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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 18 of 18 Records
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1962 (1) TMI 92
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... ... ..... to non-holding or late holding the elections at the gram panchayat as also municipal level only for the purpose of showing that even in such a case, the operation of the existing statutes or implementation thereof has not been held to have ceased. Thus, unless an appropriate case is made out for issuing a direction upon the State to make a legislation in terms of Article 243W read with Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution of India, prima facie the provisions of the Act as also the rules and regulations framed under the MRTP Act relating to town planning as well as the land use or the building plans have not become otiose. As other questions raised by the petitioners are already covered by the earlier decision of the High Court, which is the subject matter of several special leave petitions pending judgment before this Court, we are of the opinion that no fruitful purpose would be served in entertaining the special leave petition at this stage, which is accordingly dismissed.
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1962 (1) TMI 91
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... ... ..... rs cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the Court from doing. Sri Tripathi was competent to consider when the other party raised the objection whether the appeal was validly up for re-hearing before him. He considered the question and decided it rightly. It is also urged for the appellants that Sri Tej Pal Singh, had the jurisdiction to pas orders on the application presented by the appellants on December 17,1956, praying for the re-hearing of the appeal and that therefore his order could not be said to have been absolutely without jurisdiction. We do not agree. He certainly had jurisdiction to dispose of the application presented to him, but when s. 369, of the Code definitely prohibited the Court's reviewing or altering its judgment, he had no jurisdiction to consider the point raised and to set aside the order dismissing the appeal and order its re- hearing. We therefore see no force in this appeal and accordingly dismiss it. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (1) TMI 87
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... ... ..... urt.” Thus, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act do not apply to arbitrations other than those conducted under the Indian Arbitration Act. A Division Bench authority of the Bombay High Court (Shah and Gokhale JJ.) in Savitra Khanda Boradi v. Nagar Agricultural Sale and Purchase Co-operative Society Ltd., Ahmednagar . A.I.R 1957 Bom. 178., has been cited in support of this proposition. It was observed by the Bombay High Court in this case that “it cannot, therefore, be said that in terms the provisions of the Limitation Act prevent an arbitrator from entertaining a claim which, if made in a Court of law, may be barred by limitation.” Even assuming that the claim of the Society against the petitioner is barred by time, the arbitrator can still give and award in favour of the party and no challenge can be offered to it under the Arbitration Act itself. 7. Thus there is no force in this petition which fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (1) TMI 86
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... ... ..... ive Government for which there is no prima facie justification and of which the petitioner was not even given a notice of. The action of the executive cannot be defended on the vague formula of "administrative grounds" as observed by Basi Reddy, J. in K. Venkataramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh. (7) Mr. Jindra Lal has very strongly contended that the pension given to the petitioner was a matter of grace and bounty not founded on any legal right. No reference has been made in support of this proposition to any law or statutory rules and considering that the petitioner had enjoyed this pension for a span of many years I feel bound to hold that there has been a very serious interference with and grave violation of a right which must in the context be regarded as property right. In this view of the matter the petition must succeed and the order of cancellation of pension set aside. The petitioner would get the costs of these proceedings. HF/V.B.B. (8) Petition allowed.
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1962 (1) TMI 84
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... ... ..... e was not made solely with t(sic) object of supplying evidence of the debt. 6. No other point has been argued before us. The amount of the debt is admitted. T(sic) assignment of the debt in favour of the plaintiff (sic) sufficiently proved. It must follow, therefore, th(sic) the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as claimed (sic) the plaint We pass the following order. 7. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge i(sic) set aside. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff Prokash Chandra Kishenlal against (sic) defendant Kays Construction Co. for the sum of ₹ 7,651/9/- with interim interest at the rate of 6% per annum from August 19, 1957 up to tod(sic) and interest on decree on the principal sum of ₹ 7,651/9/-. The defendant Kays Construction Co. do pay to the plaintiff Prokash Chand (sic) Kishenlal the costs of and incidental to the suit (sic) also the costs of and incidental to this appeal. Das Gupta, J. 8. I agree.
