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Indian Laws - Case Laws
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2013 (7) TMI 1182 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... upon any latter coordinate Bench deciding the same or similar issues. If the latter Bench wants to take a different view than that taken by the earlier Bench, the proper course is for it to refer the matter to a larger Bench. 9. Thus, looking to the fact that coordinate Bench of this Court has consistently held in Kunstocom Electronics (I) Ltd. and Sunder Dev (supra) which has been decided much prior to Pt. Gorelal's case, the decision is binding upon latter coordinate Bench. Considering the facts of the instant case that not only in the pleadings of the complaint, but in the notice as well as in the affidavit filed by the respondent, number of cheque has been mentioned as 332534, in my opinion, the learned Courts below have committed illegality in allowing such amendment. In view of the above analysis, the orders passed by the Courts below are not sustainable. Hence, the petition is allowed and orders passed by the Courts below dated 24.11.2010 and 4.8.2011 are quashed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1181 - SUPREME COURT
Conflict of opinion in the decisions of two Two-Judge Benches and Three-Judge Bench - Powers of the Session Court u/s 209 of Crpc - Court of original jurisdiction - issue of summons u/s 193 - committal order passed by the learned Magistrate - This matter was initially directed to be heard by a Bench of Three-Judges in view of the conflict of opinion in the decisions of two Two-Judge Benches, When the matter was taken up for consideration by the Three-Judge Bench, it was brought to the notice of the court that two other decisions had a direct bearing on the question sought to be determined. Ranjit Singh's case disapproved the observations made in Kishun Singh's case, which was to the effect that the Session Court has power under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Code to take cognizance of an offence and summon other persons whose complicity in the commission of the trial could prima facie be gathered from the materials available on record. According to the decision in Kishun Singh's case, the Session Court has such power under Section 193 of the Code. On the other hand, in Ranjit Singh's case, it was held that from the stage of committal till the Session Court reached the stage indicated in Section 230 of the Code, that Court could deal only with the accused referred to in Section 209 of the Code and there is no intermediary stage till then enabling the Session Court to add any other person to the array of the accused.
HELD THAT:- the Session Courts has jurisdiction on committal of a case to it, to take cognizance of the offences of the persons not named as offenders but whose complicity in the case would be evident from the materials available on record. Hence, even without recording evidence, upon committal under Section 209, the Session Judge may summon those persons shown in column 2 of the police report to stand trial along with those already named therein. Consequent upon our aforesaid decision, the view taken by the Referring Court is accepted and it is held that the decision in the case of Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar [1993 (1) TMI 304 - SUPREME COURT] and not the decision in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [1998 (9) TMI 696 - SUPREME COURT]and lays down the law correctly in respect of the powers of the Session Court after committal of the case to it by the learned Magistrate under Section 209 Crpc.
The matter is remitted to the Three-Judge Bench to dispose of the pending Criminal Appeals in accordance with the views expressed by the court in this judgment.
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2013 (7) TMI 1178 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Respondent turned hostile under coercion of accused person, can seek an application for re- examination U/s 313 Crpc after five months of his examination in trial court - The trial Court disallowed the applications of the Respondents filed u/s 311 of the Crpc, to re-examine PW-9, the informant. The High Court directed the trial Court to allow the 2nd Respondent to examine himself as a witness on a specified date by its order dated 9.12.2010. HELD THAT:- The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The order impugned dated 9.12.2010, passed by the High Court is set aside. The order of the trial Court stands restored. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial. The stay granted by this Court in the order dated 7.3.2011, stands vacated. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage it was left and conclude the same expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
The permission of the Court u/s 311 Code of Crpc for his re-examination by merely alleging that on the earlier occasion he turned hostile under coercion and threat meted out to him at the instance of the Appellant and other accused. It was quite apparent that the complaint, which emanated at the instance of the Appellant based on the subsequent incident, which resulted in the registration of the FIR, seem to have weighed with the second Respondent to come forward with the present application u/s 311 Crpc, by way of an afterthought. If really there was a threat to his life at the instance of the Appellant and the other accused, as rightly noted by the Court below, it was not known as to why there was no immediate reference to such coercion and undue influence meted out against him at the instance of the Appellant, when he had every opportunity to mention the same to the learned trial Judge or to the police officers or to any prosecution agency.
