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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 49 Records
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2011 (1) TMI 1588
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... ... ..... up any lacunae, as alleged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Nor will it cause any prejudice to the Petitioner, as he has already placed the relevant evidence on the record. 9. Counsel for the Respondent has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan(supra) to state that ultimately the object should be to delve at the root of the matter and elicit the truth by obtaining proper proof of facts for arriving at a just and correct decision that should matter with the criminal court. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is not inclined to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere in the impugned order, as it does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness or perversity, nor would the said order result in miscarriage of justice. 10. The petition is dismissed, along with the pending applications.
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2011 (1) TMI 1587
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... ... ..... involvement in it. Yet, at this stage, the materials on record do not reveal that the only exception - a libel based on falsehood, which cannot be proven otherwise during the trial- applies in this case. Therefore, the Court is of opinion that granting an injunction would freeze the entire public debate on the effect of the port project on the Olive Ridley turtles' habitat. That, plainly would not be in public interest; it would most certainly be contrary to established principles. To recall the words of Walter Lippman The theory of the free press is not that the truth will be presented completely or perfectly in any one instance, but that the truth will emerge from free discussion For these reasons, the Court is of opinion that the application for interim injunction, i.e. IA No. 9089/2010 has to fail. It is accordingly, dismissed. CS (OS) No. 1407/2010 The suit shall be listed before the regular Bench, according to Roster, for further proceedings, on 21st February, 2011.
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2011 (1) TMI 1586
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... ... ..... hat the Appellant at the time of the commission of the offence did not know the nature of his act; that it was either wrong or contrary to law. In our opinion, the plea of the Appellant does not come within the exception contemplated under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. As regards the decisions of this Court in the cases of Mohinder Singh (supra) and Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale (supra), relied on by the Appellant same are clearly distinguishable. In those decisions, this Court on fact found that the accused at the time of commission of crime was suffering from Schizophrenia and in that background held that accused is entitled to the protection under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. Here on fact, we have found that the Appellant was not suffering from unsoundness of mind at the time of commission of the crime and therefore the decisions relied on in no way advance the case of the Appellant. 13. We do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly.
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2011 (1) TMI 1579
Ascertain the difference in the inks utilised for different handwritings in a disputed (pro-note) document - Suit on a pro-note for recovery of sum alongwith interest and costs - whether there are differences between the inks used for signatures in the suit pro-note and other printed form?
HELD THAT:- Since various scientific avenues are available for finding out the age of the ink in a document, it must be subjected to tests as suggested by various scientists. Hence, following the ratio in the decisions in Kalyani Baskar's case [2006 (12) TMI 545 - SUPREME COURT] and T. Nagappa's case [2008 (4) TMI 789 - SUPREME COURT], and direct to refer the disputed document to such examination in order to provide an opportunity when a good material is available, to rebut the presumption as per law, by non-destructive method in this regard.
If the expert concerned considers that such examination would destruct a part of the document or the document itself, they may report the fact before the Court and the Court thereafter shall pass further orders for the proof of the facts on the basis of pleadings and other evidence. Latching the opportunity to the accused in the attempt at the stage of rebutting the presumption u/s 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not at all "fair trial". As per the settled law, every opportunity shall be extended to the party to a case to establish his defence.
In this situation, it is also regarded that it is the view of the Supreme Court that some delay in taking steps for referring the document to the wisdom of the expert cannot be a legal embargo for entertaining the plea.
Therefore, the disputed document has to be referred to the expert for ascertaining the age of the ink and practical hardships, if any, sustained by the expert shall be brought to the notice of the Court and the Court shall thereafter act according to the settled principles and procedures, in affording appropriate opportunity to the Petitioner/Defendant to prove his case.