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1962 (1) TMI 78
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... ... ..... be. The matter will however be different if the District Judge had no concurrent jurisdiction with the Subordinate Judge. In such a case he would certainly be justified in refusing to entertain the application for probate. The District Judge therefore having jurisdiction concurrent with that of the subordinate judge should have at the stage at which the application came to him, entertained it and disposed it of himself or transferred the same to the file of the Sub Court for disposal. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the lower court is set aside and the District Judge is directed to entertain the application for probate and dispose it of at an early date. 20. As the respondent was unrepresented Sri N. Venugopal Nayagar was appointed to represent her case as amicus curiae. Before parting with the case we must express our thanks to Sri N. Venugopal Nayagar for the able assistance he gave us in deciding the points arising in the appeal. 21. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (1) TMI 77
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... ... ..... ris was not disposed of by the Subordinate Judge for two years and it took the High Court three years to dispose of the revision petitions against the orders of the Subordinate Judge. The proceedings were further held up even after special leave was granted by this Court in March, 1957 for nearly five years before the appeal could be heard. This Court had ordered that the hearing of the appeals be expedited and heard on cyclostyled record but the record was not made ready for a long time. We also find that a large number of documents were included in the books prepared for use of the court to which no reference was made at the Bar during the course of the hearing. We trust that the case will be taken up for hearing with the least practicable delay and disposed of according to law. The appellants in the two appeals will be entitled to their costs both in this Court and the High Court. The costs of the trial court will be the cost in the cause. Appeals allowed. Cases remitted.
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1962 (1) TMI 76
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... ... ..... decision in the matter on facts unknown to him. If, in the instant case, the decision or the opinion of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, ultimately turns out to be correct and the petitioner's own impression about his own age turns out to be incorrect, then by asking the Chief Justice to treat the petitioner as a sitting Judge and not as a retired Judge and by asking him further to allocate judicial work to him, the Chief Justice may be asked to face the peril of having judicial work done by a retired Judge. That must be avoided lest it may result in disastrous consequence to judicial administration. 19. The petitioner says that the Ministry of Home Affairs has not correctly decided his age. That is a dispute which he may fight out against the Ministry of Home Affairs, if he has his remedies. By sidetracking the attack on the Chief Justice of this Court the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. 20. For the reasons aforesaid I dismiss this application.
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1962 (1) TMI 74
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... ... ..... applicable would be Article 74. Such an instance would be where the suit is brought for the recovery of the installment that has fallen due and before there is such a default as makes the whole amount become due. In such a case, although the bond is a bond payable by installments and there is a default clause, Article 74 would nevertheless be applicable. But I am clearly of opinion that where Col. 1 of Article 75 is in terms applicable, then Article 74 cannot be relied upon." 10. As stated earlier, it is a case which is clearly covered by the provisions of Article 75 of the Limitation Act because the right to recover the whole amount accrued to the creditor only upon the default of payment of all the installments and as the present suit had been instituted within three years of the date of default of the last installment payable under the bond, it was rightly held to be within time. 11. We, therefore, find no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1962 (1) TMI 73
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... ... ..... he appointment would be merely incidental to the main purpose of the enquiry. It would be difficult to conclude therefrom that the Special Committee were holding a parallel enquiry on matters pending decision by a court of law and that thereby their action tended to interfere with the course of justice." The same, with greater emphasis, can be said in the present case. The Departmental enquiry against Gurbaksh Singh did not tend to interfere with the course of justice. Bachan Singh, appellant, was conducting the enquiry under the orders of Pratap Singh. Pratap Singh directed the enquiry under orders from Government. Neither of them would commit contempt of Court in discharging his duty. I am therefore of opinion that the facts of the case do not make out that the appellants, by their alleged conduct, committed contempt of Court. I would therefore allow their appeals. BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, these appeals are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (1) TMI 71
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... ... ..... tee, on which the conclusion of the High Court was supported. In any event, a case cannot be an authority on a point of fact, and each case will have to be examined in the light of the circumstances existing in it. In the present case, the two Tribunals specially appointed to consider these matters, went thoroughly into the question, and discussed it from a correct angle. If they had examined they facts after instructing themselves correctly about the law, a Court of revision should be slow to interfere with the decision thus reached, unless it demonstrates by its own decision, the impropriety of the order, which it seeks to revise. No attempt of this kind has been made in this case, and in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in reversing the clear finding. In the result, this appeal must be allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside, and that of the appellate authority is restored. The landlord shall pay the costs here and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (1) TMI 66
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... ... ..... ity together as a unit. The power of excommunication is vested in him for the purpose of enforcing discipline and keep the denomination together as an entity. The purity of the fellowship is secured by the removal of persons who had rendered themselves unfit and unsuitable for membership of the sect. The power of excommunication for the purpose of ensuring the preservation of the community, has therefore a prime significance in the religious life of every member of the group. A legislation which penalises this power even when exercised for the purpose above-indicated cannot be sustained as a measure of social welfare or social reform without eviscerating the guarantee under Art. 25(1) and rendering the protection illusory. In my view the petitioner is entitled to the relief that he seeks and the petition will accordingly be allowed. BY COURT In accordance with the majority view of this Court, the petition is allowed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