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2013 (7) TMI 1176 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... port have been filed. Moreover, once it is held that the plaintiff has no right in the property and was living therein as a licencee of the defendant no. 1 and once it is found that the plaintiff on the date of institution of the suit was not living in the property, mere finding of the goods and articles belonging to the plaintiff in the said premises would not entitle the plaintiff to be put back into possession. Reference in this regard may be made to Section 65 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 which provides the remedy of dispossessed licensee as for compensation only and not for repossession. I have had an occasion to discuss this aspect in detail in a recent judgment in Keventer Agro Limited Vs. Kalyan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. and need is thus not felt to reiterate the same here. The suit is accordingly dismissed as barred by the provisions of the Benami Act. Resultantly all pending applications are also dismissed; however in the circumstances no costs. Decree sheet be drawn up.
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2013 (7) TMI 1173 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... use the operation of the said order is stayed. The dicta laid down in a judgment cannot be ignored unless the Court, after hearing a particular case, doubts the correctness of the dicta and thinks it appropriate that it should be reconsidered. (N. Rami Reddy AIR 2001 A.P. 226 2001(1) ALD 443 2001(1) ALT 438); K. Yella Reddy V. Registrar APAT 1996(3) ALT 1047). As the law declared in Surendra Raj Jaiswal 2011(6) ALD 198 would bind a coordinate Bench, the impugned proceedings dated 24.06.2011 and 04.03.2013 must be, and are accordingly, set aside. The first respondent shall consider the petitioner's representation for grant of NOC afresh in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made hereinabove, at the earliest in any event not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... there is anything repugnant in the subject or context so as to come to the conclusion that the plural will not include the singular. We have examined the use of the plural word "persons" from that angle and we do not find that there is anything repugnant in the subject or context so that it may not be read as singular. It is worth mentioning here that Sub-section (b) of Section 43A(1) of the Act has also used the plural expression "leases" and if we accept the reasoning of the High Court, the aforesaid provision shall cover only such cases where there is more than one lease. This, in our opinion, will defeat the very purpose of the Act. 12. Thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court is vulnerable on both the counts and, hence, cannot be sustained. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Tribunal is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ve petition does not mean that this Court has affirmed the judgment or the action impugned therein. The order rejecting the special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent. This submission is, therefore, rejected. 31. In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the Respondents are not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force does not merit any interference. It is legally sustainable. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the order of cancellation of the Respondents' candidature. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The orders of the Delhi High Court impugned in both the appeals are set aside. The cancellation of candidature of the Respondents-Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld.
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2013 (7) TMI 1169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 2007 SC 1721. 12. Dr. Nirmal Kumar Gupta (PW.18), deposed that 100% burnt patient can also be in a fit mental and physical condition to give statement. Dr. V.K. Deewan (PW.14), who performed the postmortem of deceased Guddi, deposed that she was completely burnt and the burn injuries were anti-mortem. She had died due to Asphyxia, due to burn injuries, her death was homicidal. In view thereof, both the courts below were of the considered opinion that the Appellant was responsible for causing the death of Guddi, deceased. 13. The defence taken by the Appellant that she had gone out of her house to provide water to the buffalo has been disbelieved by the Court. As the incident occurred in the house of the Appellant, and she was present therein at the relevant time, she could have furnished the explanation as to how and under what circumstances Guddi died. The matter was within her special knowledge. 14. In view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1168 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een held by the Supreme Court in I.T.C. Limited Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate that merely because issues have been framed, is no reason for the trial to be undertaken, if it is brought to the notice of the Court that the same is not necessary. Similarly, it has been held in Parivar Seva Santhan Vs. Dr. Veena Kalra AIR 2000 Delhi 349, Meera Gupta Vs. Dinesh Chand 94 (2001) DLT 10 & State Trading Corporation of India Vs. Nirmal Gupta that framing of the issues is no bar to consider the application under Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC. 13. In the present case, no trial on the same issues, findings whereon have attained finality, in any case could have been undertaken. 14. No other argument has been urged. 15. It would thus be clear that there is no need to call for the records of the suit or to issue notice to the respondent. The appeal is without any merit and is dismissed; however the same having been dismissed on the very first date, no order as to costs. Decree sheet be drawn up.