Hence, interference with the order challenged before this Court has become inevitable, which is set aside. The revision deserves to be allowed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1577
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... ... ..... any authority was given to the complainant to fill in the contents will have to be decided after evidence is led by both parties and, for that purpose, it is not necessary to send it to the Handwriting Expert. Secondly, this application has been filed at a belated stage. No reply was given to the statutory notice alleging that contents were not filled up by the accused. The contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant that only after suggestions made by the accused were denied by the complainant, it became necessary to file an application for sending the cheques to Handwriting Expert, cannot be accepted. In my view, it is clear from the facts and circumstances of the case that the application is only made to protract the trial. I am informed that the trial is on the verge of completion and the written arguments are also submitted, as a result interim order which was passed earlier by this Court was vacated on 19/11/2010. 18. Criminal Application is therefore dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1576
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... ... ..... dated 13.12.1993. He would further submit that there may atleast be a direction for trying the said probate case, along with the present suit by the learned Single judge. We find justification in the said submission. 22. In view of all the above, O.S.A.NO.398 of 2010 is dismissed and O.S.A.No.397 of 2010 is allowed in part in the following terms - (i)The impugned order to the extent the learned Single Judge has allowed marking of the unregistered Will dated 13.12.1993 is set aside and it is clarified that the said Will can be allowed to be proved in evidence in T.O.S.No.38 of 2004, if only the same is probated in accordance with law. (ii)The order of the learned Judge allowing to mark the other four documents enumerated in the order subject to proof of those documents in accordance with law is confirmed. (iii)If any application is filed, by the respondents seeking probate of the Will dated 13.12.1993, the said case shall also be tried along with T.O.S.No.38 of 2004. No costs.
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2011 (1) TMI 1570
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... ... ..... paying its debts. It was held that the aim of equity is to promote honesty, and not to frustrate the legitimate rights of financial corporations which after advancing the loans take steps to recover their dues from the defaulting party. HRML inspite of the decision in the case of Haryana Steel & Alloys Ltd. entailing similar questions persisted with the present petition, obviously because the interim order operating herein was to its advantage. It is rather the conduct of HRML which is found malafide and in an attempt to deprive public monies. HRML for this reason also is not entitled to any equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 38. Accordingly, W.P.(C) 14999/2006 is without any merit; the same is dismissed and the interim order is vacated. HRML to also pay costs of this petition of ₹ 1 lac each to IFCI and KMBL. W.P.(C) 9662/2007 is dismissed as infructuous. CONT. CAS(C) No.461/2008 is also dismissed, no case of contempt having been made.
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2011 (1) TMI 1566
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... ... ..... to India in 2009. But, this is not correct. The very first paragraph of the grounds of detention makes a clear reference to the petitioner’s activities post May 2009 in the following manner - “… Even after his return to India in May, 2009, he continued to engage in the same businesses which he was doing during his stay at Dubai including arranging foreign exchange for Indian parties. S/Shri Manoj Garg, Pooran Chand Sharma, Bimal Jain and Satpal Jain were other members of syndicate active1y associated with Shri Naresh Kumar Jain and assisting him in carrying out his illegal activities in/from India.” Hence, this plea of the petitioner is untenable. Conclusion 33. In view of our decision on Point Nos. 2 and 3 above, the continued detention of the petitioner would be illegal. Hence, this petition is allowed to that extent and the respondents are directed to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be in custody in some other case.
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2011 (1) TMI 1562
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... ... ..... elonging to Petitioner. 15. Further, regarding the contention that Petitioner herein is not entitled to challenge the notice under SERFAESI Act in this writ petition, in the light of Satyavati Tandon's case this Court hold that the ratio laid down by Apex Court in the aforesaid decision does not apply to the facts of this case. In the instant case, what is challenged is the right of the Bank to initiate proceedings for recovery of due pursuant to compromise arrived at between the Bank and Principal borrower, as if the said amount is due under original loan transaction which the Bank can recover by initiating appropriate proceedings under SARFAESI Act. Therefore, the notice issued by the Respondent/bank under Section 13 of SERFAESI Act to the Petitioner herein vide Annexure-E to this petition is without basis on the same is required to be quashed. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. Notice dated 15.9.2009 vide Annexure-E is quashed. Parties to bear their own costs.
