separately.
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2013 (7) TMI 1211 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er relief claimed, is of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from dealing in the properties mentioned in the plaint. As far as the properties with respect to which the three agreements-cum-bayana rasid are stated to have been executed, the plaintiffs in the plaint itself admit the said properties to have since changed hands; the subsequent purchasers have not been impleaded; the claim for injunction against the defendants with respect to such properties is therefore utterly misconceived. As far as the property subject matter of Sale Deed, cancellation whereof is sought is concerned, once the plaintiffs have been held to be not entitled to the relief of cancellation, the question of the plaintiffs being entitled to the relief of injunction with respect to the said property does not arise. 16. The suit thus, in so far as against the defendants no. 1&2 also, is found to be not maintainable and is dismissed; however in the facts no costs. Decree sheet be drawn up.
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2013 (7) TMI 1206 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... after his birth defendant no. 2 could have alienated the property only as Karta for legal necessity. It is nobody’s case that defendant no. 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as Karta for any legal necessity. Hence, the sale deeds and the release deed executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of entire coparcenary property are illegal, null and void. However, in respect of the property which would have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of execution of sale-deeds and release deed, the parties can work out their remedies in appropriate proceeding. In view of what we have observed above, the view taken by the lower appellate court as affirmed by the High Court is erroneous in law. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court as affirmed by the High Court and restore that of the trial court with the liberty aforementioned. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1201 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions made by learned counsel for the parties and bare perusal of the order reveals that the application has been rejected by the trial Court on the ground of there being no scientific method for determining the age of the ink upon the cheques. Perusal of the order does not reveal the basis on which the said observation was made by the trial court. In the circumstances, the order based upon the same cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed and set aside by keeping the said question open for consideration of the trial court. 5. Resultantly, the impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is relegated back to the trial Court for deciding the application Exh.-55, in accordance with law. It is clarified that the issue regarding relevancy of age of the said ink is kept open for consideration by the trial Court. The trial Court is further directed to decide the proceeding as expeditiously as possible. Rule made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1194 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are of the view that the interest would be revenue receipt and therefore income. There is no exception provided in respect of interest on compensation payable under the Act. The only exception of the nature is seen provided under clause (ix) of sub-section (3) which we have already alluded to. Therefore, whatever may have been held by this court in the context of the question as to the prerequisite to maintain an appeal under S. 30, we would think that as far as the liability to deduct tax in so far as the interest is concerned it to be treated as revenue receipt and the appellant was liable to deduct tax on the interest. In such circumstances, the upshot of the above discussion is as follows - The appeal is meritless and it is dismissed. The appellant was justified in deducting tax on the interest portion under S. 194A of the Income Tax Act. The appellant will not be liable to pay that amount from out of the amount ordered by the Commissioner to the claimant under the award.
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2013 (7) TMI 1192 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ut it was recorded in full. Mr. Sanjanwala, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand, submits that the law laid down in Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah and Anr. v. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal and Anr. (AIR 2011 SC 3076) (supra) be followed. 4. We have perused the notes of evidence which are produced on record. They clearly show that the evidence in this case was recorded in full and not in a summary manner. That being so, we cannot but accept the sub-mission of Mr. Ahmadi. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mehsana, to proceed hereafter from the stage where it is pending now. As far as the application of the Respondents for adding some other person to the complaint is concerned, we are not inclined to accept that. It is for the complainant to decide as to against which party it wants to proceed. That application will stand rejected.
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2013 (7) TMI 1191 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... employees, officers, representatives of people and other high dignitaries continue to stay in the residential accommodation provided by the Government of India though they are no longer entitled to such accommodation. Many of such persons continue to occupy residential accommodation commensurate with the office(s) held by them earlier and which are beyond their present entitlement. The unauthorized occupants must recollect that rights and duties are correlative as the rights of one person entail the duties of another person similarly the duty of one person entails the rights of another person. Observing this, the unauthorized occupants must appreciate that their act of overstaying in the premise directly infringes the right of another. No law or directions can entirely control this act of disobedience but for the self realization among the unauthorized occupants. The matter is disposed of with the above terms and no order is required in I. As for impleadment and intervention.
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2013 (7) TMI 1188 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the principles laid down by this Court in para. 13 of the judgment in Jimesh Jose v. State of Kerala and Others, 2013(1) KHC 49. 30. However, the materials before this Court show that following the last prejudicial act which took place on 23.10.12, Ext. P5 report was made by the sponsoring authority on 30.11.12 and further reports were made by him on 22.1.13 and 8.2.13. It was thereafter that the detention order was passed on 16.2.13. Further the affidavit filed by the 1st respondent shows that it took time for the authority to apply his mind to all relevant aspects of the matter and pass an order. Therefore, we are of the view that the delay, if at all, stands explained in this case and for that reason, this contention does not merit acceptance. 31. In the result, we are unable to accept the case of the petitioner that Ext. P1 order is vitiated on any one of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Resultantly, writ petition will stand dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1187 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under challenge. As such, this application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1185 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eatures and the fundamentals of such essential processual property being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter. We also find no illegality in the direction given by the learned Single Judge in permitting the writ petitioner to redeem the house property at Calcutta on payment of fine in lieu of forfeiture in terms of section 9(a) of SAFEMA. Competent Authority shall pass appropriate order in that regard within two months from date. The order of the learned Single Judge is upheld. The appeal (APO No. 297 of 2009) and other connected applications are accordingly dismissed. Arun Mishra, J. I agree.
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2013 (7) TMI 1183 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 16A of the PFA for not adopting summary procedure. If he had, therefore, commenced the trial and carried it on as a non-summary case, his successor Magistrate had to continue the same. There is nothing in section 16A of the PFA to suggest that even in such a case, the successor Magistrate, if he is otherwise authorized to conduct the summary trial, must either revert back to the summary procedure and restart the trial from the very inception or pass an order after hearing the parties for not adopting summary procedure. Quite apart from no such intention emerging from the statutory provisions, any such view would not be conducive to the interest of justice as the trial would oscillate between summary and non-summary procedure depending on the nature of powers enjoyed by the Magistrate in-charge of the trial. We have, however, not based our conclusions solely on this factor and have given our independent reasons for our conclusions. 32. In the result, the petition is dismissed.
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