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2013 (7) TMI 1166 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uld have to be granted sans interest. 21.1 What is true for the respondents is true for the petitioner as well. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the prayer for interest would require examination of the charge levied against the petitioner that it was responsible for the breach of the contract obtaining between the parties. This is not, an aspect which this court has examined. Hence, the prayer for interest cannot be granted. 22. The third prayer, in view of what is stated above, has now lost its significance. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned letter dated 09.07.2010 is quashed. The respondents are directed to refund the sum of ₹ 18 Crores to the petitioner within two weeks from today. It is, though made clear that, the respondents would be at liberty to institute an action against the petitioner in accordance with law to claim damages, if they are otherwise entitled to and, if so advised. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that both the husband and wife are domicile of India and, hence, shall be covered by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. As on fact, we have found that both the husband and wife are domicile of India, and the Act will apply to them, other contentions raised on behalf of the parties, are rendered academic and we refrain ourselves to answer those. 29. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 487 OF 2007 30. In view of our decision in Civil Appeal No. 4629 of 2005 (Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini) holding that the petition filed by the Appellant for judicial separation and custody of the children is maintainable, we are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the Respondent for somewhat similar relief is rendered infructuous. On this ground alone, we allow this appeal and dismiss the writ petition filed by the Respondent.
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2013 (7) TMI 1163 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Preponderance of Probabilities - Presumption in favour of Holder u/s 139 of NI Act - Appellant claimed that respondent took loan from him and repaid part of it through cheque, rest of the cheques were dishonoured. Respondent claimed that the cheques were obtained by appellant by force. Respondent was not having balance in account so cheques were dishonoured. Appellant's claims and justifications raised a doubt on the claims of the respondent. - HELD THAT:- Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. Initial presumption favours the complainant. Absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. If the respondent is able to raise a probable defence that creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. But in this case, the respondent couldnot prove his defence thus held liable.
Decision in the case of - SANJAY MISHRA VERSUS KANISHKA KAPOOR AND ORS. [2009 (2) TMI 901 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] was humbly dissented.
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2013 (7) TMI 1162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ding availability of the original record or other evidence before the Investigating Agency shows that the delay caused due to inaction on the part of the Respondent. Therefore, in our view, keeping investigation pending for further period will be futile as the Respondent including Directorate for the State Literacy Programme is not sure whether original records can be procured for investigation and to bring home the charges. Considering the fact that delay in the present case is caused by the Respondent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is thereby violated and as the Appellant has already been exonerated in the departmental proceedings for identical charges, keeping the case pending against the Appellant for investigation, is unwarranted, the FIR deserves to be quashed. 34. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the FIR No. 10/2000 lodged in Police Station, Dausa as against the Appellant is hereby quashed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1158 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s.I to III are insufficient. It is pointed out that similar course was adopted in Anilkumar v Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. (2013 (2) KLT 944). 5. I permit the petitioners to move a representation before the first respondent within a period of two weeks from today. The representation if so filed shall be considered by the first respondent within a period of one month therefrom. All the loanees as well as the guarantors shall be put on notice and heard before the orders are passed. It is up to the first respondent to devise whatever method is necessary to conduct sale legally and realise theamount. The first respondent in consultation with respondents two, three and four is free to fix a common venue for the conduct of sale and decide the course for auction sale. 6. The coercive proceedings already initiated shall be put on hold as against the fourth petitioner till orders are passed by the first respondent on the representation as directed above. The Writ Petition is disposed of.