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2011 (1) TMI 1560
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... ... ..... And, there is no attempt by the defendant to explain away the admission save the bald assertion as to the poor quality of goods or lack of consideration in relation to the cheques. After all, the goods were not supplied subsequent to the ledger accounts being admitted by the defendant or subsequent to either of the cheques being issued. GA No. 1264 of 2010 succeeds. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in the sum of ₹ 1,55,14,191/- which will carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from August 12, 2009 until payment. The plaintiff is undeserving of costs on this application. Since nothing further remains in the suit, CS No. 2 of 2010 is disposed of without any order as to costs. The undertaking furnished by the defendant will continue till such time that the entire payment is made to the plaintiff. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be made available to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.
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2011 (1) TMI 1552
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... ... ..... he requested information, other than the RC numbers of the case, will make the Appellant privy to the extremely confidential information which was meant for the exclusive use of the CBI for the purpose of prosecution. It can be sufficiently concluded that such information clearly falls well within exemption contemplated in Section 8(1)(h) given the fact that the process of "prosecution of offenders" will be impeded if that very information is provided by the CBI at this stage. Thus, the FAA was just and right in refusing to disclose the information sought by the Appellant by invoking Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act. In any case, the FAA has taken initiative to furnish some information to the Appellant even though that information was not exactly sought by the Appellant in his original RTI Application dated 28.11.2008. We find no hesitation in upholding the Order of the FAA, with the modification of the order of CPIO, in the present appeal. 12. The Appeal is rejected.
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2011 (1) TMI 1551
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... ... ..... the outskirts of Gadag-Betegeri within a distance of one kilometer from Gadag Railway Station and the bus stand; and that there were several residential colonies and colleges in the surrounding areas. Therefore though the lands were agricultural, they could be classified as lands having urban development potential. Having regard to the partial access to infrastructural facilities, we are of the view that a deduction of 40% towards cost of development would meet the ends of justice. On the facts and circumstances, the cut of 53% applied by the Reference Court is too high and the cut of 33% applied by the High Court is low. On applying a cut of 40%, the rate per acre for the acquired land as on 6.2.1992 would be ₹ 2,95,476/- (rounded off to ₹ 2,95,500). 11. Accordingly we allow these appeals in part and reduce the compensation awarded from ₹ 4,42,875/- to ₹ 295,500/- per acre. The Respondents will be entitled to all statutory benefits as already awarded.
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2011 (1) TMI 1548
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... ... ..... or setting aside the sale does not arise since it is the duty of the Court to order resale. 13. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge did not take into consideration the above law and did not apply properly to the facts of the case. If there are attachments over the money in deposit, the auction purchaser has got all rights to recover the same from the judgment debtors. Therefore, the order of the lower Court suffers from infirmity. However, the revision Petitioners are directed to deposit the amounts, which were deducted from the auction money belonging to the auction purchaser with interest at 12% per annum, failing which, it can be recovered as a decree against the judgment debtors. The balance amount, which is in deposit, shall be returned to the auction purchaser along with the value of the non-judicial stamps said to have been deposited in pursuance of the order of the Court. 14. Accordingly the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2011 (1) TMI 1547
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... ... ..... the said fact cannot be given undue importance. 33. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that 70 kgs of poppy husk alleged to have been recovered from two persons and Vikas accused has stated to have died and as such at the most 35 kgs of poppy husk can be said to be attributed to him. 34. I have carefully considered the said submission but do not find any force in that submission. 35. If two persons are found in possession of commercial quantity of contraband in that case the same cannot be bifurcated to the convenience of accused to make it non-commercial. Therefore, the said contention is also meritless. 36. No other point has been urged before me. 37. So, in view of the above discussion, no ground for interference in the appeal is made out and finding of trial Court regarding guilt of accused stands affirmed. 38. Consequently, the appeal is without any merit and the same stands dismissed. A copy of this judgment be sent to the trial Court for strict compliance.