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1962 (1) TMI 63
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... ... ..... gly hold that when a person transfers property representing that he has a present interest therein, whereas he has, in fact, only a spes successionis, the transferee is entitled to the benefit of s. 43, if he has taken the transfer on the faith of that representation and for consideration. In the present case, Santhappa, the vendor in Ex. III, represented that he was entitled to the property in praesenti, and it has been found that the purchaser entered into the transaction acting on that representation. He therefore acquired title to the properties under s. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, when Santhappa became in titulo on the death of Gangamma on February 17, 1933, and the subsequent dealing with them by Santhappa by way of release under Ex. A did not operate to vest any title in the appellant. The Courts below were right in upholding the title of the respondents, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs of the third respondent, who alone appears. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (1) TMI 61
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... ... ..... les but on persons. It has not been shown how the imposition of this tax is an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the petitioner to carry on trade, but it was submitted that by this means the petitioner will not be able to compete with the manufacturers outside the State of Assam. Assuming that this is so, it is clear that goods which are purchased are put to different uses and if the legislature thinks that certain classes of goods should pay the tax and not others that is a question of policy into which the courts cannot enter. We can only say that in such circumstances, per se there is no discrimination. There is no force in the second contention either. In view of our decision on these two points the third point, that is, the refusal of the Sales Tax Officer to amend the registration certificate will have no force. In the result this petition fails and is dismissed and the rule is discharged. The petitioner will pay the costs of the respondent. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (1) TMI 60
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... ... ..... ld not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on the right of freedom of speech and expression. It is clear, therefore, that cl. (2) of Art. 19 clearly save the section from the vice of unconstitutionality. It has not been contended before us on behalf of the appellant in C.A. 169 of 1957 or on behalf of the respondents in the other appeals (No. 124- 126 of 1958) that the words used by them did not come within the purview of the definition of sedition as interpreted by us. No arguments were advanced before us to show that even on the interpretation given by us their cases did not come within the mischief of the one or the other section, as the case may be. It follows, therefore, that the Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957 has to be dismissed. Criminal Appeals 124-126 of 1958 will be remanded to the High Court to pass such order as it thinks fit and proper in the light of the interpretation given by us. Appeal No. 169 of 1957 dismissed. Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958 allowed.
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1962 (1) TMI 58
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... ... ..... d freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. It has also, by way of limitations upon the freedom of personal liberty, recognised the right of the State to legislate for preventive detention, subject to certain safeguards in favour of the detained person, as laid down in cls. (4) and (5) of Art. 22. One of those safeguards is that the detained person has the right to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made against him, in order that he may be able to make his representation against the order of dentention. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, it has not been shown that the appellant had the opportunity, which the law contemplates in his favour, making an effective representation against his detention. On this ground alone we declare his detention illegal, and set aside the Order of the High Court and the Order of Detention passed against him. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (1) TMI 57
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... ... ..... of the orders of the District Collector. This is hardly a matter which can be considered at this stage and particularly in revision. If the suit is not maintainable on any such ground, it would be open to the defendant-petitioner herein to raise it at the trial and leave it to the consideration and determination by the Collector, Markapur. 17. On the merits, I am not satisfied that the 'judgment of the District Collector, Kurnool, in the order proposed by him is vitiated by one or other of the defects mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115, C.P.C. The District Collector felt satisfied that the plaintiff respondent herein had sufficient cause for his absence to the date of hearing before the Collector, Markapur and I fail to see how the conclusion reached by him could be said to be illegal or vitiated by any material irregularity. On the merits, the revision petition tails and is dismissed. In the entire circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.
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1962 (1) TMI 55
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... ... ..... ished altogether by the flat of the executive Government for which there is no prima facie justification and of which the petitioner was not even given a notice of. The action of the executive cannot be defended on the vague formula of administrative grounds as observed by Basi Reddi, J., in Kakku Venkataramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh . 8. Mr. Jindra Lal has very strongly contended that the pension given to the petitioner was a matter of grace and bounty not founded on any legal right. No reference has been made in support of this proposition to any law or statutory rules and considering that the petitioner had enjoyed this pension for a span of many years feel bound to hold that there has been a very serious interference with and grave violation of a right which must in the context be regarded as property right. In this view of the matter the petition must succeed and the order of conciliation of pension set aside. The petitioner would get the costs of these proceedings.
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