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2013 (7) TMI 1157 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and the lower Appellate Court have taken into account, Exs. P-1 and P-2, and the entries in the adangals. It is only when the concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court are found to be perverse, or not based upon any evidence, that this Court can interfere in a revision. Such a situation does not arise in the instant case. If the petitioners file appeal under the Act, and are successful in getting Exs. P-1 and P-2 set aside, they can certainly seek modification of the order under revision. 7. Hence, the C.R.P. is dismissed, however, observing that, in case Exs. P-1 and P-2 are set aside by an Appellate Authority under the Act, at the instance of the petitioners, it shall be open to them to file an application under the relevant Rules of Order XXXIX C.P.C., before the trial Court, and the same shall be decided on its own merits. The miscellaneous petition filed in this C.R.P. shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ss-examination has made it clear that in spite of his best persuasion, none of them were willing to become a witness. Therefore, he could not examine any independent witness. Section 114 of the Act 1872 gives rise to the presumption that every official act done by the police was regularly performed and such presumption requires rebuttal. The legal maxim omnia praesumuntur rite it dowee probetur in contrarium solenniter esse acta i.e., all the acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly, applies. When acts are of official nature and went through the process of scrutiny by official persons, a presumption arises that the said acts have regularly been performed. In view of the above, the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard, are held to be without any substance. 30. In view of the above, the appeal does not present special features warranting any interference by this court. Appeal is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d by the parties under Section 54 of the Act as also the cross objections. The parties shall be free to urge all points in support of their respective cause and the High Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced by the observations contained in this judgment. 36. Maruti Udyog Limited shall be free to file an appropriate application before the High Court for its impleadment or grant of leave to act as intervener in the appeals filed by the parties. If such an application is filed, the same shall be decided on its own merits. 37. The State Government/HSIIDC shall pay the balance of compensation determined by the High Court, i.e., ₹ 37,40,000 - ₹ 28,15,356 ₹ 9,24,644 per acre to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with all statutory benefits within a period of four months from today. The payment shall be made to the landowners and/or their legal representatives by following the procedure laid down in the interim orders passed by this Court.
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2013 (7) TMI 1133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Superintendent of Post Office was delivered on 22.5.2012 then we have no option but to hold that the notice issued by the office of Respondent No. 1 was delivered to the addressee on 22.5.2012, i.e., one day after the date fixed for hearing. 19. As a corollary to the above findings, it must be held that order dated 12.6.2012 passed by Respondent No. 1 is vitiated due to violation of the rule of audi alteram partem and is liable to be set aside. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order as also order dated 12.6.2012 passed by Respondent No. 1 are set aside and the matter is remitted to Respondent No. 1 for fresh disposal of the application filed by Respondent No. 3 for grant of certificate for unilateral execution of conveyance. Respondent No. 1 shall make an endeavour to decide the application of Respondent No. 3 within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment without being influenced by order dated 12.6.2012.
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2013 (7) TMI 1128 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ontrary to any such rule, communicates or attempts to communicate with any prisoner, and whoever abets any offence made punishable by this section, shall, on conviction before a Magistrate, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, or to both.” Thus, as per the above provision, whoever, communicates or attempts to communicate with any prisoner is liable for punishment. In the present case, petitioner was entering the jail premises with a mobile phone and its charger which he had hidden in his turban and shoe. The said articles were apparently being carried to enable communication with a prisoner. After presentation of challan, charges have already been framed against the petitioner. In these circumstances, at this stage, no ground for quashing of the FIR in question is made out. Petitioner would be at liberty to take up all the pleas available to him during trial. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1126 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... umar, Adv. Ms. Sunaina Kumar, Adv. ORDER Leave granted. Tag with Civil Appeal No. 1410 of 2007.
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