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2011 (1) TMI 1546
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... ... ..... y be liable for departmental action and may also render himself liable to be punished for contempt of court and the proceedings for contempt of court may be instituted in any High Court of the country having territorial jurisdiction of the matter. The officials may be liable for departmental action or punishment for committing contempt, but on the basis of observation indicated above, it would not be open for the petitioner's counsel to contend that the lapse on the part of the opposite party, if any, would amount to any kind of contempt. It is also necessary to mention here that for initiating contempt proceedings the procedure has been laid down in Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The instant case is not of such a nature to take action suo-moto, therefore, we are not inclined to interfere to initiate any proceeding against the opposite party. In view of the above the contempt petition is misplaced and misconceived and therefore the petition is dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1543
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... ... ..... ronounced today the Respondent is convicted for offences punished under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. List for hearing on the quantum of sentence on 12th January, 2011. The respondent will be present in Court on that date.
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2011 (1) TMI 1539
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... ... ..... es on charitable purpose, but it also extends assistance to such institutions carrying on these charitable purposes. It is not in dispute that all the donees who are carrying on charitable activities are exempted under Section 80G and which is renewed every year. If those donees have not utilized the funds for charitable purposes, the said amount is taxable at their hands. The donee trusts which are registered under the Act are recognised as carrying on charitable purposes and the registration is renewed every year and in particular to the relevant years. Therefore, the lower appellate authority as well as the Tribunal on consideration of the entire material on record, have properly held that the order passed by the AO is illegal, contrary to law and requires to be set aside. Accordingly, the same is set aside. Hence, no interference is required by this Court. No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal for consideration. Accordingly, all appeals are dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1538
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... ... ..... Regular First Appeal was filed for challenging the original decree that the Respondents made an application under Order VI Rule 17 for amendment of the original written statement to incorporate the counter claim with a prayer for possession of the land in dispute in Survey No. 110/1. In such circumstances, the High Court erred in disturbing the findings recorded by the trial court. 36. The matter herein symbolizes the concern highlighted by this Court in the case of Ramesh Chand (supra). Permitting a counter claim at this stage would be to reopen a decree which has been granted in favour of the Appellants by the trial court. The Respondents have failed to establish any factual or legal basis for modification/nullifying the decree of the trial court. 37. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court committed a serious error of jurisdiction in allowing the appeal filed by the Respondents. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside.
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2011 (1) TMI 1527
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... ... ..... aside inasmuch as it is not possible to say that the award did not relate to Claim I. This is a sufficient reason for setting aside the award and remitting the matter back to the arbitrator. 24. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment as also judgment dated 25.11.2004 of the trial Court are set aside and the award of the Arbitrator is quashed. The Arbitrator shall now decide the dispute afresh after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties which shall necessarily include an opportunity to adduce oral and documentary evidence. 25. If the Arbitrator who passed award dated 17.11.1989 is not available, then the parties may move the trial Court, which shall give an opportunity to them to nominate their respective arbitrators within a specified time. If the parties fail to nominate their arbitrators, then the Court may appoint an arbitrator who shall pass an award after giving opportunity to the parties in terms of the preceding paragraph.
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2011 (1) TMI 1521
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... ... ..... on-petitioner rebutted the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. I have perused the impugned judgment as well as the judgment of learned trial court and the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. as the complaint was registered as a private complaint under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and the learned trial court acquitted the present petitioner Manju for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable instrument Act against which complainant Ghyanshyam preferred the appeal which was accepted by the Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Udaipur who was having no jurisdiction to entertain such appeals in view of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., therefore, the order dated 12.10.2010 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Udaipur cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the revision petition filed by the present petitioner is allowed and the impugned order dated 12.10.2010 is set aside.
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